

10590


UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.


GIFT OF


DANIEL C. GILMAN.

*Greek
Demosthenes*


751
11918








Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2007 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation





P. 425
NOTES,


GRAMMATICAL AND RHETORICAL,

UPON THE

ORATION ON THE CROWN,

WITH AN

HISTORICAL SKETCH.



NEW HAVEN:
PRINTED BY EZEKIEL HAYES.
1855.

NOTES

GRAMMATICAL AND SYNTACTICAL

NOTES

ORATION ON THE CROWN

1874
G. L. L. L.


HISTORICAL RESEARCH



NEW HAVEN

THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

1874



HISTORICAL SKETCH.

PA3949.A2.1850. MAIN

INTRODUCTION.

§ I. PERIOD UNDER REVIEW. 404–338, B. C.

1. GREECE never recovered from the effects of the Peloponnesian war. The course of events, which began soon after the termination of that war and which originated in the state of things produced by it, held on its destructive way till it came to an end in the subjugation of Greece under Philip. The influence of the Peloponnesian war doubtless extended itself farther, but is no longer distinguishable in the general current of events. We may, therefore, consider the period extending from the end of that war to the battle of Chæronea,—from 404, B. C., to 338, B. C., 66 years—as constituting a single historical period. This period, however, is subdivided into two; the period in which Greece struggles with success to secure her freedom from the domination of Sparta, and the period in which she loses that recovered freedom and falls under the power of Philip of Macedon. The first of these subordinate periods extends to the 352, B. C. battle of Mantinea and the accession of Philip to the 359, B. C. throne, embracing forty-five years, at the end of which time the states of Greece are indeed free, but with the loss of the ancient Hellenic sentiment of union against a foreign foe and without any one state able to control the rest, at the same time distracted by internal feuds and weakened and corrupted by long wars. The second period extends to the battle of Chæronea, embracing twenty-one years and terminating 338, B. C. with the utter and final ruin of Grecian freedom. These two subdivisions of the general period stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect; germs were planted in the former which brought forth fruit in the latter. Hence

the two should be studied in connection. But, besides this reason for studying them in connection, the student of Demosthenes has another; although the final struggle in which Demosthenes contended for Grecian independence took place in the latter period, yet, without a knowledge of the former, it is impossible either to understand the historical statements and allusions in the speeches of the orator, or to comprehend the objects and principles of the policy recommended in them.

§ II. STATE OF GREECE AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THIS GENERAL PERIOD. 404, B. C.

2. In treating of the state of Greece at the opening of this period, it will be sufficient to speak of Athens and Athens. Sparta; and first, of Athens.

The battle of Ægospotami which was fought in September or October, 405, B. C., resulted in the capture of almost the entire Athenian fleet, only twelve triremes escaping of the one hundred and eighty-two of which it was composed. Farther resistance was impossible: Byzantium, Loss of Fleet. Chalcedon, Lesbos, Thasos, Samos, indeed, all the Of Foreign Possessions. cities either in alliance with Athens or dependent upon her, both on the islands of the Ægean, in Thrace and in Asia Minor, submitted to Lysander,—thus was Athens stripped of her foreign possessions. Six months after, about the City. the middle or end of March, 404, B. C., the city itself was taken, and the Peloponnesian war ended.

3. Athens was compelled to submit to the following terms of Terms of Peace. peace: that her Long Walls and the fortifications of the Piræus should be destroyed, her vessels with the exception of twelve surrendered, her foreign possessions abandoned, and her citizens confined to the territory of Attica; moreover, that the political exiles should be restored, and Athens become a member of the Peloponnesian confederation, under the headship of Sparta. In exacting these terms, Sparta aimed at two definite objects; on the one hand, to prevent Aims of Sparta. Athens from again becoming a maritime power, and, on the other, to place the government in the hands of those who would submit to reduce their country into a state of perpetual dependence on Sparta, in the system of Grecian poli-

tics. Upon the former of these objects, the clause confining Athenian citizens to the territory of Attica had a direct bearing. Under Pericles, and to some extent earlier, Athens had planted many colonies of citizens in the islands of the Ægean, in the Thracian Chersonesus, in the northern parts of Eubœa, and elsewhere within her empire. These settlers, becoming the active men of business in those regions, had contributed much to the commercial prosperity of Athens, while by retaining their rights as Athenian citizens and thus identifying their own interests with those of their native land they added equally to her power. All these citizens Lysander compelled to return to Athens, having first, however, stripped them of their possessions. Now, the clause of the treaty under consideration not only deprived Athens of a large amount of property, by preventing the return of these colonists to their homes, but destroyed the system of colonization itself; while the loss of her fleet and the destruction of the fortifications of her harbor disabled her from affording the necessary protection to the foreign commerce both of her own resident citizens and of such foreigners as might still have traded with her. *The restoration of the exiles* was aimed at the Athenian democracy and had for its object to place the government in the hands of its bitter enemies, who would rule in subjection to Sparta. These exiles were leaders in the oligarchy, many of whom had been expelled and others had fled from the city. Some of these exiles had served with the Spartans in Decelea; others had been in the fleet of Lysander, fighting against their country; all were now present, exulting in the humiliation of Athens, shouting along with her enemies at the prostration of her walls, and burning to wreak vengeance upon their fellow-citizens of the democracy. It was through such men as these,—and the greater part of them belonged to the most ancient and best Attic families—that Sparta hoped to make Athens one of her humble tributaries.

4. The government, which was established in Athens soon after the peace, was an oligarchy of thirty persons—
The Thirty Tyrants. the well known “Thirty Tyrants,” aided by a police force of eleven, the equally well known “Eleven Executioners.” At first, they were able to maintain themselves without aid from Sparta; but such was the fury with which they raged

against the people, that they were soon compelled to solicit a military force. Accordingly, a Lacedæmonian garrison and harmost were planted in the Acropolis itself. Thus was Athens reduced by her own citizens to the lowest state of humiliation.

The empire of Sparta embraced all Peloponnesus, Attica, Sparta. Her Bœotia and the remainder of central Greece, together with the cities in Thrace and in the islands of the Empire. ~~Ægean~~, which had been dependent on Athens. Her Fleet. fleet, increased by the triremes which were taken at ~~Ægospotami~~ and those which were surrendered at Athens, was larger than had been collected in Greece, since the Army. battle of Salamis; and her army was proportionally great. Besides, the forces of the several states under the headship of Sparta were commanded while in actual service, by Spartan officers. The foreign policy of the Grecian Influence in Foreign and Domestic politics. world was controlled by her; at the same time, she exercised an absolute authority over the domestic politics of the individual states. The great political struggles in nearly every Grecian city and state turned upon the question of oligarchy or democracy. Athens was the head of the democracy, Sparta of the oligarchy. The Peloponnesian war itself was to some extent a contest between these two parties. The supremacy of Sparta now placed the whole Grecian world in the hands of the oligarchy. The scheme of government which Lysander, acting in the name of Sparta, universally established, was called a Decarchy; a government administered by ten men, selected from the most powerful of the oligarchical families, and supported by a Lacedæmonian garrison and harmost. With the exception of Athens, where, as we have seen, an oligarchy of Thirty was established, this form of government was imposed by Sparta upon all the states, both tributary and allied, throughout her empire, and that, too, though she had begun the war with the express purpose and promise of giving freedom to Greece, and leaving each city and state to govern itself. But, instead of this universal autonomy, there was established and enforced the most grinding tyranny that had ever been felt in Greece.

6. Such was the situation of Athens and Sparta, at the close of the Peloponnesian war. Athens, without a single Summary. foreign possession, without tribute, without a single

fortified place in Attica and with her Long Walls and the fortifications of the Piræus destroyed, without a fleet or army, almost without commerce, and above all torn and distracted and oppressed by a ferocious and revengeful oligarchy. Sparta, with a powerful fleet and army, with a large tribute, and with an empire embracing almost the entire Grecian world, over which she exercised an imperious rule.

RECOVERY OF GRECIAN FREEDOM FROM THE DOMINATION OF SPARTA. 403-359, B. C.

§ III. GENERAL VIEW.

7. The course of events in Greece, during the half century which followed the complete establishment of Spartan despotism, tended towards the single point of the maintenance or the overthrow of that despotism. Both war and peace were made to turn on the question of Spartan supremacy. We proceed, therefore, to speak of the most important of those events by which the empire of Sparta was subverted and the freedom of Greece rescued from her grasp. These events were, the overthrow of the Thirty Tyrants in 403, B. C.; the destruction of the *maritime* power of Sparta by the battle of Cnidus, in 394, B. C.; the re-construction of the maritime empire of Athens in 371, B. C.; and the battle of Leuctra in 371, B. C., which weakened, and the battle of Mantinea in 362, B. C., which prostrated the power of Sparta *on land*, and brought to a close the long series of hostilities which grew out of the Peloponnesian war.

§ III. OVERTHROW OF THE THIRTY TYRANTS AND RESTORATION OF ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY. 403, B. C.

8. The first movement in the direction of freedom was the overthrow of the Thirty Tyrants, and the restoration of the Athenian democracy. The duration of this tyranny was only eight months, yet within that short period more than twelve hundred citizens were slain, one after the

other, as hate or fear or lust of plunder marked them out for slaughter; multitudes more were driven into exile, or fled; vast private possessions, the property of those who had been slain and of those who were in exile, were confiscated; and the city filled with carnage and rapine. The Thirty began with putting to death the most obnoxious of the demagogues; next, they made way with the leaders of the democracy, then with the most worthy and respectable of the private citizens; and, finally, raged with indiscriminate slaughter against the wealthy of every class, whether belonging to the democracy or the oligarchy, whether citizens or foreigners. They also drove large numbers of individuals into exile, and at length, after the death of Theramenes, by a single act expelled the whole body of citizens at once, with the exception of the Three Thousand whom they had enrolled as reliable followers. Many citizens fled of their own accord, but against these, the Thirty raged with peculiar ferocity, and even obtained from Sparta a proclamation, that the Grecian states into which they fled should surrender the refugees to the government of Athens. Confiscation and pillage kept pace with the slaughter and banishment of the citizens.

9. But extreme violence can not last; and in the present *Causes of the case, the violent measures of the Spartans, of the Overthrow.* Thirty, and of Lysander, interfered with each other and finally wrought out deliverance for the Athenian people. 1. The injustice and arrogance of the Spartans had alienated their allies and made them less hostile to Athens. All the booty which had been taken in the latter years of the war, and the large sums which Lysander had received from Cyrus for carrying it on, the Spartans kept for their own use, although the allies who had borne an equal share in the toil, claimed their proportion. The Thebans had an additional cause of complaint. For, the Spartans, in the dedication of offerings at Delphi, had omitted the name of the Thebans in the inscription which recorded the names of their other allies. The result was, that the Grecian states disregarded the proclamation, requiring the surrender of the exiles, and harbored the Athenian patriots, who thus in security awaited the opportunity for the recovery of their freedom. The Thebans, who a few months before in the council to determine on the fate of Athens, had voted to

raze the city to the ground, to sell the citizens as slaves, and convert the whole of Attica into a pasture ground for sheep, now, not only harbored the exiles but protected them from injury by a special decree and ordered that no one should take notice of it, if any of the exiles should go armed from Bœotia into Attica. Such were the opportunities afforded, by the dissatisfaction of the allies with the Spartans, for concerting and preparing plans for the overthrow of the Thirty. 2. The violence of the tyrants themselves had so disgusted and estranged the greater part of the oligarchy that they fought with very little heart against Thrasybulus and his band of patriots, who otherwise could hardly have got possession of the Piræus. 3. The pride and haughtiness of Lysander had excited the suspicions of the Spartans and the jealousy of king Pausanias to such a degree that in answer to a requisition for aid, Pausanias was sent along with Lysander to the relief of the Thirty. Had Lysander retained his influence unimpaired, there can hardly be a doubt but that Thrasybulus would have been defeated and the Thirty reinstated in power. But through the influence of Pausanias, a truce was granted, commissioners were sent to Sparta, and freedom restored to Athens. It is not necessary, however, to detail the steps by which Thrasybulus and his band of exiles, starting from Bœotia under the connivance of the Theban state and aided by individual Thebans, seized upon Phyle, and then, through the lukewarmness of the oligarchy got possession of the Piræus, and then, through the sufferance of the Spartans themselves entered the city and restored the democracy.

10. Athens is now free. The Lacedæmonian garrison and harmost are withdrawn from the Acropolis, and the Democracy. Lacedæmonian troops from Attica. The government is restored; the archons, the senate of Five Hundred, the Assembly, and the dikasteries. The democracy, too, was restored pure and simple as it existed before the capture of the city; and it is to the honor of the people that past enmities were forgotten, and none but the infamous Thirty and the Eleven who executed their commands, molested for what had been done during this ancient "Reign of Terror." Thus ends, in the spring of 403, B. C., the "Year of Anarchy"—the Year without an Archon. The archonship of Euclides, 403, B. C.,

becomes a marked epoch in Athenian history. But though free, Athens is poor and powerless. She has, however, the springs of life within and needs only an opportunity to rise again to power. But it should be noted, that this revolution in Athens had no effect upon Spartan predominance in the other states of Greece.

§ V. DESTRUCTION OF THE MARITIME EMPIRE OF SPARTA. 403-394, B. C.

11. The next important step in the emancipation of Greece from Spartan domination was the destruction of the maritime empire of Sparta, at the battle of Cnidus. From the restoration of the Athenian democracy to this battle was about ten years,—from the spring of 403, B. C. to midsummer of 394, B. C. We first glance, therefore, at the intermediate period.

12. In Greece, during the whole of these ten years, there was but a single war, a war between Sparta and Elis. This war arose out of an artful scheme of policy, now adopted by Sparta against the larger cities of Greece. An independent city-government was the paramount object of ambition with every Grecian city, great or small; nothing could be more odious to them than to be subject to a ruling city. Indeed, this reluctance to be under another, "to do what was bidden," as Demosthenes expresses it, had a controlling influence in many periods of Grecian history. Hence the many wars of Thebes with Plataea, and Thespiæ and Orchomenus. But, still, notwithstanding this inaptitude to enter into *permanent* political confederations, there was a kind of headship exercised by certain cities over the smaller cities within particular territories. Such was the control of Thebes over the cities of Boeotia, of Athens over those of Attica, and Sparta over those of Laconia. The sentiment of union, however, was weak, and, in many cases, the confederation was maintained only by superiority of power. It was this spirit of independence—this ambition of autonomy—pervading the Greek cities, that Sparta now made use of, for her own advantage; she came forward as the champion of the smaller cities and proclaimed the principle, "that no city should keep smaller places in subjection." The carrying out of this principle would of course weaken all the larger states of Greece,

and enable Sparta, as she did not propose to relax her own hold upon the subject townships of Laconia, easily to rule the whole. The first forcible application of this principle was against Elis. Sparta demanded that Elis should relinquish the authority which she exercised over certain dependant townships in Triphylia,—a region lying on the south of her, between the rivers Alpheus and Neda. On the refusal of Elis to comply with this command, Sparta invaded her territories; and after a war which extended through portions of three years, compelled Elis to submit to what had been demanded of her. This victory over Elis made Sparta supreme throughout Peloponnesus, and established a policy fraught with consequences most fatal to Grecian freedom. Through it as a principal cause, after the peace of Antalcidas, Sparta ruled over subjugated Greece.

13. We turn now to the proceedings of Sparta in Asia Minor, which had a close connection with affairs in Greece. Affairs in Asia Minor between 403-394, B. C. During the ten years of almost continuous peace in Greece—~~un~~broken only by the war against Elis,—War between Sparta and Persia. Sparta was engaged in hostilities with the King of Persia. They originated as follows. During the last years of the Peloponnesian war, Sparta, in consideration of Causes of the War. aid against Athens, had bargained in three formal conventions to surrender the Greek cities of Asia Minor into the hands of the King of Persia,—those cities having ever been an object of ambition to the kings of Persia but hitherto successfully protected by Athens. After the battle of Ægospotami, the fulfilment of this bargain was exacted; and, the cities along the coast of Ionia, Æolis and the Hellespont, with the exception of Abydos, were delivered into the power of Tissaphernes, satrap of that region. But the policy of the younger Cyrus led him to seek the favor of these cities. Thus countenanced, they revolt from Tissaphernes and throw themselves into the hands of Cyrus, who stations Greek garrisons in them for their protection. Soon after this, Cyrus sets out on his famous expedition, accompanied by a large army of Greek mercenaries—the renowned “Ten Thousand”—to wrest the throne of Persia from his brother Artaxerxes. But the defeat and death of Cyrus at the battle of Cunaxa at once changed the course of events. Tissaphernes, relinquishing the pursuit of the Ten Thousand, returns to the coast and attacks the Greek cities.

These implore Sparta to aid them. Sparta, who had connived at the expedition of Cyrus and had rendered him secret assistance, now resolves, partly from ambition and partly from shame at her former betrayal of these cities, to give the desired aid.

399-387, B. C. The aid is given, and a war commences, which continued twelve years,—to the peace of Antalcidas.

14. The war between Sparta and Persia had a decisive influence on Grecian affairs. It gave an opportunity to Athens, Thebes and Corinth, who had refused to co-operate with Sparta, to recover themselves. Besides, the Persians were at length driven by the success of the Spartans to attempt the overthrow of the very dominion which they had aided to establish. They aim a double blow; against the *maritime* ascendancy of Sparta, through a fleet to be manned in part by Greeks, and against her dominion on *land*, by exciting a war in Greece.

15. It was fortunate for Persia,—fortunate too for Greece—that she was able to bring into her service, the ablest Preparation of a Fleet. admiral of his times, the Athenian Conon. Conon, who escaped from Ægospotami with the only triremes which were saved, had been since living in seclusion with Evagoras prince of Salamis, in Cyprus, where he awaited the opportunities which time might bring. The war between Sparta and Persia afforded him the desired field of action. Through the influence of Pharnabazus, satrap of Phrygia, the King of Persia was induced to equip a fleet to be put under his command. This was in 395, B. C. It at once inflicted a heavy blow on Sparta. For, encouraged by the presence of Conon with his fleet, the island of Rhodes revolts from Sparta,—the first revolt within her empire. Meanwhile, however, Sparta was not inactive. Aided by her allies, she fits out a powerful fleet, and is ready for the contest. Without entering into details, it will be sufficient to say, that by the summer of 394, B. C., the fleets were prepared for the struggle, which was to decide the fate of the maritime empire of Sparta.

16. We have now arrived at the year 394, B. C., which was The Year 394, crowded with events important to Greece. Taking B. C. our stand at the commencement of it, we may contemplate the situation of the several parties who were to be the principal actors in them. Off the south-western coast of Asia

Minor, were two large fleets, ready to contend for the mastery of the sea. In Asia Minor itself, Agesilaus, who had been successful in all his attacks upon the Persians, was now looking forward to the accomplishment of vast schemes of conquest. In Greece, every thing was quiet, excepting a quarrel between the Locrians and Phocians, about a small strip of border land north of the Opuntian Locrians. The power of the Spartan empire was unbroken. Athens was weak, though doubtless in the preceding eight years of peace, she had somewhat recovered herself. Nor was she without her great men, like Thrasybulus, who could take advantage of every opportunity which might be presented. It was doubtless a year of hope. The proceedings of Conon must have been known, and indications were not wanting of a general disposition in Greece to attempt something for freedom.

17. In describing the events of this year, we shall not follow a strictly chronological order. We begin with the Battle of Cnidus, 394 B. C. battle of Cnidus, which was fought about the month of July. The fleet opposed to the Spartans was composed of Phœnician and Grecian vessels, the former commanded by Pharnabazus and the latter by Conon. The Spartan fleet was commanded by Pisander. Pharnabazus and Conon bring their united fleet round to the island of Rhodes, whence they sailed to offer battle to the Spartan fleet, which lay in the harbor of Cnidus in the peninsula of Cnidus, nearly opposite Rhodes. The Spartans accept the challenge and a battle is fought. But the Spartans are defeated, Peisander slain, and more than half their vessels captured or destroyed. Thus did Conon, who alone of the Grecian commanders performed the duty of a great captain in the battle of Ægospotami, avenge the dishonor of that calamitous defeat.

18. The results of this battle were most important. It struck a fatal blow at Spartan supremacy on the sea, from which Sparta never recovered. The islands in the Destruction of the Spartan Maritime Empire. Ægean, and the cities on the coast of Asia Minor, at once revolt and proclaim themselves independent; Cos, Nisyra, Teos, Chios, Erythræ, Ephesus, Mitylene, and Samos. Pharnabazus and Conon sailed from island to island, from city to city, driving out the Lacedæmonian garrisons and harmosts, and leaving the inhabitants free to enjoy their coveted autonomy.

But Conon rendered another service to the Athenians, still more gratifying. Through his influence with Pharnabazus, the victorious fleet was brought over to the shores of Greece, and under its protection and aid, the Long Walls and the fortifications of the Piræus are rebuilt.

But in connection with this attack on sea, Persia attempted, as we have before said, to excite a war against Sparta in continental Greece. For this purpose an agent was sent into the principal cities, with promises of coöperation. But before any concerted action could be effected, a war broke out, independently of Persian interference, between Sparta and Thebes—the Bœotian war, which also commenced in this year. We turn, therefore, from the hostilities in Asia Minor, which no longer possess interest for us, to Greece, to trace the first attempts at freedom there.

§ VI. PERIOD BETWEEN THE DESTRUCTION OF THE MARITIME EMPIRE OF SPARTA, AND THE WAR WHICH DESTROYED HER EMPIRE ON LAND. 394–379, B. C.

We have gone through with two of the successive movements by which the freedom of Greece was rescued from the dominion of Sparta; the overthrow of the Thirty Tyrants, and the destruction of the maritime empire of Sparta. But, before coming to the next triumphant event in this matter,—the battle of Leuctra,—there intervenes a long and gloomy period, in which Sparta carried her empire on land to the highest degree of power, and, also, of oppression. This intermediate period embraces the Bœotian and Corinthian War, the peace of Antalcidas, and the course of events which proceeded from that peace.

I. BŒOTIAN AND CORINTHIAN WAR. 394–387, B. C.

19. We have already referred to a quarrel between the Locrians and Phocians about a strip of border land north of the Opuntian Locrians. The Locrians called in the aid of the Thebans; the Phocians appealed to the Spartans. Sparta was glad of the opportunity to attack the Thebans, with whom she had been dissatisfied and angry for a long time. It was determined that Lysander, who was now at Heraclea, should march from the north and Pausanias from

Events. Peloponnesus, and that they should meet at Haliartus. Thebes thus in danger of being crushed between these two powerful armies, sent to Athens for aid, and Athenian troops under Thrasybulus marched to Haliartus. Lysander arrived before Pausanias, and without waiting for him, attacked the Theban forces, but was defeated and slain. Pausanias on coming dared not risk a battle, but demanded a truce for the burial of the slain and then withdrew with his forces into Peloponnesus. The Spartans suffered a heavy loss in the death of Lysander. The defeat was disastrous to them in another respect. For, it led at once to a combination of states against them. An alliance was formed between Athens, Thebes, Corinth and Argos, which was strengthened soon after by the junction of the Eubœans, Acarnanians, Ozolian Locrians, Ambracia, Leucas, and the Chalcidians of Thrace. The allies held a synod at Corinth and transferred thither their forces. The Spartans send for Argesilaus from Asia, but, so great did the danger appear of losing all their extra Peloponnesian possessions, that without waiting for his return, they engage in battle with the allied forces and are victorious, though no decisive results followed the victory. The battle was called the battle of Corinth, and the war henceforth the Corinthian war. The news of the victory of Corinth reached Argesilaus at Amphipolis. He hurries into Bœotia, where the allied forces had gone to resist his progress. He fights and gains the battle of Coronea, but makes no use of his victory, and soon after retires to Sparta. These were busy times. Within two months—the months of July and August of 394, B. C.—had been fought three important battles, the battle of Corinth, the battle of Cnidus, and the battle of Coronea, to which is to be added the battle of Haliartus, fought a few months earlier. Demosthenes, two generations later, boasts of the daring of the Athenians of this time, who, though the city was without ships, and without walls, marched to Haliartus, and, again, not many days after to Corinth.

The Corinthian war continued from the battle of Coronea, in August of 394, B. C., where we leave it, to 387, B. C. The detail of the incidents possesses no interest. The taking of Lechæum, and the destruction of a Lacedæmonian *mora* by the peltasts of Iphicrates are the only events of importance. The war was ended by the peace of Antalcidas, of which we now speak.

II. THE PEACE OF ANTALCIDAS AND ITS RESULTS. 387-379, B. C.

20. The peace of Antalcidas was a master-stroke of Spartan art, but equally a master specimen of Spartan baseness. Although Sparta had been carrying on war against Persia almost from the end of the Peloponnesian war, and although Persia had been coöperating with the Greeks against her, yet Sparta had the art to alienate the King of Persia from the Athenians, and to obtain from him conditions of peace which were most favorable to her ambitious designs; but she did it by the sacrifice of every sentiment of Grecian freedom, by the betrayal to Persia of the very cities of Asia Minor for the independence of which she had professedly waged so many years of war, and by submitting the interests of all Greece to the mere despotic will of the King of Persia. The terms and the language of the treaty were as follows.

Terms. "King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia, and the island of Klazomenæ and Cyprus shall belong to him. He thinks it just also to leave all the other Hellenic cities autonomous, both small and great,—except Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, which are to belong to Athens, as they did originally. Should any parties refuse to accept this peace, I will make war upon them, along with those who are of the same mind." The Grecian states formally accept the terms of this peace, influenced partly by the threat of the Persian King, partly ensnared by the bait of independence, but principally through their inability to resist the united force of Persia and Sparta. The Spartans became "Presidents (guarantees or executors) of the peace," and used the power thus placed in their hands in the most despotic manner. Sparta aimed at two

Aims of Sparta. things in this peace; by the enforcement of autonomy, to break up all partial confederations in which several smaller cities lying in the same territory were united to a leading city, thus securing her own power beyond danger, as the single states could not compete with her; and at the same time, to establish in the several cities an oligarchy devoted to her interests. She accomplished both. By the year 379, B. C., she had broken up all the confederacies of the Grecian states, and by the oligarchies devoted to her made herself

supreme. We subjoin the following summary of her proceedings. 1. She extorted from Corinth the dismissal of
Events.

her Argeian allies, and separated from Athens her confederates, Thebes and Corinth. 2. She broke up the confederation of cities under the headship of Thebes, in Bœotia, and compelled Thebes to renounce her presidency. Besides, she succeeded in establishing oligarchies in most of the cities. Orchomenus and Thespiae were garrisoned by Lacedæmonian troops with a harmost. Plataea was restored, but governed by the partizans of Sparta. 3. Mantinea was destroyed and its inhabitants divided into five small villages, so as to be no longer formidable to Sparta. 4. By coöperating with the oligarchical party in Thebes, Phœbidas, on his march against Olynthus, seized the Cadmea, and the Spartans, though they disowned the act and professed to punish Phœbidas for it, still kept the citadel, with a Lacedæmonian garrison, for three years, until they were driven from the city by force of arms. 5. She attacked and subdued Olynthus, the head of the confederation of the Grecian cities in Chalcidice, and thus surrendered the Greeks of Chalcidice into the power of Macedon as she has surrendered the Asiatic Greeks to Persia. Thus, by the beginning of 379,

Results. B. C., Sparta had carried her dominion to the highest pitch of power. The whole of inland Greece with the exception of Argos, Attica, and the more powerful Thessalian cities were enrolled in her confederacy. In place of the Lysandrian decarchies and harmosts, she had established an oligarchical party of devoted partizans, through whom she exercised a supreme control and a dreadful oppression over each of the individual states.

§ VII. DECLINE AND DOWNFALL OF THE SPARTAN EMPIRE ON LAND. 379-362, B. C.

21. We have thus far traced, on the one hand, the downfall of the Spartan empire on the sea, but, on the other, the rise of her empire on land to the highest pitch of power. We have now to contemplate the decline and downfall of her empire on land. But, before speaking of this, we pause to describe the situation of the three principal states of Greece at this time, Sparta, Athens and Thebes. The situation

of Sparta has already been set forth. She was at the height of her power. She ruled supreme over Greece. We shall speak of Thebes in connection with the war itself. We will, however, enter into some detail of the situation of Athens.

22. The rebuilding of the Long Walls, and of the fortifications of the Piræus, gave an opportunity to the Commerce. commercial marine of Athens to take a new start. Athens made very great progress both in the preparation of a naval force, and in the extension of commerce. During the Corinthian war, in 387 B. C., we find a fleet of forty triremes, under Thrasybulus, in the Hellespont. Indeed, Athens was master of the Hellespont, and exacted the duties which were charged upon merchant vessels sailing in and out of the Euxine. Byzantium was in alliance with her, and through the aid of Thrasybulus had reëstablished democracy. Besides, her influence and power extended to Samothrace, Samos, and the cities of Thrace. Her harbor became again the mart of commerce and her merchants were as numerous as before her reverses. But it was in the interval between the peace of Antalcidas and the present war against Sparta,—387–379, B. C.,—that she made the greatest progress in maritime affairs. During this entire period she was free from war. By the peace of Antalcidas itself, she became possessed, as we have already seen, of Imbros, Lemnos, and Scyros; and afterwards she was constantly acquiring tributary dependencies among the smaller islands of the Ægean.

It will be convenient in this connection, to speak of the new New Confed- confederation which Athens about this time formed eration. with the islands of the Ægean, and the cities on the Thracian coast and on the Hellespont. So preponderating had her maritime power now become, that they were quite ready to join with her. This new confederation was formed on just and equal terms. Each city, great or small, was to send one delegate to a congress to be held periodically at Athens, and to have an equal vote; Athens was to be president of the confederacy, but each city to be autonomous; a common fund was to be raised, with a common naval force, through an assessment imposed by the congress and used as the congress should direct; and it was agreed that the general object of the confederation should be to maintain the inde-

pendence of each confederate against foreign attack, by their combined forces. Moreover, as under the former empire many Athenian citizens had been settled as colonists or cleruchs in various dependencies, who had lost their property at the close of the war, Athens passes a formal decree, barring all revival of these suspended rights; and, besides, Athenian citizens are forbidden from holding property, either in houses or lands, in the territories of any one of the confederates. Thebes became a member of this confederacy; so, also, all the cities of Eubœa, with one exception, Chios, Mitylene, Byzantium, and Rhodes, and many others, though it is impossible to specify what ones. After a certain time, there came to be no less than seventy cities which sent deputies to the congress at Athens. The affairs of Athens were conducted at this time by able men; Iphicrates, Chabrias, Timotheus, and Callistratus. Thrasylus was dead. Although there was no really great man among them, yet they were superior as a whole to the statesmen and generals of the following age. Thus, has Athens arisen to a considerable degree of power and prosperity. A new generation of citizens has grown up since the Peloponnesian war, who, unacquainted by experience with the calamities of that war, are looking forward with hope and ambition to the elevation of Athens to still higher degrees of wealth and power, though we must notice some falling off from the ancient Athenian vigor. We proceed now to speak of the war between Thebes and Sparta.

23. The entire contest between Thebes and Sparta lasted from the recovery of the Cadmea in 379, B. C., to the battle of Mantinea in 362, B. C.,—17 years. But it may be most conveniently divided into two portions. The first portion extends to 371, B. C. In this period, Thebes, aided by Athens, was enabled to restore the ancient federative system of Bœotia and to consolidate her power and train her troops, for the final contest. The second portion embraces the remaining period after the peace of 371, B. C., in which Athens withdrew from the contest, and Thebes carried on the war alone to a most triumphant result.

24. The war against Sparta arose out of that great act of Thebes and Athens. injustice,—the seizure of the Cadmea and its forcible retention by a Spartan garrison and harmost.

The citizens who fled or were driven from Thebes on that occasion were hospitably received and sheltered at Athens. In the winter of 379, B. C., these exiles starting from Attica surprise the Cadmea and expel the Lacedæmonian garrison. Sparta at once proclaims war against Thebes. She also demands of Athens redress for the support which some of her generals had given to Pelopidas and his party. The redress is given. The accused generals are tried and punished. Athens would probably have remained neutral in the war, had it not been for the attempt of a Spartan named Sphodrias, to seize the Piræus, in the same way as Phœbidas had seized the Cadmea. The Athenians now in their turn demand redress. But the Spartans refuse it, and the Athenians at once contract an alliance with Thebes and make vigorous preparations for war.

25. It was determined in the congress of the confederates to **Proceedings** carry on the war on a large scale, and both by sea **of the war.** and by land. Athens waged the war on the sea, and Thebes on the land. Athens added many cities and islands to her confederacy, such as Abdera, Cephallenia and Corcyra. She also gained a decided victory over the Lacedæmonian fleet, in the battle of Naxos, which was fought in 376, B. C.,—her first naval victory since the Peloponnesian war. Thebes was successful on land, and by 374, B. C., had driven out all the Lacedæmonian garrisons and harmosts from the Bœotian cities, put down the local oligarchies which sustained them, and reconstructed the Bœotian confederacy, to which all the cities belonged, with the exception of Orchomenus. We need not describe the incidents of the war. We turn now to the separate peace made by Athens with Sparta.

26. It is now eight years since the war began, and Athens **Peace between** has become desirous of peace, partly from the **Sparta and Athens.** burden of the war, and partly from a rising jealousy of the Thebans, who had recently attacked the Phocians, former allies and friends of Athens, and destroyed Plataea. Resolutions were finally taken at Athens, and probably in the congress of deputies, to propose peace to Sparta. In the spring of 371, B. C., envoys from Athens, Thebes, and from various members of the Athenian confederacy arrived at Sparta, and a treaty of peace was negotiated, on these terms:—that the armaments on both sides should be disbanded; and the har-

mosts and garrisons every where withdrawn, so that each city might enjoy full autonomy. Each city was to be left really independent. All the states and cities swore to this peace, except Thebes, who declined the oaths, unless she could be permitted to take them in the name of the Bœotian confederacy. This Sparta refused, and Thebes was left out of the peace.

27. The war of course continues between Thebes and Sparta. Thebes and Sparta. And, now we come to the final contest—the contest which ended in the utter and irretrievable ruin of the Spartan power. It lasts from 371, B. C., to 361, B. C.; from the battle of Leuctra to the peace which followed upon the battle of Mantinea. It was supposed, that as Thebes stood alone, she must fall at once before the power of Sparta. But within twenty days after Epaminondas left the congress at Sparta, the battle of Leuctra was fought, and Sparta prostrate. Never was there a more complete overthrow. Her ascendancy north of the Corinthian gulf ceased at once. Phocis concluded an alliance with Thebes; so, also, the cities of Eubœa, the Malians, the town of Heraclea, together with both branches of the Locrians. In Peloponnesus, the results were not less remarkable. The Spartan garrisons and harmosts at once withdrew from all the cities, and returned home. Besides, in all these cities there had been decarchies in the interest of Sparta, which had been most violent and oppressive. These governments were overthrown, and their partisans proscribed. Thus, even in Peloponnesus, the empire and dominion of Sparta over the states out of Laconia, was quite overthrown. Sparta fell at a single blow. Still the war continued for several years. As Sparta sought to prevent Athens ever rising again to power, so Epaminondas was not satisfied with overthrowing the power of Sparta; he laid his plans, and with far-sighted wisdom, to prevent her from again tyrannizing over Greece. In the fall of 370, B. C., he entered Peloponnesus with a powerful army, and established a permanent barrier against Sparta on her western border. The Messenians were recalled, and the city of Messene founded. The Arcadians were induced to enter into a confederacy and built for its chief city, Megalopolis. Western Laconia was enfranchised, and detached from Sparta. Between these events and the year 362, B. C., no year passed without acts of hostility, though without decisive results. The battle

of Mantinea was fought in June 362, B. C., and a general peace followed the next year, 361, B. C.

The peace according to the terms of it left every thing in *statu quo*. But how different is the *status quo* in 361, B. C., from that in 379, B. C.! Then Sparta was at the pinnacle of her power, and it was questionable whether Thebes could stand for a single campaign against her. But now the empire of Sparta on land, after a duration of nearly forty-five years, is overthrown and Thebes has taken her place. But in order fully to understand the state of affairs in Greece at this time, it is necessary to be acquainted with the course of Athenian matters, during the period in which Thebes and Sparta have been struggling for mastery. We turn, then, from Thebes and Sparta to Athens.

§ VIII. GROWTH OF ATHENIAN POWER. 371-358, B. C.

28. The period of Athenian history, which is to pass under review in this section, extends from about the time of the battle of Leuctra, down to a period three or four years later than the battle of Mantinea. Although this period stretches a little beyond our first general division, into the second—the subjugation of Greece under Macedon, which commences with the accession of Philip to the throne in 359, B. C.—yet, it constitutes a distinct portion of Athenian history, and is better treated of in the present connection. With its opening, commenced a change in Athenian policy, which at its close had carried Athens to the highest degree of power which she ever attained after the Peloponnesian war. Within the thirteen years of this period, she established her power in the Thracian Chersonese, in the Chalcidian peninsula, and in Eubœa.

The battle of Leuctra had a powerful effect upon the policy of Athens. While the destruction of the Spartan dominion on land presented an opportunity for the extension of her own power, the growing strength of Thebes seemed to impose the necessity of doing it. Indications of more extended schemes of policy on the part of Athens appeared in the congress of the confederates which was held a few months after the battle of Leuctra, in September or Octo-

ber, 371, B. C. At this congress, Athens caused the peace, which had already been sworn at Sparta, to be resworn by the confederate cities, under her own presidency and guarantee;—thus silently dethroning Sparta and stepping into her place. At the same time, while guaranteeing to every Grecian state, great or small, the enjoyment of autonomy, she reserved to herself certain cities, as her own; among them certainly Amphipolis, and probably the towns in the Thracian Chersonese, and Potidæa in Chalcidice. She did not, however, take immediate steps towards the accomplishment of her new schemes of ambition. The year 371, B. C., was a critical period in Greece. Great changes were everywhere in progress. During the next year, 370, B. C., the condition of northern Greece was altered by the assassination of Jason of Pheræ, and it would not have been prudent for her ablest generals and her principal forces to be absent, when it was not certain but that all her resources would soon be needed against the overwhelming power of Thebes. Indeed, in the winter of the next year, 369, B. C., her aid was implored by Sparta, and she sent Iphicrates, who after the peace, when he was recalled from Corcyra, had been living at Athens as a private citizen, to her assistance. But in the spring of this year, Athens begins to carry out her plans of reconstructing her former empire. We shall speak of her efforts for this object in the following order: first, of her efforts in Chalcidice, then, in the Chersonese, and lastly, in Eubœa.

1. In the region of Chalcidice, the first efforts of the Athenians were directed to Amphipolis, the permanent possession of which they had been seeking for nearly a century. This city was situated on the river Strymon, near the Strymonic gulf; its site, near the silver mines of Crenides and in the neighborhood of large forests of ship-timber, had early attracted the attention of the Athenians. Accordingly, they planted a colony there as early as 465, B. C., and again, the former having been destroyed, in 437, B. C. But they had possession of it only thirteen years, when it was taken from them by the Spartans, under Brasidas, in 424, B. C., and they were never afterwards able to recover it. Brasidas introduced Lacedæmonian colonists and was considered as the second founder of the city. It remained in possession of the Spartans

only about three years, till the peace of Nicias in 421, B. C. By the terms of this peace, Sparta should have surrendered Amphipolis; she however did no more than withdraw her garrison, pretending that she was not able to force the inhabitants, who were hostile to the Athenians, to surrender their city to Athens. Amphipolis, therefore, became independent, and remained so. Thirty-seven years after, her independence was guaranteed by the peace of Antalcidas, in 387, B. C. and, again, seventeen years later, by the treaty of peace which was made between Athens and Sparta, in 371, B. C. But, notwithstanding this actual independence of half a century and Athens. these successive guarantees, Athens asserts her claim to it. This claim was advanced, as we have seen, in the synod of allies held at Athens, soon after the battle of Leuctra; and was acceded to by Amyntas, the father of Philip, though he had still less claim than Athens. This claim of Athens could only be established by force of arms; and we proceed to speak of the war carried on against Amphipolis by Athens.

The order of events in this war is obscure; in the following War against both Grote and Thirlwall concur. First. Iphicrates Amphipolis. was sent to the Chalcidian coast. This, as we have seen, was in the early part of 369, B. C. He spent most of the year in surveying the coast and preparing for future operations. He next took part in the civil dissensions, which ran high in Macedon. Amyntas, the friend of Athens, had died in 370, B. C., a few months after his return from the synod at Athens. He left three sons, Alexander, who succeeded him, Perdiccas, and Philip, then thirteen years old. Alexander was assassinated in 369, B. C., by Ptolemy of Alorus, instigated by Eurydice, the widow of Amyntas. Ptolemy, who became regent of the kingdom, was attacked by Pausanias a pretender to the throne, and with such success that he, with Eurydice and her two sons, were in danger of being driven from the kingdom. Eurydice appeals for aid to Iphicrates, who had been adopted by Amyntas as his son. Iphicrates interferes, expels Pausanias, and secures the throne to the family of Amyntas. From this time commenced the campaign of Iphicrates against Amphipolis, which lasted three years (368-365, B. C.), but was without success. Second. Iphicrates is recalled, and is succeeded by Timotheus, son of Conon, who at the same

time holds a command in the Hellespont. Ptolemy, notwithstanding the aid which had been rendered him by Iphicrates, had joined the Amphipolitans against Athens. But in 365, B. C., Ptolemy was assassinated by Perdiccas, the second son of Amyntas. Perdiccas for the first year or two of his reign appears to have been friendly to the Athenians, and by his aid Timotheus made himself master of Torone, Potidæa, Pydna, Methone, and various other places in the Chalcidian peninsula, and its neighborhood; but the Athenians were again disappointed in their hopes of taking Amphipolis. The campaign of Timotheus extended from "midsummer of 364, B. C., to midsummer of 363, B. C."* when he returned to the Hellespont. 3. Timotheus was succeeded by Callisthenes. But Callisthenes had more to contend against than either of his predecessors. For Perdiccas had now turned against the Athenians, and joined with the Amphipolitans, who had placed their city in his hands. But still, Callisthenes fought with success against Perdiccas, and would probably have captured the city, had he not been induced to make a truce with him, by his promise to abandon the Amphipolitans. The truce enabled Perdiccas to recover himself; and he then refused to fulfill his engagement, but continued to hold the city against the Athenians. Affairs remained in this situation till the death of Perdiccas, who was slain in a battle against the Illyrians in 360, B. C., and the accession of Philip in 359, B. C. Thus, the Athenians lost their only opportunity of getting possession of this coveted prize. But the acquisitions of Timotheus in Chalcidice were of great value to them.

II. We proceed now to speak of the efforts of the Athenians in the Thracian Chersonese. The Athenians took advantage of the revolt of Ariobarzanes from the King of Persia, to commence their operations in the Hellespont. Timotheus was sent there, for this purpose, though he was not to do any thing which should violate the peace with the king. He, therefore, besieges Samos, and takes it somewhere in 366, B. C. For this success, Ariobarzanes makes over to him Sestos and Crithote in the Chersonese, with a large circumjacent territory. This is his first successful step in the recovery of that peninsula. Timo-

* Grote. Clinton and Thirwall place it in 360, B. C.

theus soon afterwards got possession of Elæus and other cities, so that the Athenians now claimed the whole Chersonese, throughout the entire length of it, including Cardia and several independent cities. The Athenians, at the same time, sent colonists both to the Chersonese and Samos, thus reviving her ancient policy, which she had formally discarded at the formation of her new confederacy, and thereby alarming not a little her confederates. This recovery of the Chersonese took place between 366, B. C., and 364, B. C. From midsummer 364, B. C. to midsummer 363, B. C., Timotheus was in Chalcidice, but in 363, B. C., returned to the Hellespont.

But the reoccupation of the Chersonese had brought the Athenians into conflict with Cotys, king of Thrace, and as that king was now aided by a Theban fleet, their newly recovered possessions were in great danger. It was on this account that Timotheus returned from Chalcidice to his command in the Hellespont. Timotheus was successful against Cotys, and during his command, the Athenian possessions continued in peace and safety. He returned to Athens in 362, B. C. The course of the war after the recall of Timotheus is little creditable to the Athenians. The events of it are so obscure and uninteresting, that we do no more than enumerate them. 1. Timotheus was succeeded by Ergophilus, probably in the latter part of 362, B. C., who seems not to have carried on the war with any efficiency. 2. Ergophilus was succeeded by Autocles, who had not only to carry on operations against Cotys, but to protect the Proconnesian allies of Athens against the attack of the city of Cyzicus, and to provide a safe convoy for the corn-fleet from the Euxine, which was endangered on account of a prevalent scarcity. 3. Autocles was succeeded by Menon, and Menon by Timomachus. But affairs in the Chersonese were quite unfavorable to the Athenians. Cotys contrived, in 361-360, B. C., to surprize Sestus, the most important place in the peninsula. The chronology is obscure, but it is probable that these several commands were held between August, 362, B. C., and the latter part of 361, B. C. 4. Timomachus was succeeded by Cephisodotus. Cotys was now joined by Charidemus, a mercenary general who had formerly been in the service of Athens, and by their joint forces, the Athenian possessions were in great danger. But at this juncture, Cotys is assassinated.

His young son Cersobleptes succeeds him, who makes Charidemus his principal minister. After seven months of useless warfare, Charidemus forces Cephisodotus to conclude a most dishonorable convention, which is at once rejected at Athens. Cephisodotus is recalled about the beginning of 359, B. C. It does not appear that Athens had any commander in Thrace during the whole of this year, nor till the middle of the next year, 358, B. C. But, at this time, there were two competitors for the throne against Cersobleptes, Berisades and Amadocus—who uniting their forces under an Athenian named Athenodorus, pressed Charidemus so hard that he was finally compelled to agree that Thrace should be divided among the three competitors, and that all three should concur in surrendering the Chersonese to Athens. The Athenians upon being informed of this, send Chabrias with a single trireme to ratify the convention and take possession of the country; but, as they had neglected to send the money which Athenodorus had asked for the pay of his troops, that general was compelled to disband them. This circumstance emboldened Cersobleptes and Charidemus to disown the convention; they even compel Chabrias to accept the former convention. This excites great indignation at Athens, and ten commissioners are sent to demand the ratification of the latter convention, but as they are not accompanied by a force, they are treated with contempt by Cersobleptes and Charidemus. At length, in the latter part of 358, B. C., Chares is sent with a sufficient force to compel a ratification of the treaty, and at once, the Chersonese is surrendered to the Athenians, though Charidemus retains Cardia. We here leave the Athenians in quiet possession of the Chersonese, and turn,

III. To their expedition into Eubœa, in which the Athenians manifested their old spirit. Although, at the revival of the Athenian confederacy in 378, B. C., most of the cities of Eubœa became confederates, yet after the battle of Leuctra, the island passed under Theban supremacy, and throughout the war contingents served in the army of Epaminondas. But in the year 358, B. C., the cities became discontented, and Thebes sent over a large number of troops to quell the disturbances. The cities of Chalcis and Eretria solicited aid from Athens. It was at once rendered, and with the greatest zeal. Volunteer trierarchs, of whom Demosthenes was one, offer their services. A large force

was equipped, and landed in the course of a few days in Eubœa; in twenty days, the Thebans were defeated, and Eubœa became a portion of the Athenian confederacy. A body of mercenaries under Chares served in the Athenian army, who after the conclusion of the enterprize, went to Chersonese to take possession, as we have already seen, of that peninsula.

Thus, at the end of the year 358, B. C., Athens was at the height of her power, having among her confederates the principal islands of the Ægean, possessing the Chersonese, and several cities in Chalcidice, and now exerting a controlling influence over Eubœa.

§ IX. CONCLUSION.

30. We here complete our account of the period of Grecian history extending from the end of the Peloponnesian war to the peace following the battle of Mantinea, 404–361, B. C. Some of the events which have been brought into it, occurred three years later than the point of time just mentioned, but, not to speak of the impossibility of bounding the historical periods of different states by precisely the same year, these events had their causes within the assigned limit. We have also carried forward the entire period to the year 359, B. C., when Philip ascended the throne of Macedon, but this was done merely for the convenience of chronological arrangement; the period properly ends with the peace of 361, B. C.

31. With the general peace of 361, B. C., one system of politics may be said to have come to an end, and a new one to commence. The results of the Peloponnesian war are reversed; Sparta is prostrate, and Athens exalted, though neither in external power nor in her internal condition is she the Athens of the Peloponnesian period. Almost the only external difference is the increased power of Thebes. But the powers and combinations of policy which brought about this result have spent their force. Persia in fact ended the Peloponnesian war, destroyed the Athenian empire, and raised Sparta to dominion. Persia, too, destroyed the maritime power of Sparta at the battle of Cnidus, but by the peace of Antalcidas rendered stronger than ever her despotism on land. But from this peace, Persia ceases to have a *control*

Change in the
System of Gre-
cian politics.

over Grecian politics ; her influence grows less and less, until at length Persia is little more than a topic of oratory for Isocrates and other Greek rhetoricians. We hear little more of the Grecian cities in Asia Minor. The leading principle of Grecian policy after the peace of Antalcidas, and the political combinations of the states, were directed either to the confirmation or the subversion of Spartan domination in Greece. But this principle and these combinations ceased of necessity with the battle of Mantinea and the general peace. A new political period commences. Grecian politics as a whole—the Pan-Hellenic system—instead of having reference to Persia, or, as in later times, to the supremacy of Athens or Sparta or Thebes, take a new direction ; they turn northwards to Phocis, Thessaly, Macedonia, Thrace. A new power rises into importance—Macedon—and rules for a little while the Grecian world. In Greece itself, however, there can hardly be said to be a *system* of politics. Events follow each other, without centering in any one grand object. Indeed, it is the want of a system in which all Greece should be united under the guidance of some one state, that enabled Philip to conquer it, as he did, by piece-meal. It was only in the few last months, or rather days, of her freedom, that, by the eloquence and statesmanship of Demosthenes, the Pan-Hellenic spirit was aroused, and Greeks fought together for freedom against Macedon, as they had fought against Persia, or Sparta. But it was too late,—Greece was subjugated ; and we now turn to describe the gloomy period of her subjugation.

SUBJUGATION OF GREECE UNDER MACEDON.

§ X. THE INTERNAL STATE OF GREECE AT THE OPENING OF THIS PERIOD, 359, B. C.

32. Externally, at the opening of this period, Greece is prosperous. She has just succeeded in rescuing her freedom from the oppressive tyranny of Sparta. Several of the states have arrived to a high degree of power. The maritime empire of Athens rivals the former empire which was overthrown by the

Peloponnesian war. Thebes has never been so powerful. But, yet, as a whole, Greece has degenerated, nor longer possesses the ability of acting in concert against a foreign foe. The very struggle which she had gone through with for independence had prepared her for subjection. The several states are free, but so fearful of losing their freedom, that they will not unite under the lead of any one state, even against a common foe. They are independent of each other, and, because they are independent, will not look beyond their own individual interests, to the common interests of the Grecian world, but hope, as Demosthenes expresses it, each, in the perils of others, to escape itself. Besides, the states are weakened by internal dissensions, and there prevails a general deterioration of morals, growing out of long protracted wars. In addition, there is, at least in Athens, a decay of the military spirit, and a dearth of great military commanders. The truth of these assertions will appear, if we consider the internal state of Peloponnesus, Thebes, and Athens; and it is important to do this, if we would see how it was that almost in the moment of emancipation, Greece became again enslaved—that in twenty-three years, the battle of Mantinea was followed by the battle of Chæronea.

33. Although the states of Peloponnesus were now freed from the dominion of Sparta, they were weakened, dis-
Influence of the former Period upon the latter. tracted, and suspicious of each other. Besides, the overthrow of the oligarchies which had been upheld by Sparta had given rise to bitter civil dissensions, terrible cruelties and unappeasible feuds. Thus, it was impossible to form, even against a foreign enemy, any new combination of states, in place of that which had existed under the headship of Sparta. On the contrary, so suspicious were the other states of Sparta, prostrate as she was, that they were ready to ally themselves with any foreign power, or even enemy of Greece against her; and some did actually join Philip.

34. Thebes had become powerful. Although she had lost
Of Thebes. most of her Peloponnesian allies, she retained her allies in Central Greece; the Locrians, the Malians, the Heracleots, the Phocians, though these last were reluctant allies, and most of the Thessalians. She had also extended her dominion over the whole of Bœotia, having appropriated the

territories of Coronea and Orchomenus on her northwestern, and of Thespiæ and Plateæ on her southwestern borders. Besides, she had, on the northeastern frontiers of Attica, the important town of Oropus, which she had taken during the war. But Thebes, in breaking up the free cities of Orchomenus, Coronea, Plateæ and Thespiæ, and scattering and exiling their citizens, had alienated the feelings of the Greeks, and made the states hostile towards her. In the death of Epaminondas at the battle of Mantinea, she lost all she might otherwise have gained from the victory; she lost her only great man, the statesman who could have directed her resources in a wise manner, and united all Greece under her, against Philip. As it was, however, Thebes soon after, without necessity and from motives of mere revenge, gave rise to a war—the Sacred war—which raged for ten years in the heart of Greece, and furnished Philip with the occasion and the means of subduing Greece; indeed, Thebes itself coöperated with him until the last struggle, when it was too late for her to do any thing against him.

35. We come now to speak of the internal situation of Athens, and much more at length. For, it is here we find the real causes of the downfall of Grecian freedom. If Athens had been what she once was, Philip would never have passed the straits of Thermopylæ.

36. It is to be remarked, however, that this change was not in the forms of her constitution and laws, but in the character of the people. With the expulsion of the Thirty, was restored the popular institutions of Athens; and from that time to the present, we find the same democratic form of government. We meet with the same large senatorial body of Five Hundred, convening daily, with the exception of festival days, in the senate house, preparing measures to be acted on by the Assembly, and exercising a superintendence over all financial affairs and over all public officers. With the same Assembly, composed only of those whose names were enrolled in the registers of the several Demes as born of Athenian parents and who had taken the citizens' oath, meeting regularly four times in each prytany, or about once every ten days, and exercising the Legislative powers of the state. With the same Dikasteries, courts composed of a large body of jurors—some hundreds—without judges to instruct them in the laws. With

No change in
Government
and Laws.

the same public officers, the ten Archons, the ten Strategi, the Logistæ and Euthuni, and others, all exposed to the trial of their eligibility, and all liable to the trial of accountability. We meet with the same carefully formed system of finance; and with the same kinds of expenditures; with the same liturgies and trierarchies. We also meet with the same forms of trials,—the Graphe Paranomon, the trial of unconstitutional laws, and the Eisangelia, the prosecution of public offenders. The city with its public buildings, the number of the citizens, metics and slaves, its commerce and manufactures, were about the same as in the flourishing days of the republic, before the Peloponnesian war. The public buildings of the Acropolis with all their splendid works of art, and all the public structures, had escaped unharmed the capture of the city by Lysander, and the violences of the reign of terror. The Long Walls and the fortifications of the Piræus, though not equal to the former, were sufficiently strong for protection. The population was nearly as large as ever. It has been estimated at 500,000, of which 90,000 were citizens, 45,000 metics, or resident foreigners, and the remainder 365,000, slaves. Of the whole population, 180,000 has been assigned to the city and harbors. Of the 90,000 citizens, about 20,000 would be Assembly-men. The large number of resident foreigners, who were mainly engaged in commerce and manufactures, indicates the material prosperity of the city.

37. But while there has been no change in government and laws, and none, except for the better, in the material prosperity of the city of Athens, there has been a change, and, in many respects, an improvement, in the character of the people. There has been a gradual progress in civilization, which commenced with the political career of Pericles. Commerce had brought great wealth into the city, and it had been freely expended in adorning it. The fine arts had reached a point of perfection beyond which they never went. If by the renown of her schools, the celebrity of her poets and philosophers, by the elegance and refinement of her social state, she ever deserved, it was now, to make hers the appropriate name for the literary metropolis of succeeding nations. It is true, her most distinguished poets were dead; but Sophocles, Euripides and Aristophanes were familiarly known by a near

Change in the
Character of
the Athenians.

tradition ; Thucydides must have been remembered by many of the citizens ; the memory of Herodotus was fresh, and Xenophon survived though in exile. But Plato was in the vigor of his life, Aristotle was just becoming distinguished, and Diogenes vented his cynical lectures about the streets upon the manners of the times. Isæus, Lysias, and Isocrates were in the height of their fame, Demosthenes had already pleaded his first cause. It was an age of philosophers and orators rather than of poets and historians—the age of reflection which usually succeeds the age of original production. Athens was the resort of scholars, the school of the arts for all Greece, for the islands of the *Ægean*, and for Asia Minor. She had never seen the time, it is probable, when there was so much accumulation of wealth in the hands of private individuals, so much refinement in the style of living among the rich, such general abandonment among other classes, at the theatre, festivals and public games, to the pleasures of life, in a word, so much enjoyment of the comforts of peace and commercial prosperity. But ancient civilization, destitute of a religion, which ameliorates the barbarities of civilized life, and while increasing the pleasures of life, fortifies the heart against being corrupted by them, unprotected too by the discoveries of physical science, which ancient philosophers despised, but which in modern times have placed civilized man far beyond the reach of the uncivilized, was destined either to fall before the assaults of barbarous people, or else to perish through the corrupting influence of the very blessings it conferred.

It was very natural under these circumstances for the great body of the citizens to be averse to service in the army and fleet. They preferred the duty of jurors in some of the multitudinous courts of Athens, or the wages of four pence half-penny as legislators in the public Assembly. They were unwilling to exchange the lounge in the Forum, the excitement of the games and processions, the cheap pleasures of the public theatres, for hard labor and poor pay. But this love of peace, though arising in part from a proper appreciation of its advantages, was also the love of idle pleasure. They did not decline war because of its calamities, nor did they refuse military service because they wished to employ themselves in agriculture, in the useful arts and trades, or in manufactures, or in short in any of

the various modes of industry in which men now engage, for in fact their civilization had not produced them; they were unwilling to endure the hardships of war, because they could lead an easier life. As a nation, they were as ready for war as ever.

This readiness for war as a nation and this reluctance to engage in it as individuals, led to two fatal expedients. The first was the employment of mercenary troops. If they would have war, they must have soldiers and sailors, and unfortunately for them, these could be easily obtained. The long protracted wars had made martial service a trade or profession. In all parts of Greece, there were adventurers with few or more followers, ready to serve the best paymaster. They were not free-booters or pirates, but men of an honorable profession—the cavalier of more modern times, the Dalgetties of the thirty years war. During all the contests in the reign of Philip, it was rare to find an Athenian citizen in the army or fleet.

The other great change was the separation of the office of the statesman and the general. In former times, a public man was both statesman and warrior; he who originated the plan, carried it into execution. Epaminondas was the last of this race, whose wisdom and eloquence was equalled by bravery and generalship. This separation, though it is of great importance in modern times, produced many evils. Before, all citizens were soldiers, and all public men were generals; but now, no citizen is a soldier, and their ten generals are too often mere militia generals. The commanders who were engaged in actual service, were adventurers, who fought for the *spoils* of war. Hence, they acted as they chose abroad, plundering the allies, hiring themselves out to execute any enterprize which the hundred independent cities on the islands or on the coast, might have planned, or else privateering on their own account. On their return, they must of course make friends with the people. This was done by a profuse expenditure of money, and by hiring the orators to defend them under impeachment. Demosthenes often complains of these evils.

38. Such was the character of the people of Athens; refined, pleasure-loving, proud, and ambitious of military conquests, but without the enterprize and vigor to secure them. Such too, was the situation of the several states composing the collective Grecian world; with respect to each

Summary.

other, jealous and suspicious, standing aloof from common enterprizes, and some more ready to join with a foreign foe than with their countrymen; and, with respect to their internal situation, degenerate in morals, distracted by bitter feuds between the different classes of citizens, and not one, without leading men of the oligarchy, who waited only for the opportunity to sell their country for gold. Such was the Grecian world—ready to be enslaved—at the time its first conqueror ascended the throne.

§ XI. ACCESSION OF PHILIP TO THE THRONE. 359, B. C.

39. Philip ascended the throne at the age of twenty-three, which was just the age of Demosthenes. Philip had been sent as an hostage to Thebes, and was there at the time when she was distinguished for her great men. Nor can we doubt but that he profited not a little from the example of great military skill he must have been familiar with in the exploits of Epaminondas. Indeed, in the first great battle which Philip fought, a battle against the Illyrians in the first year of his reign, he employed the same tactics,—strengthening one wing for the attack and reserving the other for defense—as Epaminondas at Leuctra and Mantinea. In Thebes, also, he acquired a knowledge of the Greek language, which he wrote, it is said, with accuracy and elegance. Not unlikely he became accomplished in all the parts of a Greek education; philosophy, poetry and oratory. He was a brave and skillful soldier, an artful diplomatist, an unsafe friend, and a dangerous enemy.

Philip ascended the throne in 359, B. C. Macedon, which had never been a kingdom of great power, was reduced at the time of his accession, to a state of extreme weakness, and was exposed to the danger of utter ruin from powerful enemies. On the west, it was threatened by the Illyrians, who in a recent battle had slain king Perdiccas with four thousand of his troops, on the north and northwest, by the great Pæonian kingdom, and on the east, by the Thracians. Besides, there were several claimants to the throne; two pretenders, Pausanias and Argæus, the former of whom was supported by a Thracian prince, and the latter by the Athenians; three half-brothers of Philip, Archelaus, Aridæus and Menelaus;

and an infant son of Perdiccas, in whose name Philip exercised regal authority.

Such was the dangerous situation of Macedon, and such were the difficulties which confronted the youthful Philip at the outset of his career; but he encountered and overcame them all, and never in any period of his life did he exhibit more art or a greater power of moulding events to his own purposes. With respect to his three half-brothers, he puts one to death, the other two escaping the same fate only by flight. With respect to the two pretenders to the throne, he foils Pausanias by buying off his Thracian supporters, and attacks and defeats Argæus, and his Athenian auxiliaries with him. He next propitiates the Athenians, who had been defeated in their efforts to aid Argæus. For this purpose, he dismisses with presents the few Athenians whom he had taken prisoners, withdraws the Macedonian garrison from Amphipolis, and sends a letter to the Athenian people, soliciting peace. Peace was concluded, in which, according to Grote, Philip "renounced all claim to Amphipolis and acknowledged that city as a possession rightfully belonging to the Athenians." Having thus put out of the way all claimants to the throne, and made peace with the Athenians, he marches against the Pæonians, whom he easily subdues. The Illyrians remain, and are a more formidable foe. His campaign against them seems to have lasted more than a year, but Philip finally triumphs, and dictates terms of peace. This was in the early part of 358, B. C. Thus, in the space of little more than a year, has Philip defeated all his enemies, and established himself firmly on the throne.

We have now before us the situation both of the Grecian states and of the kingdom of Macedon under Philip, at the opening of the period of history which ends in the subjugation of the former by the latter. In tracing the events by which, either directly or collaterally, this result was brought about, we shall be obliged to follow a simple chronological order, almost entirely independent of the relation of cause and effect.

First transactions
of his reign
359-358, B. C.

§ XI. CONQUESTS OF PHILIP IN CHALCIDICE AND IN THRACE IN 358-354, B. C.

40. The first enterprise of Philip was naturally directed against the Chalcidian peninsula, and the gold mines of Thrace. The peninsula of Chalcidice is separated from the main land of Macedonia, by a range of mountains, crossing from the Thermaic to the Strymonic gulf. Towards the seaboard, it runs out into three tongues of land, divided from each other by the Toronaic and Singitic gulfs, and forming three small and narrow peninsulas, of which the eastern is called Acte, the middle Sithonia, and the western Pallene. Chalcidice, therefore, from its very situation would present itself to Philip as the first object of his ambition. Its possession would give him a line of sea-coast co-extensive with the territory of Macedonia,—and Macedonia had now only a narrow strip of coast on the western shore of the Thermaic gulf—and, besides, having been early settled by Greek colonists from Chalcis in Eubœa, (whence its name of Chalcidice), and being from its intersecting gulfs well situated for commerce, it was farther advanced in wealth and refinement than any portion of Macedonia, and was in itself a valuable acquisition. The possession of the eastern part, moreover, opened to him the valuable mining district of Thrace. But the political condition of Chalcidice rendered its conquest no easy matter. The two most important of its cities were Amphipolis and Olynthus. Of Amphipolis, we have already spoken at length. It was a free and independent city, and on terms of friendship with Macedon. Olynthus was a powerful city, situated at the head of the Toronaic gulf. It was the ruling city of a large confederation. This confederation was formed somewhere about 393, B. C., but in 379, B. C., Olynthus was besieged and taken by the Spartans, the confederation broken up, and the individual cities enrolled as allies of Sparta. But by the time the Athenians began to attempt the revival of their empire, Olynthus had re-established her confederacy, and gained a controlling influence over the peninsula. Amphipolis was in confederation with her, and Timotheus, in his expedition in 364, B. C., had carried on

war against both cities. Athens, as we have seen, had several tributary cities in this region ; Torone, Potidæa, Apollonia, and perhaps others. Thus, it will appear that both Olynthus and Athens were interested in keeping Philip out of the peninsula ; and it is equally evident that Olynthus and Athens united could have withstood all Philip's encroachments. This state of things

Art and Policy of Philip. points out and illustrates the plans and art of Philip.

Sound policy required Athens to unite with both Amphipolis and Olynthus, but these cities had ever been hostile to her, and Philip takes advantage of this hostility to prevent her from coöperating with them. We proceed to the detail.

41. Philip first attacks Amphipolis. This is in the latter part of 358, B. C. What pretext he had for this

Attack on Amphipolis. attack upon a city with which he had been on terms of friendship, we know not ; for the real cause, we need look no farther than his ambition. Philip presses the siege

The Amphipolitans ask aid of Athens, with great vigor, and the Amphipolitans are driven to send envoys to Athens for succor. But Philip

was on the watch, and at the same time sends a letter to the Athenians for the purpose of counteracting their

Which is refused. movements. Much in the future history of Greece depends upon the answer which the Athenians shall give to this entreaty of the Amphipolitans for aid,—so much that Demosthenes declares, in one of his Olynthiac orations, that if the Athenians had got possession of Amphipolis against Philip, they would have been saved from all their subsequent calamities. But a fatal refusal is given. We may assign two

Causes of the refusal. causes for this refusal. First, Philip declared in his

letter, as Demosthenes again and again asserts, that Amphipolis belonged of right to the Athenians, that he was besieging it for them, and, when he had taken it, would deliver it into their hands ; and, hitherto Philip, as his father Amyntas, had been a friend. But, still, the promise of Philip was too good to be sincere, and the Athenians would have been suspicious of it, had it not been for that fatal inactivity and love of ease,—the second cause above referred to—which now prevail and paralyze all her counsels. The party of ease, led by Eubulus and other politicians, who found it easier to gain popularity by indulging the people in pleasures and amusements than by engaging them in wars for distant possessions,

had the control at Athens. The Amphipolitans, though abandoned by the Athenians, still held out against the assaults of Philip, but, betrayed by some of its leading citizens who had been bribed by Philip, it soon fell into his hands. This is the first conquest of Philip, and he here employs the same means which he henceforth employs for the overthrow of Greece; force, craft, and bribery. It is needless to say that Philip did not deliver Amphipolis over to the Athenians. The same fatal inaction and love of ease, which permitted Philip to take the city, suffered him to keep it. Philip amused the Athenians for a little while with apologies for temporary delays, and promises of future delivery, until at length no more was said about it, and Amphipolis remained a portion of Macedon, till Macedon itself was conquered by the Romans.

42. The next important movement of Philip was to form an alliance with Olynthus. The Olynthians, alarmed by the capture of Amphipolis, sent ambassadors to Athens with proposals for a peace and an alliance. Such an arrangement was most important. These two cities united could have prevented even now the further progress of Philip in the peninsula. But Philip is on the alert. His partisans assure the Athenians of his continued friendship and of his readiness to deliver Amphipolis. They propose, however, to the Athenians,—and the very proposal gives to his offer of surrendering Amphipolis, a certain appearance of sincerity—that they should yield Pydna, which formerly belonged to Macedonia, to him. Moreover, the negotiations about Pydna are made a state-secret, as the inhabitants of Pydna were hostile to the Macedonians. The craft of Philip triumphs over the interests of Athens. The proposals of the Olynthians are rejected. Philip gains two advantages by these proceedings. He reveals the negotiations about Pydna, and thus exasperates a portion of the people of Pydna against the Athenians and forms a party in it favorable to himself. But much more than this, he has the art to make an alliance with the Olynthians himself. As the condition of alliance with Olynthus, he cedes Anthemus, and promises to take Potidæa for her. Accordingly, Philip enters now into open war against Athens.

43. Notwithstanding Philip's recent professions of friendship, and notwithstanding he had received no cause of complaint against the Athenians, Philip begins open hostilities. This war is called the "War about Amphipolis," and lasts till the general peace of 346, B. C. It is however, a state of hostility rather than a formal war. Philip first takes Pydna and other places for himself, and then, in conjunction with the Olynthians, besieges and captures Potidæa for Olynthus. In Pydna several Athenian citizens were taken prisoners, some of whom were afterwards ransomed by Demosthenes. It does not appear that the Athenians made any attempt to aid Pydna, though they might have done so. The Potidæans, however, implore assistance. A force of mercenaries is sent, but, as they are without pay, they go elsewhere first, and do not arrive till the city is taken. In this connection, though not in chronological order, we mention the capture of Methone, which took place in 354—353, B. C. The siege of this city lasted a long time; news of its danger reached Athens in season for her to send aid, but the expedition was so long in preparing, that it did not reach Methone, till it was too late. Here, too, there were Athenians among the prisoners, some of whom were ransomed by Demosthenes. Thus, has Philip stripped the Athenians of all their possessions in Chalcidice and on the coast of Macedon. It is true, he has not himself come into possession of more than three or four cities, but he has planted himself in the region, and, as soon as he becomes powerful enough, will treat his allies, the Olynthians, as they have aided him to treat the Athenians—strip them of all their possessions. But within the period which we have just finished, Philip got possession of the gold mines of Crenides, and founded in their neighborhood, the city of Philippi. These mines were of vast importance to Philip. They yielded annually more than a million of dollars, and enabled him both to maintain his army and corrupt the demagogues and traitors in Greece.

We have seen that Athens made but a feeble resistance against the progress of Philip. This was owing in part to the Social War, as it was called, which she was carrying on during this period. We proceed to speak of this war, for, though Philip had no hand in it, it served to further his ambitious designs.

§ XII. THE SOCIAL WAR. 357-355, B. C.

44. The Social War commenced in the early part of 357 B. C., by the revolt of Cos, Rhodes, Chios and Byzantium, and continued till 355, B. C. The causes of this revolt are not

Causes. definitely known, but they probably originated in exactions imposed upon the confederates by the Athenian commanders, who, in the absence of means from Athens, had recourse to such spoliations for the support of their troops. Indeed, Demosthenes says the allies were more afraid of the Athenian friendly forces than of their enemies. The course of the events of this war is not well known. It will be sufficient

Results. to say that a peace was negotiated in 355, B. C., by which the Athenians recognize the autonomy, and severance from her confederation, of the revolted cities. The Social war was a great calamity to the Athenians. It had been costly, and her finances were now reduced to a low ebb. She was deprived for the future of a large portion of the contributions which she received from her allies, and, in general, her power was much weakened. Indeed, Athens was in a dangerous situation. She had lost her most distinguished generals; Timotheus was living in Chalcis, in exile, where he died in 354, B. C.; Iphicrates serves her no longer; Chabrias was slain during the war; and no one is left, but Chares, who, though a brave man, was destitute of military talents.

§ XIII. THE SACRED OR PHOCIAN WAR, 357-346, B. C.; THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PHILIP'S POWER IN THESSALY, 353-352, B. C.; PHILIP IN THRACE, 352-351, B. C.; HIS FLEET.

45. We have seen how opportune for Philip's purposes was the occurrence of the Social War. Nearly contemporaneous in its commencement, but lasting much longer, was the Sacred or Phocian war. Although Philip had nothing to do with originating either of these wars, yet both contributed materially to his success. The Social war weakened the power of Athens, and for the time being, gave Philip an unobstructed field of action in Chalcidice; the Sacred war distracted and

exasperated all the states of Greece, filled the chief parties to it with unextinguishable animosities, prepared the way of Philip in Thessaly, and finally opened for him a passage through the straits of Thermopylæ into the heart of Greece.

46. The Amphictyonic League, one of the most remarkable Amphictyonic institutions of Greece, dates beyond the period of League. Origin. authentic history. It was formed by twelve na-

tions : Dorians, Ionians, Bœotians, Locrians, Phocians, Thessa-
lians, Phthiotians, Malians, Perrhæbians, Magnes,

Composition. Dolopians, Ænianians, or Cætæans. The Amphic-
tyons were divided into two bodies, a Senate and an Assembly.

Constitution. The senate was composed of Pylagoræ and Hierom-
nemones. Each nation might send as many deputies

as it pleased, but each had only two votes. Besides this, there
was a popular assembly, which was composed of all the people
who might be present from any of the nations, though each
nation had an equal vote. This congress of the Amphictyons
met twice a year ; in the spring, at the temple of Apollo at Del-
phi, and in the autumn at Thermopylæ, in the sacred precinct
of Demeter Amphictyonis. Its principal function was to watch

Functions. over the safety, interests and treasures of the Del-
phian temple. Occasionally, it aimed at exercising
a sort of control over the general affairs of Greece. After the
Crissean, or first sacred war, it took the superintendence of
the Pythian games, which were celebrated once in four years
near Delphi. But, in the time we are now speaking of, it

Present State. had lost its power. While it gave a kind of conse-
quence to some small states as master of ceremonies
at the games or festivals, and from the crowds it brought to-

A Political gether, it was a mere tool in the hands of the more
Engine. powerful states. By this means, its influence became

most baleful on Greece. It gave rise to three bloody and fatal
wars, the last of which ended in the complete destruction of
Grecian freedom. The first was called the Crissean or first

First Sacred War. Crissa was situated on that part of the
War. Corinthian gulf, which after the name of the city is

called the Crissean gulf, and was the port at which multitudes
of pilgrims landed to visit Delphi. On the charge that the city
practiced violence and extortion against these strangers, the
League declared war against the Crisseans, and after taking the

town, razed it to the ground, choked up its harbor, and turned the fruitful plain of Cirrha into a desert. This event was commemorated by the institution of the Pythian games, over which the Amphictyonic League presides. This was in 576, B. C.

47. The second war was called the Sacred, or the Phocian, war. Phocian War. This war was instigated by Thebes. As early as Origin. 370, B. C., the year after the battle of Leuctra, Thebes had made use of the League to forward her own purposes. It was through her influence that it imposed a fine of five hundred talents on Sparta, on account of her seizure of the Cadmea. So, now, notwithstanding the recent general peace of 361, B. C., and notwithstanding the importance of a resting time from war for all states, Thebes seeks again through the League to gratify her revenge. The Locrians, who are her tools in the matter, bring a charge against the Phocians, that they *cultivated the consecrated plain of Cirrha*, and the Amphictyons impose a heavy fine upon the Phocians, for the sacrilege. This was in 357, B. C. As this fine was not paid, it was decreed at the next meeting of the Amphictyons, to make war on the Phocians, and to consecrate all their territory to Apollo, as had been done with the Cirrhean plain.

48. Of the war, thus wantonly and maliciously brought about, we can do no more than give a summary of events.

Events. 1. The Phocians do not wait to be attacked. At the instigation and under the guidance of a wealthy and leading citizen named Philomelus, they seize the temple of Delphi, and maintain it against the Locrians, who had marched to its defense. Philomelus sends envoys to the several states of Greece, announcing that he had seized the temple only for the recovery of the ancient privilege of presiding, which the Phocians claimed, and with a good degree of right, and that the treasures should be kept sacred. The seizure of this venerated temple was a startling event, and split the Grecian world into two bitterly hostile parties. Sparta, Athens, the Peloponnesian Achæans, and some other states of Peloponnesus, acknowledge the claims of the Phocians and agree to sustain them; but Thebes with all the northern states of Greece declared strenuously against them. At first, only the Locrians entered the contest against Philomelus. Philomelus, who had collected a force of five thousand mercenaries, levied a contribution upon

the inhabitants of Delphi, increased his army, and gave the Locrians a thorough defeat. At this point, the war passes from its narrow boundaries into a general Grecian war. Thebes puts herself at the head of the movement against Phocis. Philomelus now commences to make use of the treasures of the temple. With these he offers a much higher pay for soldiers than usual—he had already once increased the pay—and collected a large army of ten thousand mercenaries. After various vicissitudes, Philomelus is defeated and slain. 2. Philomelus was succeeded by Onomarchus, who, as the Thebans were slack in following up their recent victory, was enabled to re-organize the Phocian army. He made a still more profuse use of the treasures of the temple, and soon collected a larger force than ever. With this force, he was everywhere successful. He subdued the Locrians of Amphissæ, the Epicnemidian Locrians, and the territory of the Dorians; he also took Thronium, one of the towns which commanded the pass of Thermopylæ, and probably Nicæa and Alponus, which were important ports near it,—and Orchomenus in Bœotia. At this point, the scene of the war is changed; and we pass into Thessaly, and describe the state of things in that region.

49. The cities of the Thessalian plain—the most fertile portion of Greece,—were governed by powerful oligarchical families, with numerous dependent serfs. The Aleuadæ chiefs at Larissa, and the Skopadæ at Crannon, were at one time the most powerful of these. But Jason of Pheræ had more recently taken the lead. As federal leader, or tagus, the whole force of Thessaly was united under him, together with a large army of mercenaries, so that he was looked upon as dangerous to the liberties of Greece. But Jason was assassinated in 370, B. C., the year after the battle of Leuctra. His brothers, Polyphron and Polydorus, succeeded him. But Polydorus was slain by Polyphron, who in turn was slain by his nephew, Alexander, and he in his turn, by his wife and her brothers. This was in 359, B. C., the year Philip ascended the throne. The civil feuds in Thessaly were one of the unfavorable circumstances, which laid Greece open to Philip's attacks. At the time of the Phocian war, the country was as usual in a state of internal conflict. The Aleuadæ, too weak to contend against Lycophron, who was now despot of Pheræ, called in

Philip. Nothing could have been more opportune. Philip had just conquered the last of the Athenian possessions in Macedonia—the city of Methone—and was now prepared to extend his dominion in any direction which would be for his interest. He, therefore, readily marched with his forces into Thessaly. This turned the scale against Lycophron, and he in turn called in Onomarchus. Thus the scene of the Phocian war is transferred to Thessaly.

50. Onomarchus first sends his brother, Phayllus, with a force of seven thousand men, but he is defeated by Philip. Onomarchus then marches himself with his whole army, and, in two battles, defeats Philip with such loss that he withdrew from Thessaly. But Philip after some considerable time spent in preparation, returns, and now finds himself supported by the Thessalians with much more heartiness. Lycophron sends for Onomarchus, who marches into Thessaly with a large force. The two armies, nearly equal in numbers, engage in a desperate conflict, in which Onomarchus is defeated and slain, with the loss of six thousand troops killed, and three thousand taken prisoners. This defeat destroyed the power of Phocis above Thermopylæ, and remitted the war for a time to the original belligerents.

51. But the results of the battle were still more important in another respect ; it made Philip in effect master of Thessaly. For, he at once besieged and took Pheræ, which he made a free city, and Pagasæ, which he kept for himself. The Athenians despatched a force to the aid of Pagasæ, but it did not arrive till the city was taken. Philip thus became master of the Pagasean gulf, the principal maritime outlet of Thessaly, and extended his power over Magnesia. Besides, the victory gave him renown as the great captain of the age, and made him distinguished as the avenger of the Delphian god, while he took great pains to proclaim himself as fighting in a sacred cause. Having settled matters in Thessaly, Philip attempts to march with his army into Phocis. But, in order to do this, it was necessary to force a passage through the straits of Thermopylæ. Here, however, he is defeated. The Athenians are at length aroused, and an armament, composed of Athenian citizens, is at once fitted out, which proceeds to Thermopylæ, and stops the farther progress of Philip in that direction.

Establishment
of Philip's power
in Thessaly.

Attempt to pass
Thermopylæ.

52. Philip's victory in Thessaly opened before him new fields of conquest. It is not unlikely that in his attempt Philip in Thrace. to pass the straits of Thermopylæ, he aimed at the immediate mastery of Greece. But if so, he was disappointed. His failure, however, in one plan, only turned his attention to another. Withdrawing, therefore, his army from Thessaly, he proceeds at once to Thrace. Philip's proceedings in Thrace are not well known. It seems probable that before this, he had made an expedition into Thrace, for Demosthenes speaks of him as having besieged the important towns of Abdera and Maronea, on the coast of Thrace, under circumstances, which points to some time during the campaigns in Thessaly. But, however this may be, it is certain, that after his repulse at Thermopylæ, which was in midsummer, 352, B. C., he marched into Thrace, where he took part in the disputes between various native princes. In November of this year, news reaches Athens that he was besieging Heræum Teichos, which was situated on the Propontis, and held by an Athenian garrison, for the protection of the corn-trade. The Athenians are alarmed, and, in the Assembly, pass psephisms, ordering a property tax to the amount of fifty talents to be levied and collected, a fleet of forty triremes to be equipped, and that the citizens should serve in person in the fleet. But news coming soon after that Philip was sick, then that he was dead, they relax their efforts, and it was not till September of 351, B. C., that they despatched the expedition under Charidemus; and even then, it consisted of only ten triremes without soldiers, and with only five talents in money. Philip, however, was in reality sick, and was obliged on that account, to leave Thrace, sometime in 351, B. C., without accomplishing any thing of importance.

53. But Philip's activity was not confined to the land. In the earlier years of the war, he suffered much from the Athenian cruisers, but after the capture of Paganæ, when he got possession of the fleet which had been collected by Jason and Alexander of Pheræ, and perhaps earlier, he began to retaliate upon the Athenians, and by his superior activity proved himself almost a match for the Athenians on their favorite element. His triremes levied contributions on her allies, ravaged the islands of Lemnos and Imbros, extended their incursions to the southern Cape of Eu-

Attack on the
Athenians by
Sea.

bœa, and even ventured into the harbor of Marathon from which they carried off as a prize one of the sacred triremes; besides making spoliation on the commerce of the Ægean.

We here recapitulate the successive steps by which Philip mounted to his present height of power, together with the dates, though there is doubt as to the accuracy of some of them. In 359, B. C., Philip ascends the throne, and in 358, B. C., had firmly established himself in power. In the latter part of 358, B. C., he took Amphipolis. Between 357–355, B. C., he captured Pydna and Potidæa, got possession of the mines of Crenides, and founded Philippi. In 354, B. C., he took Methone. His first campaign in Thessaly was in the summer of 353, B. C.; his second, embracing the defeat of Onomarchus, the capture of Pheræ and Pagasæ, and his repulse at Thermopylæ, was ended before midsummer of 352, B. C., and, perhaps, between 353–352, B. C., was an expedition into Thrace. Between 352–351, B. C., he was in Thrace. We turn now to speak of Demosthenes, and the state of affairs in Athens.

§ XIV. DEMOSTHENES.

54. We have now arrived at the period of time, when Demosthenes begins to take a share in public counsels. It is, however, several years before his political influence becomes conspicuous. He was only about twenty-seven years old, when he delivered his first extant address to the Assembly; and Eubulus, Phocion, and other older men were now at the head of public affairs, and directing the policy of the State. Yet, it is both interesting and useful to examine these early political harangues. They give an idea of the Grecian world at the time, and shew the early statesmanship of Demosthenes. The address above alluded to, which is called *περὶ συμμαχιῶν*, was delivered in 354, B. C., on the following occasion. During the Social war, Chares, in order to obtain the means to pay his troops, entered, on his own responsibility, into the service of Artabazus, a satrap of Persia, then in revolt, and gained a splendid victory over the Persian forces, for which Artabazus most liberally rewarded him and enabled him to pay his troops. This was in 356, B. C. But reports now reach Athens that the Persian king is about to make war upon them, for the aid

Speech on the
Navy Boards.

their general had given his revolted satrap. This rumor produced great excitement at Athens; and many in the Assembly, which was called in consequence, were for summoning a congress of the Greek states and entering at once into a war against Persia. Demosthenes opposes these views, on account of the dissensions, and the distrust of each other, which existed among the Greeks. He says, the states would not come to such a congress, but would seek their own safety and join the king himself, so that again the Persian king would become arbiter of the rights of the Greeks. Throughout the oration, he laments the dissensions among the Grecian states. He tells the Assembly, that "the Greeks themselves are hostile to one another, and some, more ready to trust in the king of Persia than in their own countrymen:"—"that the fear of the king has not yet become greater than the enmity of some of the Greeks to you and to one another;"—and beseeches them not "to reveal the degeneracy of the Greeks, by summoning a congress, when they will not come, and going to war, when you are not able." Instead of declaring war, he advises to make preparation, and in case of being attacked, to apply for coöperation to the other states, who, seeing the Athenian ready for the war, would then join them. With respect to preparation, he recommends a new classification of the citizens, for the more successful taxation of property; thus showing in his first public speech in the Assembly, the same practical statemanship which appears in all his orations. But, already Demosthenes has uttered the complaints which are repeated again and again through all these years of degeneracy,—that the rich will not contribute, nor the citizens serve in the army or fleet. "You are richer," he says, "than all the other states together, yet, those who have wealth are so disposed, that if all the orators should announce, 'that the king was coming, was at hand, and the danger unavoidable,' if with the orators others should give prophetic warning, not only would they refuse to contribute, but they would not discover their wealth or own that they had it." And with respect to military service, he says, "The first and greatest of all the preparations of war is for every man to be willing to bear his part in it. When you *all* counsel alike, and *each one* thinks it his duty to help execute your counsels, you never fail, but when, though you *all*

agree in counsel, no one does any thing, supposing that somebody else will, nothing succeeds." He also speaks of Thebes in language of forbearance, never heard from other orators, as if he foresaw the importance of her friendship. Moreover, he is animated with the ancient Athenian spirit, when he says, "it would be dishonorable for you even when wronged to punish the wrong doer, if in so doing you would put him under the power of the barbarian." In short, in this early oration, we find all that sagacity in discerning the weakness of his countrymen, all that boldness and practical statesmanship in proposing remedies, all that ancient Athenian passion for the freedom of the Greeks—in a word, that true statesmanship, which was manifested in the maturity of his powers; the only difference being that he had not yet detected the real enemy of Greece. For, there is no reference to Philip, though he had already taken Amphipolis, Pydna, Potidæa, and perhaps Methone, and only a remote allusion to the Phocian war.

The next year, 353, B. C., in the latter part of it, Demosthenes delivered the oration for the Megalopolitans. The occasion of it was an embassy from Sparta to invoke aid against the Arcadians, who had also sent envoys to oppose the Spartans. The Spartans, seeing that the Thebans were hard pressed by the Phocians, thought the time had arrived to attempt the recovery of their power in Peloponnesus, and they proposed for this purpose a general restoration of the former state of things; the restoration of Oropus to Athens, the autonomy of Orchomenus, Thespiæ and Plataea, and the like, looking for herself, to the recovery of Messene and the dissolution of the Arcadian union. The contest became violent in the Assembly, some of the public speakers advocating the cause of Sparta, others, that of the Megalopolitans. Demosthenes in his speech takes a general view of Peloponnesian affairs. He says that neither Sparta or Thebes should be permitted to attain to supreme power. He sees that Sparta is aiming to overthrow the barrier which Epaminondas erected against her in the establishment of Megalopolis and Messene. He, therefore, opposes the proposition of Sparta. But he is equally averse to the farther aggrandizement of Thebes, and would, therefore, have Athens take her place, as protector of the Arcadians and Messenians. These are the opinions of a

real statesman—of an Athenian statesman filled with the true spirit of Athenian patriotism—but they were not adopted.

It is not a little remarkable that the growing power of Philip should hitherto have excited no alarm at Athens. The Athenian statesmen were always on their guard against the king of Persia. Demosthenes, in this oration, would not suffer Sparta again to rise to power, and would check the aggrandizement of Thebes, but he has no reference whatever to Philip. But within a year or two after this oration was delivered, Demosthenes saw the real state of things. Philip's power in Thessaly, his attempt to pass Thermopylæ, his progress in Thrace, threatening the possessions of the Athenians in the Chersonese, opened his eyes to the real danger of Greece—the danger of being subjugated by Macedon. This new view, which Demosthenes now took of Grecian politics, appeared in his first Philippic, which was delivered in the first part of 351, B. C., when Philip was in Thrace. In this oration, Demosthenes puts forth the full

The First Phil-
ippic. vigor of his style. In none of the subsequent speeches, do we find sentences more pointed, or more compacted with thoughts; nor statesmanship wiser or bolder, or more comprehensive and systematic. Those, indeed, who think the great end of oratory is to attract the admiration of the hearers by brilliancy of thought and language, will be disappointed, as well as those, who have a still lower view of oratory, as a mere instrument of confirming the people in opinions already entertained, or of leading them against what is right and good by appeals to passion and prejudice. But our orator is too much in earnest to think of the fame of his oratory, and too much of a patriot to flatter and deceive. "Never," he says to the people, "have I sought your favor by saying what I was not persuaded was for your good." The course of thought in the oration is simple. The orator first strives to remove the despondency which prevails at the present state of affairs. Next, he points out the causes of failure, and dwells upon the reluctance of the people either to contribute of their money, or to serve in person in the fleet and army. He, then, lays before the Assembly a systematic plan of action, against Philip. For the purpose of showing how plain and practical the speech is, we give it. He recommends the equipment of fifty triremes, with transports for one thousand cavalry, for

emergencies ; and the establishment of a standing force of two thousand foot, of whom one quarter should be citizens, and two hundred horse, with one quarter citizens, together with sufficient transports. He then goes through with the particulars of the expense, the whole amounting to ninety-two talents, or about \$100,000, a year. But the smallness of these armaments, and the manifest caution with which they are introduced, the orator begging the Assembly not to condemn till they had heard, is a striking comment upon the supineness of the people. Having shown how these forces should be employed, the orator concludes with another attempt to arouse the Athenians to action ; and as we read his energetic periods, we feel as if his counsel must have prevailed. But it did not. His political influence was as yet weak, and he was opposed by such men as Eubulus and Phocion, who encouraged the citizens to persist in their inactivity and let matters take their course. We meet, too, in this oration, with the first intimation of a Philippizing party in Athens, or, at least, of individual traitors ;—"There are, there are among ourselves, too many who report every thing to him." The next public speech of Demosthenes related to the Olynthian war, and we now turn to that.

§ XV. PHILIP'S CONQUEST OF OLYNTHUS AND CHALCIDICE, 350-347, B. C. ; WAR IN EUBCEÆ, 349-346, B. C.

55. We have heretofore seen how adroitly Philip averted the Change of Policy, alliance with Athens, which was proposed by the by the Olynthians. Olynthians on account of his capture of Amphipolis, and substituted himself as their ally in place of the Athenians. This alliance, which of course involved them in the "War about Amphipolis," continued unbroken till Philip's victory over Onomarchus. The growth of his power consequent upon that victory, and his increased activity in pushing forward in every direction, alarmed the Olynthians, and they send envoys to Athens to negotiate a peace. This peace seems to have been made before November, 352, B. C., as Demosthenes speaks of it as already existing, in his oration against Aristocrates, which was delivered between midsummer 352, B. C., and midsummer 351, B. C. They, however, did not propose an alliance, as that would have compelled them to join with the Athenians

in the war against Philip. This partial separation from him was not overlooked by Philip, who is said by Demosthenes in his first Philippic to have made incursions against Olynthus, probably in the early part of 351, B. C. or the latter part of 352, B. C. This state of distrust lasted some months, till Philip at length made open war against them, probably towards the middle of 350, B. C. The pretext of the war was, that the Olynthians harbored his two half-brothers, whom he wished to get into his own hands, to kill; the real cause, his ambition of power and conquest. With Olynthus and Chalcidice in his possession, he would be master of the whole region, both inland and seacoast, from Thrace to Thermopylæ. Philip prosecuted his plans, in his usual modes, which he had now carried to a high degree of perfectness; bribery, dissimulation and force. He does not attack the Olynthian confederacy as a body, but under one pretext or another assaults the individual cities, all the while disclaiming any hostile purposes against Olynthus. At the same time, he manages by bribery and every species of corruption, to attach to himself partizans in all the cities, ready to betray them into his hands. After having in this way captured the thirty-two confederate cities of Chalcidice, he besieges and takes Olynthus. This is the general course of events, but it is perhaps impossible to determine the details. There is also equal uncertainty as to the order in which the Olynthiac orations were delivered. On the whole, Grote's arrangement seems to be the best. But we dwell only upon a few points.

56. Some time after Philip's attack upon her confederate cities, Olynthus sends an embassy to form an alliance with Athens. The alliance was formed, and either on this occasion, or soon after, Demosthenes delivers his first Olynthiac, or the *second* in the edited order. This speech is a most earnest remonstrance against the inactivity of his countrymen, and a stirring appeal to awake, and seize the favorable occasion which fortune had unexpectedly presented to them. "The men are here who are ready for a war with Philip—let us aid them at once." The orator is evidently animated with the hope of now, at last, striking a heavy blow, against Philip. But he is disappointed. The Athenians make

the alliance, but send no aid. "They listen to Eubulus, a man not at all corrupt, but of simple, conservative routine, evading all painful necessities and extraordinary precautions; conciliating the rich by resisting a property tax, and the general body of citizens by refusing to meddle with the Theoric expenditure." But soon matters become more urgent, and the Olynthians send another embassy, imploring aid. It

The second Olynthiac. was on this occasion, that the second Olynthiac was delivered, the first in the usual edited order.

The orator speaks with greater emphasis than ever of the lukewarmness of the citizens, and urges a vote to be passed to assist Olynthus;—to send two armaments, one to preserve the cities of Chalcidice for the Olynthians, and the other to make a diversion, by attacking Philip at home. He also recommends that Athenian envoys should go to Olynthus, to watch affairs. He declares that citizens *must* serve, that money *must* be had, an expedition *must* be sent. The Athenians about this time, whether in consequence of this oration or not, we do not know, sent a body of foreign mercenaries to the aid of the Olynthians and Chalcidians, but without Athenian citizens, and without pay for the mercenaries. The expenses of the outfit, however, were defrayed by voluntary contributions. The expedition was dispatched towards the autumn of 350, B. C., and gained at first some considerable advantage.

The news of this success was received with exultation. The

The Third Olynthiac. demagogues laid hold on the opportunity, to flatter the people with the idea of having rescued Olynthus,

and humbled Philip. But Demosthenes knew better. He saw that now was the very time to put forth renewed exertions, whereas there was danger they would give up all farther efforts. With the spirit of a true patriot and far-sighted statesman, he stood forth in the third Olynthiac—"one of the most splendid harangues ever delivered"—to attempt the ungrateful task of moderating their triumphs and urging to increased exertions. This oration was delivered in the latter part of 350, B. C., and the three, in the last six months of that year. But it does not appear that the speech had any immediate effect.

57. The war continued for the next eighteen months. And no doubt, during this time, the Athenians put forth strenuous exertions. In the third Philippic, deliv-

ered six years after, Demosthenes says, that they sent to the war, four thousand citizens and ten thousand mercenaries, with fifty triremes. But all was in vain. Philip pressed the Chalcidians more and more. At last he draws near Olynthus, Fall of Olynthus. and sends the terrific message, that either the Olynthians must quit Olynthus, or he leave Macedonia. They make a desperate resistance, but betrayed by the traitors, Euthycrates and Lasthenes, Olynthus fell. His mastery of the Chalcidian peninsula thus became complete. The war lasted from 350, B. C., to the winter of 347, B. C.

58. The fall of Olynthus was a terrible calamity. Demosthenes asserts in his third Philippic, that Philip Consequences. raged with such brutality against Olynthus, Methone, Apollonia, and the thirty-two cities of Chalcidice, that "the traveler could scarcely tell whether they had ever been inhabited." The Olynthians, men, women, and children, were sold into slavery; their wealth was confiscated, and houses and lands and slaves bestowed with a lavish hand on soldiers, officers, and hirelings. Æschines, as he reported to the Athenians, met with a band of these Olynthian captives, in Peloponnesus—thirty women and children,—whom Philip had given to one Atrestidas as his slaves. But, besides the ruin it brought on the Chalcidian peninsula, it was a heavy calamity to the whole of Greece. We shall soon see Athens, to use the language of Grote, terrified into a peace alike dishonorable and improvident, which even Demosthenes does not venture to oppose; Æschines passing out of a free spoken Athenian citizen into a servile worshiper, if not a paid agent, of Philip; and Isocrates, once the champion of Pan-hellenic freedom and integrity, ostentatiously proclaiming Philip as the master and arbiter of Greece, while persuading him at the same time to use his power well for the purpose of conquering Persia.

59. We turn now to Eubœa. While the Olynthian war was going on, the Athenians were also engaged in a war War in Eubœa. with Eubœa. We have seen that, in 358, B. C., Athens obtained a controlling influence in the island. Since that time, the three principal cities, Oreus, Chalcis and Eretria, had sent each a member to the synod of confederates at Athens. But, Philip, as soon as he got possession of Pagasæ, at the head of the Pagasean gulf opposite Oreus, began to intrigue in the

island. Demosthenes in his first Philippic, reads a letter which Philip sent into the island, and by the present time, there was a Philippizing party in each city. Hostilities broke out about the beginning of 349, B. C., at Eretria. An Eretrian, named Plutarch, professing to be friendly to Athenian interests, sent to Athens for aid. Demosthenes suspecting that Plutarch was a traitor in the pay of Philip, opposed the request, but the party of Eubulus and Phocion favored it, and Phocion was sent with an armament into the island. But he was betrayed by Plutarch, and the Athenian troops placed in great danger, but by the skill of Phocion, they defeated the enemy and escaped. The war continued for some time, though we are not acquainted with its details. The hostile parties, however, in the summer of 348, B. C., applied for peace. It seems not to have been granted, and the Eubœans continued hostile to the Athenians until the peace of 346, B. C., when they were left to themselves.

§ XVI. THE PEACE OF 346, B. C.

The next step in the subjugation of Greece was the fatal peace of 346, B. C. We shall speak of it under the following heads; the Motives on the part both of the Athenians and Philip, which led to the negotiation; the Objects aimed at by each party; the Negotiation itself; and the immediate Results of the peace.

60. There were several considerations which inclined the Athenians to peace. 1. They had been engaged in a desultory war with Philip, between ten and eleven years—since his refusal to surrender Amphipolis, and his capture of Pydna in 357, B. C.;—and without honor or success. They had failed to recover Amphipolis, Eubœa was alienated, the commerce of the Ægean harrassed, and the finances of the state exhausted. Philip, on the contrary, had been continually growing in power, and now ruled supreme over the whole region between Thrace and Thermopylæ, and, with his well trained troops, and with his vast resources, collected from the mines of Thrace, the plunder of Olynthus and the ravages of his fleet, was prepared and ready for farther conquest. A just peace under these circumstances would have given Athens an opportunity to put herself in a

Motives of the
Athenians.

1. Their ill success.

better condition, though she was not so reduced as to be under a necessity of making it. But, 2. coöperating with this cause,

2. Their inability to form an alliance with the other Greeks. was her failure in an attempt which she made, after the destruction of Olynthus, to unite the other states in a league against Philip. So far

from succumbing under that great calamity, the Athenians prepared for still greater exertions. Even Eubulus and the party of ease were aroused. Envoys were sent into several states, to stir up the people to action and to unite them in a common war for the defense of Greece. Æschines himself went into Peloponnesus, where he addressed the Arcadian assembly of Ten Thousand, but found an orator from Philip present to oppose him, and he failed of success. The other envoys did not succeed much better. Although a few ambassadors from other cities were induced to visit Athens, yet no hearty coöperation could be formed against Philip;—so distracted were the states of Greece. This indifference of the other Greeks to the danger of Greece, disheartened Eubulus, Æschines, and others of their party, and inclined them to peace; which inclination, under the pressure of present circumstances and the prevalent love of ease, became general.

61. But, 3. the situation of the Phocian war made it important to negotiate, if possible, a general peace. 3. State of the Phocian war. After the defeat and death of Onomarchus in Thes-saly, Phayllus succeeded to the command of the Phocians. Aided by Sparta, Achaia, and even Athens, he was able to maintain himself against the Thebans, notwithstanding that disastrous defeat. Soon after, the war was transferred in part to Peloponnesus, where it was carried on for about two years. Phayllus died in 351, B. C., and was succeeded by Phalæcus, under whom the Phocians stood their ground, and maintained possession of Orchomenus, Coronea, Alponus, Thronium, Nicæea, and Thermopylæ. But the Phocians finally fell into dissensions among themselves. The temple funds were now exhausted, and the plunder of the temple had grown to be odious, even in Phocis, so that a party was formed, which deposed Phalæcus, and appointed Deinocrates with two others in his place. Phalæcus, however, was soon restored to power. But, notwithstanding these intestine feuds, the Phocians were too strong for their enemies. But, it was apparent, that the time had come

for putting an end to the war, which had devastated Greece now for nearly eleven years. This might be done in two ways; through the intervention either of the Athenians, or of Philip. The coöperation of Athens and Thebes would have been the best for Greece, since it is not unlikely some compromise might have been effected, which would tend to soothe the irritation and exasperation of feelings which had grown out of the war. Such coöperation was attempted by some of the Athenians, among whom was Demosthenes. But the Thebans refused to join with the Athenians, and in refusing the aid of the Athenians, appealed to Philip. The Thessalians joined with them, entreating that he would put an end to the war. It was this position of affairs, with regard to the Phocian war—when the moment, long expected by Philip, had arrived, that he should be invoked to put an end to it—that made peace most essential to Athens, in order, if possible, to have some part, through negotiation, in the pacification of Greece.

62. But Philip himself was not averse to peace. In order to put an end to the war, it was necessary to pass the Straits of Thermopylæ, and it was by no means certain, should the Athenians support the Phocians with their fleet, that he could force the passage. As cautious as brave, he was therefore not unwilling to make peace with the Athenians, in order to deprive the Phocians of their support. Besides, he hoped, under the cover of a peace, to be better able to carry forward his plans of future conquest in Greece and on the Hellespont.

63. We thus see that both the Athenians and Philip are disposed to negotiate for peace. And the maintenance or the overthrow of Grecian freedom depends upon the result of this negotiation. If the Athenians shall be able to make peace with Philip on the basis of each party retaining what it has, and if Phocis shall be included, then Philip will retain his own possessions in Thessaly, Chalcidice, and Thrace, but will be kept beyond the Straits of Thermopylæ; the Athenians will be secured in their possessions in the Chersonese; *Phocis will be saved*, and Southern Greece preserved from attack, at least for a time. On the contrary, if Philip shall be able to *exclude the Phocians*, and still make peace with the Athenians, then, he would be able to end the

Phocian war, and in so doing to become master of Thermopylæ, and leader of the Amphictyonic League. The great point with him is, to be in a situation to put an end to the Phocian war, and thus become arbiter of the state of affairs growing out of such a settlement. Hence, it was the aim of the Athenians to *include* the Phocians in the treaty of peace, and of Philip to *exclude* them. Philip saw the state of affairs just as it was, and entered upon the negotiation with matured plans; but the Athenians were divided in their counsels, and directed mainly by the very persons whom Philip had purchased.

64. We proceed now to detail the successive steps of the negotiation. There had been rumors, coming through Eubœa,

Early Rumor of Philip's desire of Peace.

of Philip's desire of a peace, even before the end of the Olynthian war. At the solicitation of a citizen

of influence by the name of Phrynon, who had been captured by one of Philip's cruisers and had paid his ransom, the Athenian Assembly sent Phrynon himself, together with an envoy, to Philip, in order to recover the money thus paid. They were successful, and on their return extolled the hospitality and generosity of Philip, and reported that he had no wish to continue in hostilities with Athens. In this state of

Permission to Philip to send envoys to treat of peace.

things, Philocrates proposed a decree, granting Philip leave, if he chose, to send a herald and ambassadors to treat of peace. The decree passed

unanimously, yet, the mover was impeached, but, being defended by Demosthenes, was acquitted. Philip, however, did not avail himself of the opportunity. At the capture of Olynthus, several Athenians of high standing were taken prisoners,

Negotiations about release of prisoners.

and it was resolved in the Assembly to open indirect negotiations with Philip for their release. Two distinguished actors, Neoptolemus and Aristodemus,

were employed for this purpose. Neoptolemus, on his return, reported to the senate the favorable dispositions of Philip; that he was desirous not only to be at peace with Athens, but also to be admitted into an alliance. This report was made somewhere in September or October, 347, B. C. About this time, the envoys, who had been sent to invite a congress for the formation of a confederation against Philip, returned, without having accomplished any thing. Phocian affairs had also now reached the critical position, already described. It was under

these circumstances, that about November, the Assembly de-
Embassy to creed that ambassadors should be sent to learn on
Philip. what terms Philip would make peace; ten Athenian

envoys, and one from the synod of allies, sitting at Athens, were
 on the embassy, among whom were Philocrates, Demosthenes,
 and Æschines. The envoys left Athens about December, 347,
 B. C., proceeded by sea to Oreus, crossed over to Pagasæ and
 went thence, through Larissa, to Pella. They returned about
 the beginning of March, 346, B. C. The only terms on which

Philip would make peace were that *each party*
Terms of Peace. *should retain what it already possessed.* Philip

sent by the envoys a letter addressed to the people of Athens,
 setting forth his good will and readiness for peace and alliance,
 and saying "he would have specified favors he was prepared to
 give them, if he had been sure they would make the alliance."
 Philip, just as the envoys were leaving Pella, sat out on an ex-
 pedition against Cersobleptes in Thrace, but pledged himself
 not to attack the Chersonese, until the Athenians should have
 had an opportunity to act on the question of peace. Demos-
 thenes, being senator that year, moved in the senate that the
Honors to the envoys be crowned with a wreath of honor, and
Embassadors. dine the next day in the prytaneum. The envoys
 then report their doings to the Assembly. Demosthenes moved
 in this body also, to greet by libation the herald who had ac-
 companied them from Philip, and the Macedonian envoys who
 were expected; and, also, to assign the envoys seats of honor,
 at the Dionisiac festival. He also moved to appoint a meeting
 to discuss the conditions of peace, after the arrival of the
 envoys.

65. Antipater and Parmenio, Philip's envoys, arrived about
 the middle of March, and the Assembly was held on the eight-
 eenth and nineteenth of the same month. Philo-

Assembly to crates stood forth in the Assembly, as the mover of
discuss terms the resolutions on the peace. The resolutions pro-
of peace. posed, first, that there should be peace and alliance between
 Philip and Athens; and that the treaty should include the
 allies of Philip, and the allies of Athens, with the exception of
 "the Phocians and Halus;" secondly, that the conditions of
 the peace should be, that each party should retain the posses-
 sions actually in their hands. The proposal of Philocrates in-

volved these two questions; whether the Assembly would agree to peace and alliance, on the terms specified? and, if so, whether it would permit the Phocians—Halus may be left out of the account—to be excluded from the treaty? With regard to the first, there does not seem to have been much dispute. Eubulus told the Assembly, as Demosthenes reports it—“You must either march forthwith to the Piræus, pay direct taxes, and convert the Theoric fund into a military one, or vote for the peace and alliance.” Indeed, no better conditions could have been expected. There is no doubt but that Demosthenes was in favor of it. But it was the second question, which was the critical one, and we are informed by Demosthenes that the people compelled Philocrates to expunge the expression, “except the Phocians and Halus,” and to say explicitly, “Athens and the allies of the Athenians.” Such was the peace and alliance, which was agreed to in the Assembly between Philip and his allies on the one side, and Athens and her allies, on the other.

66. On the twenty fifth of March, an Assembly was held for the ratification of the treaty, by taking the oaths from the envoys of Philip. This procedure at once raised the critical question, as to who are the allies of the Athenians. Shall Cersobleptes be considered among them? Shall the Phocians? With respect to Cersobleptes, the envoys seem to have made no objection; but with respect to the Phocians, they are obliged at last openly to announce Philip's determination, not to include them in the treaty. Here is the turning point of the whole transaction. Here the policy of Philip and the policy of the Athenians come into direct collision. Six days before, the Athenians had expressly voted, that they would not exclude the Phocians; Philip now declares, that he will not admit them. And here begins to appear the treachery and corruption of Philocrates and Æschines, and the craft of Philip. Both Philocrates and Æschines must have known from the outset this determination of Philip—hence Philocrates in the original resolution made his exception of the Phocians—and both came prepared to mislead and betray the Athenians. They did it in this way. When the envoys had announced Philip's determination, they followed them with speeches in which they tell the people, to use the language of Demosthenes, “that it would not be well for Philip

Ratification of
the Treaty.
Reception of
the oaths by
the Athenians.

openly to receive the Phocians as allies, on account of his present alliance with the Thebans and Thessalians, but that, should he become master of events and obtain the peace, he would then do every thing which we now wish him to agree in the treaty to do." They assure the people that "Philip was a friend of the city, that he would save the Phocians, that he would humble the Thebans; moreover, that, if he obtained the peace, he would confer what was of more value than Amphipolis, that he would restore Eubœa and Oropus." Trusting to the assurance of these men that Philip's exclusion of the Phocians was only a matter of form, intended to hoodwink the Thebans and Thessalians, and misled by these magnificent promises, the Athenians take the fatal resolution, and receive the oaths from Philip's envoys, "without the Phocians."

67. At the Assembly in which the oaths of ratification were taken by the Athenians, an embassy, the same which had been sent to learn on what terms Philip would make peace, was appointed to go and take the oaths of ratification from Philip, and they were also commissioned to promote in other ways the interests of Athens. Demosthenes was of course a member of this embassy, but the large majority, perhaps all the rest, were partizans of Philip. Philip, however, was not yet ready to ratify the treaty. He desired delay for two objects; to extend his conquests in Thrace, and then, after his return, to prepare for passing Thermopylæ. With regard to Thrace, Philip had returned from there sick, in 351, B. C., without making any conquests. The Olynthian war employed him the next two or three years. But at the time the embassy was on their former visit to Pella, he was about setting out on an expedition into that region, where he still was. But, at the time the embassy were appointed to receive from him the oaths, he had been there but a few days, and, of course, needed a longer interval. Hence the importance to him of delaying the ratification, but to the Athenians, of hastening it. It is true, indeed, he was bound to restore all the places taken after his envoys had given the oaths to the Athenians, yet he knew well, the Athenians would not dissolve the peace, even if he did not restore them. But, notwithstanding this urgency, the embassy lingered in Athens sev-

eral days, till at length Demosthenes carried a decree in the senate, ordering the embassy to leave forthwith, and directing Proxenus, then commanding in Oreus, to transport them wheresoever they might learn that Philip was. But the embassy, although they were compelled to leave Athens and go to Oreus, made no farther haste. They never went after Philip in Thrace, but after staying a while at Oreus passed over to the main land, and continued in Pella, till Philip returned ;—fifty days after they had left Athens, although they might have reached Philip, within five or six days of the conclusion of the peace in Athens. During the interval, Philip had taken Doriscus with other Thracian towns, some of them garrisoned by Athenian soldiers, and completely subdued Cersobleptes, whose son he brought back as prisoner and hostage. But Philip was not yet ready to take the oaths. He had now only secured the means of a future attack upon the Chersonese ; he wishes farther delay in order to make sure of Thermopylæ.

With regard to Thermopylæ. And with respect to Thermopylæ, he wished to be so near to it with his forces, before the Athenian ambassadors returned, that the Athenians, even if they should determine in the last resort to disregard the peace and support the Phocians, would not have time to carry their determination into execution. Pella was now the scene of greatest interest in Greece. Embassadors were there from Athens, Thebes, Eubœa, Sparta, and even Phocis ; while, near by, was encamped a well-trained army, ready for instant action. It was a moment of anxiety, fear and hope. The Phocian war was to be ended, but how, none knew. Athens, Sparta, Phocis, Thebes, were prostrate before Philip, awaiting his decision. All parties courted his favor. The Thebans and Thessalians besought him to proclaim himself openly as the champion of the Amphictyons against the Phocians, while the envoys of Phocis, together with those from Athens and Sparta, implored interference in their behalf. Philip played off the one against the other, filling them now with hopes and now with fears—although no clear-sighted and unbiassed statesman should have permitted himself to be blinded as to his real purpose—until, at length he was ready, and proceeded with his army, the Grecian envoys following in his train, to Pheræ, within three days' march of Thermopylæ. It was here that the Athenian ambassadors adminis-

tered the oaths to Philip and his allies, among whom was even Cardia, on the very borders of Athenian possessions in the Chersonese. Thus is there peace and alliance between Athens and Philip, but with the sacrifice, on the part of Athens, of her ancient allies, the Phocians.

68. The envoys arrived at Athens on the thirteenth of June, and at once presented themselves before the senate. Return of the Embassy. The dissimulation of Philip had not imposed upon Demosthenes, nor had the corruption and treachery of Æschines and his party escaped his observation. He saw that Philip meant to destroy the Phocians, and that he had brought over his colleagues to coöperate with him. But he did not despair; and, in denouncing the craft of Philip and the unfaithfulness of the embassy, he urged upon the senate not to leave the Phocians to perish without an effort to save them. Resolution of the Senate. The senate agree with Demosthenes, and draw up a decree to be submitted to the Assembly. The Assembly was held on the sixteenth of June, and it is almost certain, that, even at this late hour, the Athenians, if they had so Proceedings of the Assembly. chosen, might have interposed with success. But they were cheated into the belief that there was no necessity of such interposition—that the Phocians would be saved without it. Æschines got possession of the Assembly. Without reference to the resolution of the senate, he proceeded at once to speak of Philip and his plans. He said “that he had left Philip with opinions favorable to their interests in every thing, both with regard to Amphictyonic questions and every other; that through his influence with Philip, Thebes was to be besieged, as they would hear in two or three days, Thespiæ and Plataea restored, and the treasures of the god demanded, not from the Phocians, but the Thebans, who had been the first to plot the seizure of the temple; moreover, that there was another matter arranged by him, but which he would not speak of, as some of his colleagues were already envious of him”—hinting in this way at Oropus. The Athenians, who had been dismayed at first by the near approach of Philip, were reassured by the hopes, thus held out, of obtaining all that they wished for, without an effort. At this point of the meeting, Demosthenes attempted to turn the current of feeling. He arose, and said he knew nothing of any such matters, and was going on

to repeat what he had said in the senate, when Æschines and Philocrates interrupt him with outcries and jests, in which the people join, and will listen to nothing from him. The occasion is seized to read a letter which Æschines had brought from Philip to apologize for the delay of the embassy, the blame of which he affects to take upon himself. Although this letter contained not a word about Thebes, or Phocis, or the other matters of which Æschines had spoken, yet, its specious and fair-spoken words encourage the Athenians still more; and Philocrates seizes the right moment and moves, that the peace and alliance with Macedon shall be perpetual, and that if the Phocians do not surrender the temple to the Amphictyons, the Athenians will compel them;—which motion was carried. Besides, two letters, which Philip addressed to the Assembly, inviting Athenian troops to meet him forthwith at Thermopylæ, served to blind the Athenians still more, as they seemed to evince the cordiality of his feelings, and his disposition to have their coöperation in his present undertaking. Thus, do the Athenians deliberately deliver the Phocians, “with their hands bound behind their backs,” as Demosthenes expresses it, into the hands of Philip.

69. We come now to the sad catastrophe. After the de-
 Immediate results of the peace. parture of the Athenian envoys, Philip summoned the Phocian leader, Phalæcus, to surrender Thermopylæ. But Phalæcus had not given up all hope of aid from Athens in the last extremity. He had sent an envoy there to learn the final determination of the Assembly, and therefore postponed his answer to Philip, till he returned. When he heard from him the proceedings of the Assembly of the sixteenth of June, and the decree of Philocrates, he gave up in despair, and with his army of eight or ten thousand foot and one thousand cavalry, on the twenty-third June concluded a convention, in which it is agreed that Phalæcus and his mercenaries, with as many Phocians as chose, might
 Surrender of Phalæcus. leave the country and go where they pleased, but that those who remained should be left to the mercy of Philip. In accordance with this convention, all the towns in Phocis, twenty-two in number, together with Thermopylæ, were surrendered into the power of Philip. Philip had no sooner put an end to the war, than he sided with the Thebans, transferred

to them a considerable portion of Phocis, restored Orchomenus and Coronea, and made Thebes the head of the Bœotian confederacy. Philip soon after convoked anew the

Convocation of
the Amphic-
tyonic League.

Amphictyonic Assembly, which had not met since

the seizure of the temple. The Assembly decree,

first, that the Phocians should be dispossessed of their place in

the Assembly as one of the twelve ancient Amphic-
tyonic races and Philip substituted instead ; secondly,

that all the rights which the Phocians ever had over the temple should be cancelled ; and, finally, that the twenty-two towns of Phocis should be broken up into villages, and the Phocians be compelled to pay a fine of fifty talents a year, until the wealth taken from the temple should be made good. Dreadful was the ruin throughout Phocis. Demosthenes describes it as he saw it, two years later, in passing through the country : “ houses razed to the ground, walls demolished, a country stripped of its adult population, a few women, little children, and miserable old men.” Well might he exclaim, “ results more dreadful and momentous had never occurred in Greece.”

70. The news that Philip was in possession of Thermopylæ and Phocis, first reached Athens from one of the envoys, whom they had sent to communicate the decree of Philocrates to Philip. He had heard of it at Chalcis in Eubœa, and immediately returned. The people, who at the time of his arrival were met in Assembly in the Piræus, were overwhelmed with astonishment and terror. It was moved to fortify the Piræus as well as the fortifications in Attica, and to bring within the walls all their movable property, together with the women and children. Not long after, a letter came from Philip, communicating what he had done. It was written with great skill, expressed much regard for his allies, and promised they should reap great advantage from the alliance. This letter relieved them from the fear of an immediate attack, and the arrival, soon after, of the Athenian prisoners taken at Olynthus somewhat reconciled them to their present inglorious situation. Greece is now at peace, but enslaved ; and no one has done so much towards this as the traitor and hireling,—Æschines. So far from being indignant with Philip for the falsification of all his promises and the disappointment of all his hopes, if he really had any,—so far from repenting of what he had done,

he rejoices in it; he at once set off to visit Philip, and he took part in the festivities which celebrated his triumphs over the Phocians.

§ XVII. PERIOD OF THE PEACE, 346-340, B. C.

71. Miserable is the situation of Greece. It is scarcely four years since thirty-two Grecian cities were destroyed by Philip, the inhabitants enslaved or dispersed in exile, their property transferred to traitors and hirelings and a rude soldiery. And now, not in a remote colony, but in the very bosom of Greece itself, twenty-two cities more have been destroyed by the same hand, the land laid waste, the adult population of men slain or in exile, and the few remaining women and children, and old men reduced to the lowest misery; and, what is far more, an ancient Grecian state blotted out of existence, and its Barbarian destroyer elected to take its place in the most venerable and the most purely Hellenic institution of Greece. And it is a coincidence not a little remarkable, that the restoration of Athenian citizens who were taken prisoners at the former calamity should be the only circumstance which mitigates the grief of the Athenians at the latter.

72. Philip has now the destiny of Greece within his grasp. But he postpones the final blow, till he can give it with the certainty of success. Athens, he sees, is the only Grecian state which can combine the other states in unity of action, and he, therefore, directs his efforts, for the next five or six years, to two points; first, to unite with himself all those states which were disaffected to Athens, and to form a body of partizans in those which were not; and, secondly, to make such conquests in Thrace as should lay open the Chersonese and the Hellespont to his attacks.

73. Although the Athenians were indignant and exasperated at the fraud which through the coöperation of paid partizans in the Athenian Assembly Philip had practiced upon them, yet, they had not lost any of their actual possessions, nor were they damaged in their commercial prosperity, or weakened in their military and naval resources. But still their situation was rendered much worse by the unexpected results of the peace. Athens was relatively weaker through the increased power of Philip. His conquests in

Thrace threatened the Chersonese; his occupation of Thermopylæ gave him command of the passage into Phocis, Bœotia, and Attica; his now closer alliance with the northern Amphictyonic states, and his mastery of the Amphictyonic league, enabled him at will to involve the Grecian world in another sacred war. Thus it resulted that, though Athens had not actually lost any of her possessions, yet she had permitted Philip to raise on her very borders, the fortresses from which to assail her. But, on the other hand, Athens had learned by the miserable failure of the peace to distrust the leaders who for the last thirteen years had been at the head of affairs, as well as the policy which they had recommended. Demosthenes had now by long probation approved himself to the people, and by the power of his eloquence, and the wisdom of his statesmanship, forced his way to the directorship of affairs. Besides, he had now trained up a generation of younger citizens, whom he had inspired with his own generous sentiments of liberty. And he went on increasing in his power over the Athenians, till at length he aroused a pleasure-loving and degenerate age to feel and think and act worthily of their ancestors—of the best days of Greece. The policy of Athens is now reversed. It is to meet Philip promptly, and at every point where he appears. Philip and Demosthenes are pitted against each other, and it is interesting to follow them in the contest. The details are known principally from the orator himself, but even with his aid we can do little more than give the probable order of events,

It may be remarked here, that in the Oration on the Crown, which is a defense of himself as a leading statesman in Grecian affairs, he disclaims all responsibility for whatever took place before the peace, and in or immediately after it. He was then no more than an opposition speaker in the minority. But, after he took the lead of Grecian politics, after he became prime minister of state, he acknowledges his accountability and is ready to meet it. We turn now to trace the order of events during the period of peace, which extends from March, 346, B. C., to beyond midsummer, 340, B. C.

74. In August, 346, B. C., about two months after the surrender of Phocis, the Amphictyons appointed Philip to preside over the celebration of the Pythian games, in conjunction with the Thebans and The-

Philip's presidency over the Pythian games.

saliens. The Athenians, who had been accustomed to send a deputation to the festival, consisting of the senate of Five Hundred and the six Thesmothetæ archons, now resolve to take no notice of the celebration. It was not long after this, it is probable, that an embassy came to Athens, composed of Thessalians, Macedonians and Thebans, to demand a formal approval and recognition of the Amphictyonic decree, which made Macedon a member of the League.

Embassy of
Thessalians,
&c.

This demand was both embarrassing and irritating. It was equivalent to a demand that Athenians, the proudest of the Hellenic race, should recognize the Macedonians as a pure Hellenic people, whereas they ranked them among the alien races whom they termed barbarous. Such a recognition, too, would be a kind of endorsement of the Amphictyonic proceeding in relation to Phocis. The Assembly was in a state of great excitement. Some of the speakers were for rejecting the demand as most disgraceful to Athens. Æschines was driven from the Bema. Demosthenes, however, counselled moderation, and, such now was his influence, was listened to. His speech remains, and is entitled *περὶ εἰρήνης*. Demosthenes

Speech of De-
mosthenes.
περὶ εἰρήνης.

treats the question as one of peace or war, and with true wisdom shows that the present was no time for war. They were weaker, and Philip stronger than before the peace; and, besides, an Amphictyonic war would unite all the states against her. He also strives to depreciate the importance of the League itself, and ventures to speak of the folly of making war on account of the Shade at Delphi. The oration was delivered 346–345, B. C.

75. The first warlike enterprize of Philip, after the destruction of Phocis and the celebration of the Isthmian games, was against the Illyrians, whom he defeats and plunders. This was sometime in the last half of 345, B. C.

Philip in
Illyria.

We next find him in Thessaly, which he reduces more completely under his power. He restores an ancient political division of the country into four provinces, and places partizans of his own over each tetrarchy. This was accomplished by treachery, and Demosthenes mentions two of the traitors, Eudicus and Simus. This seems to have been in the spring of 344, B. C. Having strengthened his power in the north of Greece, he turns to the south, and we meet with his intrigues in Peloponnesus.

In Thessaly.

76. The obstinacy of Sparta in refusing to acknowledge the independence of Messene and Megalopolis, had a most fatal effect on Grecian interests. For, now that Thebes was prostrate, Philip attempted, and with success, to succeed to the sway which was exercised over Peloponnesus by Epaminondas. Sparta, notwithstanding her weakness, cherished the hope of recovering her power, and by so doing, kept the other states in continual anxiety. And since Athens had refused her aid when they applied for it in 353, B. C., they now courted the favor of Philip. Philip declared himself the protector of Messene, and called upon the Spartans to renounce their claims, and when this was refused, supplied his allies with men and money, and threatened to march into Peloponnesus in person. This procedure made Philip popular with the confederacy of which Messene, Megalopolis and Argos were the principal members. Demosthenes mentions in the *περὶ παραπρεσβείας*, that several of the Arcadian commonwealths had decreed crowns and pillars to Philip. These proceedings produced anxiety at Athens, and an embassy, with Demosthenes at the head of it, was sent into Peloponnesus to counteract the intrigues of Philip. Demosthenes went to Messene and Argos, and perhaps to other places. He warned those states to beware of the treachery and bad faith of Philip, and referred to his duplicity with respect to the Olynthians, and his perfidy towards Athens in the matter of Amphipolis. They heard him with applause, but continued in their alliance with Philip. Philip, either resenting these charges or thinking it a good opportunity to strengthen his interest in Peloponnesus, sent an embassy to Athens to complain of these charges. It was accompanied by embassies from Messene and Argos to expostulate against the countenance Athens gave to Sparta. It was on the occasion of this embassy, that the second Philippic was delivered, in the latter half of 344, B. C. In this oration, Demosthenes aims at two things. In the first place, he seeks to convince the Athenians that Philip, notwithstanding the peace, and notwithstanding all his fair spoken words and promises, which continued to be repeated, was their bitter enemy, and that in his intrigues in Peloponnesus, and in all his proceedings he was preparing for an attack finally on them. In the next place, he urges the people

not to yield to the complaints of the ambassadors, in which he was successful; thus establishing the policy of resisting Philip wherever he was getting a foothold in Greece. Both in this oration and in the one on the Peace, Demosthenes seems to move with caution, as if he was not yet fully master of the Assembly. He, however, begins to speak with more boldness against those orators in the Assembly who plead for Philip, and to threaten prosecutions. Philip gained nothing by this embassy, and for the present is baffled in his design on Peloponnesus.

This promptness and firmness of the Athenians in resisting his first machinations in Greece, so soon after the disastrous peace, alarmed Philip. For, about this time, in the first half

of 343, B. C., he seems to have made some attempts to conciliate the Athenians. He was not yet ready to go to war with them, and he had

learned, from the vigor of their opposition to him in Peloponnesus, that they were still able to contend against him with success. He would postpone the final contest, and therefore sends an eloquent Byzantine, named Python, as an envoy to Athens to express to the Athenians his friendly disposition towards them, to complain of the charges of fraud and treachery which the orators were perpetually making against him, and to make an offer of revising and amending the treaty. Python addressed the Assembly, and with much eloquence and effect. It was voted in the same Assembly, that two amendments should be proposed to the treaty. 1. That instead of the phrase, "Each party shall have what they are in possession of," it should read, "Each shall have his own," by which the Athenians hoped to revive their claim to Amphipolis. 2. That "not merely the allies of Athens and Philip but also all the Greeks should be included in the treaty"—aiming to check in this way the perpetual encroachments of Philip. It was also, voted that Philip should be required to surrender the Thracian towns which he had taken after the treaty was sworn to by the Athenians. These points seem to have been admitted, or at least not objected to, by his ambassadors; and an embassy from Athens, headed by Hegesippus, a bitter enemy of Philip, was sent to present these points for his acceptance. Philip refused the first outright, denying that he had made any such

proposal; he admitted the second, and offered to submit the third to arbitration. It appears, also, that the envoys were instructed to demand possession of Halonesus, an island off the north-east coast of Eubœa. This island had made a part of the Athenian empire, but the Athenians had been driven from it by a pirate named Sostratus. Philip expelled Sostratus from the island, but, instead of restoring it to the Athenians, kept it for himself. In answer to the envoys, he says, that the island is his, but that he will *give* it to the Athenians, though he would not *restore* it. The attempt to reconstruct the treaty failed, and Halonesus remained in the hands of Philip. This embassy was in the first part of 343, B. C.

But Philip can not remain quiet for any considerable length of time. He begins again his intrigues in Greece. His present plan is to secure a passage into Peloponnesus, through a faction of his partizans in Megara. It seems
Philip in Megara, that the contest between the oligarchies and the people had by this time changed into a contest between the partizans of Philip and the people. The wealthiest men sought the aid of Philip in establishing themselves in power. This was the case in Megara. Ptæodorus, one of the most distinguished Megarians in wealth, birth and reputation, entered into a conspiracy with Philip, in which he employed the services of Perilaus. But this plot was defeated by the activity of the Athenians. The Athenian troops were led by Phocion. Defeated in Megara, Philip turns to Epirus. Incited
In Epirus. by Alexander, brother of Olympias, Philip marches into Epirus, and takes the cities of Bucheta, Pandosia and Elatea, which were half Grecian towns in the district of Cassopia. But Philip had farther views. His position in this district prepared the way for marching against Ambracia and Leucas; Ambracia led to Acarnania and Ætolia,—and he had already won the Ætolians by the promise of taking Nauptus from the Achæans for them—and once getting a foothold in Acarnania and Ætolia, he could easily pass over into Elis, where he already had partizans. But this scheme of getting into Peloponnesus was defeated by the energy of the Athenians. An embassy, headed by Demosthenes, was sent into Acarnania and Peloponnesus, with the object of forming a league against these perpetual encroachments of Philip. They

brought promises of aid to Athens from some of the Peloponnesian states, from Megara, and Acarnania. The Acarnanians were hearty in their coöperation, and for their encouragement a body of troops was sent to them from Athens. At the same time, it is probable, an Athenian force was sent into Magnesia in Thessaly under Aristodemus, who was honored on his return with a crown proposed by Demosthenes. If this expedition was sent at this time, it was intended to act as a diversion and recall Philip from Ambracia and Leucas. However this may be, at least, Philip was unsuccessful in his projects in the west of Greece. These events took place in the latter part of 343, B. C. No farther movements occurred in Peloponnesus till the battle of Chæronea.

77. But while Philip was busy in person in the west, his partizans were at work in the east, in Eubœa. Of In Eubœa. the three principal cities in this island, Oreus and Eretria fell into the hands of the partizans of Philip, In Oreus, the mass of the people were under the control of Philistides, Philip's principal adherent, by whom they were persuaded to imprison Euphræus, the opposing leader, as a disturber of the peace. Then, taking advantage of this opportunity, Philistides introduced a body of Macedonian troops, and thus secured to himself the mastery of the city. Euphræus slêw himself in prison. In Eretria, Cleitarchus and others managed in the same way; they expelled the leaders of the opposite party, refused to receive the Athenian envoys, and, introducing a thousand Macedonian troops under Hipponicus, made themselves masters of the city. At the same time, they destroyed the fortified seaport of Porthmus, in order to cut off communication with Attica. Chalcis, however, seemed to be more friendly to Athens, under the guidance of a leading citizen, named Callias. These proceedings took place in the latter part of 343, B. C.

78. In the spring of 342, B. C., Philip went into Thrace, where he remained nearly a year. He is preparing In Thrace. to strike a heavy blow: He is getting ready to attack the Chersonese, and to obtain control of the Hellespont and the Euxine. The contest is now becoming closer;—actual hostilities, though not yet, are near. The Athenians had sent out a body of colonists to settle in the Chersonese, who were

accompanied by a military force under Diopithes, to protect them in their possessions. It seems that these settlers and the inhabitants of Cardia had come into collision, and the latter probably had applied to Philip as his allies, for aid. Philip, perhaps on his arrival in Thrace, sent an embassy with a letter to Athens, and it was on this occasion that the oration *περὶ Ἀλοννήσου*—attributed to Demosthenes, but probably the speech of Hegesippus—was delivered. The letter of Philip, while complaining of the Athenians, was friendly; he offers again to give them the island of Halonnesus. Halonnesus, but denies, with reference to the amendment of the treaty, that he had given permission to his ambassadors to proffer an amendment, or that they had so stated it. Hegesippus proves by a reference to the Athenian archives that Philip's ambassadors had made such an offer in his name. With respect to the gift of the island, he urges the people to refuse it, though it afforded much amusement to Æschines and others, that the Athenians should refuse to receive as a gift what was already their own by right; and he also dissuades from submitting to arbitration. Thus nothing was effected by Philip's embassy. It is not likely Philip expected any thing would result from it. The letter was his oration to the Athenian Assembly in defense of himself against the charges of the Athenian orators.

In the mean time, matters are growing serious in the Chersonese. The Macedonian troops under pretense of acting in behalf of the Cardians overran the Chersonese, while Diopithes made excursions out of the peninsula and attacked parts of Thrace subject to Philip. Philip sends letters of remonstrance to Athens, though at the very time he was making conquests in Thrace against Cersobleptes, Teres, and Sitalces, who had received the honor of Athenian citizenship. These letters seem to have produced some effect at Athens, and the people were disposed to recall Diopithes. It is in this state of things that Demosthenes delivers his oration on the Chersonese, probably in the winter of 341, B.C. This is a noble oration, not less dictated by far-sighted statesmanship than animated with the most powerful eloquence. The orator tells the Athenians, that Philip in Thrace is making war on Athens; that it was not for the wretched hamlets in

Thrace that he was striving, but for Athenian harbors, and dock-yards, and triremes and mines; it was for these he was wintering amid the horrors of Thracian tempests. For the first time, Demosthenes, in his counsels to act vigorously against Philip, triumphs over the inactivity of his countrymen. Diopithes is not recalled, but left to act according to his own judgment; and ambassadors are sent to Philip to demand that he shall cease to war against Cersobleptes. This vigorous proceeding saved the Chersonese. In the spring of this year (341, B. C.), The Third Philippic. Demosthenes delivered the third Philippic. This is in the same strain as the oration on the Chersonese, and aims at the same object; only Demosthenes now speaks with still stronger emphasis against Philip, and urges with still greater vehemence the necessity of immediate action. He looks forward to a combination of the Grecian states to save Greece from the dominion of Macedon. Nor does he speak in vain. Demosthenes is now the leading statesman in Athens; the people place confidence in him, and never thereafter withdraw it. The period of Athenian history, extending from about this time to the battle of Chæronea may be treated of, under the general head of the "Administration of Demosthenes."

§ XVIII. ADMINISTRATION OF DEMOSTHENES; FINAL STRUGGLE. 340-338, B. C.

Demosthenes foresaw the impending war, and prepared for it. His efforts were directed both to Eubœa, and to the Chersonese and Byzantium.

79. In the last half of 340, B. C., he proposed an embassy, and then an expedition into Eubœa. The forces Embassy and Expedition to Eubœa. were commanded by Phocion, and were successful. Cleitarchus and Philistides, together with the Macedonian troops, were expelled from the island. At the same time, through the negotiation of Demosthenes with Callias, a new political arrangement was made, by which the connection of the cities with the synod of the confederates at Athens was renounced, and an Eubœan synod established, having its sessions at Chalcis. Besides, Callias, who was a bitter enemy of Philip, made incursions into the gulf of Pagasæ, and captured many Macedonian vessels, for which success, public thanks were

awarded him at Athens. Demosthenes, also, was rewarded with a golden crown.

80. Eubœa being thus secured, Demosthenes next goes as Demosthenes as
 envoy to the Chersonese and to Byzantium. Be-
 sides consulting with Diopithes, he seeks to win
 Chersonese and
 Byzantium. back to the friendship of Athens, the important
 city of Byzantium, which had been disaffected towards her
 ever since the Social war. But Byzantium was in alliance with
 Philip, and he was now urging her to join with him in active
 hostilities against the Athenians. But, Demosthenes, by the
 power of his eloquence, triumphed over these ad-
 verse circumstances, and brought the Byzantines,
 with their allies, the Perinthians, to make an alliance with
 Athens. This success of Demosthenes so exasperated Philip
 that he shortly after—a little before midsummer
 Exasperation of Philip. 340, B. C.—commenced the siege of Perinthus, both
 by sea and land; at the same time, he let loose his cruisers
 against the Athenian merchantmen. These outrages at last
 provoke the Athenians to declare war. Shortly
 Athens declares War. after midsummer, they pass a formal decree to re-
 move the column on which the treaty stood recorded;—thus
 declaring war. This was done probably during the absence
 of Demosthenes on his embassy to Byzantium, since he asserts
 that none of the decrees relating to the war were his. About
 the same time, as is probable, Philip addressed a
 Letter from Philip. letter to the Athenian Assembly, enumerating his
 grounds of complaint and ending with a declaration of war.
 And Declara- War is now openly declared by both parties, and it
 tion of War. continues till the peace of Demades in 338, B. C.
 We return to the siege of Perinthus.

Philip brings thirty thousand men against the city, with an
 amount and description of enginery such as had
 Siege of Perinthus. never been known. On the motion of Demosthe-
 nes, the Athenians equip a fleet, which was sent to the Helles-
 pont and to the Propontis. Philip pressed the siege with great
 vigor. But the Perinthians were aided not only by the Athe-
 nians and Byzantines but also by the Persian satraps on the
 Asiatic side of the Propontis. The siege must have lasted
 nearly three months, when Philip withdrew from before the
 city, but appeared of a sudden against Byzantium. The attack

on Byzantium aroused the Athenians to still greater exertions. They equip a new and large fleet, and, what was of more consequence, place it under the command of Phocion. The islands also, Cos, Chios, Rhodes, and others, sent assistance, and Philip was compelled to raise the siege. He was also defeated by Phocion in the Chersonese. Besides, the privateering was checked, and grain became uncommonly abundant and cheap throughout Greece. Thus had Demosthenes, on the one hand,

Results. rescued Eubœa from the power of Philip, and made it a bulwark of defense before Athens, and, on the other, had restored Byzantium to the friendship of the Athenians, and prevented the Hellespont, with the grain trade, from passing into the hands of Philip; for which, crowns were given by Perinthus, and Byzantium and the towns of the Chersonese to the people of Athens, and by the people of Athens, a crown to Demosthenes. This crown was moved by Aristonicus, and was so popular that no one ventured to impeach the mover. But, besides this, Demosthenes had effected a most important change in the trierarchy law,—a law by which the Athenian navy was furnished with triremes,—by which change the whole service was made much more effective. This was brought about probably soon after the declaration of war, in the summer of 340, B. C. It was under this law and by means of it, that the fleet sent out under Phocion was equipped, and during the whole war, every thing about the navy was done in season, and the fleet did efficient duty.

81. The siege of Perinthus and Byzantium, and the other enterprizes of that campaign occupied the last six months of 340, B. C. In the spring of 339, B. C., Philip made an expedition against the Scythians, ravaging the country between Mount Hæmus and the Danube, and bringing away a vast amount of cattle as well as large numbers of youthful slaves of both sexes, but on his return over Mount Hæmus, he was attacked by the Thracian tribe of the Triballi, in which attack he lost all his slaves and was himself wounded in the thigh. This expedition occupied the first half of this year, 339, B. C. But, while he was away an event took place which more than compensated Philip for all the losses and disgraces of the war, and which once more placed the destinies of Greece in his hands,—another Amphictyonic war. But, before

speaking of the war which was thus thrust between Philip and Athens, we refer to the uniform success which since the peace had attended the efforts of the Athenians against the intrigues and encroachments of Philip. He had made no important progress in any direction. Under the guidance of Demosthenes, Athens had acted with promptness and vigor, and it must have been a bitter disappointment to the ardent patriotism of Demosthenes, thus to have her career of success interrupted by another Sacred War.

Nearly all our information concerning this war is derived from the rival orators in their orations on the Crown.

Amphiscean War. The following outline may be gathered from them. The quarrel arose between the Amphiscean Locrians and Æschines, at the session of the Amphictyonic Council, at Delphi, in 339, B. C.; and hence, the war is called the Amphiscean War.

Occasion. We have already seen that the fertile plain of Cirrha was consecrated to the Delphian god, by which consecration it was forever prohibited from being cultivated. The Amphisceans of Locris, however, had reoccupied and cultivated that portion of the plain which lay on their borders, and this use had been acquiesced in for a long period. They had thus laid themselves open to any fanatic that might have occasion to use this desecration against them. It so happened that after the Phocian war, the Athenians burnished certain shields, which had been made out of the spoils of the battle of Plataea and formally dedicated to the Delphian god, and set them up afresh in the temple, without the usual forms of dedication. These shields contained an inscription—"Dedicated by the Athenians, out of the spoils of Persians and Thebans engaged in joint battle against the Greeks"—which was highly offensive to the Thebans and Locrians. These latter, who had been zealous partizans with the Thebans in the Phocian war, had prepared, out of friendship for the Thebans, to bring a charge of impiety, according to Æschines, against the Athenians for the omission of the forms of dedication, and to demand against them a fine of fifty talents. This, indeed Demosthenes denies, but that the Locrians were indignant at the inscription is certain. Thus matters stood at the opening of the session. During the session, Æschines, who was one of the delegates, was rudely assailed by one of the Locrians, who interrupted him in a speech, and

in a frenzied manner denounced the Athenians as joint criminals with the Phocians and exclaimed, "turn them out of the sacred grounds, like men accursed." Æschines, as he says, was provoked to uncontrollable anger, and, on the spot and without forethought,—as the Cirrhean plain lay right below, in full view,—brought home to the Locrians, the charge of cultivating the sacred fields. His eloquence aroused the whole assembly, and carried them to such a pitch of enthusiasm that proclamation was made, "that the whole Delphian population of sixteen years old and upwards, bond and free, should assemble on the next day at dawn, with spades and pickaxes, at the Place of Sacrifice, as it was called; that the Hieromnemones and Pylagoræ should come to the same place to aid the god and the sacred land; that whatever city should be absent should be excluded from the temple and be accursed." At day-break, the entire Delphian people, with the Amphictyons at their head, marched down to the plain, and destroyed the harbor and set fire to the houses. But on their return, they were attacked by the Amphisæans, and escaped only by running. On the next day, Cottyphus, President of the Council, called an Assembly, that is, a meeting not only of the Hieromnemones and Pylagoræ but also of all persons who were at Delphi, sacrificing and consulting the god. The Assembly vote, that the Hieromnemones should meet at a specified time before the next regular session at Thermopylæ, bringing with them from their respective cities a decree to punish the Locrians for their sin against the god, the sacred land, and the Amphictyons.

Thus the train is laid for another Amphictyonic war—and within six or seven years after that fatal war, which had devastated Greece for ten years, and in the end opened it to the inroad of Philip. But, still, Æschines upon narrating to the Athenian Assembly what he had done, was well received, though Demosthenes at once foresaw the danger, and exclaimed—"You bring war into Greece, Æschines, an Amphictyonic war." But Æschines had packed the Assembly with his partizans, as Demosthenes charges, and they would not listen to him. His views, however, soon prevailed, and a decree, moved by him, is passed, that the delegates should not go to the extraordinary meeting at Thermopylæ. The meeting is held. The Theban as well as

the Athenian delegates were absent. The Assembly, however, The war de- clared. chose Cottyphus, general. Cottyphus failed of success, and at the next regular meeting of the Council at Thermopylæ in September, 339, B. C., by previous arrangements, Philip was chosen general of the Amphictyonic forces.

Demosthenes charges Æschines with corruption and treachery in getting up this war. Whether this is true or not, can not be determined, but it is certain, that if Æschines had been acting in his pay, he could have done nothing so favorable to the ambition of Philip, and so fatal to the freedom of Greece, as this new Amphictyonic war of which he was the author and promoter.

Philip, who had just returned from his Scythian expedition, was ready to engage in this new enterprize. Having collected a force, he marched through Thermopylæ, took Nicæa, one of the towns most essential to the security of the pass, from the Thebans and put it into the hands of the Thessalians, passed on to Phocis, which it was necessary for him to do on his way Seizure of Elatea. to Amphissa, but stopped at Elatea, and fortified it.

This town commanded the passage into Boeotia and thence into Attica, and it was equivalent to a declaration of carrying the war into those countries, for him to stop at that post. It was so regarded at Thebes and at Athens. Indeed, Philip soon threw off all disguise and openly declared that he had come to carry the war into Attica. This was a sad thing for Athens. It must have wrung the soul of a patriot like Demosthenes with agony, to see all the triumphs of the Athenians over Philip in the Hellespont and Byzantium made unavailing, and the war transferred from a theater where Athens had every ground to expect success, into the heart of Greece. But still he did not despair. The news of the seizure of Elatea

Consternation in Athens. filled Athens with consternation, and in the Assembly

held at dawn, on the next morning after its arrival, none of the statesmen dared to propose what should be done. Demosthenes came forward. He spoke words of encourage-

Advice of Demosthenes. ment. He proposed to send forth troops at once to Eleusis, and to form an alliance with Thebes. The troops were sent, and he himself went as ambassador to Thebes. Here everything was against him; the presence of embassa-

dors from Philip, and among them the eloquent Pytho, the nearness of the Macedonian troops, and the long and ancient hostilities of Thebes towards Athens. But Demosthenes triumphed—a triumph of eloquence only equalled by his triumph at Byzantium. An alliance is formed, and Athenian troops marched to Thebes. The influence of Demosthenes continues to increase, and his ascendancy gives a vigor to the counsels of Athens, which they had not known since the Peloponnesian war. And now for the first time he succeeds in converting the Theoric fund to military purposes. Philip was much disappointed at the alliance between Thebes and Athens, and thought it expedient to reassume his pretence of acting in behalf of the Amphictyons against Amphissa. Accordingly he writes to his allies in Peloponnesus to join him for this specific object. The

war was carried on, in Phocis and on the borders of Boeotia, during the fall and winter of 339–338, B. C. The Athenians and Thebans not only maintain their ground against Philip, but gain some advantages over him, especially in two battles, called by Demosthenes the battle of the river, and the battle in the winter. There were great rejoicing on account of these successes, and to Demosthenes was voted a crown, which was proclaimed at the Dionysiac festival of March, 338, B. C. Besides, the Athenians and Thebans now reconstructed the Phocians as an independent state, and Ambrysus on the southwestern portion of Phocis was fortified with great care. Indeed, the war was carried on for some months on a large scale and with considerable success, but was brought to a sudden termination by the fatal battle of Chæronea, which was fought in August, 338, B. C. But we are not acquainted with the intermediate events.

The battle of Chæronea was a hard fought battle. The number of Philip's army is stated by Diodorus to have been thirty thousand foot and two thousand horse, besides troops from the Thessalians and his other allies. The numbers opposed to him are not known. The Athenians furnished the largest number under Lysicles and Chares; next, the Thebans, and then the Phocians, Acheans, and Corinthians. The Lacedæmonians, Messenians, Arcadians, Eleans, and Argians took no part in the war; the last four on account of their

Battle of Chæronea.

fear that Sparta would seek the protection of Philip, or, at least, avoid his enmity. The omens were pronounced unfavorable, but Demosthenes declaring the Delphian priestess had philippized, refused, like Epaminondas before the battle of Leuctra, to regard them. On the field of battle, Philip commanded a chosen body of troops, on the wing opposed to the Athenians, Alexander commanded on the wing opposed to the Thebans. The Theban phalanx which under Epaminondas had conquered at Leuctra and Mantinea, strove in vain against the phalanx of the Macedonians; so desperate was the contest that the Sacred Band perished to a man. The Athenians in their wing fought with ardor and obstinacy, and were at first successful, but could not hold out against the well-trained and hardened forces of Philip. After a long struggle, the allied forces were defeated. One thousand Athenian citizens perished, and two thousand were taken prisoners. The loss of the Thebans was equally great.

82. The news of the defeat filled Athens with consternation; but there was no despair. The people, without
Proceedings at Athens. waiting to be called, met at once in Assembly, and made preparations for defense. The whole body of citizens were placed under arms; none were exempted, and it was made treason to flee. Citizens, who had been disfranchised by judicial sentence, were restored to the full rights of citizenship, and the metics, or resident foreigners, received the same privilege. The slaves, also, who could aid in the defense of the city, were enfranchised. Families in the country were ordered to repair, with their property, into the several strongholds in Attica; the fortifications of the harbor of the Piræus were entrusted to the Senate; the citizens at large engaged in repairing the walls and fortifications of the city itself. The groves near the city were felled, and the stones taken from the tombs, to furnish materials for the repairs; while the wealthy citizens came forward with large contributions to pay the expenditures. The decrees authorizing these various preparations of defense, were most of them proposed by Demosthenes. Indeed, he had lost none of his influence with the people, notwithstanding the failure of his measures, but continued to exercise the same directorship of affairs as before.

83. While Athens was thus preparing to defend herself, Philip was drawing nearer and nearer to the city. Philip treated the Thebans with great severity. He sold all his Theban captives into slavery, and, after he got possession of the city, put to death several leading citizens and banished others, at the same time confiscating the property of both the slain and the exiles. He overthrew the existing government, and established a despotism of Three Hundred selected from his own partizans, whom he supported and controlled by a Macedonian garrison in the Cadmea. He, also, overthrew the Bœotian confederacy, and made Orchomenus, Plataea and other towns, independent of Thebes.

84. Philip's treatment of the Athenians was not less characteristic than his cruelty towards the Thebans. He professed himself willing to make a treaty of peace with them. His offer, however, was dictated by considerations of policy. In the first place, it was by no means certain that he could take the city, or, at least, without great difficulty; for it was well fortified, its fleet commanded the sea, and a protracted siege would enable the Athenians to combine other states against him. And, in the second place, Philip was now anxious to set out upon his long cherished expedition against Persia, and he wished in that expedition to be acknowledged as the leader and head of the Grecian world.

Hence, with an appearance of great generosity, he offers to restore his two thousand Athenian prisoners without ransom, and to deliver Oropus, which the Athenians had so long coveted, into their hands; but he requires that Athens shall acknowledge him as the head of the Grecian world, and not only so, but promote a like acknowledgment from all the other Greeks, in a congress speedily to be assembled. This is asking all that he had ever aspired after, in the very height of his ambition;—to make Athens his tributary, and to rule over the Greeks. His policy is no less evident than the generosity, which his Athenian partizans so much lauded. These terms were proposed in the Athenian Assembly by Demades, and were readily accepted. Hence, the peace is called the peace of Demades. Soon after, Philip mastered Acarnania, placed a garrison in Ambracia, and

marched as a conqueror through Peloponnesus. He, then, as-
Submission of sembled a congress of Grecian cities at Corinth, in
all Greece. which he was appointed leader of the united Greeks
against Persia. Philip was soon after assassinated, and with
the death of the great destroyer of Grecian freedom, we termin-
ate our narrative of its fall.





NOTES.

INTRODUCTION.

THIS Introduction will embrace the following subjects: the circumstances under which the Decree of Ctesiphon was proposed, and the character of that decree; the Impeachment of Ctesiphon by Æschines, and the character of that impeachment; the Trial, and an account of the Speeches of both Æschines and Demosthenes.

The defeat at Chæronea gave new life to the philippizing faction at Athens, while the successful negotiation of the peace had probably acquired for the leaders some considerable popularity. This recovered vitality manifests itself especially in attacks upon Demosthenes, though at first not openly by the leaders, but by underlings, set on by them. Every form of action was brought against him, but he was acquitted in all of them. But, although the citizens had in this indirect way, through the courts, shown their confidence in Demosthenes, yet it was desirable to have the deliberate and formal judgment of the whole people upon his conduct, partly to end the annoyance of these petty prosecutions, but principally, as a tribute justly due. Accordingly, Ctesiphon offered in the senate a Resolution, that "the people of Athens should crown Demosthenes with a golden crown."

The grounds on which Ctesiphon proposed, that the people should bestow this Crown, were two; certain specific acts, and the general conduct of Demosthenes, as a public man. The specific acts were the gift of three talents towards the repair of the walls of the city, and a considerable contribution to the Theoric fund.

The hasty repair of the walls, which had been made after the defeat at Chæronea, in order to defend the city against an immediate attack, had disclosed the necessity of a general and thorough repair. It appears from Athenian inscriptions somewhat recently found, that this rebuilding was distributed through five years; that the general superintendence of the work was consigned to an architect, by whom the wall was divided into ten sections, and each section given to one of the tribes; and that each tribe chose some one to have the management of the funds, which were given by the state for this purpose. Demosthenes was chosen, in the first year of the repairs, to this office, by the tribe of Pandionis, and supplied the insufficiency of the public funds, by a contribution of his own. It is to this thorough repair of the walls, to which, the contribution of Demosthenes, mentioned in the decree of Ctesiphon, refers, and not, as is generally supposed, to the hasty repairs just after the battle of Chæronea.

The Theorica were public moneys distributed at stated times among all the citizens. This money was given, both to pay the entrance fee to the theater and the charges made upon individual citizens at the public festivals. At all the great festivals, there were not only sacrifices, but processions, theatrical exhibitions, and gymnastic contests, the expenses of which were defrayed indeed, principally, by the largesses of the rich, under the name of liturgies, but in part by fees. The sum paid to each individual for the theater was two obols, and two obols for each day of a festival up to six obols, but not beyond. The sum paid to each individual was called the diobely,—διωβελία—and the sums together, expended in this way, the Theoric moneys,—τὰ θεωρικά—these latter being so called, because the distribution in its origin, as established by Pericles, was limited to defraying the expenses of the theater. This donation of public money may be considered perhaps as nothing more than a mode of supporting the public theater and maintaining the religious festivals, at the public expense, and that in a way peculiarly congenial with the democratic sentiment at Athens. Says Grote, "The expenditure of the Theoric fund was essentially religious in its character, incurred only for various festivals, and devoted exclusively to the honor of the gods. The Theoric fund was essentially the Church-Fund at

Athens; that upon which were charged all the expenses incurred by the state in the festivals and the worship of the gods. The diobely was given in order to ensure that every citizen should have the opportunity of attending the festival, and doing honor to the god. Such an attendance was essential to that universal communion which formed a prominent feature of the festival. There was no appropriation more thoroughly coming home to the common sentiment, more conducive as a binding force to the unity of the city, or more productive of satisfaction to each individual citizen." At first, the Theoric funds were taken from the common funds of the state, and were disbursed by the common treasurers, the Hellenotamiæ, but, afterwards, the whole surplus of the annual revenue, after the expenses of the civil administration were paid, which by the ancient law was to constitute a military fund, was devoted to the Theoric fund, and a board of managers appointed to superintend it. By a law of Eubulus, it was made a capital offense even to propose that this fund should be applied to military purposes. Demosthenes struggled hard to persuade the people to devote this fund to the defense of the state, but did not succeed till just before the battle of Chæronea. It seems, however, that the fund had been immediately restored to its former use, and, what is more, that Demosthenes had been appointed one of the board of managers;—an incidental proof, under the circumstances, of the still unimpaired confidence of the people.

The resolution of Ctesiphon, judging from the references in the pleadings, was drawn with sound judgment. Especially, in view of the position which Demosthenes had held towards the Theoric fund, was it prudent to bring forward his donation to that fund, which donation itself was probably an act of political prudence, although Demosthenes had always been liberal in his expenditures for the public. So, too, the specification of the contribution towards the repairs of the walls was well chosen, for that was a great work, of which the Athenians might be justly proud. But, still, it was his political acts upon which Demosthenes would rest his claims to the praise of his countrymen; and, Ctesiphon, in departing from the custom of specifying acts, and alledging the whole career of Demosthenes, as, in the spirit of patriotism which controlled it, worthy of a crown, though he may have mul-

tiplied the chances of defeat, yet, enhanced the glory of triumph:—his decree would crown the whole life of Demosthenes with honor.

The senate passed the resolution of Ctesiphon, and proceeded to lay the proposition—the *προβούλευμα*, as every such proposition was called,—before the Assembly. The next thing in order would have been for the Assembly to discuss and pass upon the senate's proposition, but this procedure was arrested by a declaration, under oath, of Æschines, that he intended to prosecute the original mover of the resolution; which he did. Demosthenes was appointed to superintend the funds for the repair of the walls, in 337, B. C.; Ctesiphon brought forward his motion sometime in the course of that year; and Æschines commenced the prosecution about the middle of 336, B. C., before the assassination of Philip.

In order to understand the nature of this impeachment, it will be necessary to examine the mode of making laws at Athens, and the difference between a law and a pseplism. Changes in laws were made with great caution. The proposal of any new law was preceded by a formal abrogation of the old one. Nor could any law, whether a new one or amending an existing law, be made, unless, having been approved by the senate, it was first brought before the first regular Assembly of the year; after which, if voted by the Assembly, it was submitted to the *Nomothetæ*, with whom alone the final decision rested. Thus the laws were invested with a kind of sacredness; and to produce before the judges a fictitious law was punishable with death. A law must be distinguished from a psephism. Resolutions passed by the Assembly were psephisms, and continued in force only one year. It is obvious, however, that these psephisms might contain matter in conflict with the laws; and that thus laws might be indirectly abrogated, or enacted, in violation of the established mode; hence, the importance of providing means of prevention. This was done by the impeachment of the mover of any resolution, containing such matter. The writ of impeachment was called the *παρὰ νόμων γραφή*, the use of which was limited to this specific offense. It might be brought after the resolution had passed the Assembly, or, as was done by Æschines, at its introduction. If the prosecution

was successful, the resolution was annulled, and the mover fined; if unsuccessful, the prosecutor was himself fined.

There were three things in the resolution of Ctesiphon, or in connection with it, which were alledged by Æschines to conflict with existing laws. We proceed to enumerate these in the order in which Æschines arranged them in the writ. The first ground of impeachment may be explained as follows.

Grounds.

1. Falsity of the Resolution.

Psephisms are public documents, and it is forbidden by law to insert that which is false in public documents. But the resolution of Ctesiphon, which, if passed by the Assembly, would become a psephism, is virtually a public document, and it contains, in the clause which asserts Demosthenes to be a good and patriotic citizen, that which is false; in this respect, therefore, it conflicts with existing laws. Æschines, it will be observed, denies the fact alledged, as to the public character of Demosthenes, but he infers from it, not that the crown should be refused Demosthenes, as being unworthy of it, but that Ctesiphon should be fined for falsely saying in a public document that he was worthy of it. This objection turns upon a matter of fact, and involves the real question at issue, the merits of Demosthenes as a statesman. It is brought forward in the form of an issue at law, because in the trial of a *παράνομον γραφή*, it could be discussed on no other ground; still, it goes to the merits of the case.

Æschines objects, in the second place, to the legality of the resolution of Ctesiphon, because the proposal in it to crown Demosthenes, was made while he was in office. For, it was a fundamental principle of the Athenian polity, that, with the exception of the dicasts, every citizen holding any office whether of emolument or honor, should, at the expiration of the office, or within thirty days after it, undergo a scrutiny, or pass an examination, as to the manner in which he had performed the public duties entrusted to him. The generals, the archons, ambassadors, the *diætetæ*, the priests and priestesses, the secretaries of the state, the superintendents of public buildings, the trierarchs, the senate, and even the areopagus, in short, all, with the exception above mentioned, were strictly held to pass this scrutiny. Nor did it relate only to matters of money, it embraced, also, the manner in which all the duties of the office had been discharged. It is

probable, however, that with the exception of money accounts, the scrutiny was somewhat a matter of form. The scrutiny was held before a board of ten officers, called Logistæ, with whom was connected, though precisely in what relation is not known, another board of ten officers, called the Euthyni. With regard to such officers as had anything to do with the public money, the process is stated to have been as follows: the officer first laid his statement before the Logistæ; if they found any thing wrong, or any charge was brought against the officer within thirty days, they delivered the case to the Euthyni, before whom the officer was obliged to appear and plead. If the Euthyni were not satisfied, they referred the case to a court of justice, for which the Logistæ appointed the judges by lot, and in which proclamation was made, for any one to come forward as accuser. The court was held in the logisterion, where the ex-officers handed in their statements for examination. The scrutiny itself was called *εὐθύνη*; the person under liability to to it, *ὑπεύθυνος*. In addition to various disabilities attached to a person in this situation, there was one which pertained directly to the present case; namely, that no crown, or honorary reward, should be bestowed on such a person. But Demosthenes was in two offices at the time the resolution of Ctesiphon was proposed, and was of course liable to the scrutiny, and continued so, till the expiration of his term of office, and thirty days after. It was clear, therefore, that the resolution in this respect conflicted with an existing law, and that, too, one of great importance. For, besides the checks which it furnished against malfeasance in office, it was an acknowledgment, which the people exacted from those to whom they had delegated power, of their own sovereignty; so that to refuse to render an account of the office one had held, was considered a kind of despotic assumption of supremacy over the state.

The third ground of impeachment was, that the resolution conflicted with the law of proclamations, which required the proclamation of crowns conferred by the senate to be in the senate house, and of those by the people, in the Assembly in the Pnyx, whereas this resolution of Ctesiphon ordered the crown to be proclaimed in the theater at the Dionysian festival, at the performance of the new tragedies. The law of proclamations, however, was merely a

matter of policy, and, therefore, this objection is less important than the second, though sufficient, if well founded, of which perhaps there may be some doubt, to nullify the resolution and convict Ctesiphon. These last two objections, it will be noticed, are strictly legal ones, both in form and substance. They admit the facts in the case, but deny the legality of the proposal which is founded upon them.

The writ of impeachment was drawn with skill, and was well adapted to the object which Æschines had in view. Both the resolution of Ctesiphon and the impeachment of it by Æschines were party movements; they were passages at arms between the party of freedom, and the Macedonian faction, in the persons of their great leaders. Æschines had his choice between two modes of resisting the resolution of Ctesiphon. He might have done it in the Assembly, by showing that Demosthenes did not deserve a crown. But he chose to discuss this point, the merits of Demosthenes as a public man, before the dicasts rather than before the Assembly; which, we have seen, he could do, in a trial of impeachment. And he had here one great advantage. The illegality of Ctesiphon's resolution was undeniable; with respect to the law of accountableness, certainly, and probably with respect to the law of proclamations. Æschines, therefore, by this mode of procedure, could attack Demosthenes through Ctesiphon, with the certainty, as he thought, of both convicting Ctesiphon and depriving Demosthenes of the proposed honor. At any rate, it could be postponed, as it was, for many years.

The trial did not take place till sometime in the beginning of autumn, 330, B. C. We are not acquainted with the causes of this delay. Neither orator refers to it, or complains of it. The trial had no doubt been talked of throughout Greece. Demosthenes and Æschines were every where known, and known, not only as rivals, but as the great orators of the age. As the day of contest approached, we can easily imagine the eager curiosity of the people, and the anxious importunity of friends; at length, we behold the crowds from every quarter, from Peloponnesus, and Thebes, and not unlikely from Macedon itself, collecting into the city to be present at this grand, this last struggle in the cause of Grecian liberty. For, Æschines complains of the solicitations which

were made by the party of Demosthenes among the people. He also remarks that all the Greeks were solicitous about the trial, and that no one remembers ever to have seen so many persons present before on such an occasion. At last the day arrives, and, after the usual preliminaries, Æschines arises and speaks.

It is to be considered that it is now eight years since the battle of Chæronea, that the Athenians retained their free constitution and all the forms of civil proceedings which they ever had, and that they might easily be persuaded to believe they were as free as ever. It was quite natural that with the loss of liberty they should grow more and more attached to its forms, and by their admiration of what was ancient make up in their own feelings for their present situation. Æschines powerfully appeals to this conservative feeling. He tells them in the opening sentence, to look on the one hand at the intrigues, and arrangements and entreaties which certain individuals were making to defeat the due course of law; but he assures them in contrast, that he came relying, first upon the gods, and then upon the laws. He straightway begins a plain, convincing, lawyer-like argument, to show that this decree of Ctesiphon, proposing to crown Demosthenes when he had not submitted himself to the people, is a violation of *ancient* customs and laws, and he claims that the neglect of their ancient constitution, by giving all political power into the hands of irresponsible men and mere demagogues, was the cause of all they had suffered. In conducting the argument, after cautioning the Judges against the arts of his adversary, "thinking to put down laws by words," he winds up with a sentence, which is quoted by Pliny as an example of bold language. "The orator and the law must say the same thing, and when the law utters one voice, and the orator another, give your verdict to the justice of the laws and not to the shamelessness of the orator." The argument upon the point is unanswerable.

Æschines next enters into an argument to prove the illegality of the time and place. In this part, too, he dwells upon the reverence due to the laws. In reply to certain supposed objections, he says, "to these sophistries, I oppose your laws as my advocates, whose aid I invoke throughout the trial." He then proceeds to the political transactions. It is not necessary to follow him through the whole. In regard to the peace of 346, B. C.,

he claims that Demosthenes was bribed to hurry the treaty, by which the Athenians lost the opportunity of making a favorable one. The orators contradict each other upon the facts point blank. But there is a passage near the end of this part of the argument, which I will translate, as it has been admired by Cicero, and commented upon by Plutarch, and imitated by Junius. Æschines had spoken of Demosthenes' extravagant flattery of Philip at the time of the treaty, and then brings up in contrast with it, his exultation at the assassination of Philip. "And yet, Athenians, this enormous flatterer, having heard from the emissaries of Charidemus, of the death of Philip, but pretending to have had it revealed to him in a vision from the gods, as if he had learned the event, not from Charidemus, but from Jupiter and Minerva, who, as he says, appeared to him in the night and foretold it to him—to him in the night!—they whom he perjures himself by, every day of his life—this enormous flatterer, I say, on the one hand came before you with a lie in his mouth, and on the other, only seven days after the death of his daughter, before he had mourned and performed the usual rites to the dead, came forth in public crowned with a garland and dressed in white to sacrifice in public—he, the wretch! who had lost the only one and the first one who had ever called him father: I say not this to upbraid him with his affliction, but I scrutinize his character. For the unnatural and bad father cannot be a good citizen, nor will he, who has no affection for those who are nearest and closest allied to him, value you above foreigners; nor could it be possible for him who is base in private to become virtuous in public, nor could he who was not virtuous in public at home, become honest and upright in the embassy in Macedonia, for he changed not the character, but only the place; οὐ τὸν τρόπον ἀλλὰ τὸν τόπον μόνον." No translation can do justice to the exquisite construction of the first part of the paragraph, or the concise force and antithesis of the remainder. It may be best seen in the imitation of Junius. He is addressing the Duke of Bedford; "I reverence the afflictions of a good man; his sorrows are sacred. But how can we take part in the distresses of a man whom we can neither love nor esteem, or feel for a calamity of which he himself is insensible? Where was the father's heart when he could look for or find an immediate consolation for the loss of an only son, in consultations and bar-

gains for a place at court, and even in the misery of balloting at the India-house." Cicero, in the Tusculan Questions expresses the highest admiration for this passage. "Itaque et *Æschines* in *Demosthenem* invehitur, quòd is, septimo die post filiae mortem, hostias immolasset. At quam rhetorice! quam copiose! quas sententias colligit! quae verba contorquet!"—That this passage was familiarly known in Greece and admired as a great effort, is manifest from what Plutarch says upon it. He enters into an argument to justify the conduct of *Demosthenes* on the occasion, and adds,—“These reflections we thought proper to make, because we have observed that this discourse of *Æschines* has weakened the minds of many persons and put them on indulging all the effeminacy of sorrow.”

Æschines next proceeds to the interval between the peace and the war. His general statement is, that *Demosthenes* finding the peace unpopular, strove to break it; and he represents the exertions of *Demosthenes* during these years, as influenced by bribery, and terminating in the surrender of the rights of Athens to the smaller states, with whom he made treaties. He, however, does not dwell long upon this period, as he was here weak, while *Demosthenes* dilates upon it at length, as comprising chiefly the period of his taking the lead in public affairs.

Æschines now comes to the fatal war, the last Sacred war. He here appeals to the superstition of the people, and wishes to show that in opposing the Holy League of the Amphictyons, *Demosthenes* had forfeited the favor of the gods, and that Philip in fighting in this cause had secured all his success. He even seems to attribute all the sufferings of the Greeks from Philip and Alexander to the anger of the gods. The narrative of the circumstances leading to the war, and of the suffering of the Greeks, is done with the skill of a master-artist, and, yet, one cannot help feeling it was too late in the history of Athens to appeal to the superstition of the people.

He then proceeds to the events which happened between the battle and the present trial. The general strain of the argument is, that everything in which *Demosthenes* has had a hand, has turned out badly: and it is in answer to this point, that *Demosthenes* bestows the most labor—claiming that he had done well for the honor and glory of Greece, but a destiny rules over all.

This oration of Æschines is wrought with great care; in the earlier part, where he felt himself strong, direct and logical, in other parts plausible and vigorous, and in some rising to the very heights of eloquence. The narratives, to which the ancients, both poets and orators, paid much attention, are finished with perfect art, and the loftier appeals to the stronger feelings and passions are some of them made with great power. But the reader feels even now that his long detail of the laws is tiresome, and that his prolixity, especially when compared with the concise energy of Demosthenes, often becomes mere dullness. His conclusion is most lame and impotent: "O Earth and Sun, and Virtue, and Understanding and Education, by which are distinguished the honorable and the base, I have uttered my words, and I have declared my sentiments"—a personification and an address so puerile as justly to bring down the ridicule of his adversary, and yet, what is the more remarkable, it immediately follows the noblest passage in all ancient eloquence, excepting the still loftier one to which it undoubtedly gave rise,—the celebrated oath of Demosthenes. This oration was much admired by the ancients. Cicero has many allusions to it, and expressly imitates the graphic description of the burning of Thebes, in two of his orations. On the whole, we may say, that it was worthy to call forth the very greatest exertions of the very greatest orator that ever lived.

Ctesiphon spoke next, and then Demosthenes. Demosthenes had many difficulties to encounter. He had urged his country to war, and she was conquered. He had made mighty exertions, and they had been unavailing. He had to defend himself, standing amidst the ruins of the State, and that State brought low under his administration. In addition to this, every attempt at deliverance from the power of Macedon had not only been unsuccessful, but had exposed those who made them to still greater rigor, and Demosthenes was regarded as the secret instigator of the whole. A bare enumeration of events will show this. In 335, B. C., Thebes revolts, as was supposed through the agency of Demosthenes, but she is utterly destroyed by Alexander. The Athenians send an embassy to apologize for their part in the matter. Alexander demands ten citizens to be given him, among whom is Demosthenes. But they refuse to deliver Demosthenes. In 334, B. C.,

Speech of Demosthenes.

Alexander was in Persia and fought the battle of the Granicus. In 333, B. C., there were some attempts at a revolution in Lacedæmon, but they were suppressed, by the news of the battle of Issus. In 332, B. C., Alexander is in Tyre, where ambassadors meet him from Greece, and from Athens among the rest, to assure him of their fidelity, as there had been further attempts at freedom in Lacedæmon, and as the King of Persia had sent three hundred talents of gold to Athens to instigate the Athenians to revolt. In 331, B. C., the Lacedæmonians were utterly defeated in their efforts at freedom, by Antipater, and Alexander gained the battle of Arbela. Embassadors were sent to implore his mercy, and he requires the leaders of the revolt to be punished.

It was just at this time, when every thing was adverse, when the last struggles for liberty had been exhausted, when Athens was in supplication at the feet of her conqueror, and that conqueror the greatest warrior in the world, when Demosthenes had already been once marked out as a victim to appease the wrath of Macedon and was now regarded as coöperating with Persia against Greece; it was at this time, when he was charged as being the accursed instrument, fated of the gods, of all her calamities, amidst defeat and discouragement, and before a people bereft of the spirit of liberty, and cowering before the conqueror of Asia, that Demosthenes was to defend himself from having been the cause of all this ruin. But there is one feeling so deeply seated in the heart of man as to be the very last that is utterly eradicated. Subjected to foreign power as Athens now was, the love of glory was still strong in the hearts of the Athenians. They were proud of the days of their power when they gave law to Greece, and they cheated themselves with the belief that they were after all, of the old Athenian race. Here was the strength of Demosthenes. Nor did it require any art to point out to him the course he was to follow. For he himself was borne up, in all his labors, by this pride of country. He had embodied, as it were, in himself the ancient spirit of the land. From the beginning of the oration, he is reanimating the Athenians with the proud feelings of the past, and he carries them with him and with such rapidity of thought that at last he swears to them in an oath, that if they had known they were to be defeated, they ought to have done as they did.

The speech of Demosthenes is wrought in every part of it, with the utmost care. Like a drama, it is divided into certain larger portions, or acts, and these again are subdivided, as it were, into scenes, and the whole is put together with as much consummate skill as is to be found in the most perfect work of art. We shall here mention only the principal divisions. These are three. The first part embraces the period of the fatal peace of 346, B. C.

General Account of the Speech of Demosthenes.
First Division. It contains an account of the circumstances under which the peace was made, of the injurious delay of the embassy which was sent to administer the oaths of ratification to Philip, of the passage of Thermopylæ, and the destruction of Phocis, and of the general and remote consequences of the peace. Demosthenes separates this portion of his speech from the rest, on the ground that it embraces matter irrelevant to the case. He professes to take it up, merely because Æschines had given so false an account of it. This movement, by which he is enabled to treat of a period so disgraceful to Athens and her statesmen, as something not properly pertinent to the case, (but which after all he could not safely have left out of it,) is most masterly. For this peace, whether the freedom of Greece could ultimately have been saved or not, was the immediate and most powerful cause of its overthrow; and Demosthenes, as we have seen, was a good deal connected with the transactions of that period. It was well judged, then, if it could be fairly done, to separate this portion of his public life, from that on which he relied for the proof that he was deserving of the crown which Ctesiphon had proposed. But could it be fairly done? Demosthenes makes a distinction between that portion of his public life in which he acted as the leading statesman in Athens, originating and directing all the important measures of the State, and that earlier portion in which he was struggling in vain against the policy and measures of the dominant leaders. If this be a just distinction, and it seems so, then might Demosthenes fairly leave out this early period from the account which he wishes to give of himself as an Athenian statesman, though it is to be observed that in going through with it, he is careful to set forth his share in the transactions as patriotic, and worthy of approbation.

Having finished the irrelevant topics, which, as he said, had been forced upon him by Æschines, Demosthenes proceeds to make his defense against the impeachment itself, and to recount those things done by himself for which he was deserving of the honor, which had been voted him by the senate. It is in this connection, he makes the distinction mentioned above. He confines himself to the instances of successful resistance, which were made against the encroachments of Philip, after "I," as he says, "came to take the lead in affairs." The period of what we may call the administration of Demosthenes commences about the time when Philip, after the peace, began to intermeddle with the affairs of the Grecian States, and extends to the battle of Chæronea. Demosthenes divides this period into two subdivisions, which correspond to the second and third divisions of his speech. We have seen with what success, Demosthenes, by his embassies and his eloquence, resisted and thwarted the intrigues of Philip in Peloponnesus, in Megara, in Acarnania; and how triumphantly the Athenians, under the guidance of Demosthenes, after the war was declared, rescued the Chersonese, saved Byzantium, and expelled Philip from Eubœa; but we also saw how suddenly this successful career was stopped, by the unexpected outbreak of another Sacred war in Greece. In accordance with these facts, Demosthenes divides this period into two; that, in which Athens was successful against Philip, and that, in which by the great calamity which befel her, she lost the fruits of her victory, and was herself conquered. Demosthenes, therefore, embraces in **The Second Division.** the second division of his speech only that portion of his administration in which Athens was every where successful. It begins with the embassy into Peloponnesus and ends with the triumphs in Eubœa and Byzantium. This too, was a masterly movement on the part of our orator; he separates the period of defeat from the period of victory. It is easy to see with what exultation he dwells upon this brief period of triumph, and what advantage it gave him to look at it by itself, and to found upon it alone a sufficient ground for the honor which had been awarded him. Nor was there any thing unfair in asking a judgment upon those measures which he had both originated and carried to a successful issue, apart from those, in which he made a vain resistance against a war brought upon

his country by another party. It is true, his statesmanship was as conspicuous in the latter as in the former period, but if there was any disadvantage to himself arising from the unsuccessful result of the war, he was right in avoiding it.

This second part of the oration contains, as we have said, his defense against the impeachment. He first discusses the meritorious ground of the honor which Ctesiphon had proposed should be bestowed upon him; next, he examines, but very slightly, the questions of official accountability and of the proclamation; and then concludes this portion of his speech by assuming that he had made out a clear case of acquittal for Ctesiphon.

But Demosthenes can no more leave out the Amphiscean war from his speech than he could have done the peace of 346, B. C. But the pretense under which it is brought in, is somewhat remarkable. It is, that Æschines had gone

Third Division.

out of the proper bounds of the case to attack him, and it was no more than fair that he should be attacked in turn. It is under this rather thin disguise, that Demosthenes brings in the period of the Amphiscean war, which forms the substance of his third division. He first traces out the several steps by which Æschines brought the Amphictyonic war against his country, and, then, states, at great length and with wonderful power, the measures which he had adopted for his country in warding off the perils of which Æschines was the cause. Having gone through with these, he passes in a rapid review over the principal points of his defense, and ends, as he began, with a prayer, but now, with a prayer for the salvation of his country. We proceed to a more particular analysis and explanation of the oration.

ANNOTATIONS.

§ 1—8. EXORDIUM.

In the speech of Æschines, especially in the latter portion, after the orator had finished the formal divisions of his argument, there were several points, which produced so great an impression, that Demosthenes was driven to put forth his great-

est efforts at the very outset of his speech, in order to do away with the effect of them. In particular, *Æschines* urges that *Demosthenes* shall not be called on to speak at all, but, if he does speak, that he should be limited to the same order in the defense, which he himself had followed in the prosecution. There was no need of oratory, he says in substance, in the trial of an impeachment of this kind; it is only necessary to compare the psephism with the law, as was done in ancient times by the judges, who were then so scrupulous that they would condemn the accused for the variation of a word. And such evils have grown out of the practice of suffering orators to speak on these trials, in aid of the parties, that "For my own part," he says, "I would almost propose that neither prosecutor nor defendant should have assistant speakers; for, the Right in this matter is not a thing indefinite, but is bounded by your laws. In carpentry, when we wish to learn whether a part is straight or not, we apply a measuring rule to determine; so in these trials, we have only to apply the laws, the measure of the Right, to the psephism, to determine whether there is anything in it contrary to the laws. Shew that the two are coincident, *Ctesiphon*, and you need say no more. Why, then, is it needful for you to call *Demosthenes*?" "But if overstepping the just bounds of defense, he shall call *Demosthenes*, do not you, judges, accept this evil-doing man, who thinks to put down the laws by words; but, if you do, demand that he follow the same order in the defense, as I followed in the prosecution. And what was that? First, I exhibited the laws forbidding to crown those who were subject to the official scrutiny, and I proved that *Demosthenes* was thus subject, when *Ctesiphon* proposed to crown him. Next, I went through with the laws of proclamations, prohibiting the proclamation of a crown bestowed by the people, anywhere, except in the Assembly; and lastly, I spoke with brevity of his private life, and at length of his public crimes. So, too, demand of *Demosthenes* that he speak first on the question of the official accountability, secondly, about the proclamation, and, thirdly, show that he is worthy of the crown. And if he shall entreat you to indulge him as to the order of his speech, promising in the end to make his defense against the charge of illegality, indulge him not, nor be ignorant that this is a trick of the court-house. He does

not intend to return to that charge, but having no defense to make, hopes to lead you to forget it, by drawing your attention to other matters. But watch him, and drive him to the true question." The issue of the trial turned upon this point; if Æschines had been successful here, it is probable he would have been successful in the trial. Hence, the solemn prayer of Demosthenes, in his opening sentence, that the gods would inspire his judges with the determination, to let him speak as the laws permitted,—according to his own choice.

Æschines, too, in connection with the foregoing topic, represents Demosthenes as having very little interest in the trial;—"Why, the tears? Why, the cry? Why, that tone? Is not Ctesiphon defendant, and the penalty a fine, while you contend neither for property, nor life, nor citizens' rights? But for what is his zeal? for golden crowns, for proclamations in the theater, contrary to the laws;"—after this, he returns to the point, that Ctesiphon should not call in Demosthenes to assist him. In this connection he speaks of the shamelessness of Demosthenes, in praising his own deeds. "If Ctesiphon shall presume to call for Demosthenes to address you, and he shall ascend the Bema, and laud himself, it will be harder to listen to the praises than it was to endure the deeds." "From such a shameless proceeding, if you are prudent, Ctesiphon, you will forbear, and make the defense yourself." It is these topics,—the order of the defense, the interest he has at stake, the self-praise,—especially the first, which Demosthenes takes up in the exordium.

§ 1-2. THE PRAYER OF DEMOSTHENES, IN WHICH HE PRAYS, FIRST, FOR THE GOODWILL OF THE JUDGES, AND, SECONDLY, FOR PERMISSION TO FOLLOW THE COURSE OF THOUGHT, WHICH HE HAD MARKED OUT FOR HIMSELF.

§ 1. εὐχόμεαι. English translators have avoided the simple word, *I pray*, preferring the fuller forms "*I begin by praying*," "*Let me begin by imploring*," "*I make my prayer*;" but the simple *I pray* seems to be the most forcible. Wolf translates; "*precor*." πᾶσι καὶ πάσαις. Lord Brougham has done well in not translating πάσαις; "*All the Heavenly*

Powers." Perhaps, the simple *First, I pray all the gods*, is the best way of translating these few opening words. It should be observed, however, that the words *πᾶσι καὶ πάσαις* have an emphasis in the original, from their position, which is lost in any translation. *διατελεῶ*. Both Æschines and Demosthenes quote this verb from the resolution of Ctesiphon, and Æschines lays stress on it; for he says, he will prove that "*Demosthenes never began to say what is most honorable, nor is now continuing to do what is useful, to the people.*" § 50. There was, therefore, a fitness in the choice of the phrase. *καὶ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν*, to all—you,—the individuals before me, not the state alone; thus establishing a personal sympathy with those whom he was addressing. *ὑπάρξει*. This clause had better be translated by a subordinate proposition, as in the Latin, "*ut tanta (benevolentia) mihi a vobis tribuatur*," and in the English translations; yet, the English can give the form of the Greek expression; *I pray for so much goodwill to be granted to me.* *τοῦτο*, this, not the vulgar "*this here.*" Dionysius of Halicarnassus, in speaking of changes made in words with the view to a harmonious composition of them in the members of the sentence, refers to this clause, and says: "Demosthenes added a letter to the pronoun, in reference to the structure"—not to the thought—"for, *εἰς τοῦτον τὸν ἁγῶνα* was enough." De Comp. Verb. C. vi. *ὅπερ*, that which, or, what, not "*whatsoever.*" "Sane cohærent syntactice *ὅπερ* et *τοῦτο*. Quæ sequuntur, *μὴ τὸν ἀνιδίκον*—, addita sunt *ἐπεξηγήσεως χάριν.*" SCHAEFER. *ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν*, for your interest. Compare *ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐχθρῶν*, § 234; and, also, *ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαστῶν*, § 249, "*utile judicibus.*" SCHAEFER. *καὶ τῆς ὑμετέρας εὐσεβείας τε καὶ δόξης*. This clause contains the particulars, embraced in the general expression, *ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν*, and being united in one by *τε καὶ*, is connected with that by the first *καὶ*. This form of construction occurs in English; but in general the particulars are simply appended without a conjunction, as if in apposition. It may be translated thus, *for your interest, for both your piety and honor*; or, perhaps better, *for your interest, your piety, and your honor*. It concerned their piety not to violate the judicial oath, and their honor, not merely not to do that, but, also, not to be so unfair as to take the opposite party into their counsels. ULPIAN. *τοὺς θεοὺς*, introduced, because

the infinitive is remote from the finite verb. πῶς ἀκούειν.

§ 2. We have seen how carefully Æschines had marked out, how they should hear him. τὸν ὄρκον, the oath taken by the dicasts at the time of their appointment. It is given in Demosthenes' speech against Timocrates. § 746-747. The portion referred to here is as follows: καὶ ἀκροάσομαι τοῦ τε κατηγόρου καὶ τοῦ ἀπολογουμένου ὁμοίως ἀμφοῖν. Quoted by SEAGER, in Classical Journal, vol. 53, p. 50. πρὸς ἅπαν τοῖς ἄλλοις δικαίοις. Each requisition of the oath was a just one; hence, by referring to *all the other just requisitions*, he gives to the words of the oath which he quotes, that sanctity which belongs to the whole. οὐδὲ = οὐδὲ μόνον. See § 93, § 107. τῇ τάξει καὶ τῇ ἀπολογίᾳ, not, = τῇ τάξει τῆς ἀπολογίας, but embracing both the order and the matter of the defense. The single word, ἀπολογία, might easily be understood to mean both, but, with reference to the exigencies of his case, the orator draws attention to "the order," by a specific word. Hence, to avoid ambiguity, it should be rendered something as above, *the order and the matter*, or, as Lord Brougham, "*method and line*," or as Kennedy, "*order and course*" of defense. "*Quo ordine et quod velit dicere*." DISSEN. βεβούληται καὶ προῆρηται, not, "*may choose and prefer*," as would be said by modern orators, but, *has chosen and preferred*, in accordance with the practice among ancient orators, of previous preparation. Lord Brougham has overlooked this distinction, and translates "*may be pleased to prefer*." In one respect this is a very fine translation. Demosthenes has here, as elsewhere, used two verbs, where either would have well expressed the meaning without the other. There is a distinction between the words, it is true, but it does not seem important that it should be brought forward in the present instance. This is common with all writers, although the repetition appears in different languages, in different forms; and it is the duty of the translator to transfer the forms of expression in one language into the corresponding forms in another. Lord Brougham in the present case has done well to transfer the finite form of one of the verbs into the infinitive. τῶν ἀγωνιζομένων ἐκαστος. Ἀπολογία requires ὁ φερόγων, but, while the orator would give prominence to the rights of the defendant, he would claim for him only what belongs to the prosecutor as

well, what the law gives to both parties,—that they should be heard alike;—hence, the anacoluthon. “*Consulto locutus est orator perplexius, ut veniam ordinis pervertendi tanquam suffuraretur.*” SCHAEFER. That the “perplexed diction” was intentional, is doubtless true, but there was nothing unfair in the demand of Demosthenes. Æschines assigns no legal reason why Demosthenes should begin with the question of official accountability or of the proclamation.

This sentence consists of three portions, or periods, of which the first prepares the way for the second, and the second for the third, while, in the importance of the thought, the third is superior to the second, and the second to the first. In the first, the orator implores the kindness of the judges; in the next, what kindness would prompt, that they would hear *both parties* alike; and in the last, what is involved in the hearing both parties alike, that they would allow *him* to follow his own order of *defense*;—and this is the grand object of the whole. This principle of arrangement is universal, and obtains even in the smaller portions of a sentence. Thus, in the first portion, the solemnity of the prayer foretells the importance of the petition, while the clause, expressive of his kindness both to the state and the individuals before him, contains the ground and the measure of that kindness which he asks in return. If the first member had been placed last, or the second and third had exchanged places, these auxiliary thoughts would have lost much of their power. In the second portion, the first clause, by its appeal to the piety and the honor of the judges, awakens in their minds a strong personal interest in the forthcoming petition, that they would take for their counsellors as to the manner in which they should hear him, the Laws and the Oath, which petition itself is strengthened by the contrast of the cruelty of taking his adversary as their counsellor; and then, after premising the justice of all the other requisitions of the oath, and hence raising a presumption in favor of the justice of that requisition he was about to mention,—then, at last he utters the important clause, that they should hear both parties alike. The last portion is constructed on the same principle as the whole sentence,

—that of the climax. Not only is the thought, most important to the oration, placed last, but prominence is given to it by the very mode in which the three clauses are united, by *οὐ μόνον—ἀλλὰ*. This analysis, which is taken substantially from Disсен, is sufficient to authorize the law of arrangement, or disposition, which he lays down, “ut præmittatur id cujus minor rhetorica vis, postponatur cujus sit major rhetorica vis et quo maxime trahere velis attentionem.” By the rhetorical worth of a thought, he goes on to explain, he does not mean its intrinsic and absolute worth, but its worth relative to the case in hand. “Rhetorica autem vis ubique *consilio loci* definitur.” De Structura periodorum oratoria, XII–XIV.

If we examine this sentence with respect to its contents, apart from the form, we shall find several things worthy of attention. 1. The proposition and the argument are both obvious, and might have been stated in the most simple form of the sentence;—thus, “I ought to be permitted to follow my own order in the defense, for this is required by the laws and the judicial oath.” But, if the orator had so stated it, he would undoubtedly have failed in his defense. Now, it is the difference between such a

A Characteristic of true Eloquence formal, abstract statement of an argument, and that full, expanded treatment which we find in the present sentence, employing various forms of expression, the appeal, antithesis, climax, definition, to set forth the argument, that constitutes one of the most important characteristics of genuine eloquence. 2. We may also notice the combination

Combination of Appeal to the feelings with Argument. of an appeal to the feelings with the argument. The orator appeals to mutual kindness, to piety, to honor, to justice, before he uses argument. He touches the heart before he addresses the understanding. The union of the heart and the intellect is also characteristic of the greatest orators, and no man can be a great orator without such union. 3. We may notice, also, a characteristic of Demos-

Enforcement of Argument. thenes,—the enforcement of an argument by pointing out its applications. When he had quoted from the oath, that the judges should hear both parties alike, he might have stopped there, and left it to the judges to determine what was implied in that clause;—but, no, he was not

satisfied without pointing out the application himself, and thereby *repeating* what he had already in substance demanded. In general, Demosthenes, who makes the most of every consideration, prefers to enforce a single argument by following out its applications to the introduction of several distinct arguments. 4. We add, that the last portion of this sentence expresses the thought in a form of which the orator is very fond,—the form of a definition. Thus, in the present oration, he distinguishes by definition, Accusation from Invective, § 123, and the Statesman from the Demagogue, § 189. Aristotle in his Rhetoric includes definition among the topics of proof. Book 2, Ch. 23.

§ 3–4. HE STATES THE DISADVANTAGES UNDER WHICH HE LABORS, BOTH IN HAVING MORE AT STAKE AND IN BEING UNDER THE NECESSITY OF SPEAKING OF HIMSELF.

ἐλαττοῦμαι. Both Brougham and Kennedy give their translations a different turn from the Greek,—“*Æschines has the advantage of me,*” availing themselves of our expression, “to have the advantage of.” But the orator gives prominence to *his own* unfavorable position, not Æschines’ favorable one. *In many things, Athenians, I am in a worse position than Æschines on this trial.* περὶ τῶν ἴσων. Kennedy translates, “My risk in the contest is not the same.” But the Greek does not so much express *the risk of loss* as *the value* of that which is at stake. True, in proving the fact of inequality, the orator refers to the inequality of the losses, yet, it would seem that in this clause he purposely used a different expression. Ἀγωνιζεσθαι περὶ is *to contend about an object*, without the specific idea of winning or losing. Hence, *I do not contend about equal things*; this inequality is explained in the next clause, where we should have expected the mention of the things themselves, instead of which, in consistency with the topic of disadvantage which he is upon, we meet with the mention of their loss. The orator dwells upon the disadvantages under which he labors,—hence the propriety of the words ἐλαττοῦμαι, διαμαρτεῖν. εὐνοίας. Really, it was the crown which he might fail to attain, and in this view of it, Æschines asks why all this ado about such a trifle; virtually, it was the kindness which was

signified by the crown, the loss of which was a loss that could not be expressed. But, Demosthenes was not the man to fail of the right word here. *διαμαρτεῖν*, not, “*to forfeit your esteem*,” as Lord Brougham and Kennedy give it,—the esteem already existing, but, *to fail of obtaining your favor*,—in the present case. ἀλλ’ ἐμοὶ μέν.—The construction of this sentence is remarkable. The orator declares how great would be to him the loss of their kindness, by the suppression of the words which would express it, and then, instead of completing the antithesis by setting forth the trifling risk of Æschines, introduces against him the charge of wanton impeachment,—as if his risk was too insignificant to be mentioned. *δυσχερὲς*, literally, offensive. But, however it may be rendered, there is reference, as Kennedy says, “to the fear of an evil omen.” *ἐκ περιουσίας*. The thought is obvious, but difficult to express in English. *Περιουσία* literally means that which is over and above one’s necessary expenses,—a superfluity; hence, as a motive of conduct, it is used of whatever is done without necessity, or from mere wantonness. In the present case, Æschines volunteered, and without risking any thing jeopardized the greatest interests of Demosthenes. REISKE’S *Annotationes* and *Index Græcitatis*. *But this man brings against me a wanton accusation.* ὁ φύσει, *the other—what belongs by nature to all men—that they hear*,—instead of, “the other, that all men, what belongs to them by nature, hear.” This clause was thrown in to soften the assertion, that Æschines from his position as accuser had an advantage, by representing it as *natural to all men* to listen with pleasure to invective. But still, it is worthy of notice that the Athenians took an excessive delight in the invectives which were so common in the Assembly and the dicasteries. Demosthenes tells them that “they bartered away the interest of the state for the pleasure they took in invectives.” § 138. ὥς ἑπὶ πᾶσι is construed with *πᾶσιν*, *almost all*. This clause is also thrown in to soften the absoluteness of the assertion. δόξω, “non, *mihi* videbor, sed, *hominibus* videbor, alioquin opus erat δοκῶ.” BREMI. *I shall be thought*.

We may notice here with what skill Demosthenes turns to his own advantage the attempt of Æschines to excite odium against him by representing him as striving for nothing but a paltry crown, and then, in order to secure it, proclaims his own praises. He sets forth these things as so many disadvantages under which he labored; and the topic of Disadvantage—the having of some peculiar difficulty to encounter,—is one of the Common Topics of Oratory. But observe the nature of these disadvantages. They were not of a kind to lower him in the estimation of his judges, but contrariwise. The first was, not that he had so little, but so much at stake—even their kindness!—the second, that he was, not to glorify himself, but to speak of his own public life.

It is characteristic of Demosthenes, in taking up any topic of his adversary that he not merely answers it, but makes some farther use of it, either directly for himself, or against his antagonist; he not only takes possession of the enemy's weapons, but he uses them, and almost always turns them against him. Thus, here, he takes advantage of the sneer of Æschines, that he was contending for the bauble of a crown, to express his deep sense of the value of that for which he was really contending—the friendship of the Athenian people. So, too, having shown the necessity he was under to speak of himself, he adds, that the blame of this, if any, was justly his, who created the necessity.

§ 5. HE DECLARES THAT THE TRIAL WAS OF COMMON INTEREST TO HIMSELF AND CTESIPHON.

ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι. Reiske, Dissen, and others have *δικασταί* instead of Ἀθηναῖοι. But, although Demosthenes was speaking before the dicasts, and although he expressly distinguishes between the dicasts and the audience (§ 196), yet, in most other instances in his speech, he uses the general address,—Athenians. Besides, a general address here comports better with the latter part of the sentence,—as he is there really speaking of the whole Athenian people. Voemel has the same text as Dindorf. ἐμοὶ τε καὶ. *Τε καὶ* unites Demosthenes and Ctesiphon as on the same footing of interest. It is true, indeed, that *κοινὸν* implies the same thing, but such repetition is not

uncommon. *Te* is omitted in the best Codex, (also, in some of the best editions, as Voemel's) perhaps, by an error of the copyist, or by a correction of the style. The different readings of passages often involve the nicest questions of style, and hence, we shall occasionally refer to them. In the present case either would be correct. "*Utrumque dici potuit.*" W. DINDORF. ἐλάττονος, that is, than from Ctesiphon, or, possibly, "*quam si pro me solo decertarem.*" BREMI. ἐμοί, the dative of reference. KÜHNER, 284. 10. *Of no less earnestness as it respects myself, or simply, from me.* πάντων, *any thing.* "*Quacumque re spoliari, non, rebus cunctis.*" BREMI. To be deprived of any one of all things, but especially of *this one thing* of all, your friendship. For a similar use, see § 26, § 246. ἀλλως τε καὶ. Käv=καὶ ἐάν. "*Ἀλλως τε καὶ.*" "*Ad ea spectat ἄλλως quæ nunc præterimus, καὶ autem ad illud, quod ut præcipuum ponimus.*" Hence, "*Quum aliter, tum,*"="præsertim." HER. ad VIG. 778. τφ=τινί. ὁ σφ περ καί. This clause, besides repeating positively what has just been implied under a negative form of statement, avoids the necessity of ending the period with words of ill-omen. "*Ex veterum judicio sententia hic non poterat in verbis mali ominis subsistere, sed ad contrarium, ad læta reverti debebat; aliter manca fuisset nec absoluta.*" DISSEN.

This paragraph refers to the proposal of Æschines, that he and Ctesiphon should argue the case by themselves. It is refutation by contempt. The orator takes it for granted that he was of course to speak, and we might almost suspect, that he notices the proposal of Æschines only for the opportunity it gave him of reiterating his high appreciation of the friendship of the people. We may observe, that, naturally, the objection against Demosthenes' speaking at all should have been considered before the objection against its being left to his choice to determine the order of his speech. But Demosthenes for his own purpose took up the more important point first. Here, however, he follows the strictly logical order, for the present topic is followed by a recurrence to the question of the order of the speech.

§ 6-7. HE REVERTS TO THE ORDER OF THE SPEECH.

ἀξιῶ καὶ δεομαι, *I demand (as a right), and I implore (as a favor).* κῶσις ἀξιώματος καὶ οἴκτου. ULPIAN. Probably, however, the two words were customarily joined together in such connection, and had lost somewhat of this distinction. See § 34. “Synonyma junguntur ad augendam notionem, ut apud Latinos *oro rogoque*, i. q. vehementer rogo.” BREMI. δμολῶς. Construed with ὑμῶν; “*a vobis cunctis pariter, nemine excepto.*” REISKE. δικαίως. Construed with ἀκοῦσαι. BREMI and others. *To hear me in the just way; or, in that just way which the laws require.* ὁ τιθεῖς. Τιθέναι νόμον is used both of the person who proposes an individual law to be enacted, and of the Lawgiver, who establishes a code of laws. Thus in the oration against Timocrates, Demosthenes referring to Timocrates says, τέθεικε τὸν νόμον, and of Solon,—νόμων—οὗς ἔθηκε Σόλων. § 732. *He who anciently ordained them.* δημοτικός, *a friend of the people*, in distinction from a friend of the oligarchy. Thus, Æschines in his oration contrasts the two;—τὸν δημοτικόν—τὸν ὀλιγαρχικόν. § 168. τῷ γράψαι. Γράφειν νόμον, is to propose a law to be acted upon, and hence will not apply to the laws of Solon. Γράφειν is also used of the engraving of public documents on tablets or pillars of stone or brass, as, εἰς στήλην χαλκὴν γράψαντες. Phil. III, § 41. This is its meaning here; *which Solon, our ancient lawgiver, thought should be enforced not merely by their enrollment, but also by the fact that you who judge are under oath.* οὐκ ἀπιστῶν ὑμῖν, that is, as individuals, but referring to § 7. the general principles of human nature. παρελθεῖν. “Citat h. l. Harpocration v. παρελθεῖν interpretans ἀντι τοῦ νικῆσαι. Simile ductum a certantibus cursu seu pedestri, seu equestri, sen curuli, et contententibus inter sese prævertere.” REISKE. This verb means, to pass along the side of; to pass along the side of *beyond*, generically, any one, specifically, one in a race; hence, from this last meaning, as applied to persons, to pass beyond, to surpass, in fraud, craft, &c., and as applied to things, to overcome, as, τοὺς λόγους τὰ ἔργα παύροχεται, Phil. IV, § 132, *deeds get the better of words.* Thus, *it is not possible for the defendant to overcome the criminations.* The three words, ὁ διώ-

καιν, τῷ φεύγοντι, παρελθεῖν, are beautifully adapted to each other, but are rather suggestive of a figure than used figuratively; since, if so used, it would be the pursuer, ὁ διώκων, who would overtake and outstrip the one flying, τῷ φεύγοντι. καὶ τὰ, the apodosis begins here, *shall both receive—and thus make.*

This sentence is constructed on the same principle as the Construction of the Sentence. opening sentence of the oration. It consists of three clauses, of which the first implores a fair hearing according to the laws, the second enforces this request by the character of the law-giver who ordained them, and the third, after supplying a new argument drawn from the reasonableness of the laws, returns to the point from which the sentence started, and again implores of their piety a friendly and impartial hearing;—thus forming a perfect period, which is formed by the course of thought passing from a given point round through various related thoughts to the same point.

Although the orator returns in this paragraph to the topic of Repetition of the Topic of Order. the order of the speech, yet it is not a naked repetition. What before he prayed that the gods would inspire the judges to do as a matter of piety and reputation, he now claims, also, as a right, while he enforces the claim by a combination of new considerations with the former ones; such as, the greatness of the interests at stake, the judicial oath required by the law, the character of the lawgiver, the manifest fairness of the law, and that regard for the gods which was involved in the observation of their oaths—and all these interwoven without confusion. The introduction of Solon in this connection is done with consummate art. For Æschines in the end of his oration had brought him forward as one who had adorned the democracy with the most excellent laws, a wise man and a good lawgiver, and represented him as imploring the Athenians, by no manner of means to value the words of Demosthenes beyond the oaths and the laws. Now, it is the laws of this very founder of the democracy, which Demosthenes here implores them to be guided by, in hearing him. This wresting to his own advantage, of the splendid eulogium of

Æschines upon Solon, to which they had just listened, must have been highly relished by the quick and sensitive minds of his audience.

With respect to the demand of Demosthenes that he should be permitted to follow his own order of defense, it was a just one. The three objections which Æschines brought against the decree of Ctesiphon, were each of them legal ones, and Æschines nowhere shows any *legal* ground why Demosthenes should take up the question of official accountability first,—why he should take up that, for instance, before the question of the proclamation. The most that he could ask was that the judges as a matter of *policy* should require Demosthenes to take up that point at once which in their view was decisive of the case. And hence it is that Demosthenes makes his appeals to right, to justice, to law supported by oaths. The position of Æschines was masterly, but still more so, the movement which defeated him.

To guard against awakening prejudice, or offending individuals in the audience is one of the most important cautions to be observed in popular oratory. This was particularly the case in addressing the democracy of Athens, and Demosthenes everywhere shows himself alive to the necessity of it. His caution in this respect generally appears in short phrases and peculiar turns of expression, and can be best pointed out in the grammatical notes; but the present is a marked instance of it, and hence we refer to it. Demosthenes had thought it necessary to make a strong appeal to the oaths of the judges, but lest they should think it a reflection to remind them that they needed to be put under oath in order to obey the laws, he at once subjoins—*not distrusting you, at least as it seems to me.*

§ 8. HE REPEATS THE OPENING PRAYER.

ὥς ἔοικε, expresses, as it were, the comment of the speaker upon what he is now uttering; hence, its varying shades of meaning. Here it expresses the surprise and indignation of the orator that his private life should be brought into trial. To mark this the more, he gives *παντός* an emphatic position. *My private life—the whole—as it seems.* ὅ τε, what-

soever, not a specific request, as in the opening. *Κοινῇ*, though an adverb, is equivalent to a substantive, forming a parallel to *ἐκαστῷ*, *reputation as respects the state, and piety as respects each individual*. For the dative here, see note to *ἐμοί*. § 5.

An intimate acquaintance with the speech of Æschines is necessary, in order to perceive all the bearings of this exordium. We will here refer to only one, in addition to those already mentioned. Æschines had represented Demosthenes as a contemner of the gods, as hurrying on the battle of Chæronea in spite of adverse omens, and as the ill-fated cause of the evils which Greece had suffered. There could be no more fitting refutation of this calumny than the prayer he here offers to the gods.

If we look at the *matter* of the topics treated of in this exordium, we need not hesitate to say, that it answers all the ends of a perfect exordium, which aims, as Quintilian says, "*reddere auditores benevolos, attentos, dociles.*" If we look at the *form*, we must pronounce it equally perfect. It opens and ends with a prayer. Nor are we to regard this prayer as a mere effort of rhetoric; it was the natural expression of a man in the circumstances in which Demosthenes was placed, though to give utterance to his feelings in such a form was the boldest effort of oratory.

ARGUMENT.

§ 9—53. FIRST PART OF THE ARGUMENT.

Thus far Demosthenes has carried the day. The judges, it seems, did not interfere in the matter of the order in which the points at issue should be argued, but allowed him to follow his own course. This course was very different from the one Æschines had marked out for him, though, in one respect, it was precisely the one which Æschines said he would take. He postpones the questions of official accountability and of the proclamation. But Æschines also predicted, he would promise, if the judges would allow him his own order, that he would

take up those points in the latter part of his speech. But Demosthenes was too sagacious to do this. He nowhere alludes to these points, nor betrays the least consciousness of their being difficult, or that it was necessary to postpone them. He simply demands his rights. But, yet, although he gives no intimation of its importance to him, the movement, by which he postponed the strictly legal points until he had made a favorable impression upon the feelings of his judges, is quite unparalleled. Lord Brougham speaks of it with enthusiastic admiration. "The great skill of this movement, by which he at once takes up his position on his own ground, and there fights the battle, instead of fighting it on the very disadvantageous ground chosen by his enemy, is worthy of especial observation. Napoleon's movement at Wagram resembled this, and was attended with equal success. The Austrians had been preparing for weeks to fight on one ground; he made a sudden and unexpected march which let him fight on another."

The First Part of the argument treats of matters which Demosthenes contends are foreign to the indictment. **Contents of First Part.** It consists of two portions, of which the first relates to the attacks of Æschines on his private life, and the second to the peace of 346, B. C. (See p. 97 for an account of this First Part.) The contents of this part of the argument are arranged with the nicest care, such as implies forethought and deliberation. The skilfulness of this arrangement will appear from the following analysis.

§ 9. PARAGRAPH PREPARATORY TO THE BRIEF DEFENSE OF HIS PRIVATE LIFE.

'Εδλωκε refers to the indictment, κατηγόρησεν, to the speech, of Æschines. προβουλεύματος, the Senate's decree. See p. 88. οὐκ ἐλάττω λόγον, no fewer words. ἀνήλωκε, not, "employed," as Lord Brougham, but, wasted. It refers to a useless employment of words. See §§ 140, 270. But since he has wasted no fewer words in going through other things. τὰ πλεῖστα, that is, of the other things. "Das meiste davon." PABST. κατεψεύσατο, has fabricated against me. Καταψεύδεται means, 1. to lie, 2. to make up a lie, to fabricate, as here, and 3. to lie about a thing, to misrep-

resent or falsify, as in § 17. This last meaning, though in PASON, (etwas unrichtiges oder unwahres von einer Sache sprechen), is not in LIDDELL and SCOTT. ἀναγκαῖον — δίκαιον. Notice the emphatic position of these words, the unemphatic being thrown between, thus enabling the voice to give the emphasis with greater ease. NECESSARY, *do I consider it to be, and* JUST. Compare—

——“He seemed
For DIGNITY composed and high EXPLOIT.”

“FIT audience find, though FEW.”—MILTON.

βραχέα σιπείν, *to say a few things*, rather than “*to speak briefly*,” as better according with οὐκ ἐλάττω. ἔξωθεν, *irrelevant*. Compare § 34, ἔξω τῆς γραφῆς, *out of the writ*,—out of the record. ἀλλοτριώτερον, *with feelings too alienated*. ἀκούη μου. “Junge ἀκούη μου (ex me audiat) τῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς γραφῆς δικαίων.” BREMI.

The art with which Demosthenes finds his apology for treating of irrelevant matter, in the example of Æschines, has been imitated by Cicero in his oration for Sylla. “Sed jam redeo ad causam; atque hoc vos, Iudices, testor: mihi de memetipso tam multa dicendi necessitas quædam imposita est ab illo. Nam, si Torquatus Sullam solum accusasset, ego quoque hoc tempore nihil aliud agerem nisi eum, qui accusatus esset, defenderem: sed cum ille tota illa oratione in me esset invecus, et cum initio, ut dixi, defensionem meam auctoritate spoliare voluisset, etiam si dolor meus respondere non cogeret, tamen ipsa causa hanc a me orationem flagitasset.” Pro Sulla, § xii.

§ 10-11. DEFENSE OF PRIVATE LIFE.

τῶν ἰδίων, “*vita privata*.” BREMI. But, better, *those personal scandals*, referring to the specific calumnies of Æschines. λοιδοροῦμενος βεβλασφημία. Demosthenes, in drawing a distinction between κατηγορία and λοιδορία distinguishes, also, these words. Κατηγορία—Impeachment—has for its object offenses for which there are punishments ordained by the laws, but λοιδορία,—Invective—has for its object scandals—βλασφημίας—such as enemies naturally utter of each other. § 123, also, § 126. Λοιδορία, therefore, may be regarded

as the more general term, and *βλασφημία*, as the more specific. Perhaps, in the present case, *λοιδορούμενος* is used with reference to Æschines, as acting the part of a calumniator rather than of a prosecutor. *ἀπλῶς καὶ δικαίως*, which are used in § 58, without diversity of meaning. *μηδὲ φωνήν*, *endure not a word*, that is, from me. *Endure not a word even, not, though I have managed all public matters preëminently well, but rising up, condemn now*. The sentences in this oration are constructed with such consummate art,—with such a perfect union of perspicuity and force—that, although the meaning is almost always obvious, the difficulty of translation is next to insuperable. The student should aim at a word-for-word translation, with only such variation as the idiom or usage of our language requires. A translation for the English reader might be made on a different principle, but the scholar should seek to transfer the original sentences with all their condensed expressions, as far as possible, into corresponding English ones. In the above sentence, there are several things which are noticeable. (1.) Although in itself it is equally proper to say, “endure not the *voice*,” yet the usage of our language requires another expression, as, *endure not a word*. Again, (2.) the Greek has a great advantage over the English in the frequent omission of the pronoun, although in sentences which are to be spoken, pronouns, even in our language, may often be omitted, with advantage, as, perhaps in this case; *rising up—condemn—now*. It may, also, (3.) be remarked that the English prefers the fuller form of expression—the verb and an object—to the simple verb. Naturally, the fuller form is more emphatic, and the rule is so laid down in regard to Greek, but it may be doubted whether it is so, in general, in English. Thus, in the present case, we might translate the verb, *καταψηφίσασθαι* by, “pronounce condemnation,” but the simple verb, “condemn” is more forcible. Once more, (4.) both the Greek and English make frequent use of the participle to express an action coëxistent with the action expressed by the verb, by which means the sentence becomes much more compact; but sometimes the one language will use the participle and the verb, where the other will use two verbs, and contrariwise. Thus here, Lord Brougham translates, “*but rise up this instant and condemn me*.”—a most admirable translation.

The pronoun though used, is almost an enclitic, and would scarcely be heard in the utterance of the sentence. Attention to these three things, the pronoun, the simple verb, and the participial construction, will be of great use to the student. ἀναστάντες, rising up, without the formality of a vote. ἐκ βελτιόνων, that is, γονέων. ULPIAN. This is a common form of expression. See § 126, τίς ὢν καὶ τίνων. It refers not to a noble but a virtuous parentage, which the Greeks highly esteemed. Hence the proverb, ἀγαθὸς ἐξ ἀγαθῶν, ἀριστος ἐξ ἀρίστων. DISSEN. Καὶ τοὺς ἐμούςς, that is, γονεῖς. ULPIAN. ὑπειλήφατε, *understood*, from common report, γιγνώσκειτε, *know*, of your own knowledge. κακοήθης, "*malitiose ingeniosus*." SCHAEFER. We can not express the play on the words, κακοήθης, εὐήθης, ᾠήθης, *cunning as thou art, O Æschines, thou wert very simple in thinking*. κατεψεύδου καὶ δεῖβαλλες, *lied about* (see Note, § 9), and *traduced*. Διαβάλλειν, to throw across or over, hence, figuratively, to cause to pass ignominiously before men, like the Latin, "*traducere per ora hominum*," to *traduce*. τῆς δὲ πομπείας. Πομπή, a *procession*, such as took place at the festival of Bacchus, in which those engaged in it were wont to attack the spectators with ribaldry and abuse, from the carts or waggons in which the procession went. Many forms of speech, and proverbs, expressive of insulting invective, grew out of the practice. Hence, Demosthenes says of Æschines, βοῶς, ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀμάξης, § 122, *you cry out, as if from a cart*. Hence, the verb πομπεύειν, § 124, *to use opprobrious language*, and, from the verb, the substantive, πομπεία, *scurrility*. τῆς ἀνέδην οὕτως ἰ γεγενημένης, *so licentiously indulged in*. We must depart from the simplicity of the original word, γεγενημένης, and render by some more forcible word, as *indulged in*, or, with Lord Brougham, by introducing a figure, "*poured forth*." βουλομένοις. For the "*special Grecism*" of this participle in the dative, see BUTTMANN, § 136, N. 6, KÜHNER, § 284, 10, c.

The dignity and sincerity of this appeal impress us; nor can we help believing that the confidence which Demosthenes thus reposed in the good opinion of the people was well founded. But we may look at it in another point of view, and in this we

Characteristic shall recognize an illustration of that characteristic of Demosthenes. of our orator, by which he makes the most of every refutation, and pressess every point to the utmost. It was not enough that by this appeal he annihilated at a blow all the personal charges which his opponent had brought against him;—he enforces upon the mind of his judges the sweeping inference that they should, therefore, distrust everything that he advanced. Nor was it enough in this way to disparage the character of his opponent;—he takes advantage of the opportunity to appeal to the past kindness of the people to himself, and to implore their favor in the present trial. Nor does this satisfy;—he even affects to believe that Æschines had indulged in these invectives as a mere rhetorical artifice, to divert him from the more important topics of his public life; by which artifice, however, he did not mean to be caught.

We may also notice with what a fine sense of decorum the orator, in saying that after the examination of his public measures, he would return to these invectives, adds the precautionary remark, *if you shall be pleased to listen*. Nor was this a random promise. The retort upon Æschines was doubtless already prepared and arranged. When we come to the Third Part, we shall find him saying—*Æschines has chosen to inveigh not to accuse, but it is not fair he should have any advantage even in this*; and, therefore, without farther leave asked, he proceeds to the retaliation, by invectives unparalleled in keenness of satire, and polish of style.

§ 12–16. PARAGRAPH PREPARATORY TO SPEAKING OF PUBLIC MATTERS.

Demosthenes, in this paragraph, seeks to disparage Æschines as an accuser. This he does on the general ground that Æschines had instituted this trial, not to do the state a service, but to avenge himself on a personal enemy.

Τὰ μὲν — τοῦ δέ. The orator contrasts the severity of the charges with the motives for making them, and *τὰ μὲν — τοῦ δέ* introduce the contrasted clauses. *Κατηγορημένα*, such as treason and bribery. *ἐν τῷ*, not governing *ὅν*, but added to it as an adjective, limiting its application. WESTERMANN. But we may render, *some of which*. *ἐχθροῦ μὲν — τῷ*

μὲν τοι. These correspond. W. DINDORF. They imply according to Disсен, a contrast between the real object of the accusation—the injury of a personal enemy—and what would have been the object of an honest accusation—the punishment of the crimes. But the latter part of the contrast is only implied by a clause proving the fact that the accusation did not seek to punish the crimes, since the state could not do it. “Crimina quidem—τὰ μὲν—objecta magna sunt gravibusque pœnis obnoxia, sed—τοῦ δέ—hæc accusatio hostilis quidem—ἐχθροῦ μὲν—vexationis et petulantiae et convicii et contumeliae et talium rerum plurimum habet, pœnas vero—μὲν τοι—istas not quærit, scilicet, crimina vero insimulata etiamsi vera essent, ne possunt quidem puniri, ut pateat pœnas ab eo non spectari istas.” DISSEN. *The things charged are many and severe, and there are some for which the laws assign great and most severe punishments, but the design itself of the present trial has for its object at once the abuse and the disgrace and the insult and the dirision of an enemy, and all such things;—since indeed, of the accusations and charges which have been mentioned, if they were true, it is not possible for the state to take a befitting punishment:—implying, of course, that Æschines was not seeking to punish the crime, but to injure an enemy. For, if the state for any reason can not punish a crime, the prosecution must be a malicious one.* οὐ γὰρ introduces the argument which proves § 13. that the state can not take under the present circumstance a befitting punishment for the crimes alledged by Æschines. The argument is this. The state can not properly punish without giving the accused person an opportunity to make his defense. Now, Æschines had so managed that Demosthenes had been deprived of this privilege, and therefore the state can not now fairly punish him. Demosthenes first enforces the fact. λόγου τυχεῖν, “audientiam impetrare,” INDEX GRÆCITATIS. ἐν ἐπηρείᾳ τάξει. Τάξις, the proper place or rank to which anything belongs. Hence, ἐν ἐχθροῦ τάξει, in the rank of an enemy, as an enemy. Adv. Lept., § 481. So here, as a matter of abuse and envy. See, also, § 63, § 258. τοῦτο, that is, to come before the people, or in other words, to use the privilege granted, to speak, out of enmity and envy. ὁρθῶς ἔχον, δίκαιον, repeated below, § 15. τῆς ὁρθῆς καὶ δίκαιας ὁδοῦ. πολιτικόν, befitting a citizen, that is, of

a free state, or, as we might say, in accordance with the principles of our government,—in the spirit of our institutions. *Constitutional.* KENNEDY. *Statesman-like.* Lord BROUGHAM. *For, it is not proper to take away the opportunity of coming before the people and getting a hearing,—this in terms is general, but aimed at Æschines who had deprived Demosthenes of this right,—nor to do this out of malice and envy—as Æschines is now doing, a clause thrown in to give the sentence a more personal bearing.* The orator then proceeds to impress this sentiment by a solemn reiteration.—*No, by the gods! it is not right, nor citizen-like, nor just.* But how did Æschines deprive Demosthenes of his right of coming before the people and obtaining an opportunity of speaking in his own defense? This appears from what follows. It is in substance this. Criminal charges should be brought against specific, definite acts, for which there are precise punishments in the laws; should be brought at the time they are committed; should be brought against the person who is guilty of them. But Æschines never brought any indictment against Demosthenes at the time the crimes charged are said to have been committed; nor does he, now that after so long a time he brings an impeachment, bring it against Demosthenes, but against Ctesiphon, an innocent third party. In these three ways, then, by bringing the impeachment against Ctesiphon and not against Demosthenes personally, by postponing the charges to so remote a period, by bringing them all in a mass without specification, had Æschines deprived Demosthenes of the privilege of a personal and legal defense; had, therefore, disabled the city from taking a befitting punishment; had, therefore, convicted himself of seeking not the good of the state in the present trial, but the gratification of envy and spite against a personal enemy. Dissen and others suppose that Æschines deprived Demosthenes of this right of defense solely by his impeachment of Ctesiphon, but the course of thought in the paragraph seems to require that the other causes mentioned above should be included. But, to proceed, Demosthenes has shown what Æschines had done, but which, if he had been an honest accuser, he would not have done. He now shows what he should have done, but which, since he was a dishonest accuser, he had not done. ἐτράγη-
δεῖ καὶ διεξήει. Often, one of the two verbs which are

joined together denotes the manner of the action expressed by the other. *Tragically recited*. There is an allusion in ἐτραγῶδει, to the early profession of Æschines, who was an actor. So, also, in ὑποκρίνεται below, and frequently elsewhere. παρ' αὐτά. "Eo tempore quo injuria patrata est." BREMI. χρῆσθαι, governed by ἔδει, "supplendum e prægresso δει." SCHAEFER. εἰσαγγελίας. Εἰσαγγελία, "is an information laid before the senate or Assembly, and the consequent impeachment and trial of state criminals under novel or extraordinary circumstances;"—for offenses for which the laws had made no provision or an uncertain one. It was also used in some other cases. It is obvious that we have no process very closely corresponding to this, and therefore no appropriate word with which to translate, εἰσαγγελία. Yet, it seems better to select a word, having some analogy to it, than merely to change the Greek into an English word. τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, that is, in the peculiar way of the εἰσαγγελία. γράφοντα, γραφόμενον. These words illustrate the usage of these two forms of the verb. Γράφειν παράνομα, to propose illegal resolutions, γράφεσθαι παρὰ νόμων, to impeach for illegal resolutions. Bremi recognizes in γράφοντα παράνομα, παρὰ νόμων γραφόμενον what he calls a *lusus verborum*. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ποῦ. The connection will appear, if we repeat from the preceding,—*me, I say—for surely*. οὐ δύναται is the logical predicate of both parts of this sentence. Thus, *for surely, that he is prosecuting Ctesiphon through me, but me myself*—ἐμὲ—αὐτόν, separated by tmesis—*if he had thought to convict me, would have forbore to impeach*—οὐκ ἂν ἐγράψατο—is not possible. Grammatically, Αἰσχίνης is the subject of δύναται, and in the second member, οὐ δυνατόν is supplied from the preceding. This clause serves as a transition to, and a concealment of, the repetition of the foregoing thought in the following sentence. διέβαλλε may § 14. be rendered by an adverb as above, *calumniously went through with*. τιμωρίαι, punishments fixed in the laws themselves. τὰ πινίμια, both punishments fixed in the laws and those assigned by the judges, in cases where the laws left it to their discretion. Thus, τὰ πινίμια was too general to apply to νόμοι, and τιμωρίαι not general enough to apply to ἀγῶνες, and κρίσεις. Hence the division in the sentence into laws and the punishments ordained by them,—into actions and trials for

particular transgressions, with the penalties following them. From DISSEN. τοῖς πρὸς ἐμέ, "scilicet, νόμοις, ἀγῶσι, καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις." BREMI. *The legal remedies.* ἡ κατηγορία, that is, the accusation brought under these circumstances, not the present one. The accusation would have been proper, and his conduct in bringing it, honest. ὑποκρίνεται, *plays a*
 § 15. *part*; is not a sincere, honest accuser. The sentence, νῦν δ' ὑποκρίνεται, condenses and reiterates the whole of the preceding paragraph. The first clause—*but now having departed from the straight forward and just way, and shunning the proofs at the time of the events themselves*—repeats what he had just said as to Æschines' not having done what he should have done—; the next clause,—*in heaping up at such a late hour charges and scoffs and invectives*,—gives an example of Æschines' doing what as an honest accuser, he should not have done, and which was stated in general terms at the opening of the paragraph; while, the single expression—*he plays a part*,—repeats the original proposition, that Æschines had only in view in the trial to harrass an enemy:—thus giving a beautiful unity to the whole. κατηγορεῖ, see to § 9, 1. Κρίνει, *puts this man on trial*, like ἐδίωκε, § 9, 1. προτίσταιται, *he makes his hostility to me prominent throughout the whole trial*. But Dissen, "*Causam totius accusationis facit inimicitiam in me.*" But this clause seems to refer to the speech of Æschines, not to the indictment, and is only a fuller explanation of κατηγορεῖ. Hence, it expresses the character of the speech rather than of the indictment. ταύτην, refers to ἔχθραν. ἐπιτίμλαν. If Ctesiphon should be convicted, he would become a public debtor to the amount of the penalty, and if he could not pay, would be deprived of all his rights as an Athenian citizen. In exposing him to this risk, Æschines may be said to have sought to take away from him these privileges. It may be observed that this last clause is a more full development of the thought expressed by κρίνει. This sentence then is constructed in this way. The antithesis is first stated generally, by the two verbs, κατηγορεῖ and κρίνει, and then each member of the antithesis is enlarged by the following contrasted clauses.
 § 16. τὸν ἐξέτασμον ποιεῖσθαι, spoken of the litigants, but ἐξέτασιν ποιεῖν, of the judges. § 226. ἐτέρω, by attraction, for ἕτερον. BUTT. § 151, 4. HER. ad VIG. p. 889.

The preceding section furnishes a good illustration of the two modes of Repetition of Thought, mentioned by Whately in his Rhetoric. The first is simple Repetition, with reference to Illustration of the enforcement of the thought, by bringing it a second time before the mind ;—by “affording such an expansion of the sense to be conveyed, and so detaining the mind upon it, as the case may require.” “Cicero among the ancients,” according to Whately, “and Burke among the modern writers, afford, perhaps, the most abundant practical exemplifications of this rule.” But with respect to a rule which requires the utmost caution and judgment in its application, Demosthenes is a far safer guide than either. *The second mode*, is that of condensing at the end, in a short and pointed sentence, what has been fully expanded, in the preceding part, of the paragraph ;—we shall meet with many exemplifications of this in the subsequent portions of the oration. WHATELY, Part III, Chap. 1, § 2, also. Chap. 2, § 8.

This section furnishes, too, a good illustration of a Common Depreciation of Topic of oratory, especially in the oratory of free an Opponent. states,—of what Whately calls, the Depreciation of an Opponent. WHATELY, Part II, Chap. 3, § 4. There are many grounds for such depreciation, but none more common, or, when well founded, more just, than the charge that the prosecutor has personal motives in the case, or at least, some other motive than the good of the state. Demosthenes in several places dwells upon the fact that Æschines did not prosecute the charges against him, at the time the alleged criminal conduct took place, and each time draws a different conclusion from the fact of this postponement. Here, he infers that Æschines brought the present suit, merely to harrass a personal enemy ; but farther on, (§ 125), when he felt more certain that Ctesiphon would be acquitted, he infers that he designed to give a secret stab at the state itself, by his apologies for Philip and his condemnation of the state ; and, finally, when he had triumphantly justified the policy of the state, and placed it far beyond the attack of Æschines, he can find no other motive for the suit than as affording a field for the display of his oratory. § 226, 280.

§ 17. APPLICATION OF THE PRECEDING TOPICS, AND TRANSITION TO THE ARGUMENT ITSELF.

ἐπ' ἀληθείας, *on the ground of truth*, the thing spoken of being conceived as resting upon the truth. KÜHNER, § 296, 1. κατ' ἐκείνους τοὺς χρόνους, *during those times*, referring to a period of time; πρὸς τὸν ὑπάρχοντα καιρὸν, *with respect to the existing occasion or emergency*. You should be acquainted with the general state of things at the period in which the peace was made, in order that you may judge of each individual event according to the existing emergency which occasioned it. This sentence contains the necessity and the propriety of what was proposed, the proposition itself, and the end in view, and this, as most important, is placed last.

This section serves chiefly as a transition to the consideration of the peace, but contains, also, an unexpected inference from the preceding remarks,—a farther application. We have already referred to this practice as one of the characteristics of Demosthenes. § 1–2, p. 105, 3. § 10–11, p. 118. The present instance is a fine example of it. Demosthenes is not satisfied to leave it to his hearers to infer, that charges, preferred by a man who is governed solely by personal enmity, and who was so eager to reach his enemy that he did not hesitate to strike a blow at an innocent third party, must be both unjust and false; he carefully draws that inference himself, and forces it upon their attention.

§ 18–52. TRANSACTIONS OF THE PEACE.

For the history of this period, see Historical Sketch, § XVI. Demosthenes arranges the several topics of this portion of his speech with great skill, and carefully keeps each distinct from the other. He divides the whole into three general divisions; the Negotiation of the Peace, § 18–24; the Ratification of the Peace, § 25–41; the Consequences of the Peace, § 42–49. Each division is variously subdivided in the same careful way, but these subdivisions will appear in the following analysis.

§ 18-24. NEGOTIATION OF THE PEACE.

§ 18-20. STATE OF THINGS WHICH LED THE ATHENIANS TO ASSENT TO THE PEACE.

Τοῦ γὰρ Φωκικοῦ πολέμου. For the origin of this war, see Hist. Sketch, § XIII, 45-47. οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἐπολιτευόμην πω τότε. Demosthenes' first speech before the Assembly, the speech *περὶ συμμοριῶν*, was not made till 354, B. C., which was after the commencement of this war. See Hist. Sketch, § XIV, 54. οὐ—πω, "Sæpius οὕτω sic dirimunt. Inprimis notabile quod legitur p. 230, 27, οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε, κ. τ. λ. SCHAEFER, ad p. 348, 5. καίπερ οὐ δίκαια ποιοῦντας. This refers to the plunder of the Delphian temple; and we may notice with what nice sense of decorum the orator speaks of the Phocians, who had been ancient allies of the Athenians, but whose conduct in plundering the temple at Delphi was condemned throughout the Grecian world. ὅτι οὕν, *any thing whatever*, any extremity. There had always existed ill-will between the Athenians and the Thebans, which grew to be very violent after the battle of Leuctra, though it was somewhat moderated by the alliance which was formed between the two states just before the battle of Chæronea. οἷς γὰρ εὐτυχήκασαν, *their success*, or, perhaps, better, *good fortune*, implying of course the use of the power which that success gave them. "Cæterum ἃ εὐτυχήκασαν ἐν Λεύκτροις, *Principatum Græciæ* vides esse, quem isto prælio consecuti erant." DISSEN. οὐ μετρίως. The Thebans used their power with great arrogance and cruelty, especially in their treatment of the Bœotian cities, Plateæa, Thespiæ, Orchomenus. οἱ μισοῦντες Λακεδαιμόνιους, such as the Messenians, Arcadians and Argives. οἱ πρότερον δι' ἐκείνων ἄρχοντες, referring to the decarchies which Sparta established in the several cities and states, after the Peloponnesian war. Hist. Sketch, II, 5. ἄκριτος, "χρῖσται carens, h. e. diremptione." REISKE. *Unsettled*. παρ' ἐκάστοις, that is, *each state*. ἐν οἷς, "scilicet, *χρόνοις*." DISSEN. ἐν οἷς = ἐν τοῖς χρόνοις ἐν οἷς. But Westermann, "inmitten," ἐν οἷς = ἐν τοῖτοις ἃ. κακῶς ἐφρόνου, "*dissidebant*." DISSEN. παρεσκευάζετο, is a very fine word here, but difficult to express. Philip was

making ready, putting himself in a position, for future action. *Then, through the mistakes and dissensions of others, himself was getting ready to act, and growing strong against all.* ἐφύετο. This verb means *to grow, as plants*, and hence, figuratively, *to grow in power*. “Invallescebat adversus omnes.” REISKE. οἱ τότε μὲν refers to the time after the victory at Leuctra, νῦν δ’, since the destruction of Thebes by Alexander, in 335, B. C. βαρεῖς, *overbearing*. “*Insolentes*,” DISSEN. καταφύγειν ἐφ’ ὑμᾶς. The orator here substitutes what must have been his own most ardent wishes at the time, for the historical fact. ἐπηγγελάτο, of course secretly, to the Thebans. ὀλίγου δεῖν, construed with ἐκόντας, *almost willingly*. πῶς μόνον συνεχῆ, that is, the long protracted Amphipolitan war. διὰ ταῦτ’, construe with ἐπράχθη, *wherefore the peace then acceded to was made under these circumstances, not through me, as this person charges*. τὰ δὲ corresponds to μὲν οὖν, the contrast being between the peace which *was not made* by him, and the crimes which *were committed* in it by the opposite party. ἐν αὐτῇ, that is, *the peace*, but embracing the whole transaction both of the negotiation and of the ratification.

The sentence, ἐπεὶ θ’ ἡ Πελοπόννησος . . . ταραχῇ, is a fine example of the most perfect form of the period. The Perfect form of the Period. orator first states the general proposition—that *all Peloponnesus was divided*—next lays down two particular propositions that are contained in the general—that *neither the enemies of the Lacedæmonians were strong enough to destroy them, nor were those who had formerly been established in power by them, masters of the cities*—and finally returns to the original proposition, repeating and enlarging it—but *there was an unsettled quarrel and confusion, both among them and ALL THE OTHER GREEKS*. This form of the sentence is often very elegant in English, though we should probably, in accordance with the asyndetic character of English style, omit the connecting particle between the general and the two particular propositions. Thus, *All Peloponnesus was divided;—neither those who, &c.*

We have another example in this section. In the sentence, καὶ οὖν συνηγωνίστατο . . . ὑπηκούσατε τῷ Φιλίππῳ, the orator be-

gins by saying, in the form of a question, that the Athenians were *almost voluntarily deceived* by the proffer of peace which Philip made; he next gives the causes of this, drawn from the conduct of the other Athenian states; and then ends with the inference, that under these circumstances, they were *prepared to listen* to Philip. Ὀλγῶν δὲ ὑμᾶς ἐκόντας, and ἐτοίμως ἀπηκούσατε, express different shades of the same thought.

ταῦτα δ' ὁρῶν ἐπηγγείλατο. This is the simplest form of the period. It is the form called by Aristotle, λέξιν διηρημένην, Division, in which the contents belong to the same subject-matter, and the several members of which are parts of one whole. In the present case, there are three members, as is indicated by the punctuation, and each relating to Philip. It is the conduct of Philip, the whole of which is directed by the same ambition to one common end, that gives unity to this sentence, for in each member there is a different phase of his proceedings. In the first, he is fomenting disturbances among the Greeks; in the second, he is availing himself of these disturbances, and preparing for further action; in the last, he strikes the blow which he had been preparing for. In periods of this kind two things are necessary; the first, that there should be some common principle, uniting the members together, and, the second, that the last clause should contain within itself some obvious and sufficient reason for the division stopping where it does. In the present case, the division terminates with the last act in the series, so far as the present subject is concerned—the Peace. Dichotomy and Trichotomy are the most perfect form of this sentence.

There are two other subordinate particulars which may be noticed in this period. 1. We notice that the two participial clauses, ταῦτα δ' ὁρῶν and χοήματα ἀναλίσκων are not connected by a conjunction, the reason of which is that they sustain different relations to the principal verb, συνέχρουνε, the former that of the occasional, and the latter, of the instrumental cause. 2. We notice, also, that the proposition, expressing the end which Philip had in view in the proffer of peace and alliance precedes that proffer, in accordance with the rule that the position of such clauses depends upon their rhetorical value in the sentence.

This section contains a very fine example of what was called *Argumentative Narrative* by an ancient rhetorician, ἡ διήγησις ἀποδεικτική, the Argumentative Narrative, or, as it might be called, the Statement of the case. It consists in such a selection of facts and such a combination of them into one whole as to make the conclusion drawn from the statement appear in itself plausible, by showing a sufficient ground for it in the ordinary principles of human nature. There is a weight in the statement beyond what is due to the sum total of the individual facts. It is distinguished from a mere narrative of events, inasmuch as its object is, to establish a conclusion, not to give information, or to please, or to affect the feelings.

We have seen that the Peace of 346, B. C., was most calamitous to Greece. But of all the parties who were concerned in it, none were really so much to blame as the Athenians themselves. It was their love of ease that enabled Philocrates and Æschines and their partizans to deceive and betray them. Hence, Demosthenes, in denying the charge that he was the author of the peace, was obliged to represent the case in such a way as not to offend the pride of the people. In exculpating himself, he aims to exculpate them. In doing this, he seeks to produce the conviction that the peace grew naturally out of the circumstances in which they were placed, and of course without any fault on their part. Every thing is made to contribute to this single impression.

The orator first introduces the states which were the leading parties in the Phocian war, and represents the Athenians, though by no means indifferent, yet not sufficiently ardent to interfere and end the war. He next speaks of the remaining parts of Greece, and here he represents Peloponnesus distracted by contending parties so as to afford a fine field for the arts of Philip, but no hope of assistance to the Athenians in resisting him. Thus far, it would seem the Athenians could have very little motive for not making a peace with Philip. The orator next introduces Philip himself as fomenting these dissensions, and taking advantage of them to get ready himself for any emergency, and, then, at last, when the Thebans were about to have recourse to the Athenians, interposing and offering peace to the Athenians, and aid to the Thebans. But how happens it that the Athenians accepted this offer? This is the critical point in

the statement, but the preceding remarks had prepared the way for an answer. The orator puts the case thus:—what *coöperated with him*, and made you almost voluntarily deceived?—not your weariness of the war, and want of success, not the superior skill and power of Philip, but the conduct of the other Grecian states. No language can more precisely or more beautifully express the state of mind which the Athenians are said to have been in, than the phrases, *ὀλίγου δεῖν ἐκόντας*, and *ἐτοίμως ὑποκούσατε*; nor could any concurrence of circumstances be better adapted to make such a state of mind appear natural than those which the orator has brought together. But the orator was not satisfied with leaving the matter here; he immediately adds a most significant proposition—that it was not the peace after all, which had wrought the mischief, but the corruption of Æschines and his party in it. He does not attempt the proof of this position here; he throws it out merely as a relief to the feelings of the audience, as exculpating the people from all blame. He enters upon the proof of the proposition in § 42, where he states it in the very words here employed.

This section is deserving of the closest study. There is scarcely anything more important in oratory, to the lawyer, to the divine, to the statesman, to the argumentative writer generally than skill in “stating a case.” The oration abounds in examples. § 60–62; § 145–148.

§ 21. THE AGENTS IN MAKING THE PEACE.

ἀκριβολογοῦμαι, denotes the manner of the action expressed by *διεξέρχουμαι*, and makes it more specific, like *ἐτραγῶδει* in § XIII. *I carefully go through with.* “*Weighing and sifting.*” Lord BROUGHAM, who always in such instances endeavors to translate the two Greek verbs by corresponding English verbs, although sometimes without the conjunction. *τὰ μάλιστα*, construed with *ἀδίκημα*. *ἐν τούτοις*. Demosthenes uses the demonstrative pronoun in a very general manner. It may refer to anything which is implied in the preceding, or which could be pointed out at the time of speaking. *ἀδίκημα*. This paragraph is not to be regarded as advancing the proof of the assertion in the preceding sentence, that it was the corruption of Æschines and his party which was the cause of all their present sufferings. This subject is formally taken up after-

wards. Ἄδικημα, therefore, does not refer to ἀδικήματα, but is to be taken generally of any wrong in these transactions. Ἀφιστόδημος. "Fuit unus ex clarissimis tragoedis istius temporis, per totam Græciam cognitus." DISSEN. Hist. Sketch, § XVI. ἐκδεξάμενος, took it from him, *seconded*. γράψας, *moved resolutions*, μετὰ τούτου, *with Æschines*, according to KENNEDY, but that is not certain. διαφραγῆς ψευδόμενος, *split with lying*, or, perhaps, *split lying*. It refers to Æschines' violent exertion of the voice in speaking, which Demosthenes often ridicules. ἐγὼ δ' οὐδέν. We have seen that Demosthenes did have considerable to do with the peace; that he did nothing is only true, when spoken of him as a leader.

Demosthenes, here, introduces a second argument to prove that he was not the author of the peace; he appeals to facts and declares who the leaders in it were. The preceding argument was drawn from the nature of the case, or, in other words, from the antecedent probability in the matter. When arguments of each of the two classes, "antecedent probability" and "sign or example" are used, the former should most usually be employed first. See WHATELY, Part II. Ch. 3, § 4. The student, who directs his attention to this rule of arrangement, will find its application to be more nearly universal than he might at first suppose. It is founded in the nature of the mind, which is ever more ready to receive a fact for which a reason has been previously seen.

§ 22-24. ANSWER TO THE CHARGE OF ÆSCHINES THAT DEMOSTHENES HAD PRECIPITATED THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND PREVENTED THE STATE FROM MAKING THE PEACE IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE OTHER STATES.

ἐπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας. See Note to § 17. ὡς ἄρα ἐγώ, "*that I indeed*." KÜHNER, § 324, 3, a. Ἄρα expresses in this instance, not the conclusion drawn by Æschines, "that therefore Demosthenes"—but as it were the instantaneous conclusion of the speaker as to the absurdity of the charge. It can be best expressed by the tone of uttering ἐγώ. "Forsooth,"

by which it is sometimes rendered, is too strong. *μετὰ κοινοῦ συνεδρίου*. For an account of the new confederation of the Athenians, and for the congress of allies held at Athens, see Hist. Sketch, § VII. 22. *εἰτ' ὧ*—"O *quid dicens quis te recte appellet?*" VIGER, III. XI. IX. *O by what fitting name?* *πρᾶξιν*, "hoc est, τὸ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν εἰρήνην μετὰ κοινοῦ συνεδρίου τῶν Ἑλλήνων. SCHAEFER. *τῇ τῶν Ἑλλήνων κοινῶντιαν*, the common alliance of the Greeks, with reference to preventing the Athenians from making the peace in conjunction with the general convention of the confederate and other states.

§ 23. *ἔξελήλεγμαίνοι*. There is doubtless something of reproach in this word. It means not only that their feelings had been revealed, but that these feelings were little satisfactory to the orator. *But for a long time they had been shown what they were*; had shown themselves unreliable. *τῆς*

§ 24. *ἔξ ἀρχῆς εἰρήνης*, the former peace, in opposition to the peace of Demades. Hist. Sketch, § XVIII. 84. Æschines uses the same expression, *περὶ τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰρήνης*, § 60. *ἡγεμὼν οὐδ' ἀλτίος*. These words are emphatic; the leader and author. With respect to the general congress of the Grecian states, which Æschines makes so much of, there was no probability of any thing being accomplished by it. If Æschines referred to the embassies which were sent into the several Grecian states after the destruction of Olynthus, as he probably did, then, the failure of the attempt to unite the Greeks in a league against Philip must have been known, by the time the Athenian embassy returned from Macedonia, with the terms on which Philip was willing to make a peace. Hence, Demosthenes was right in saying that there was no embassy sent at that time. It is probable, however, that some of the embassies may not have returned, and, hence, Æschines under cover of this fact might claim that a general congress of the Greeks would have taken place, if the treaty had been delayed. But, however this may be, there was no probability of any such co-operation, and Æschines in urging it, is only availing himself of a common sophism, to cover up his own treachery and corruption, by charging his opponent with criminality in not taking advantage of some supposed opportunity of action.

This section presents a good example of the manner in which Demosthenes manages refutation, and suggests some remarks upon his general practice in this respect.

1. He is ALWAYS BRIEF, and that whether the refutation consists of a single argument, as in § 10–11, or, as here, of several. We may observe in the present instance, how compactly the arguments are crowded together. The first argument is the absurdity of the supposition that he who had nothing at all to do with the peace, should have precipitated the negotiations, which is an example of what Whately calls Indirect Refutation. Pt. I. Chap. III. § 7. The second is drawn from the inconsistency of Æschines himself, if the charge were true, in not exposing the misconduct of Demosthenes at the time. The third asserts the impossibility of the charge, because it was not a fact that there was any such general assembly to be held at the time;—and all these arguments are stated with so much conciseness, that there are hardly more clauses in the sentence than there are arguments. This is the orator's uniform practice. He prostrates his adversary by a single blow; and this, partly, as showing with what ease he can overthrow him, and, partly, because refutation is not the main business of the speech, and should, therefore, take up but little time.

2. Demosthenes not merely refutes, but makes the refutation an occasion of ATTACK. We have already had an example in § 10–11. Here, too, we see with what force Demosthenes retorts upon Æschines that the charge which he brought against himself was in reality a calumny upon the city. An argument refuted goes for nothing, as Whately says, but an argument which, instead of being against yourself, can be shown to be against your adversary, has a double point. It places you in the position of victory, and triumph over your adversary.

3. Demosthenes seems to reserve certain arguments of Æschines which can be turned into ridicule, for particular places, as if to give relief to the more sober parts of the speech. At intervals almost regular, we meet with ridicule, and sarcasm, and sneer, retorted upon Æschines, for something he had said. See § 28 : 50–52 : 82 : 122 : 180 : 232 : 243.

4. Demosthenes introduces refutation INCIDENTALLY, not formally. He does not take up the arguments of Æschines in the order in which he brought them forward, nor in connection

with the subjects to which they relate. He chooses his own place and time, when he can best answer them, and when the refutation will be most effective.

5. Nor does Demosthenes confine himself to the refutation of IMPORTANT ARGUMENTS. He takes such as he can make good use of. The object of refutation with him is not merely to overthrow arguments which are decisive of the issue against him, but also to make the refutation the occasion of advantage over Æschines. He uses refutation as a mode of depreciating his adversary. With this in view, Demosthenes often takes up mere illustrations and examples, not because they are of any importance in themselves, but because he can triumphantly retort them, or make some unexpected application. Aristotle has remarked upon the importance of attending to *any* error your opponent may make. He says, "it is necessary if he has erred in any thing, though it be irrelevant, for this would make it probable he might err in other things." Lib. 3, 17, 4.

6. Demosthenes recognizes the fact that orators often throw out things on purpose that they may be answered, in order to divert attention from the more important points. § 11. In nothing is the accomplished disputant more apparent, than in the care with which he excludes every thing of a doubtful nature, or which is not necessary to the case; nor, in any thing is the skill of the sophist more frequently exhibited than in the dexterity with which he seizes upon the opportunity afforded by irrelevant topics in his adversary's argument, to turn attention from the real points at issue. For an instance of the latter kind of skill, see a criticism upon the controversy of Junius with Sir William Draper, and with Horne Tooke, in the "Lectures on Oratory and Rhetoric," by JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, Lect. 22.

§ 25-41. THE RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY.

§ 25-30. THE PARTS WHICH DEMOSTHENES AND ÆSCHINES TOOK IN THE RATIFICATION.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ. Now then, after that the city made the peace, again consider what each of us thenceforth—ἐνταῦθα—chose to do. βουλευόμεν, "hoc est, βουλευτὴς ὢν." SCHAEFER. τοὺς πρὸς βεῖς, who had been already appointed. οὗτοι δέ,

but THESE cared not,—saw not fit—to do this, notwithstanding even my decree. There is a slight degree of irony in this use of ἠθέλησαν. τί δὲ τοῦτ' ἠδύνατο; “What was the effect of this?” KENNEDY. But, rather, what was the force—the meaning—of this? that is, of my resolution. “Quod hoc sibi volebat.” DISSEN. Demosthenes speaks of this decree in his speech Περὶ Παραπρεσβείας, § 154. “As no new Assembly could be held, and these men had not gone, but were lingering here, I proposed a decree as senator, the people having given full power to the senate, that the ambassadors depart at once, and that the commander Proxenus transport them into whatever places they might learn Philip to be; proposing it in the very words I now use.” τὸν μεταξὺ χρόνον, the interval of the oaths, that is, the interval between the taking of the oaths at Athens,—ἀφ’ ἧς ὠμόσατε ἡμέρας—and the exchange of the oaths with Philip, by which the ratification would be completed. ἐξελεύσασθε, a significant word. You released yourselves from all the preparations of the war, as if from some heavy burden. ὁ δὲ τοῦτο. τοῦτο = ὅπως ἂν ὁ χρόνος ὁ μεταξὺ ὥς πλείστος γένοιτο. WESTERMANN, from REISKE. ἐπραγματεύετο, but he all the while worked especially at this, that is, to make the interval as long as possible. The longer Philip was in Thrace, the better for him, the shorter, the better for them. ὅσα τῆς πόλεως. “τῆς πόλεως pendet ab ὅσα.” BREMI. ταῦτα τὰ χωρία ἃ νῦν οὗτος διέσσυρε, referring to the following passage in Æschines. οὗτός ἐστιν, ὃ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὁ πρῶτος ἐξευρὼν Σέρριον τεῖχος καὶ Δορίσκον καὶ Εργίσκην καὶ Μυρτίσκην καὶ Γάνος καὶ Γανίδα, χωρία, ὧν οὐδὲ τὰ ὀνόματα ἤδειμεν πρότερον. § 82. οὕτω takes up and embraces all that precedes, under these circumstances. τοὺς ἐπικαίρους, the well-situated of the places. “Situm idoneum eorum laudat in littore Thracio, unde classes Atheniensium rex excludere volebat, etiam Chersonesum et Hellespontum sibi subjecturus.” DISSEN. πολλῶν μὲν χρημάτων, with reference to the Thracian mines. πολλῶν δὲ στρατιωτῶν, with reference to mercenaries. The contrast implied by μέν and δέ can not be preserved in translating. λέγει, ἀναγιγνώσκει. These verbs are synonymous, neither reads nor mentions. βουλευών, as a senator, that is, officially. προσάγειν. Embassadors were permitted to appear before the Assembly only

by a formal vote of the senate. *Æschines*, *περὶ παραπροσβείας*, § 58. *θέαν*, a seat, "*platz im Theater*." *PASSOW*, not in *LIDDELL* and *SCOTT*. *Θέαν κατανεῖμαι*, to assign a seat, *θέαν καταλαμβάνειν*, to occupy a seat. § 572. "The places for generals, the archons, priests, foreign ambassadors, and other distinguished persons were in the lowest rows of benches, and nearest the orchestra." *SMITH's Greek and Roman Antiquities*. The privilege of these front seats, which was either hereditary, or official, or conferred by special appointment, as well as the seat itself, was called *προεδρία*, and was bestowed upon foreign ambassadors, only by a resolution of the senate. *τὸν ἀρχιτέχτονα*, called, also, *θεατρῶνῆς*, the lessee of the theater to whom the entrance-fee was paid, and who was bound to keep the building in repair. He paid a small rent to the state. *BÆCKH's Public Economy of Athens*, Bk. II. Chap. 13, p. 220. Demosthenes refers to the following passage in *Æschines*. "*Υπόλοιπον δέ μοι ἐστὶ τὴν κολακείαν αὐτοῦ διεξιλεῖν. Δημοσθένῃς γὰρ ἐν-αὐτὸν βουλευσας οὐδεμίαν πώποτε φανεῖται προσβείαν εἰς προεδρίαν καλέσας, ἀλλὰ τότε μόνον καὶ πρῶτον πρόσβεις εἰς προεδρίαν ἐκάλεσε καὶ προσκεφάλαια ἔθηκε καὶ φοινικίδας περιεπέτασε καὶ ἅμα τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἡγεῖτο τοῖς πρόσβεσιν εἰς τὸ θέατρον, ὥστε καὶ συνίτεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἀσχημοσύνην καὶ κολακείαν.*" § 76. This immediately precedes the passage, which is translated in the Introduction to these Notes. p. 93. It will be observed that *Æschines* does not speak of the resolution to introduce the ambassadors to the Assembly. It may also be noticed that *Æschines* uses the term *προεδρία*, as he does in the *περὶ παραπροσβείας*, § 281, while Demosthenes, with reference, perhaps, to *ἐθεώρουν*, prefers *θέα*, which was, also, a more fitting word for him. The reviewer of Lord Brougham's Translation has well given the meaning of this passage. "*But what ought I to have done? to have proposed not to introduce to the Assembly those who had come for the very purpose that they might hold a conference with you? or, to command the Lessee of the Theater, not to assign them a seat?*" *ἐν τοῖν δυοῖν ὀβολοῖν*. "*In spectaculis vulgaribus duorum obolorum*." *REISKE*. It means the common seats as opposed to the seats of honor. *BÆCKH*, Bk. II. Chap. 13, p. 223, *in the two obol seats*. *τὰ μικρὰ συμφέροντα τῆς πόλεως*. Although the lessee received the entrance-money, yet, says *Bœckh*, "it might have been

enumerated among the national profits, inasmuch as he paid a rent to the state. "Apparet, quam acerbe Orator adversarium subsannet de re levissima loquens satis graviter." * * * "Melli est Demostheni identidem insectari τοὺς δύο ὀβολούς." SCHAEFER. λ' ε' γ' ε' λ' α' β' ὀ ν'. Our idiom requires two verbs, *take and read*. Ψ Η Φ Ι Σ Μ Α. There has been much discussion with respect to the genuineness of the public documents in this oration; without entering into that question, it will be sufficient to give the opinion of the latest editor of Demosthenes on this point. "Mihi, etiamsi quis ea omnia, quæ nimis incerta sunt et in diversas partes disceptari possunt vel justo cupidius objecta sunt, qualia plura in Droysenii commentatione jure notarunt Vœmelius et Boecknius, missa faciat, tot remanere videntur non dubia serioris originis imperitæque interpolationis documenta ut non dubitem in eorum concedere sententiam, qui ficta ea omnia esse judicarunt." W. DINDORF. χ ρ η σ τ ο ι. Ironical. ε' ξ ὀ ν'. Accusative absolute. KÜHNER, § 312, 5, *it being possible that they*. μ ᾶ λ λ ο ν δ' ε'. It is indifferent whether the correction be considered *in contrast* with that which is corrected, as in Greek, *but, rather*, or, as the alternative of it, as in English, *or, rather*. λ' α' β' ὀ ν' τ' α' ε', construed with the accusative before ἀφ' ἧχθαι and σῶσαι.

We have seen with what care Demosthenes follows out any particular fact or argument into every possible application. Not less worthy of notice is his mode of stating facts. Mode of stating facts. That mode is not to multiply, but to dwell on facts; to present the *same fact* in a variety of ways. The present section furnishes a good illustration of this characteristic.

The orator contrasts his own conduct with the conduct of Æschines and his party. It is his object to magnify the importance of his efforts to hasten the ratification of the peace by Philip. This he does by dwelling on the injury which delay would inflict upon the Athenian interests in Thrace; and he presents this subject in four different points of view. 1. Standing at the point of time, at which, on the delay of the ambassadors, he proposed his decree, that they should set sail at once, he looks at the inaction of the Athenians relieving themselves of all the burdens of the war, and at the energy of

Philip, preparing to seize the possessions of the Athenian state. It is this view of existing circumstances, which gave the *occasion* of this important decree. 2. He next states *the end* he had in view in preparing the decree;—not, in general terms, that Philip might be prevented from seizing Athenian possessions, but specifically, that he might not become master of Thrace. 3. He next states *the result* which followed *the neglect* of this decree;—that Philip became master of Thrace, and, 4. the *results* which would have followed *obedience* to it. Thus, we have, in regard to the same transaction, the occasion, the end proposed, and the results both actual and possible. Thus, by presenting this fact in several points of view,—and every fact may be looked at, in its cause, occasion, medium, circumstances, and results—and dwelling on each, the orator gives a much more vivid idea of the fact. See Whately, Part III. Chap. i. § 2; Chap. II. § 7.

It should be observed that this mode of statement does not consist in mere repetition, which is always offensive. Not a mere Repetition. The different parts are kept distinct. It can hardly be doubted but that the sentence,—*ἀ ἐγὼ προσώμενος * * * ἀπολαμβάνειν*—was repeated, in order to separate *the occasion* of the decree from the *end* in view; nor, but that the whole topic in § 28, and the reading of the psephism were intended to separate both from *the results*.

This section is a fine instance of the periodic form, not of a sentence, but of an argument. Form of the Statement. He proposes in the beginning, to consider what each party did. He made a motion that the ambassadors should administer the oaths to Philip without delay; ÆSCHINES and his party in the embassy, delay the ratification. He then dwells, in the manner we have seen, upon his efforts to hasten the ratification; and ends as he began, with stating what he did, but briefly,—*ταῦτα γράψαντος ἐμοῦ * * * ζητοῦντος*—and more fully what they did.

With respect to § 28, see Refutation, under § 22–24.



§ 31-49. CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE.

§ 31-41. IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES IN THE DESTRUCTION OF PHOCIS.

The immediate consequence of the peace was the destruction of Phocis. But as this was brought about not merely by the delay of the embassy, but, also and principally, by the corruption of the majority of the ambassadors, and as Demosthenes dwells more upon the instruments than upon the results, it might be better, perhaps, to arrange this topic under the general head of the conduct of the embassy on the Ratification of the Treaty;—their second crime, as Demosthenes calls it. But this is merely a question as to the name to be given to a series of topics, which follow in perfect order, as will appear from the analysis.

§ 31. TRANSITION.

τὸ μὲν τοίνυν—ἔτερον δ' ; κλέμμα μὲν—δωροδόκημα δέ. While we can not fail to notice how compactly the clauses of this sentence are bound together, we must despair of giving the same compactness to the translation. *Such, then, in the embassy was THE FIRST—fraud of Philip indeed, but, also, bribery of these impious men;—but A SECOND CRIME immediately after, behold still greater than this.* δωροδόκημα, bribery. PASSOW, not in LIDDELL and SCOTT, who give, “a bribe,” as the only meaning. πολεμεῖν καὶ διαφέρεσθαι, to fight and quarrel, an anti-climax, which the ancients, says Kennedy, were not so careful to avoid, as are modern writers. We intentionally point out the sentences of transition, as Demosthenes manifests great care and skill in passing from subject to subject.

§ 32. CORRUPTION OF THE EMBASSADORS AS A BODY.

παρ' αὐτῶν ὅπως μὴ ἀπίωμεν. *He buys from them, that is, from Æschines and his party, that we, that is, the entire embassy, should not leave.* It will be remembered that Demosthenes was on the embassy. This explains the phraseology. ἐξέλθοιτε. “Ἐξέρχεσθαι proprio sensu dictum, contra hostem egredi.” SCHAEFER. ὧσπερ πρότερον. See Hist. Sketch, § XIII. 51.

§ 33-39. CORRUPTION AND TREACHEROUS CONDUCT OF
ÆSCHINES.

ἦν ἐν φόβῳ καὶ πολλῇ ἀγωνίᾳ, instead of the simple verbs, φοβεῖσθαι and ἀγωνιᾶν, as more forcible. This is a general principle. Thus in Latin, *in spe, in dolore, terrore, metu, tumultu esse*, are more forcible than the simple verbs, *sperare, dolere*, etc., especially where a state of being is expressed. The same is true in English.—ἀξιῶ καὶ δέομαι.

See Note to § 5. ἔτερον, other than to the indictment.

§ 34. ἕτερον ἐπιτελισμόν, § 87, "*alius generis*." SCHAEFER. μικρά, "*ὀλίγα, pauca*." SCHAEFER. δι' οὗτος. See above, where δι' οὗ is used. The former denotes the cause, the

§ 35. latter the instrument. The sense is substantially the same, but when speaking of Philip's hiring Æschines as his agent, he prefers the genitive, *to announce things through the instrumentality of which*, but when speaking of what Æschines did, in the fulfillment of his treacherous bargain, he uses the accusative, as denoting *the cause by which, every thing was destroyed*. This, however, is a distinction which can not be well given in a translation. μάλα σεμνῶς ὀνομάζων, *as he very gravely phrases it*. διὰ τὴν τότε ὑποῦσαν ἀπέχθειαν, *the then existing hatred*. The idea of a con-

§ 36. cealed hatred is not implied in ὑποῦσαν; their feelings towards the Thebans were no secret. χρυσίον, *gold*, that is, coined gold. τὴν μὲν ἀπέχθειαν τὴν πρὸς Θηβαίους, that is, felt by the Thebans, where as in § 36, it is, felt towards the Thebans. "*Civitas nostra odium incurrit, Philippus gratiam tulit*." SCHAEFER.

§ 33. οὕτω δ' ἦν . . . ἀπώλετο. What are the principal thoughts in this sentence? They are three; the anxiety of Philip, the object of that anxiety, and the measure to which that anxiety led, the hiring of Æschines. Observe how each of these thoughts is magnified beyond what was necessary merely to communicate the thought. *The anxiety* of Philip is magnified by the use of a fuller form of expression than the simple verb; *the object* of that anxiety, lest the Athenians should vote to aid the Phocians before he destroyed them, is strengthened, first, by the participial clause expressing the pains he had taken to secure

that end, and, secondly, by the added proposition,—*ἐκφύγου τὰ πράγματα*,—which *repeats* in general terms what had just been specifically stated; and, finally, the hire of Æschines is aggravated by the contrast in the clause,—*οὐκέτι κοινῇ μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων πρέσβειν, ἀλλ' ἰδίᾳ καθ' αὐτόν*—and by the four solemn words, *δι' ὃν ἅπαντ' ἀπώλετο*.

§ 36. *τοὺς μὲν Φωκέας . . . Φιλίππῳ*. The orator having asked what happened after these promises, this sentence contains the particulars which made up the whole event. These particulars may be divided into two classes; the direct results to the Phocians, the Athenians and Æschines, and the indirect results arising from the different views which should be taken of the destruction of Phocis. Hence, the sentence is divided into two larger members at *λαβεῖν*. But so different are the results to Phocis from those which happened to the Athenians and to Æschines, that the first larger member is divided into two parts which are put in contrast,—*τοὺς μὲν Φωκέας, ὑμᾶς δ'*—the first being appropriated to the Phocians, and the latter, to the Athenians and Æschines. So, too, the indirect results are of two kinds, hatred and favor, and hence the second member is divided into two contrasted parts, *τὴν μὲν ἀπέχθειαν, τὴν δὲ χάριν*. Most even of the better editions read *τοὺς μὲν τ α λ α ι π - ὠ ρ ο υ ς Φωκέας*, but the best Codex omits the adjective, and its omission is more in harmony with the perfect simplicity of the sentence. Demosthenes had himself seen the miserable condition of Phocis, after it had been devastated by Philip, and in the *περὶ παραπρεσβείας* has described it in a sentence of great pathos, which may be compared with the present sentence. § 65, p. 361.

We may notice the arrangement of the topics in this paragraph, and with what care they are kept distinct. First, there is the hiring of the embassy to linger in Macedonia, till Philip got ready to strike the fatal blow against Phocis; then follows the bargain with Æschines to carry to Athens a false report and thus lull the Athenians into security;—then the pause in the onward course of the thought, and, as if what he was about to say was too severe, the apology for saying it—then the treacherous speech, and finally, without preface or warning, the destruction of Phocis, the alarm of the Athenians, and amidst all this ruin and terror, Æschines himself taking his pay.

§ 40-41. CONCLUSION OF THE TOPIC OF THE IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE.

πρὸς τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ συμμάχους, that is, to the Thebans and Thessalians. "Has publice scriptas litteras rex haud dubie etiam cum Thebanis et Thessalis communicavit." W. DINDORF. Construe with δηλοῖ καὶ διορίζεται. ᾧ χετ' ἐκείνους λαβών. This verb and participle are frequently used in conjunction by Demosthenes, and denote, to seize and force along by some sudden and irresistible force. *He hurried them along.* "Animos illorum rapuit ita ut nihil eorum, quæ posthac agebantur, sentirent." BREMI. εἰς τὸ=ὥστε. W. DINDORF. οἱ τὰ λαλῶντες, referring to the Thebans. Many editions insert Θηβαῖοι. "Quæ continuo sequuntur de calamitate Thebanorum, arguunt, opinor, oratorem h. l. Θηβαῖοι addidisse." SCHAEFER. τῆς πίστεως, that is, in Philip, by the Thebans and Thessalians. Compare above, ἐμοὶ δὲ πιστεύετε. *But he* § 41. *who worked and toiled with him*—αὐτῷ—in getting up this confidence. καὶ διεξιὼν ὥς οἱ κτρά, and recites how pitiable. "Quam ea miserabilia sunt, commemorat." WOLF. καὶ τοῦτων, and that, too, of these calamities,—that is, of the Thebans—and of the sufferings of the Phocians, and of whatever other evils the Greeks suffered, OF ALL, himself being cause;—ἀπάντων αὐτὸς ὢν αἴτιος. κτήματ'. See a fuller statement in περὶ παραπρεσβείας, § 386. ἐξήτούμεν, that is, was demanded by Alexander, after the destruction of Thebes, to be surrendered, with others, into his hands.

§ 42-49. PROOFS THAT THE CRIMES OF ÆSCHINES AND HIS PARTY IN THE PEACE WERE THE CAUSES OF ALL THE SUBSEQUENT SUFFERINGS AND THE PRESENT CALAMITOUS STATE OF THINGS; OR, THE REMOTE CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE.

ἐμπίπτωκα, as if unintentionally. ἐπάνειμι. See § 20. ἐξήπατησθε. Notice here the repetition of an important word in the same sentence. For another instance, in which παρέσχετο is repeated, see § 238. φωνήν ἤκουον, with a meaning like φωνήν ἀνάσχησθε, in § 10. ὑφορώμενοι § 43. τὰ πεπραγμένα, καὶ δυσχεραίνοντες, look-

ing with suspicion upon what was done, and indignant. ἡ γὰρ τὴν εἰρήνην. Even Demosthenes advised to do so in his speech περὶ εἰρήνης. See Hist. Sketch, p. 68. καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι δὲ "Ελλήνες. There is an opposition between the manner in which the Athenians and the manner in which the other Greeks kept the peace. *You kept the peace reluctantly, but the other Greeks,—ἄλλοι δέ—even—καὶ—gladly.* περιών, "hostili exercitu huc illuc se vertens." DISSEN. See Hist. Sketch, § XVII. ἐκ τῶν πόλεων. "Præpositio ἐκ posita est propter § 44. verbum βαδίζοντες. Nam ad articulum, ad quem supplendum est participium ὢν, ponenda esset præpositio ἐν, or ἐπὶ." BREMI. See, for a similar use of ἐκ, § 145, 213. ἐπὶ τῇ τῆς εἰρήνης ἐξουσίᾳ, "pacis auctoritate et licentia freti." REISKE *Index Gr.* ὅποι πεμφθείην, with reference to the numerous embassies of Demosthenes. See Hist. Sketch, § XVII. αἱ δὲ πόλεις ἐνόσουν. This figure, though similar expressions have almost lost their figurative force with § 45. us, is placed by Hermogenes, as quoted by Reiske, among those, which τραχύνουσι τὸν λόγον, make the style harsh. Demosthenes uses the same figure in the περὶ παραπροσεβείας νόσημα γὰρ, ᾧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δεινὸν ἐμπίπτωκεν εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα. § 424. τῶν δὲ ἰδιωτῶν καὶ πολλῶν, sunt synonyma; sed oratoris est hujusmodi pleonasmis abuti, inprimis quando concinnitatis studium abundantiam poscit verborum." SCHAEFER, who not unfrequently expresses his indignation at this abuse. But Dissen thinks otherwise, "Bona vero est et consulto posita hæc latitudo dictionis." Schaefer seems the safer counsellor. τὰ μὲν, τὰ δέ, "partim"—"partim." τοιοῦτον τι πάθος, *some such a state*,—which is explained by what follows, *each thinking, &c.* πλὴν οὐκ. The full expression is found in another passage of Demosthenes; πλεονεξία πανταχοῦσε, πλὴν οὐκ εἰς Ἀθήνας. p. 1290. SCHAEFER; *that the danger would come everywhere else, only not upon themselves.* "Nun nicht." PASSOW, with reference to this passage. διὰ τῶν ἐτέρων κινδύνων, "periculis quæ aliis imminent." SCHAEFER. εἴτε, expresses here mere sequence. οἴμαι, *Then, if I mistake not.* "Ni fallor." REISKE. ἀλλ' ἐπει- § 47. δ' ἂν τῶν πραγμάτων, *but after that he who seeks to rule has made himself arbiter of affairs, he is master also—καὶ—of those who sold them.* καὶ μισεῖ καὶ ἀπισ-

τεῖ καὶ προπηλακίζει. Observe that these verbs are used without an object; they should be translated without one. Compare the following sentence. "They," King, Lords and Commons, "are the trustees, not the owners of the state. The fee-simple is in us. They *can not alienate, they can not waste.*" *παῖσα ἡ οἰκουμένη, the whole Grecian world.* "*Terra a Græcis habitata.*" REISKE *Index Gr.* ἀπεργιμμένοι, "ὑπὸ Φιλίππου." SCHAEFER. τοῦτοις—ὑμῖν. "Nota subitam conversionem a tertia persona ad secundam." SCHAEFER. § 49. τὸ ἔχειν ἐφ' ὅτῳ, the having of that on the occasion of which, *secured to you traitors and hirelings an opportunity to take bribes.* καὶ διὰ τοὺς πολλοὺς—ἀπολώλετε. *And it is through these people—that is, now present—and through those who have resisted your counsels,—that is, the orators and leaders who had opposed Philip—that you are safe, and on hire, since left to yourselves,—διὰ γε ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς,* in which notice the limiting force of γε—you *would have perished long ago.* "Per maximam partem civium et per nos oratores vestris machinationibus obstantes." DISSEN. "Nam, si per vos solos staret, dudum fame enecti periissetis." SCHAEFER.

§ 50-52. CONCLUSION OF THE FIRST PART OF THE ORATION.

Ὡσπερ ἐωλοκρασταν—κατασκεδάσας, *having spirted over me a stale mixture, as it were, of his own wickedness and crimes.* πρὸς τοὺς νεωτέρους, *in the presence of those too young to have known personally the transactions.* As the termination of the Phocian war, and the events connected with it, were fifteen years before, and as the dicasts were not required to be over thirty years of age, some of the court might not have had personal knowledge of these matters. παρηνώχλησθε δὲ καὶ ὑμεῖς, *but you, too, were annoyed, perhaps, that is, as well as myself.* "Sed ipse ceperat molestiam, cum illa juniorum causa enarrare cogeretur." SCHAEFER. He of course refers here to the judges who remembered these events. καὶ νῦν εἶπέ που λέγων, *and just now remarked, using these words.* "Dixit his verbis utens." DISSEN.

§ 42–49. This section may be regarded as a statement of the condition of Greece which grew out of the Peace, and which led to its subjugation ;—a statement corresponding to that in § 18–20, which gave an account of the circumstances which led to the Peace—thus giving the same periodic form to the whole topic of the peace, which he has given to particular paragraphs and sentences. The proposition, which the orator undertakes to prove is, that the bribery and treachery of Æschines and the Macedonian faction in the transactions connected with the peace were the real causes of this subjugation. The orator first introduces the Thebans and Thessalians exulting in the peace and hailing Philip as their friend and benefactor, and then the Athenians, in contrast, disappointed and indignant, yet keeping the peace, because they could do nothing alone ; and, finally, the other states, the Peloponnesian states, of Greece, gladly acquiescent in this state of things. And they thus acquiesced, because they were in part ensnared by their love of ease, and in part betrayed by their leading men, who had sold themselves to Philip. And what was the result ? They find they had sold their freedom for ease and pleasure—but that which opened the way for Philip to get a foothold in Greece south of Thermopylæ, and thus to corrupt the states of Greece, was the bribery and treachery of those who betrayed the interests of Athens, and connived at the destruction of Phocis. And this brings us to one of the most celebrated portions of the speech—the fate of the traitors. Not only had the traitors sold their country, they had sold themselves also. The orator explains the reason of this, in the statement of a general principle of human nature. This principle he proceeds to fortify by an appeal to the fate of individual traitors. But the orator in the rapidity of this fierce invective suddenly pauses, and turns the whole current upon the traitors in Athens. But this is not enough. Carrying his hearers along with him as he must have done with irresistible force, of a sudden, he comes down upon Æschines alone,—separated from the other traitors—and winds up the topic with sneer and contempt.

§ 50–52. We have seen that this first Part of the speech treats of matters, which the orator contends are irrelevant to the case. It is interesting to notice how carefully this impression is kept up through the whole of it. At the outset, he

speaks of the necessity which Æschines, in bringing in matter foreign to the indictment, had imposed upon him, of entering, also, upon irrelevant topics. Then, about midway, in § 34, he pauses, and apologises for traveling out of the record, laying the blame as before on Æschines; finally, at the conclusion, he speaks of the reluctance with which he had gone over those calumnies, and says he had done so, only because some of the dicasts might not have been personally acquainted with the transactions. Nor is there any, the least thing to weaken the impression, that this whole topic is in reality what it professes to be—a topic irrelevant to the case.

In the review of this portion of the speech, the student can not fail of being struck with the order of the topics and the care with which each is kept distinct—the negotiation of the peace; the mismanagement of its ratification, by which the Athenians lost their possessions in Thrace; the corruption of the embassy, and of Æschines in particular, by which Phocis was destroyed; and the remote consequences of the peace, by which the whole of Greece was subjugated under Philip. We may notice, also, that it winds up with bitter contempt and ridicule. See Remarks to § 22–24.

§ 53–125. SECOND PART OF THE ARGUMENT.

THE ANSWER OF DEMOSTHENES TO THE IMPEACHMENT.

We prefix a general analysis. After the paragraph of transition follows the statement of the points at issue, and the order of the discussion of these points. Next comes the defense itself, divided into two parts; the defense of his public life, and the defense against the purely legal charges. The account of his administration of public affairs is divided into two; an account of his foreign, and an account of his domestic, administration. The defense against the legal charges is two-fold; a defense against the charge of illegality in crowning one, who is under obligation to pass the public scrutiny for official conduct, and, also, against the charge of the illegality of the proclamation. We thus arrange the topics:

I. Transition, § 53.

II. Statement of the Points at issue, and the Order of the discussion, § 56–59.

III. Administration of Demosthenes, § 60–109.

1. Foreign Administration, § 60–101.

2. Domestic Administration, § 102–109.

IV. Discussion of the strictly legal points, § 110–122.

1. Discussion of the question of Accountability, § 110–119.

2. Discussion of the question of the Proclamation, § 120–122.

§ 53. TRANSITION.

τοίνυν, expresses the propriety of passing to a new topic; ἤδη, at this time. περὶ τῆς γραφῆς αὐτῆς. Αὐτῆς is emphatic; *by itself*, unconnected with irrelevant matter. So, also, in τὴν γραφὴν αὐτήν, below. *Now then*,—having finished what is irrelevant—I propose at this point to make my defense against the indictment itself. τὰ πεπραγμέν' ἐμαυτῷ, that is, by myself, as the responsible minister. καὶ τούτων τῶν προβεβουλευμένων, to be construed with δωρεῶν. It refers to the Senate's decree.

§ 56–59. THE STATEMENT OF THE POINTS AT ISSUE, AND THE ORDER OF THE DISCUSSION.

Ἄ μὲν διώκει τοῦ ψηφίσματος, ἐγὼ δ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν τούτων. The contrast introduced by μέν and δ' is between these parts of Ctesiphon's decree, as indicted by Æschines, and as made the basis of his whole defense by Demosthenes. πρῶτον, at once,—the first thing I will do is to prove from these—not implying, as πρῶτον μὲν would do, a sequel corresponding to it. πάντα, is to be taken in a general sense, not referring to the whole decree of Ctesiphon, which would require τὰ πάντα, nor to the three specific charges, but generally to every event embraced under them. δικαίως. By making his defense in a just way, the orator refers to a fair, or as Lord Brougham calls it, an honest defense, which shall elude no charge, but not necessarily be a complete justification;—that he will make such a defense, he proves from the charges in the indictment, because he promises to take them up one by one, in order, and give an answer to each. τῶν γεγραμμένων, that is, the charges in the indictment. περὶ πάντων, same
 § 57. as πάντα, above. τοῦ μὲν οὖν γράψαι, construed with τὴν κρίσιν. τῷ δῆμῳ, construed with τὰ θέλ-

τιοτα. ἐπαινεῖν, connected by καὶ to εἶναι and διατελεῖν, and forming with them the object of γράψαι. Γράψαι expresses the drawing up of the resolution, the remainder of the sentence, its contents; thus, *Of this, that Ctesiphon wrote in his decree that I—*. It will be observed that the subject of the verbs is changed before ἐπαινεῖν,—that *the senate* praise me for these, though it may be better translated by the passive form, as is done by SCHAEFER, "*laudandum me esse.*" *With respect to the decree, that I have always done and said those things which were best for the people, and am ready to do whatever good I can, and that I be praised for these, the decision, I suppose, rests upon my political measures.* Bremi and others connect ἐπαινεῖν with γράψαι and govern it by τὴν κρίσιν. εἴτε καὶ ψευδῆ. Καὶ expresses surprise that the alternative should be made; or even false. "Etenim in altero membro nunc additur καὶ, nunc non additur. Atque abest καὶ ibi, ubi paria vi membra. Ubi vero prius ex ambobus positus præfertur animo loquentis, additur καὶ in secundo membro." DISSEN. See εἴτε καὶ μή, below. τὸ δὲ μὴ προσγράψαντα corresponds to τοῦ μὲν οὖν γράψαι, and contrasts the merely legal points with what belongs to the substantial merits of the case. τὸ δὲ — κελεῦσαι. This

§ 58. whole sentence, in which the τὸ is taken with κελεῦσαι, and στεφανοῦν and ἀνειπεῖν are dependent upon it, is the subject before κοινωνεῖν. SCHAEFER. Bremi construes thus, τό—στεφανοῦν καὶ κελεῦσαι ἀνειπεῖν. "ἐπεὶ δ' ἂν τὰς εὐθύνας δῶ," is quoted from the speech of Æshines, § 592. ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν τοὺς νόμους ἐπέδειξα ἀπαγορεύοντας μὴ στεφανοῦν τοὺς ὑπευθύνους, ἔπειτα τὸν ῥήτορα ἐξήλεξα γράψαντα Δημοσθένην ὑπεύθυνον ὄντα στεφανοῦν οὐδὲν προβαλλόμενον, οὐδὲ προσεγγράψαντα "ἐπεὶ δ' ἂν τὰς εὐθύνας," ἀλλὰ παντελῶς καὶ ὑμῶν καὶ τῶν νόμων καταπεφρονηκότα. κοινωνεῖν μὲν has its corresponding clause in εἰ μέντοι. ἐν τούτοις, "*inter hos cives.*" WOLF. "*In concione; οὗτοι Demostheni sæpe sunt plebei, populares. Honore in horum congressu, in Pnyce, plena concione, in me conferendo. Magnum erat in oculis universæ civitatis Atheniensis honorari. Hoc tam parvi faceret Demosthenes, ut præteriret?*" REISKE, this latter clause with reference to some manuscripts which omit the words. διχαίως καὶ ἀπλῶς. For the same thought in the adjective form, see § 10. ἐγνώκα, *had determined.* See § 8. ἀπαρτᾶν, construed with

the accusative and genitive, to separate the defense from the impeachment. εἰς Ἑλληνικὰς πράξεις καὶ λόγους, not "my measures and my speeches," as Lord BROUGHAM, but *Grecian matters and their explanations*. Λόγους gives prominence to a thought contained indeed, but not expressed, in πράξεις; *I will not only speak of Grecian affairs but explain their causes and principles*; so that it does not deserve the charge of pleonasm, which Schaefer is so ready to bring against our orator. ἐμπέσω, not, unintentionally, as in § 42, but unexpectedly, that is, to them. τοῦ ψηφίσματος τό—the article of the decree, that I say and do the best, similar to αὐτοῦ ψηφίσματος, in § 56. λόγους οἰκείους καὶ ἀναγκαίους τῇ γραφῇ, "*necessario conjunctos cum accusatione*, opponuntur ἀπηριημένοι τῆς γραφῆς. SCHAEFER, *intimately connected with the impeachment*. πολλῶν προαιρέσεων τῆς πολιτείας, "*many departments of public service*." Lord BROUGHAM; such as, civil, financial, domestic, foreign, and the like. περὶ τὰς Ἑλληνικὰς, *the Grecian*, or, as we might say, *the foreign*, as opposed to the domestic. See § 109, where the distinction is expressed in full.

In the opening of his speech, Demosthenes, as we have seen, put forth his whole power in imploring and demanding permission to follow his own order of defense, and was successful. But coming now to speak of the indictment itself—having escaped from the irrelevant topics which had been forced upon him—he is again confronted with the claim of Æschines, that he should follow the same order with himself. Here, however, he has a prompt answer. He professes he will follow the order of Æschines—but the order of his indictment, not of his speech. Æschines, in drawing the indictment, did not think of the order it would be useful for him to have Demosthenes follow; and Demosthenes takes advantage of the oversight. Indeed, the contradiction between the order of the indictment, and the order of the speech of Æschines was too important an advantage to escape the notice of a much less skillful orator than Demosthenes. But, what we may particularly notice, in the present instance, is the great economy with which Demosthenes husbanded his resources. He might have brought in this consideration at the outset, where it would have been quite effective; but he

makes no allusion to it, reserving it for this place, where in connection with the indictment itself, it is still more effective. And thus, generally, instead of accumulating and commingling topics, the orator selects the best, dwells upon each separately, and introduces them only where they will be most effective. Upon this point, Lord Brougham well remarks;—"the extreme importance to Demosthenes' case of the skillful movement, so to speak, by which he availed himself of *Æschines'* error, and at once entered upon the general subject of his whole administration, thus escaping the undeniable charge to which he had no answer, and overwhelming his adversary by a triumphant defense on ground of his own choosing, required that he should again and again defend this movement, which he here does very carefully."

Having thus again triumphed, the next thing is to state the point at issue, and hence deduce his *own order*. And, here, he urges that the whole case turns upon the point of his public conduct, even the purely legal questions of Accountability and the Proclamation. But, still, though not necessary, he will show the laws which authorize Ctesiphon to do what he has done in this respect. It is in this slighting way that he always speaks of these really difficult parts of his case; and, it has been remarked, that "whatever is slightly noticed and afterwards passed by with contempt, many readers and hearers will very often conclude to be really contemptible." *WHATELY*, Part I. Chap. 3, § 8. We may remark that, in stating the legal question as to crowning one who was liable to the official scrutiny, Demosthenes is quite unfair. *Æschines*, after mentioning several evasions of the law of "crowning," and among them that of moving to bestow the crown only, "after the person shall have passed the official scrutiny," adds that Ctesiphon had not even taken the trouble to insert this proviso. His objection was, not that the illegality consisted in its omission, as Demosthenes represents it,—with it, the decree would have been equally illegal—but that the omission showed disregard and contempt of the law.

It is decided that Demosthenes shall begin his defense with an examination of his public conduct. But what public conduct?—not, the trifling matter of donations to the Theoric fund and the repair of the walls, not, any domestic, city matter, how-

ever important, but his conduct in foreign, Grecian matters.—And, here, again he is careful to point out the relevancy of this topic to the defense, *καὶ με μηδεις ὑπολάβῃ ἀπαρτᾶν τὸν λόγον τῆς γραφῆς*.—But what Grecian matters? Not, all that were embraced within the whole period of the contest with Philip, but those only, with respect to which he had the chief management. He thus, at length arrives at the precise and definite point of the discussion.—In nothing is the skill of an orator more seen than in the determination of the question; no where is it more necessary to be perspicuous in statement and judicious in selection. John Quincy Adams has well treated this topic in his VIII Lecture, “On the state of the controversy.”

§ 60–109. ADMINISTRATION OF DEMOSTHENES.

I. § 60–101. FOREIGN ADMINISTRATION.

This subject is carefully divided and subdivided. The principal divisions are,

I. A more precise statement of the point under discussion. § 60.

II. A statement preliminary to the account of his administration. § 61–72.

III. A statement proving that Philip, not Athens, broke the peace, and, therefore, that in his administration Demosthenes had resisted aggressions, not originated hostile measures. § 73–78.

IV. Transition to the account of his foreign administration. § 79, and,

V. That Account. § 80–101.

§ 60. A MORE PECISE STATEMENT OF THE POINT UNDER DISCUSSION.

πρὸ τοῦ πολιτεύεσθαι καὶ δημηγορεῖν. If we consider Demosthenes' public career as commencing with his first speech before the Assembly—which was the speech *περὶ συμμοριῶν*, delivered in 354, B. C.—and if we take the orator's words strictly, then we shall see that the only Grecian transactions which would be omitted by this limitation, are the contests about Amphipolis, Pydna, and Potidæa. It is probable, how-

ever, that with respect to the point of time he uses the words somewhat indefinitely. As a matter of fact, the transactions which he treats of under this head, occurred after the peace of 346, B. C., and were those in which he took the lead. And that he does make a distinction between what he did as an opposition speaker, if we may use this modern phrase, in the Assembly, and his measures when he was at the head of affairs, seems indicated in the latter clause of the sentence. $\alpha\delta'$ $\acute{\alpha}\varphi'$ $\tilde{\eta}\varsigma$ $\eta\mu\epsilon\rho\alpha\varsigma$ $\epsilon\pi\iota$ $\tau\alpha\tilde{\upsilon}\tau\alpha$ $\epsilon\pi\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\eta\nu$. *Ἐπιστῆναι* means, *to preside over*; hence, $\omicron\iota$ $\epsilon\varphi\epsilon\sigma\tau\eta\kappa\acute{o}\tau\epsilon\varsigma$, *generals*. Olyn. II. § 28. $\text{So, } \alpha\omega\delta\varsigma$ $\epsilon\pi\iota$ $\tau\eta\varsigma$ πολιτείας $\epsilon\varphi\epsilon\sigma\tau\eta\kappa\acute{o}\tau\alpha\varsigma$ · $\omicron\tilde{\upsilon}\tau\omicron\iota$ $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$ $\eta\gamma\omicron\tilde{\upsilon}\nu\tau\alpha\iota$, where the orator compares the statesman with the general, as both being leaders, $\eta\gamma\epsilon\mu\acute{o}\nu\epsilon\varsigma$. *περὶ παραπρεσβείας*, § 436. Also, § 112. See, also, $\epsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$ $\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omega$, in § 233, where Demosthenes speaks of himself, as presiding over and giving direction to public affairs. Thus, here, *from the day on which I took the lead in these matters of state*. “*Sic restant ea, in quibus Demosthenis primariae partes fuerunt, quæ Demosthenis opera impedita sunt, atque hoc est quod dicit: αδ' ἀπ' ἧς. κ. τ. λ.*” DISSEN. $\delta\iota\epsilon\kappa\omega\lambda\acute{\upsilon}\theta\eta$, that is, \acute{o} $\Phi\iota\lambda\iota\pi\pi\omicron\varsigma$. The verb governs α ; KÜHNER, § 280, 4. *in what he was baffled*. $\upsilon\pi\epsilon\iota\pi\acute{\omega}\nu$, *premising*. “*Præfatus*.” SCHAEFER.

The carefully selected word, $\delta\iota\epsilon\kappa\omega\lambda\acute{\upsilon}\theta\eta$, suggests a characteristic excellence of the oration. Every thing is in keeping. Not merely is there nothing in one part which is inconsistent with another, but there exists a perfect congruity throughout the whole. In the last division of the oration, Demosthenes has to meet the fact, that his country was defeated under his administration of affairs. In doing this, he takes the ground that his measures were defensive ones, and, therefore, were to be looked at from that point of view, since it makes much difference, whether a statesman originates a war and is defeated, or whether he is defeated in defending his country in a war brought upon it. Hence, the verb, $\delta\iota\epsilon\kappa\omega\lambda\acute{\upsilon}\theta\eta$, by which the orator implies that what he did, he was compelled to do, in resisting the aggressions of Philip; and this, although he might easily have used a stronger word. To the same purport, see $\epsilon\nu\alpha\nu\tau\iota\omicron\upsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ in § 69; also, § 160, and § 73–79.

§ 61-72. Τοσοῦτον ὑπειπών. STATEMENT PRELIMINARY
TO THE ACCOUNT OF HIS FOREIGN ADMINISTRATION.

This statement is divided into two parts.

1. The state of Greece. § 61.
2. What was to be done in view of that state. § 62-72.

§ 61. THE STATE OF GREECE.

πλεονέκτημα, *advantage*, in opposition to ἐλάττωμα, *dis-advantage*. See ἐλαττωμαί in § 3. φορὰν, *a crop*. This is a common figure, Æschines uses the same: φορὰ καὶ ἡμᾶς ἡγήτορων πονηρῶν ἅμα καὶ τολμηρῶν. § 234. κατὰ Κτησίφ. καὶ—διέθηκε. The apodosis begins with καὶ; *whom he both rendered still worse—and divided*. τοὺς μὲν ἐξαπατῶν. Τοὺς μὲν refers not to individual traitors but to the states. “Neque enim de proditoribus hīc cogitandum, sed de Græciæ civitatibus, quas Philippus in deteriore etiam statu constituit, cum, velificantibus ei proditoribus, *alias deciperet, aliis emolumenta largiretur, alias omni modo corrumpere*.” SCHAEFER. Reference is made, first, to the Athenians, who were deceived by the promises of Philip in the negotiation and ratification of the treaty of peace, in 346, B. C.; next, to the Thebans, who were loaded with favors for their coöperation in the destruction of Phocis; and, finally, to the Thessalians and other Greeks, who in various ways were corrupted by him.—This sentence is composed of two periods, separated at γεγονῶν. The first expresses the mere fact, that there was at that time in Greece, a large number of traitors, but observe how this fact is magnified,—*the universality* of the corruption, by the antithesis, οὐ τοῖσιν, ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν ὁμοίως, as in οὐκέτι κοινῇ, κ. τ. λ. in § 33; *the baseness* of the traitors, by the accumulation of epithets and the contemptuous use of φορὰν; and *their multitude*, by the employment, not of a single term, as μεγίστην, which would have been natural, but of a proposition, ὅσων οὐδεὶς πω πρότερον μέμνηται γεγονῶν. This period, which describes the traitors, properly precedes that which represents Philip as using them in his service. With regard to the second period, notice how prominently each important thought stands forth—*the traitors*, working and struggling for Philip, *the Grecian states*, hostile to each other

and rent in factions,—and, here, notice the two principal words, κακῶς and στασιαστικῶς, thrown apart for the sake of greater emphasis—and then *Philip* using these instruments and taking advantage of these circumstances. In this last clause, observe, that the verb, διέθηκε, is followed by a suite of participles, expressing the means which Philip used, and the clause, διέστησεν εἰς μέρη πολλά, by a participial clause, expressing the strong interest that these states had in resisting Philip,—thus giving a balance to the period.

The dissensions in the Greek states, and the treachery of the Macedonian factions in them are most important points in his defense, and Demosthenes often dwells upon them, and always with great power. The present description of Greece, rent into factions and filled with traitors, is a repetition of a statement already twice made. In § 18–20, we have a carefully-wrought account of those dissensions which led to the First Peace, and in § 42–49, another still more effective exposition of that disease which had infected the whole Grecian world, followed by that terrible scourging of the traitors, which Lord Brougham has called “one of Demosthenes’ finest bursts.”

§ 62–72. WHAT WAS TO BE DONE IN VIEW OF THE STATE OF GREECE.

καὶ ἔτι ἀγνοία. The state of Greece just described pertains especially to the period of the First Peace, when the Greeks were little aware of the ambitious designs of Philip. Hence the force of ἔτι, *all the Greeks being as yet ignorant of the existing and growing evil*;—implying, however, that they afterwards saw through his policy, which, indeed, was effected principally through the efforts of Demosthenes. πράττειν καὶ ποιεῖν. Pleonasmus est oratorius: ne putes discrimen significationis inter hæc verba intercedere. SCHAEFER. Lord Brougham has omitted one of them in translating; “to choose and pursue.” ἐν ταῦθα τῆς πολιτείας, “in ea reipublicæ parte.” WOLF. Δολόπων. At this period, the district

§ 63. of the Dolopians was a mere appendage of Thessaly, and they usually followed in the train of the Thessali-

ans. WESTERMANN. τὰ τῶν προγόνων καλὰ καὶ δίκαια, with reference to the hegemony or dominion of the Athenians. ὥς ἀληθῶς. Although ὥς with certain adverbs, as ἀληθῶς, ἐπεὶ, and the like, strengthens the positive, as well as the superlative, yet it rarely bears translating. *Truly, otherwise*, is enough. τοὔτο μὲν—ἀ δέ introduce, in contrast, the two parties who favored Philip, those who coöperated with him, and those who simply stood aloof, and let him do his pleasure. προησθάνεθ', a stronger word than ἑώρα, emphatically setting forth the baseness of those, who, though they had for a long time foreseen the danger, made no preparation against it, but suffered it to come. ὥς ἔοικεν, expresses not doubt, but certainty; *doubtless*. See note to § 8. "Opinor, hoc est, profecto: Neque enim dubitat, sed contendit." DISSEN. περιιδεῖν γιγνόμενα. Περιιδεῖν, is *to overlook*, to take no notice of; with a participle in the accusative, it has a peculiar meaning, which may be stated in general, thus; to see that take place which is expressed by the participle, without doing any thing to hinder it, although such hindrance might have been expected: hence, *to let a thing be done, to connive at a thing being done*. KÜHNER, 310, 4. e. It is difficult to give the true force of this sentence in English: *or, not to do this, for horrible in truth would such conduct be, but, what it saw would happen if none should hinder,—and had discerned doubtless a long time—to see that take place and do nothing*. Lord Brougham translates—"or if she took not that, (which assuredly it would have been monstrous to take,) was she to overlook those things when they actually came to pass, which she had descried when they were about to happen if no one interposed, ay, and had foreseen to all appearance for a long time"—and adds, "our language from its want of flexion and declension, and concord, is extremely deficient in powers of collocation. In the present instance, the collocation should be the reverse of what we are compelled, without repetition and interpolation, to adopt." It is implied in the sentence and would have been indicated by the tone of utterance, that that which was foreseen was some calamity, and it is this which it is difficult to bring out in the translation. Ἀλλὰ νῦν ἔγωγε. This sentence, it will be
 § 64. seen, repeats the former, συναίτιας corresponding to συγκατακτῆσθαι, and περιωρακτίας, to περιιδεῖν, with which

it coincides in meaning. It, however, differs; the latter clause designates and explains what was merely implied in the corresponding member of the preceding sentence. καὶ γὰρ ἐὶ § 65. μέν. There is a diversity in the text of this sentence. With the present reading, it may be translated as follows. *For while, if Philip after his success—that is, in ending the Phocian war—had withdrawn and kept quiet, harming no one of his allies or of the other Greeks in any thing, there might have been some complaint and accusation against those who opposed his enterprizes,—an admission which is thought to be very little in the spirit of Demosthenes—yet, since he has stripped all alike of their dignity, their supremacy, their freedom, nay, even of the free governments of as many as he could, how have not you taken the most honorable counsels of all, in following me?* The argument is in the latter clause, and is this; that the other Greeks had gained nothing by their subserviency, for all suffered *alike*, while, at the same time, they had sacrificed their honor. But, Wolf, Reiske, and Dissen insert ὅμως before ἤν, and οὐκ before ἐναντιωθέντων, as affording a sense much more in accordance with the character of Demosthenes. With this reading the argument is as follows: If Philip did no harm to *any*, after his success, they are *no better off* than we, and besides are liable to the charge of subserviency or cowardice in not resisting him; but if he did harm, yet to *all alike*, we are *no worse off* than they, and besides have maintained our honor, so that in either case the other Greeks are in a worse situation than the Athenians. ἀλλ' ἐκείσε, *to the point*, to the main § 66. topic of discourse, interrupted by the preceding section. ἡ τί τὸν σύμβουλον. The Reviewer of Lord Brougham, has well pointed out the climax here; “*or what did it become the statesman to say or propose—the statesman at Athens—me?*” καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο, “τὸ Ἀθήνησι σύμβουλον εἶναι.” SCHAEFER. ἀφ' ἧς, marks the time *from* which he began to address the Assembly. τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ἐκκεκομμένον, *having his eye cut out*, an idiomatic expression answering in many cases to the Greek accusative following the passive. KÜHNER, § 279, 7. BUTTMANN, § 134, 7. Philip lost his eye, at the siege of Methone. τὴν κλεῖν κατεαγότα. This happened, according to the Scholiast, in an expedition against the Illyrians; the other wounds, on his return from the Scythian

expedition, when he was attacked by the Triballians. τῷ λοι-
 § 68. πῶ, "*reliquo corpore.*" DISSEN. καὶ τοῦτ', "τὸ ἄρ-
 χεῖν Ἑλλήνων." REISKE. ἐν πᾶσι καὶ λόγοις καὶ
 θεωρήμασι, "*in speeches and spectacles.*" LORD BROUGHAM;
 "*in speeches and in dramas.*" KENNEDY. It seems better, how-
 ever, to take them in a general sense; *in every thing you hear*
and see. Thus, SCHAEFER. ὁρῶσι, applicable only to θεωρή-
 μασι, but embracing λόγοις; *perceiving.* ὑπάρξει, not "*to*
be bred," as LORD BROUGHAM; nor, "*to be naturally,*" as KEN-
 NEDY; but, *to happen, to come upon,* that is, from without, in
 distinction from springing up within, and thus beautifully con-
 trasted with ἐγγενέσθαι. It would have been little like Demos-
 thenes to speak of his countrymen as being *naturally* mean-
 spirited. αὐτεπαγγέλτους ἐθελοντάς, *of their own*
accord, voluntarily. "Sit pleonasmus; non obloquor. Sed nec
 caret gravitate hæc verborum abundantia in re turpi describ-
 enda, et Orator pleonasticis locutionibus ita abutitur, ut qui ejus
 rationem satis callet ad talia non facile offendat." SCHAEFER.
 Champlin has carried the pleonasm somewhat too far; "*a vol-*
untary willingness originating with themselves, without being
compelled to it." λοιπὸν τοίνυν ἦν καὶ ἀναγκαῖον,
 § 69. LEFT *then was it and at the same time* NECESSARY. No-
 tice the emphatic position of the adjectives, and see note
 to § 9. ἀδικῶν, has its opposite in δικαίως; *justly to oppose*
all that he unjustly did against you. Ἀμφίπολιν, Πύδ-
 ναν, Ποτίδαιαν. See Hist. Sketch, pp. 38-40. Ἀλ-
 ὄννησον. The Athenians had negotiations with Philip
 about this island in the spring of 343, B. C., though Philip
 might have taken possession of it much earlier. As the cap-
 ture of the other places was so much earlier, in 357-356, B. C.,
 the reason why this is mentioned is not apparent. See Hist.
 Sketch, pp. 71, 73. Σέξ' ῥεῖον δὲ καὶ Δορίσκον, places
 in Thrace taken by Philip before his ratification of the treaty
 of 346, B. C. See § 27, and Hist. Sketch, p. 62. τὴν Πε-
 παρήθου πόρθησιν. The devastation of this island was
 § 70. much later, as late probably as 341, B. C. καίτοι
 σὺ γ' ἔφησθα, *although you declared that I by say-*
ing these things—that is, dwelling on the injuries inflicted by
Philip—excited these—the Athenians—to enmity, that is, with
 Philip; not, as Lord Brougham, "*and yet you, Æschines, charge*

me with having raised those enemies against the country." It is noticeable that Demosthenes mingles with the remote events in which he took no leading part, those of Halonnesus and Peparethus, though these occurred within the period during which his part in public affairs was more prominent; however, he might not have been the leading counsellor as to these particular transactions. It is also noticeable, and almost inexplicable, except on the supposition of intentional deception, which, as Westermann says, must have been at once detected, that, here and in § 75, he ascribes decrees to men, such as Eubulus and Philocrates, of which we can hardly believe them to have been the authors. οὐδὲ νῦν περὶ τούτων ἐρῶ, *nor even now will I speak of them*, since, as he just said, he had heretofore taken no active part concerning them; he had proposed no decrees. "*Quare etiam nunc non dicam de his, quemadmodum antea nullas rogationes de iis tuli.*" DISSEN. ἀλλ' ὁ τῆν Εὐβουλῶν. For the facts in this sentence, see Hist. § 71. Sketch, pp. 71, 72, 73. ἐπιτελείσιμα, *a stronghold*, from whence to make attacks upon Attica, *a point d'appui*. πόλεις Ἑλληνηλίδας. "*Quas urbes intellexerit orator ignoramus.*" DISSEN. ἃς μὲν—ἃς δέ. *Some—others*. "The postpositive articles, ὃς μὲν and ὃς δέ, like the prepositive, ὁ μὲν and ὁ δέ, often retain their original demonstrative force, especially in the distinction and distribution of objects." BUTTMANN, § 126, 1, 2, 3, with reference to this place. ἦ δίκαιον. The imperfect tense is properly used of a series of events, and may be exactly given in English;—*was he doing wrong and violating the treaty and breaking the peace or not?* παρῆσπόνδεσσι, "*breaking the truce?*" KENNEDY. But what truce? It differs little in meaning from ἔλυσεν τὴν εἰρήνην. Compare παρασπονδῶν καὶ λῶν τὴν εἰρήνην. Περί Ἀλοννήσου, p. 85, § 36. ἐχρῆν ἢ μή, "*Repete φανῆναι.*" SCHAEFER. μὴ ἐχρῆν, "*Subaudi φανῆναι. Docet oppositio, v. 6.*" SCHAEFER. τὴν Μυσῶν λείαν καλοῦμεν, *the so-called Mysian prey*. § 72. The Mysians were a timid, unwarlike people of Asia Minor. Hence the proverb,—τὴν Μυσῶν λείαν—applied to any one submitting tamely to injury and insult. Cicero refers to it; "*Quid porro in Græco sermone tam tritum atque celebratum est, quam, si quis despiciatui ducitur, ut Mysorum ultimus dicatur?*" Pro Flacco. § 27. Ζώντων καὶ θνιπῶν. There is

no difference. "*While the Athenians had life and being.*" Lord BROUGHAM. Compare Τιμोधήμῳ τῷ νῦν ἔτ' ὄντι καὶ ζῶντι. ὑπὲρ Φοβούλωνος. p. 953, 17, quoted by W. DINDORF. ἐπολιτεύου-
μεν. It is obvious that Demosthenes is here describing the part of a leading statesman in Athens, yet he uses a word which might signify much less. See note to § 60. ἡναντιούμεν, see note to § 60. ταῦτα. "Scilicet τὰ ἡμέτερα κτήματα καὶ δίκαια καὶ πανχρήματα, hæc nostra bona, copias, possessiones, jura, decora. Ut Demosthenes vocabulo ταῦτα cunctas opes, totam rempublicam, universum imperium Atheniensium, ita Tullius quoque vocabulo hæc rem omnem Romanam complectitur." REISKE.

The preceding passage, commencing with § 66, Lord Brougham considers among the finest in all Demosthenes. He says, "the heavy fire of indignant invective is kept up throughout, only limited by the desire to avoid any too personal offense to an audience as vain as supine, and as impatient of censures as it was deserving of them. The rapidity of the declamation is striking in the highest degree; the number of topics crowded into a few words, in § 71, especially, and the absolute perfection of the choice, is not to be surpassed. We are left at a loss to determine whether the substance or the diction should be preferred. Nothing, too, can be more natural than the introduction of this burst, nothing more closely bearing upon the argument. In modern eloquence passages of this very kind are never failing in success. The picture of Philip is truly fine; and it is both striking and figurative, especially the ὥστε τῷ λοιπῷ ζῆν. The appeal to the Athenians, and the contrast drawn between them and the natives of a mean town, in respect of magnanimity, can not be too much admired. In our Parliament, sections 70, 71 and 72, could not have been easily delivered for the bursts of cheering they would have occasioned. I find Lord Wellesley prefers this to almost all the other passages of Demosthenes.—It is such things as this that haunt the student of eloquence, and will not quit his mind by day or by night, in the solitary walk, or in the senate and the forum, filling him at once with envy and admiration, with an irrepressible desire to follow in such footsteps, and with absolute despair at the distance of his own."

The section of the oration just examined is a fine example of that appeal to the feelings and to the principles of human action, which prepares the way for a favorable judgment of facts which are in accordance with them. The orator is about to speak of the acts of his own administration. But he would first establish in the feelings of his hearers the principles on which he should have acted, and on which he claims to have acted. This he does by an appeal to their feelings of honor, of pride, of patriotism. Thus he prepares their minds to listen with favor to the recital of his public acts. They indeed decide before they hear. For another even still finer example of an Appeal to the Feelings preparatory to a statement of facts, in order to influence the judgment in its decision upon those facts, see § 188-210.

Demosthenes first describes the state of Greece. In view of it, as leading statesman in Athens, he had counselled his country to resist the ambitious designs of Philip. He contends that no other honorable course was left her; she could not do otherwise than interpose for the defense of Greece. This is the single topic he dwells upon in this appeal; he presents it under *three* distinct aspects, thus furnishing another characteristic example of his mode of treating facts and topics.

1. Looking at the state of Greece, part coöperating with Philip, and the rest indifferent to what he was doing, he asks what did it *become* the state to do? what did its honor require? And this topic as we saw, was repeated.

2. Looking at the parties, Athens and Philip, did it become Athens to yield to Philip the freedom of the Greeks? or to resist him?

3. Looking, not at the situation of the several states of Greece, not to the character of Athens and Philip, and the spirit which animated them, but to the facts in the case, to what Philip had done, ought any state to have resisted him, and if so, what state but Athens?

We have, heretofore, had an instance, in § 34, 37, 39, in which Demosthenes, in presenting the same topic in different points of view, kept each point separate, by the interposition of matter of a different kind. So, here, between the first and second points, he interposes the topic of the expediency of the course he counselled. Demosthenes makes

his most powerful appeal to the feelings of honor, pride, and patriotism, but at the same time he forgets not to point to the fact, though as it were in an undertone, that the course of honor was also the course of interest. See § 46, 89, 195, where he carefully brings out this consideration. Again, between the second and third points, he draws the inference as to what was necessary to be done and affirms the state had done that, though it was he who proposed the decrees and managed the business.

We may, also, remark that in this appeal, which must have been highly grateful to his audience, the orator in-
Conciliation of
the Audience. directly interests them in himself; they can not but feel that he was animated with the loftiest sentiments of patriotism.

§ 73-78. PROOF THAT PHILIP, NOT ATHENS, BROKE THE PEACE;
 OTHER STATESMEN, NOT DEMOSTHENES PROPOSED WAR.

καὶ μὴν τὴν εἰρηγήνην γ'. The connection is this; Demosthenes had mentioned a variety of acts which were inconsistent with the spirit of the treaty. He now is about to speak of one, which was a direct violation of it, and which had been so regarded by the people of Athens. Hence, *And in truth the peace at any rate he broke by taking the ships.* αὐτὰ τὰ ψηφίσματα, *the decrees themselves*, as the highest evidence. *τις τίς αἴτιος, who is guilty and of what.* "The Greek language may place two or even more interrogatives without καὶ under a common predicate." KÜHNER, § 344, 7.

In coincidence with his plan of representing himself as always acting on the defensive, of merely resisting the aggressions of Philip, Demosthenes here, before speaking of the acts of his own administration, prepares the way for such a representation by proving that Philip was the aggressor in breaking the peace. We must not omit to notice, also, how careful the orator is to state that the decrees which immediately preceded the war were proposed in part by Eubulus and others of his party. As these decrees, as well as the war itself, were highly honorable to the Athenians, it might appear, at first sight, strange that Demosthenes should thus exclude himself from having anything to do with that matter. But it was not unimportant for him

to conciliate the friends of Eubulus, and to show that the statesmen of all parties agreed at that juncture, in their hostility to Philip.

§ 79-101. ACCOUNT OF HIS FOREIGN ADMINISTRATION.

I. Transition.

II. A general statement, with the results. § 80.

III. A particular reference to affairs in Eubœa, with various applications. § 81-86.

IV. A particular reference to affairs concerning Byzantium. § 87-94.

V. The justification of his measures, by examples drawn from Athenian history. § 95-100.

VI. Conclusion. § 101.

§ 79. TRANSITION.

The reason alleged why Philip made no mention of Demosthenes furnishes so felicitous a transition, that we almost suspect the letter was read for this purpose. *ἐγγεγράφει*. The common text is, *γέγραφε*, which is clearly wrong. Bekker proposes *ἐγράφε*; Voemel ingeniously *γ' ἐγράφε*, but Schaefer the reading in the text.

§ 80. A GENERAL STATEMENT, WITH RESULTS.

ἐγγραψα. For the facts, see Hist. Sketch. pp. 69, 72, 74-76. *παρεδύετο*, *was stealing into*, with reference to the insidious nature of Philip's procedures. *ἀποστολόλους*, *naval expeditions*; "*expeditiones maritimas*." HARL. *ἀπέστειλα*, not only as proposing the decrees, but as the author of the trierarchy law, in accordance with which the expeditions were sent. See § 107. *καθ' οὗς*=*δι' ὧν*. ULPIAN, "*per quas*," WOLF. "*Κατά, etiam pro διά, propter*; significationem observavi frequentius apud veteres scriptores quam apud ceteros, apud Thucydidem vero potissimum." STEPHEN'S *Thesaurus*. Compare *ὥστε οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν κακίαν τὸ ἡσῆσθαι*, "*it was not through our cowardice that we experienced the defeat*." Thucyd. II. 87. *Κατὰ φιλίαν αὐτοῦ οἱ πλείστοι ἐκ Κορίνθου στρατιῶται ἐθελονταὶ ξυνέσποντο*, *it was through their friendship for him (Aristeus), that most of the Corinthians joined the expedition as volunteers*. I. 60.

Κατὰ ταῦτα τὰ ἔπεα συνεχόντο αἱ γνώμαι, κ. τ. λ. *by these words their opinions were perplexed*. Herod. 7, 142. See Xen. Mem. 1, 3, 12. This use of κατὰ is somewhat rare, but may be viewed, perhaps, as expressing the accordance between the instrument and the result, the cause and effect, like the adverb, *accordingly*, in certain cases. πάντες οἱ σύμμαχοι, such as, Proconnesus, Tenedos, Abydos. See § 302. § 80. RESULTS. Ἐξ ὧν ὑμῖν μὲν, *from which to you—ὑμῖν μὲν—there came the most honorable things, eulogies, &c., from those benefitted—that is, by you—; while with respect to those injured—τῶν δέ—that is, by Philip,—there resulted, to such as confided in you,—τοῖς μὲν—the safety of their affairs—ἡ σωτηρία corresponding to τὰ κάλλιστα, and hence the article, the honor to you, the safety to them—but to those who were neglectful,—τοῖς δ'—the frequent calling to mind, &c.* Τοῖς μὲν ὑμῖν τότε πεισθεῖσιν refers to the same class as παρὰ τῶν εὐ πεπονθότων. Let the student notice with what facility the several classes are kept distinct, and yet, how firmly the whole is bound together, by the particles. φρονιμοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ μάντις. Observe how ἀνθρώπους as the less important is thrown in between the two predicates, as in Shakspeare's "good men and true."

§ 81–86. AFFAIRS IN EUBŒA.

Æschines gives a different account of the transactions in Eubœa, though his own statements bear marks of misrepresentation. The only important thing is the assertion that Demosthenes sold the interests and opportunities of the state for money. § 103–105. This latter charge Demosthenes here answers; first, by a denial, and, secondly, by the fact that he was crowned, without opposition, for his measures respecting Eubœa.

§ 81–82. DENIAL OF THE CHARGE OF CORRUPTION.

Καὶ μὲν, here and elsewhere, introduce a new topic, closely connected with what precedes and easily suggested by it, but the connection not pointed out by a sentence of transition. See § 73, § 120. πολλὰ μὲν ἂν χρήματα. "The repetition of this phrase, πολλὰ χρήματα," says Lord Brougham, "and its simplicity is striking. In our orations, the figure would be quite admissible, and is often used with effect." Lord

Brougham's own speeches abound in sentences of this kind, in which some emphatic word is repeated again and again. Speaking of the Holy Alliance, he says, "No, it is against *freedom*!—against *freedom* wherever found—*freedom* by whomsoever enjoyed—*freedom* by whatever means achieved, by whatever institutions secured." ταῦθ', that is, Oreus, and Eretria. δεῦρ' ἀφικνούμενοι, *coming here*, that is, as often as they came. "Putā, repetitis vicibus." DISSEN. προὔξενεις. As Æschines was not the proper Proxenus of Eubœa, the verb must be taken in a somewhat different sense; "patronus eorum eras." DISSEN. οὐ τοίνυν ἐπράχθη τούτων οὐδέν, *now then none of these things were done*; that is, neither Philistides nor Cleitarchus nor Philip succeeded in accomplishing their designs, since the Athenian interests in Eubœa were upheld with unshaken fidelity. ὡς σιωπῶ μὲν λαβών. The orator refers to the following passage, in which Æschines excuses that withdrawal from public affairs, which he has learned, he says, Demosthenes will charge upon him, though the actual charge is that he withdrew only in times of alarm and danger: "τὴν δ' ἐμὴν σιωπὴν, ᾧ Δημόσθενες, ἡ τοῦ βίου μετριότης παρεσκεύασεν· ἀρκεῖ γάρ μοι μικρὰ καὶ μειζόνων αἰσχρῶς οὐκ ἐπιθυμῶ, ὥστε καὶ σιγῶ καὶ λέγω βουλευσάμενος, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀναγκαζόμενος ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν τῇ φύσει δαπάνης. σὺ δ', οἷμαι, λαβὼν μὲν σεσιγηκας, ἀναλώσας δὲ ἐκέρραγας. λέγεις δὲ οὐχ ὁπόταν σοι δοκῇ οὐδ' ἂ βούλει, ἀλλ' ὁπόταν οἱ μισθοδότηι σοι προστάτῳσιν." § 218. ἀτιμώσαντες, a technical word, denoting the loss of the right to institute suits, on account of failing to obtain one-fifth of the votes in a public prosecution; *by disfranchising you to-day*. § 83. THE FACT THAT DEMOSTHENES WAS CROWNED. καὶ δευτέρου κηρύγματος ἡδη μοι τούτου γιγνομένου. In this speech, and in the περὶ παραπροσβείας, mention is made of four psephisms, as they are enumerated by W. Dindorf, to crown Demosthenes; the first, proposed by himself, to crown the whole embassy which was sent in 347, B. C., to obtain terms of peace from Philip, and of which he was a member, περὶ παραπ. § 414; the second, the present one of Aristonicus; the third, proposed by Demomeles and Hyperides, on account of the first successes in the last war, § 223; and the fourth, the psephism of Ctesiphon. The proclamations of these crowns were, the first in 347, B. C.; the second, in 341, B. C.; the third in 339, B. C.; and the

fourth in 330, B. C., the last three at the greater Dionysia. If now we take the words, *κηρύγματος ἤδη μοι τοῦτον*, as referring to the proclamation of the crown proposed by Aristicus, as Dindorf does, it will accord with what the orator elsewhere says in these orations. Dissen, also, refers them to the same proclamation, but disregarding the crown conferred on the embassy, supposes that Demosthenes had received another crown which for some reason he did not mention, perhaps because it related to matters of a different kind. But Reiske, Schaefer, and Westermann refer the words to the proclamation ordered by the decree of Ctesiphon, though without attempting to harmonize the order of the several psephisms with such a reference. *τὸν εἰπόντα = τὸν γράψαντα*, *the one who proposed the decree.* § 85. A FARTHER APPLICATION OF THE FACT OF HIS HAVING BEEN CROWNED. *ἐάν τε—ἐάν θ'*, *in case that—in case that.* *ὡς ἑτέρως*, *otherwise.* See § 63, and add; “ὡς præmittitur etiam quibusdam adverbis positivi gradus, quorum tamen ad significationem nihil addit. Adverbia illa usitiora sunt ἀληθῶς, ἑτέρως.” VIGER, Chap. VIII. § 10, IX. See, also, § 128, 306. § 86. CONCLUSION DRAWN FROM THE STATEMENT OF HIS ADMINISTRATION THUS FAR MADE. *μέχρι μὲν τῶν χρόνων ἐκείνων*, *up to these times* and embracing them. It will be observed that *μὲν* has no corresponding particle, though the contrast is obvious. *πάντας χρόνους*, *throughout the whole period.* *λέγων καὶ φράφων.* We have already seen that actions coincident with the action of the verb are expressed by participles. These participles stand in different relations to the verb; in that of mere coexistence, of cause and effect, of opposition, and the like. In English this relation is often elegantly indicated by the preposition. Thus, here;—*that I prevailed in speaking and propounding.* Aristophanes in describing the scholar of the sophists mentions among other things his ambition to figure in the Assembly, and uses similar words.

Καὶ βέλτιστον τοῦτο νομίζεις—

Νικᾶν πρότιν καὶ βουλευῶν καὶ τῇ γλώττῃ πολεμίζων. Nub. 418-19.

τῇ πόλει καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ πᾶσιν ὅμῳ. For another instance in which the orator identifies himself in feeling and interest individually with the audience, see § 1. *ὡς ἀγαθὸν*, not, “*as if good*,” but, *as good.*—It will be observed that

this sentence, in giving the proof that the success of his Administration was acknowledged at the time, repeats in condensed form the preceding sections.

We have in this section, § 80–86, another exemplification of the manner in which the orator pursues a fact or argument into its various applications. A single paragraph contains the statement of the facts; this is followed by a condensed account of their results; this, by a refutation of the charge of corruption in the affairs of Eubœa, which refutation itself shows, on the one hand, the importance of his measures, not merely in the estimation of the Athenians, not merely in the view of those states who had been benefitted by them, but, also, in the opinion of their enemies themselves, while, on the other, it indirectly conciliates their good will towards Demosthenes as an incorruptible patriot; this, by mention of the crown conferred on him, with an inference from this; and the whole concluded by himself drawing the inference that he was acknowledged to have always acted for the best good of the state.

We may, also, notice how skillfully the orator repeats, and without the appearance of tautology, the summary of the principal events of his administration. First, Philip is introduced as making the attack, then Demosthenes as repelling it, then both are introduced, Philip as ready to buy off opposition to his designs and Demosthenes as spurning the bribe,—and all in relation to the same facts. § 71, 80, 81.

§ 87–94. A PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO AFFAIRS CONCERNING BYZANTIUM.

For facts, see Hist. Sketch, pp. 75–76. ὅφ' ὑμῶν, ὅπ' ἐμοῦ, instead of the adjective pronouns, for the sake of emphasis; *as regards weapons, by you, but as regards policy and decrees—should some of these burst—by me.* ἔτερον ἐπιτελιχισμόν = ἐπιτελιχισμα. “Ἐπιτελιχισμός hoc loco non proprio sensu dicitur; ἔτερον igitur vertam *alius generis.*” SCHAEFER. ἐπιτελιχισμα means a fortress, not of defense, but of attack; a frontier-fortress, (Grenz-festung, Passow;) or, more generally, a fortress so situated as to be both a point from

whence to make attacks, and, also, a point of support,—a basis of operations. Demosthenes uses it in several senses; I. literally, *of fortified places*. He speaks of the Athenians having Pydna, Potidæa, and Methone, in Chalcidice, as ἐπιτειχίσματα τῆς αὐτοῦ χώρας, *strongholds against Macedonia*. Phil. I. § 5; II. somewhat figuratively, *of a whole region*. Thus, he speaks of Philip preparing Eubœa to be a stronghold against the Athenians—κατασκευάζοντος ὑμῖν ἐπιτειχίσματα τὴν Εὐβοίαν. περὶ τῶν ἐν Χερσῶν. § 66—; or, against Attica, ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν, § 71; and, also, of the island of Rhodes, as a stronghold, (in the hands of the king of Persia,) threatening Caria. ὑπὲρ τῆς Ποδίων ἐλευθ. § 12; and, III. metaphorically, *as of tyrants*; thus, “Philip has established two tyrants in Eubœa, making the one a fortress,—ἐπιτειχίστας—over against Attica, and the other against Sciathus. περὶ τῶν ἐν Χερσῶν. § 36: or, still farther removed from the literal meaning, *of any instrument of aggression*. Thus, here, after having lost the stronghold of Eubœa, Philip sought to assail the Athenians *from another sort of fortress*—referring to his mastery of the grain trade, but softening the harshness of the metaphor by leaving the reference to be inferred from the following sentence. For, the reference here is not to Byzantium, as Kennedy seems to suppose, but to Philip’s mastery of the grain-trade. “Interceptio frumenti erat alter ille ἐπιτειχισμός.” REISKE and SCHAEFER. ὁρῶν δέ. “Sententia postulat γάρ.” REISKE. “Sententia non postulat γάρ. Sæpissime enim particula δέ simpliciter copulat enuntiationes.” SCHAEFER.—Notice that the participles as holding different relations to the verb, are without connectives. See Rem. p. 127. σιτῶ πάντων ἀνθρώπων πλεῖστω χρόμειθ’ ἐπεισάκτω. The whole consumption of grain in Attica, according to Boeckh, was three million medimni, or four and a half millions of bushels a year, of which one million medimni, or one and a half million of bushels, were imported, principally from Pontus. παρελθὼν ἐπὶ Θράκης, *passing to Thrace*. οὐδ’ ἐπὶ τοῦτοις ἔφασαν, *and said they had not made the alliance on these terms*. χάρακα, a mound or rampart set with stakes, like the Roman vallum; *throwing up an entrenchment close to the city*. οὐκέτι § 88. ἐρωτήσω, *I will not again ask*, having already done it in the preliminary inquiry. § 61–72. “Οὐκέτι enim

refertur ad interrogationes, quibus supra orator adversarium identidem urserat." SCHAEFER. § 89. THE MATERIAL RESULTS OF THE WAR. ἀλλὰ μὴν, similar to καὶ μὴν. See to § 81. ὁ γὰρ τότε ἐνστάς πόλεμος, for the war then existing; the peace between Philip and Athens having been formally annulled, and war declared before this. See Hist. Sketch, p. 75. This Byzantine war, the orator is careful to distinguish from the last Sacred war, into which it merged, and in which the Athenians were conquered. ἄνευ, "præter quam quod, vel, præter." VIGER, Ch. IX. § 1-8, besides. διῆγεν ὑμᾶς. Διάγειν ἐν, is to live or be in a given state, and hence, causatively, to cause to live or be in that state. But our idiom requires the abstract instead of the concrete; hence, put you in a condition in which all the necessities of life were more abundant and cheaper than the present peace. "Fecit, (bellum,) ut viveretis in majore affluentia, &c." DISSEN. τῆς νῦν εἰρηνης, the peace made after the battle of Cheronea, the continuance of which depended upon the goodwill of Alexander. μετὰσχ-οις. In almost every other edition, the reading is, μὴ μετὰσχοιεν μηδὲ μεταδοῖεν. "Mὴ omittit et μὴ pro μηδέ præbet Codex S. quam sequi debebam. Majore enim cum vi orator apprecatur quamvis contra machinantibus." W. DINDORF. This reading accords better perhaps with the concluding prayer of the oration, in which the orator implores the gods to inspire even these traitors with better feelings. ὅν αὐτοὶ προή-ρηνται, "nor communicate their own principles to you." KENNEDY. Rather, their own servility, as the Scholiast interprets it, τῆς δουλείας, δηλονότι. § 93, 94. HONORARY RESULTS. οὐδέ = οὐδὲ μόνον. See to § 3. ἡ προαίρεσις ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ ἡ πολιτεία, more emphatic than ἡ ἐμὴ πολιτεία καὶ προαίρεσις, which occurs in § 292, 317; both, in another passage, are represented by ἡ προαίρεσις τῆς πολιτείας, § 192. Thus, in English, "my policy and my administration," or, "the policy of my administration." ὁ μὲν γε. Some read γὰρ, but γε is the proper reading. "Harum particularum, μὲν γε, is usus est ut γε ad precedentia confirmationis causa referatur, μὲν autem ad illud ipsum, de quo sermo est, spectet." HERM. AD VIG. p. 824. HE, indeed,—but YOU. ἐν τοῖς ἑμπροσθεν χροίοις, that is, in the Social war. Hist. Sketch, p. 41. τοὺς ἀδικουμέ-νοὺς, not repelling those who suffer wrong, although they had

themselves even wronged you, as the Byzantines had done. *σύμβουλον λέγω καὶ ῥήτορα*, thrown in to give prominence to the fact, that though commanders had often gained that honor for the state, he was the first man who had done it, that was merely a statesman and speaker;—a fact, significant of a great change in the administration of the Athenian government, since, heretofore, the characters of the statesman and the warrior had been united in the same man.

We again call attention to the summary exposition of the facts, as contrasted with the various particular applications and uses of them. But, if we view the account of his entire administration, we shall be still more impressed with this characteristic of the orator. First, we have several pages of preliminary matter, then a single paragraph containing the general account of what he did—§ 80,—and here two paragraphs containing the statement of two particular transactions. The whole account, regarded as an historical narrative, embraces only these few paragraphs out of fifty-one. See Rem. to § 25–30.

It may, also, be noticed that the orator, in accordance with his purpose of always representing Athens in her resistance to Philip as better off than those states which yielded to him, is careful to say that even in the midst of the war provisions were more abundant and cheaper than under the present peace, besides the glory which was gained by the war. Rem. to § 65.

§ 95–100. THE JUSTIFICATION OF HIS MEASURES, BY EXAMPLES DRAWN FROM ATHENIAN HISTORY.

§ 95. TRANSITION.

βλασφημίας. See note, § 10. *κατὰ τῶν Εὐβοέων*. For the calumnies against the Eubœans, see Æschines, § 85. Nothing of the kind, however, is found against the Byzantines in the published speech. *συκοφαντίας*. The Athenian *συκοφάντης*, has been well described as “a happy compound of the common barrator, informer, pettifogger, busybody, rogue, liar and slanderer.” SMITH’S *Antiquities*. Demosthenes charges Æschines with having brought forward the calumnies against the Eubœans and Byzantines, out of malice and spite, not out

of any motive of statesmanship and patriotism, since, if they had been true, that should have made no difference in the measures to be adopted. It is not easy to express the meaning of *συκοφαντία* by a corresponding word in English. Lord Brougham translates; "*Now, in order to show that all the invectives which he has levelled against the Eubœans and Byzantines are pure calumnies;*" Kennedy; "*To prove now the malignity of those calumnies;*" but neither translation brings out the precise point, that the invectives were prompted by the malice of the sycophant, not by the necessities of a just accusation:—*that the defamations which he uttered against the Eubœans and Byzantines were purely malicious.* *μὴ μόνον τῷ ψευδεῖς εἶναι*, uttered in a tone implying that he was not about to take up that point; *τοῦτο μὲν γάρ* gives the reason for not taking it up. *μὲν* is without its corresponding particle, which is easily supplied; *this point* implying another, in some respect different. *ὑπάρχειν εἰδότας*, is more emphatic than the simple *εἰδέναι*. DISSEN. See § 228. *τὰ μάλιστα ἥσαν ἀληθεῖς*, *if they were ever so true*; or, to use Shakespeare's phrase, *most true*. *καθ' ὅμῳς*, "*vestra ætate.*" WOLF. *πεπραγμένων καλῶν τῇ πόλει*, *the honorable deeds done by the state, not, honorable to the state*, as is implied in Lord Brougham's translation. *τῶν ὑπαρχόντων*, *facinorum jam patratum*. *Opponitur τὰ λοιπά, quæ restant patrandæ*. SCHAEFER.

This is a professed refutation. Nor were the statements of Æschines altogether unworthy of notice. But, still, the principal object was, under the cover of a refutation, to bring forward examples from the best days of Athenian history, to justify his own course of policy, and thus indirectly to engage on his own side the very feelings of pride with which the Athenians regarded those heroic deeds.

§ 96–100. EXAMPLES.

For the situation of Athens and Sparta just after the Peloponnesian war, see Hist. Sketch, § II.; for the expedition to Haliartus and to Corinth, § VI. 19. *ἀρμოსταῖς*. "The name, *ἀρμოსτής*, is connected with an expression which occurs

in Xenophon (de Republ. Laced. 14, § 2;) namely, the nomothetæ, who constituted, arranged, and settled the affairs of the towns, are said ἀρμόζειν, whence ἀρμοστής is he who has to settle and arrange the constitution of a city." Niebuhr's Lect. on An. Hist. II. 113. The *harmost* was the commissioner who accompanied the garrisons which the Spartans placed in her dependent cities. τὰς ἄλλας νήσους, such as, Lesbos, Samos. τῶν τότε Ἀθηναίων — πραχθέντων, *although the Athenians of that day had many wrongs to remember, if they had so chosen, against both Corinthians and Thebans, for what they did in the Decesean war.* πολλά, to be construed with ἐχόντων; “*ἄν* jungendum sequenti participio. Est hæc etiam hypothetica enuntiatio, ad quam subaudias, *εἰ ἐβούλοντο*; SCHAEFER. *μνησιμακῆσαι*, construed with the dative of the person and the genitive of the thing. *περὶ*, round about within, *in*, compare *περὶ Ἰταλίην*, *in Italy*. Herod. 1, 24. τὸν Δεκελεικὸν πόλεμον, the last part of the Peloponnesian war, after the capture of Decelea in 413, B. C.—The assertion in Construction of the above sentence is that the Athenians marched the Sentence. to Haliartus, and then to Corinth. But this fact in itself was unimportant; it derived its importance from the circumstances under which it took place. These were of two kinds; the power of the Lacedæmonians contrasted with the weakness of the Athenians; and the fact that the Athenians had been formerly injured by those who now sought their aid. The sentence is constructed on the principle of placing the direct assertion, which is unimportant, in the middle, and the important circumstances, by means of participial clauses, the one at the beginning, and the other at the end. We may also notice that the participles, though they stand in the same relation to the verb, are not connected by conjunctions, which are omitted for the sake of emphasis; it is this which constitutes the proper asyndeton.—ταῦτα ἀμφοτέρω, *although these both*—the expeditions to Haliartus and to Corinth,—*they neither undertook for benefactors, nor saw to be without danger; or, better, although neither of these did they undertake, &c.* This is a fine example of a sentence, which repeats and condenses the contents of a longer one. The latter part of the preceding sentence is expressed by the words οὐθ' ὑπὲρ εὐεργετῶν, and the former part is condensed into the single word

ἀκλινδυνα. It is observable that the clauses are arranged in an order, the reverse of that in the preceding sentence. This kind of arrangement, by which the writer passes from the topics A, B, through B to A, serves to give unity to the sentence or paragraph, and is a common and unconscious arrangement of thoughts. It was called by the Greeks chiasmus, or cross-arrangement, like the letter Chi, X.—πέρας μὲν—δεῖ δέ. The contrast is between the common lot of men, and the aims of the brave. θάνατος. “Eodem modo, p. 1306, 25. καίτοι πᾶσιν ἐστὶν ἀνθρώποις τέλος τοῦ βίου θάνατος.” SCHAEFER. ἐν οἱ κλισίῳ τις αὐτὸν καθίστασθαι τῇ, *should keep himself shut up in a cell*, as if seeking refuge in some hidden lurking-place. προβαλλομένους, suggests a figure rather than is one, although we are obliged to state the resemblance in full; *shielded with the good hope of success*, φέρειν—γενναίως, observe the emphatic position of γενναίως, the less important words being thrown in between it and φέρειν.—This gnome is one of those which have been supposed to show the influence of Plato upon our orator. “Nimirum noster πλατωνίζει, ut sæpe observatum fuit a plurimis. Dixit enim ille magister: ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπιχειρεῖν τοῖς καλοῖς καλὸν, καὶ πάσχειν δὲ τι ἂν ξυμβῇ.” TAYLOR. We have also the opinion of Cicero, who says; “Lectitavisse Platonem studiose, audivisse etiam Demosthenes dicitur; idque apparet ex genere et granditate verborum.” Brut. 31, 121.—ταῦθ’, that is, that sort of things. οἱ πρὸς βύττεροι. For the facts, see Hist. Sketch, § VII. 28, although Demosthenes somewhat exaggerates the importance of the Athenian interference at this juncture. Ἀα-κεδαίμονιους, cohaeret cum ἀνελεῖν. REISKE. οὐδ’ ὑπὲρ οἷα πεποιηκότων—διαλογισάμενοι, *nor regarding what those men had done, for whom you were about to encounter dangers*, the tone showing the *wrongful* character of what they had done. KENNEDY thus; “*not reckoning up the merits (?) of those whom you were about to fight for.*” διαλογιζέσθαι, and ὑπολογιζέσθαι, (below,) are used of accounts, the former, of settling an account, and the latter, of making a charge in an account, but this distinction is not observed here, nor is there more than an allusion to these meanings; and this it is not necessary scrupulously to express in the translation.—This sentence is construed on the same principle as that in § 96,

Construction of already examined. The assertion—*διεκωλύσατε*—the Sentence. as comparatively unimportant, is placed in the middle, leaving the important circumstances to open and close. But, yet, the sentence differs in two respects; the participial clauses are placed in the reverse order; and the sentence ends with the same topic,—*οὐδ' ὑπὲρ οἶα, κ. τ. λ.*—with which it began, thus making a complete period.—*σφετερίζομενων Θηβαίων.* For the facts, see Hist. Sketch, § III. p. 27. *καὶ τούτοις*, even these. The Athenians were peculiarly chagrined and indignant at the loss of Oropus. *τῶν ἐθελοντῶν*, the volunteer trierarchs then for the first time serving the state. The article shows the practice had become established. *τότε* and *πρῶτον* are separated for the sake of emphasis. *ἐθελοντῶν*, from *ἐθελοντής*.—*ἀλλ' οὐπω*, but not yet of this; the subject of the trierarchy being taken up presently. *καί τοις*—*εἰς ὑμᾶς*, and indeed honorably did you act in merely rescuing the island—*καὶ* having a diminutive force, had you done nothing but rescue the island—but much more honorably still than this in making, when you had become masters of the citizens and the cities, a just restitution of these to those very ones who had wronged you. *καίτοι* seems to be used here in its original signification of “and indeed,” of which there is an undoubted example in § 215. This signification is not in Passow, nor in Liddell and Scott. *καλὸν* and *κάλλιον* are in apposition with the whole sentence and express the judgment of the speaker upon it; *honorable was it that, &c.* KÜHNER, § 266, 2, R. 2. “*Sed cum pulchrum sit quod,—tum multo etiam pulchrius est quod*—SCHAEFER. STEPHEN’S *Thesaurus*, c. 7774, D. *ἐποιήσατε τὸ σῶσαι—τὸ ἀποδοῦναι = ἐσώσατε—ἀπέδοτε.* *ἐν οἷς*, not, “*quo tempore*,” as REISKE, but “*iis in rebus*,” SCHAEFER.

1. With regard to the above examples, we may consider the selection and the arrangement. They were the most honorable that were to be found in the history of Athens;—not inferior, in the lofty spirit of devotion to Grecian interests, to the heroic deeds of their earlier ancestors in the Persian wars. They are taken, it will be noticed, from the period subsequent to the Peloponnesian war, the examples of earlier struggles for the freedom of Greece be-

Selection and
Arrangement of
the examples.

ing reserved for another portion of the discourse, where they would be both more needed and more effective; and they recount the contests which Athens carried on against the two powerful states, which after the Peloponnesian war successively arose to dominion in Greece, Sparta and Thebes, and that, too, though she was herself reduced in strength, and though she fought for those who had been her enemies. *In the arrangement*, the orator had only to follow the order of time in the first two, while he brought in the aid furnished the Eubœans, last, not only because it was the last in point of time, but because it was most directly to his purpose, since the Eubœans were among those whom Demosthenes himself had aided.

2. It is important to notice that each example is kept distinct Separation of the Topics. by an independent remark interposed for this purpose. Between the first two is interposed the celebrated gnome concerning death. Between the last two the orator inserts the principle of policy, which, he says, follows from the preceding examples, namely, that the Athenians, while in ordinary circumstances they will avenge any injury done to themselves, will still forego that revenge, whenever the liberty of *any* Grecian state is endangered. For other instances of a similar distinction of topics, see Remarks on § 25–30, and § 61–72.

3. We have already seen that there are certain strong points, A new principle of the defense. such as the corruption of the leading statesmen of Greece, the love of ease on the part of the people, and the fact that he always acted on the defensive, doing the best he could for his country under adverse circumstances, which the orator makes the ground-work of his whole speech. There is a certain scheme of defense which he preserves throughout, and with which nothing that is inconsistent, is ever introduced. To these strong points he here adds another, or rather he here for the first time brings it out distinctly. It is this, that we should judge of political measures, by the objects at which they aim, not by the results of them. Thus, he says it becomes the brave to *attempt* all brave things, but to leave the event to God. He has no occasion in this part of his speech to take advantage of this principle, but he is training the minds of his hearers to receive it, when he hereafter shall directly appeal to it—as he does throughout his defense of the unfortunate issue of the Amphissean war. Thus is preserved a perfect keeping of

sentiments and principles in every part of the oration.—Aristotle, in his Rhetoric, has a chapter on gnomes or pointed maxims, and gives a reason for their efficacy that they flatter the hearer who is pleased to hear sentiments which he holds himself, and, moreover, that they make a favorable impression of the character of the speaker. Lib. II. Ch. 21.

4. We may also remark that the introduction of these examples gives a periodic form to the whole statement concerning his Foreign Administration. He first speaks of what the honor of Athens required, § 61–72; he next sets forth his own actions as being in accordance with the demands of that honor, § 73–94; he concludes with what she had done in past time honorable to her, § 95–100. He begins with what was due to her honor, and ends with what she had done in obedience to that honor—thus uniting the whole topic in the one point of the honor of Athens.

§ 101. CONCLUSION.

ἐν τοσούτοις καὶ τοιούτοις, “*in tot et tantis rebus.*” DISSEN. ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς—οἰσῆς, *the deliberation being in a certain sense in behalf of itself*—of its own interests. In the examples adduced, the Athenians had fought for the safety and freedom of the Greeks, without having any other interest in the contest; but in the case of the Eubœans and the Byzantines, their own interests were at stake. Every conquest of Philip was an attack on the Athenians. This was especially the case with respect to the Byzantines. The orator had just said that Philip had besieged Byzantium to get possession of the Athenian wheat trade; and in the oration on the Chersonese, he exclaims, that “it was not for the wretched hamlets in Thrace Philip was striving, but for Athenian harbors, and dockyards, and triremes and mines.” The argument is *a fortiori*. Seeing the state in so many and so important cases struggling solely for the safety and freedom of others, what was I to counsel in a case where in addition, our own safety and freedom were involved? μνησιχαεῖν. This is viewed as an interrogation by some, but Schaefer well says: “haec non interrogatio est, sed responsio ficta adversarii, qua orator per ironiam utitur, ut illum ostendat nihil aliud quam συνοφαντεῖν.” δὲ

ἀς ἀπαντα προησόμεθα, "for abandoning every thing."

KENNEDY. ἐν τῷ ὑπαρχόντων—ἐπεχειρήσεια, *if I had sought to tarnish the honors of the state by words only?*—for it could be tarnished in no other way—since the deed itself at least, you would not have done, I well know:—even if I had advised. λόγῳ is in contrast with τό γε ἔργον, and means simply, *by speaking, by counseling*. "Si modo verbis suasissem indigna priore virtute vestra; rem enim, satis scio, non fecissetis vos." DISSEN. τί ἤν ἐμποδών. The orator is very fond of ending his topics, with sharp, pointed interrogations like these. See § 282; also, § 66, περὶ τῆς παγαγῆς.

As usual the orator himself points out the inference which he would have drawn from his arguments. But it is more important to remark, from Plutarch, with what skill Demosthenes identifies himself with the Athenian people, and thus while apparently diminishing his own merits, reflects their glory upon himself; and this, without giving offense, since he could not have acted otherwise, and act in consistency with the honor of the Athenian people.

II. § 102-109. DOMESTIC ADMINISTRATION.

In farther justification of the eulogium contained in the decree of Ctesiphon, Demosthenes selects a single measure of his Domestic Administration, namely, his Law of the Trierarchy; and this as closely connected with his Foreign Administration. It will be convenient to give a preliminary explanation of this peculiar institution.

The Trierarchy was a Liturgy: and a liturgy, in general terms, was a service performed for the people, (λεῖτουργία = λέϊτος, ἔργον.) Its performance involved personal service, which was its marked characteristic, and an expenditure of money. With respect to the expenditure of money, it differed from the extraordinary property-tax (εἰσφορά,) with which it may be compared, in these two particulars; that the amount was uncertain, being left to the one performing the service, and the money was expended directly by him, not paid into the treasury and then expended by the state.

Kinds.

Liturgies were of two kinds; *encyclical*, which were

performed periodically, such as the Choregia, and the Gymnasiarchia; and *extraordinary*, which were performed only in emergencies. Of this latter, the trierarchy was the principal.

The liturgy of the trierarchy pertained to naval affairs, but Liturgy of the Trierarchy. was performed only when the navy was in actual service. The state always kept on hand in the docks of the Piræus, a large number of triremes, that is, of hulls and masts, ready to be delivered, as there was need, into the hands of the trierarchs. In addition, the state undertook to furnish pay and provisions for the crews; how far it provided the equipment of the vessel is uncertain. When the vessels were to be employed in active service, the Strategi appointed trierarchs to whom the triremes were assigned by lot. Their duties commenced with the delivery of the vessel and were as follows: 1. The trierarchs fitted the vessel for sea. The expense of this, considerable in any case, would vary Duties of the Trierarchs. with the condition of the vessel. 2. They collected the crew and provisioned the ship. It is true the state undertook to pay a certain sum for these purposes, but it was frequently insufficient, and was rarely in season. 3. They commanded the vessel. 4. At the end of the year, when the office expired, they were required to return the vessel in good order and repair, to the docks. These repairs would be heavy, especially, in cases where the vessels had been engaged in fight, or overtaken by storms. The whole expense of this liturgy averaged about one talent, which, with the year's personal service, made it a heavy burden. The trierarchs, however, were exempted from all other liturgies during the year of their service, and were liable to be called on, only every other year.

It is obvious that in the working of the trierarchy, there would be great liability, both from mistake and The Antidosis in connection with the Trierarchy. design, to unequal allotments. Indeed, it was found necessary from an early period to provide a remedy for such inequality, through the process of the Antidosis, or Exchange of Property. Thus, any one, to whom a trireme had been assigned, might call upon some other person, (whom he supposed to be richer than himself,) to take his place, and, in case of the refusal of that person, might demand of him an exchange of property. If in the legal investigation which followed, the person upon whom the demand was made

was found to be the richer, he must either perform the trierarchy, or make the exchange, in which latter case, the service reverted to the original trierarch.

The trierarchy was one of the ancient institutions of Athens, but, partly from inherent faults, and partly from change of circumstances, underwent many modifications. It appeared in four forms.

In its original form, each trierarch was required to take the charge of one trireme. And doubtless, in the best days of Athens, individuals enough might be found to furnish and command all the triremes the state might wish to use. Throughout this early period, the office was felt to be an office of honor, and was an object of ambition to the first citizens. But, at a later period, probably after the disasters in

Sicily in 412, B. C., when both the state and individuals were reduced in wealth, two trierarchs were permitted to undertake the charge of one trireme, though only in case there were not men of wealth enough to furnish single trierarchs. This was called the Syntrierarchy, and the trierarchs, syntrierarchs. The system continued without farther change till 357, B. C.

But the system grew less and less efficient, although it was not till the Eubœan war in 358, B. C., that the necessity of a radical change became apparent. In that emergency, either because there were not enough legally liable, or from the numerous expedients for escaping or delaying the service, the system failed, and for the first time, as Demosthenes says, citizens came forward, and volunteered to serve as trierarchs. As, however, the state could not depend permanently on volunteers, the next year, 357, B. C., a law was introduced by Peisander, giving a new form to the trierarchy. According to this law, there was constituted for the charge of the navy a Board of twelve hundred citizens, taken from those who stood highest on the tax-list. These co-partners, (*συντελεῖς*) as they were called, were divided into twenty classes (*συμμοριαί*) of sixty each; each class was subdivided into four companies, (*συντέλειαι*); and each company had the charge of one trireme. But, in order the better to secure the performance of their duties, there was instituted a smaller Board, composed of three hundred members, who were selected from the richest of the

co-partners. The members of this board were distributed among the twenty symmoriae, and were the leaders or overseers of these bodies, (ἡγεμόνες, or, ἐπιμεληταὶ τῶν συμμοριῶν.) These leaders, either as a body or distributed among the synteliae, performed the actual duties of the trierarchy, reimbursing themselves by an assessment levied equally on all the partners. The system, however, only increased the evils it was intended to remedy. The duties of the trierarchy were more negligently performed than ever, since the leaders of the symmoriae farmed them to contractors, who sought only their own interest; at the same time the burdens of the poor were increased, because the assessments for the reimbursement of the leaders were imposed *per capita*, which made it a heavy tax upon them, while to the rich it was comparatively little or nothing.

As early as 354, B. C., Demosthenes in his first public speech, that on the Symmoriae, proposed, though without
Fourth Form. success, a reform. But so great had the evils become, that at length in connection with the expedition to Byzantium, he was enabled to effect a radical change. According to his system, the services of the trierarchy were assigned, not according to persons, but according to property; every man whose taxable capital amounted to ten talents furnished one trireme; to twenty, two; to thirty, three, together with a tender; and this was the highest exaction, whatever might be the amount of taxable capital, while those who had less than ten talents were to unite in companies or syntelias until they made up that sum. This is the measure of which Demosthenes speaks in this section. On this subject, see БОЕЦКН, Pub. Econ. of Athens, B. iv. Chs. 11-15.

ἐπανελθεῖν, that is, from the preceding examples, as if from a digression which had led him from his main object. ἐξ ἧς, next after the decree to despatch a fleet to aid Byzantium, but immediately after, it is probable, so that the trierarchs for the expedition were appointed in accordance with his law. πάλιν αὖ, simply, *again*; a pleonasm peculiar to the Attic. BUTT. § 156, 6. τὸ ναυτικόν, *navy*, or *naval affairs*. ἀτελεῖς, *free*,—that is, from the burden of the trierarchy,—*at a small expense*. So, БОЕЦКН, Pub. Econ. B. iv. Ch. 13, Note; but Dissen and Schaefer refer it to the

exemption from liturgies, which was granted the trierarchs. "*Immunes liturgiarum.*" DISSEN. γραφεις, that is, in a παρανόμων γραφή. τὸν ἀγῶνα τοῦτον, "*a trial like the present.*" DOBREE. εἰσῆλθον. "*εἰσέρχασθαι est verbum judiciale, et dicitur tum de causa, quæ in judicium venit, tum de actore, qui accusat, tum de reo, qui accusatur et se defendit, denique de judice.*" BREMI. *And being prosecuted I entered upon this trial before you; or, perhaps, the trial; it being difficult to give the allusion expressed in τοῦτον, without an awkward circumlocution. "Atque accusatus hanc causam apud vos subii."* WOLF. τὸ μέρος, "h. e. τὸ τακτὸν μέρος, quod erat τὸ πέμπτον." DISSEN. Demosthenes was not only acquitted, but triumphantly. τοὺς ἡγεμόνας τῶν συμμοριῶν, refers to the smaller board of Three Hundred. τοὺς δευτέρους καὶ τρίτους refer either to those who in point of property were in the second and third rank below the leaders, or, to those belonging to the second and third classes in the valuation of the property-tax. "The chief burden [of Demosthenes' law,] fell," says Boeckh, "upon the leaders of the former symmoriæ, and upon the second and third symmorites who were next in order," p. 573. διδόναι, "*offerre.*" REISKE. See BUTT. § 136. 6, 10. "Agitur de re facta; nam fulmen hîc validum vibratur." SCHAEFER. καταβαλόντα ἔαν ἐν ὑπωμοσίᾳ. We have already seen, in the Introduction to these Notes, that any one might stop all proceedings on a psephism proposed in the Assembly, by declaring under oath that he would bring a παρανόμων γραφή against the mover. Such an oath of postponement was called an ὑπωμοσία, and to take the oath, ὑπωμόσασθαι. But before the day of trial, the mover of the psephism might relinquish it, and thus take away the ground of action, in which case it was said of him, καταβαλόντα ἔαν ἐν ὑπωμοσίᾳ. *That dropping it I should leave it under postponement.* See DISSEN. ἦν γὰρ αὐτοῖς, *for it was possible for them to perform the service by sixteens;* § 104. that is, for the rich to distribute it among sixteen, both rich and poor. αὐτοῖς μὲν, not the sixteen, but the rich. μικρὰ καὶ οὐδέν, "*pauca vel potius nihil.*" DISSEN. "*καὶ sæpe auget, ut corrigentis, et idem fere est, quod μᾶλλον δέ, immo.*" BREMI. τὸ γιγνόμενον, "*ratam portionem.*" HER. ad VIG. p. 777. τιθέναι, "*scilicet, ἔδει, quod vi oppositi*

eliciendum." "τιθεῖναι est sæpius *numerare pecuniam*." DISSEN. δυοῖν, "scilicet, τριήσεων." REISKE. "Substantivum hic et mox ad τῆς μιᾶς subaudiendum latet in verbo τριήραρχος." SCHAEFER. ἐδίδουσαν "obtulerunt." SCHAEFER. εἰσῆλθον τῇν γράφῃν. "I appeared to the indictment," KEN- § 105. NEDY; which, though a modern term, well expresses it. "Accusatus sum," WOLF; that is implied, but it means to come before the court in answer to an accusation. ἄρα γς. § 107. ἄρα usually requires a negative answer, but sometimes an affirmative, in which case it stands for ἄρ' οὐ, equivalent to the Latin *nonne*. HER. ad VIG. p. 821. *Appears it not that I aided you poor at least a little?* τῷ μὴ καθυσπεῖναι ταῦτα, *that I did not drop this matter*, that is, the law. οὐδὲ = οὐδὲ μόνον. § 2. 93. πεῖραν, "*documentum hujus rei*," REISKE.—Observe the condensation of the expression, and translate by the fewest possible words—πάντα τὸν πόλεμον, either the whole of the Byzantine war, or, of that, together with the Amphisæan war. Grote refers it to the entire war, that is, "from the renewal of the war about August 340, B. C., to the battle of Cheronea in August 338, B. C." Vol. XI, 467. It will be remembered that Demosthenes has spoken only of the Byzantine war. παρ' ὑμῖν, construe with ἐθηκε, *placed a supplication with you, supplicated you*. The words are chosen with reference to the usage in the case of suppliants, who carried a branch, usually of olive, bound with fillets, and placed it upon the altar of the god whose protection they sought. Those who sought the protection of the people placed it upon the altar of sacrifice which was in the Pnyx. But it is not necessary to retain these allusions in translating. ἐν Μοῦνυχίᾳ, where there was an altar of refuge for trierarchs and seafaring men. τῶν ἀποστολέων, *Naval-commissioners*; a body of ten men, whose duty it was to see that the triremes were fitted out, and to expedite the sailing of the fleet. οὐ τριήρης, *not a trireme was either lost to the state, being captured abroad*,—from not keeping up, perhaps, with the main fleet, in consequence of being badly built—or *left here, unable to put to sea*. ἔξω and αὐτοῦ are contrasted. τὰ ἀδύνατα, contrasted with τὰ δέοντα; failures to perform the trierarchy, from want of means; of course—δὴ—*there occurred many failures*.

§108-109. CONCLUSION OF THE ACCOUNT OF HIS WHOLE ADMINISTRATION.

Although what follows under this head is intimately connected with what immediately precedes, it seems best to separate it, in order again to point out the characteristic practice of the orator, in expressly enforcing the conclusion to be drawn from facts and arguments, and in giving a perfection of form to each general topic.

βάσκανον—κακὸν ἦθες; ταπεινὸν—ἀνάξιον.
The separation of these predicates is worthy of notice. Each of the first set,—βάσκανον, *envious*, πικρόν, *malicious*, κακὸν ἦθες, *malignant*, is personal, alluding to Æschines, while the others § 109. are general. ἔν τε τοῖς κατὰ τὴν πόλιν πολι-
τεύμασι καὶ ἐν τοῖς Ἑλληνικοῖς, expressly distinguishes between the Domestic and Foreign Administration of public affairs. See § 58.

This law of the Trierarchy, as we have seen, produced an entire revolution in the naval affairs of the Athenians; but what modern statesman, in giving an account of an equally important law, *could* compress it into the space of ten minutes' speaking. The four causes of the law are expressed in the same number of short clauses, and the results, with almost as much brevity. But still, the statement is brief, not because its terms are general, conveying much but impressing little, but because the chief considerations only are selected, and these are put together in the same sentence in the fewest words. It would have been easy to expand each particular into a paragraph, but the orator chose otherwise. These full but compressed statements deserve study as much as any part of the oration.

§110-122. DISCUSSION OF THE STRICTLY LEGAL POINTS.

§110. TRANSITION.

τὰ μέγιστα γέ. *The greatest even*; quite the greatest. For this use of γέ, see HERM. ad VIG. p. 824. The orator refers to his measures in the Amphisbean war. τοὺς περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ παρανόμου λόγους ἀποδοῦναι, *to render my de-*

fense concerning the Illegality itself; with reference to the terms employed in rendering the accounts in a public scrutiny. Compare ἕως ἂν λόγον ἀποδῶσι τῇ πόλει. Æschines, § 21. ὁμοίως — ὅτι ἄρχεσιν μοι, *that equally, with each of you the knowledge exists for me*; μοι, the dative of advantage; ὁμοίως, *the same as if I did speak of them*, and therefore equivalent to *nihilominus*, by which Dissen translates it.—Observe how mindful the orator is to maintain his original position, that the subject of the Proclamation and the Accounts should follow the discussion of the meritorious grounds of Ctesiphon's decree. Observe, also, that in speaking of the measures of his administration which he had omitted, the very omission of which, however, he brings to bear in his favor, he gives no intimation of being about to dwell upon them, though their consideration takes up nearly the whole of the remainder of the oration.

§ 111–119. I. THE QUESTION OF ACCOUNTABILITY.

For an account of the law of Accountability, see Introduction, p. 89. § 111–113. AN ARGUMENT DRAWN FROM THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN GIFTS AND SERVICES. περὶ τῶν παραγεγραμμένων νόμων, *contrasted laws*. “οἱ παραγεγραμμένοι νόμοι sunt leges, quas legis alicujus vel psephismatis accusator ex adverso legi accusatæ seu psephismati in eadem tabula exarandas curabat, ut, contra quas leges, lege nova vel psephismate lato, commisisset reus, iudiciis manifestius appareret.” SEAGER, in CLASS. JOURN. LIII, p. 27. See p. 640, 21; Æschines, § 200. τοὺς πολλούς, is the object of both συνεῖναι and μαρθάνειν, and governs τῶν λόγων; *the greater part*. διέβαλλε καὶ διωρίζετο; the latter verb makes the former more specific; “*has falsely and distinctly affirmed*.” Lord BROUGHAM. ἀπαντα τὸν βίον, in contrast with οὐδεμίαν ἡμέραν. διακexeλερικα, refers here specifically to the management of public funds, although it has more frequently the general meaning of, *having in hand, undertaking*. Dissen, Bremi, Westermann give the specific; Wolf, Reiske, Brougham and Kennedy, the general meaning. *I am accountable, both for whatever money has passed through my hands and for all my public conduct*. ἐπαγγελάμενος, “*sponte mea pollicitus*,” REISKE; or, simply, “*sponte mea*,” BREMI. τῶν ἐννέα

§ 112. ἀρχόντων, "qui imprimis severum examen apud λογιστάς et εὐθύνους subibant." DISSEN. φιλόδορον, "non, appetens dona, sed, facile largiens." SCHAEFER. εἰς τοὺς συκοφάντας — ἐφιστάναί, to bring him to trial before the Informers—observe the article with συκοφάντας, as if they constituted a board corresponding to the Logistæ—and to place them in authority over the accounts of the moneys he has given—"hos tanquam λογιστάς et εὐθύνους rationibus repetendis præficere." DISSEN. ἄγειν, is used of bringing one before the judges for trial. Æschines says, he understands Demosthenes will ask, of what am I accountable, εἰ μὴ τις ἐστὶν εὐνοίας εὐθύνη; § 17. ἀλλ' οὗτος συκοφαντῶν — ὄντα, but § 113. this malicious accuser says, "the Senate praised him while liable to the public scrutiny"—quoting the assertion in the words of Æschines but giving Æschines' reasons for the assertion in his own words—because being treasurer of the Theoric fund I made a present of the money which was needed. With respect to the Theoric Funds, see Introduction. τὰ χρήματα, is rendered by Kennedy, "some of my own money;" by Lord Brougham, "money of my own;" but the article seems to require a different expression. ἐπὶ ἡνέσεν. The law forbids to crown, using the verb στεφανοῦν, for which the orator adroitly substitutes, ἐπαινεῖν. So, also, he speaks of the Senate; Æschines, of Ctesiphon; but Westermann rejects ἡ βουλὴ, and Vœmel marks it as doubtful. τείχοποιός, see Introduction, p. 86. καὶ οὐκ ἐλογιζόμην, and made no charge. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λογισμός, for an audit requires accounts and examiners. ὁ λογισμός, is the act of settling; αἱ εὐθύναι, the accounts to be settled. ὁ δὲ, Ctesiphon.—The fallacy of this argument of Demosthenes is obvious; it does not follow that because he was not accountable for what he gave while treasurer of the Theoric fund, and overseer of the repair of the walls, he was not accountable for whatever else he did in the performance of those affairs, and, therefore, under a legal disability of receiving the crown.—§ 114–117. ARGUMENT FROM PRECEDENTS. ἐν τοῖς νόμοις. Having asserted that there was no law, making a magistrate accountable for what he gave to the state, the orator proceeds to show that there was no usage. ἔθεσιν. Many manuscripts and many of the best editions, Dissen's, Westermann's, Vœmel's, give

ἤθεσιν, as more emphatic; it was in their very natures not to require such a thing. Reiske and Schaefer prefer the present reading. "Restitui ἔθεσιν." W. DINDORF. στρατηγῶν, that is, while he was exercising the office of general. Of course, Nausicles was crowned for what he gave while in office, and before rendering the accounts of his office, since otherwise the example would be without force; ἐπιστάτης ὢν, is taken in the same way. Thus, Disсен; "cum prætor esset necdum deposuisset honorem et rationes reddidisset." Χαρίδημος, "scilicet, ἔδωκε." W. DINDORF. οὕτως, as being present. αὐτὰ λαβών, "Decreta ipsa opponuntur narrationi Demosthenicæ § 115. de illorum argumento." SCHAEFER.—May it not be that usage was on the side of Demosthenes?—δέδωκα. It seems that on the expiration of his offices, Demosthenes passed the usual scrutiny, and with credit; but this could not cure the original illegality of Ctesiphon's decree. εἰς ἡγὼν οἱ λογισ- § 117. ται, "*cum me scilicet in judicium ducerent logistæ.*" DISSEN. The logistæ brought those who were liable to the audit before some tribunal, in order to give the usual opportunity of accusation, if any one chose. § 118–119. ARGUMENT FROM A COMPARISON OF THE DECREE WITH THE INDICTMENT. ἐφ' οἷς οὐχ ὑπεύθυνος ἦν ἐστὲ φανῶσθαι. The argument is this: Æschines did not charge in the indictment, that the reception of the gifts was contrary to the laws; but, if not, there was no liability to render an account of them, and, therefore, Demosthenes was not accountable for the gifts. Hence, since he was crowned for the gifts, he was crowned, by the confession of Æschines, for what he was not accountable. But does it follow, that because the gift is legal, the giver is not liable to render an account of it? Æschines shows the contrary. τοῦ προβουλεύματος. τὸ προβούλευμα is the proper term, though τὸ ψήφισμα, as in the line above, is often used as equivalent. τὸ χάριν—χράθεις. But, Æschines § 119. could easily have replied that, although there might be sufficient grounds for bestowing the crown in themselves considered, it would be in violation of the laws to do it, under the circumstances, and in the manner proposed. Besides the precedents, the assertion that no one is accountable for what he gives is Demosthenes' only argument, the invincible argument—ὁ ἀφνικὸς λόγος—as according to Æschines (§ 17) he called it; yet it is of no force. βάσκανος ὄντως, not an anti-climax;

it has a personal application to Æschines. οὐχ ὁ τοιοῦτος. See § 101, and p. 362, for this mode of ending a paragraph.—It is universally admitted by commentators that the plea of Demosthenes upon the question of Accountability is unsatisfactory and sophistical. Æschines anticipated and answered it. We give the substance of his remarks. It was a fundamental principle of the Athenian constitution, as we have seen, that every one holding an office should render an account of his official conduct to the people. But there had grown up a practice which entirely frustrated the design of such a scrutiny. Magistrates who were guilty of any offense would obtain *while in office* a proclamation of a crown, which, although it would not exempt them from accountability, nor shield them from impeachment, secured their acquittal. For, as Æschines says, “the judges were ashamed that the same man, in the same city, perhaps, in the same year, should be publicly honored by the people with the proclamation of a crown at the games for his patriotism, and soon after convicted of fraud in the administration of public affairs. Now, it was this state of things, as he says, which gave rise to the enactment of the law, “which expressly forbids to crown the magistrates before they have rendered the account of their magistracy.” Many attempts were made to evade this law; especially, it was contended that it did not apply to what was given to the state. Æschines replies to this plea, with reference to the present case, in this language. “When Demosthenes,” he says, “shall impudently assert that he is not accountable for a gift, suggest this to him—let, then, the herald make the usual proclamation, ‘who wishes to accuse?’ Let any one of the citizens have the opportunity to question whether you *have* given any thing, or only paid the state what was its due? Do not snatch at public favor, do not seize the votes from the hands of the judges, do not as a citizen go before the laws but after them, for only thus will the democracy be safe.” This is evidently a satisfactory answer. To crown one for a gift would as really defeat the object of the law as to crown for any thing else. The gift might be given for no other purpose than to obtain thereby a crown, which might afterwards be made use of to secure an acquittal in case of an impeachment. Besides, the law forbade to crown for *any thing*, until the scrutiny had been passed.

§120-122. II. THE QUESTION OF THE PROCLAMATION.

The argument is drawn, first, from precedents, and then, from the words of the law. μυριάκις μυρίους, *ten thousand times ten thousand*; “*thousands of thousands.*” KENNEDY. πολλάκις αὐτός. Demosthenes mentions only four crowns bestowed on himself. Notes, p. 163, § 83. ζῆλον, “i. q. τὴν αὐτὴν τιμὴν;” SCHAEFER; *the same value*. ἀναγορευέτω, § 121. “scilicet, ὁ πῆχυς.” WESTERMANN. τί οὖν, ὦ ταλαίπωρε, συζοφάντεϊς. This is not the language of indignation, but, as Ulpian says, of commiseration. *Why, miserable man, do you accuse?*—as if pitying him for being so beside himself as to contend against so plain a law. In the same spirit he adds; *why not purge yourself with hellebore for this?*—Why not cure yourself of this madness? He then proceeds seriously. φθόρον δίκην εἰσάγων, οὐκ ἀδικήματος οὐδενός. These genitives sustain different relations to δίκην, and must be expressed in English by different prepositions. “*Are you not ashamed of bringing a suit out of envy, and not for any crime?*” “φθόρον δίκην est lis, quæ non causam habet in culpa ejus, qui accusatur, sed in invidia ejus, qui accusat.” BREMI. ἔπειτα τοιαῦτα—κομιζόμενος. § 122. Æschines had given (§ 168-170) an ideal representation of a friend of the people, as he conceived the character—that he be free-born, that he have an hereditary kindness, or at least no enmity, towards the people, that he be temperate, sound in counsel and able in speech, brave—with an application of course to Demosthenes. Demosthenes here retorts. *Then, though thus acting, you speak of what ought to belong to the friend of the people, as if you,—not any one—had bargained for a statue, to be made according to a model, and then refused it—οὐ κομιζόμενος, “non recipisses,” DISSEN—though made according to the model; that is, you recommend one course and practice another; or, but received it, though not made—οὐκ ἔχοντα, statuam non ita perfectam, WOLF—according to the model: that is, you are satisfied in practice with what falls far below your ideal. κατὰ συγγράφην, according to a written contract; which, however, as Lord Brougham suggests, must have contained a model or plan. λόγῳ,*

seems used in an abstract sense; *by talk*. καὶ βόῃς. The connection is obvious. Public men, in your view, are known by their speeches; *and*, hence, *you cry out*. ἐπητὰ καὶ ἄρρητα, "*fanda infanda*, h. e. quidquid in mentem venit." DISSEN. ὀνομάζων, governs two accusatives. *And you cry out, calling me every sort of name, as if from a cart, what belongs to you and your race, not to me.* Compare, καὶ τὴν μητέρα καὶ πᾶντας ἡμᾶς ἐπητὰ καὶ ἄρρητα κακὰ ἐξεῖπον. p. 540. SCHAEFER. ὁσπερ ἐξ ἀμάξης. See § 11, p. 117.—With respect to the Proclamation, it is somewhat doubtful what the law really was. Æschines quotes a law which seems to be decisive: "If the senate shall crown any one, the proclamation shall be made in the senate-house, but if the people, in the Assembly, and *no where else*." § 32. The law quoted above by Demosthenes seems to contradict this. "Those whom any of the boroughs shall crown shall have the proclamation made in the boroughs, except the people of Athens or the senate shall crown any, in which case it shall be lawful for the proclamation to be made in the Theater, at the Dyonisiac festival." Æschines anticipates the appeal to this law, and gives the following explanation. The performances of the theater had been interrupted by the number of proclamations of various kinds, which were made during the festivals. The person, who was crowned by a tribe or borough, was ambitious of having it proclaimed before the assembly of the theater. So, too, the one who had manumitted a slave would like to have it announced before so large a multitude. But the most common proclamation was of *Foreign Crowns*. Athenian citizens would obtain crowns from foreign states, and then seek this more public proclamation of them. By this means, not only were the performances of the theater interrupted, but such persons were more honored than those who received crowns from the Athenian people, or the senate. It was to meet these evils, according to Æschines, that the Dyonisiac law, quoted by Demosthenes, was passed. Æschines, without quoting the words of the law, professes to give the substance; "that there shall be no proclamation made in the theater, of the manumission of a slave, of a crown conferred by a tribe, a borough, or by *any one else*." To this law, there is this exception, "except the people shall vote it may be done." Now the law with this exception may be interpreted in two ways. Æs-

chines interprets thus : there shall be made no proclamation of a crown, conferred by a tribe, a borough, or by any one else, that is, *by foreign states*, except the people permit it. This interpretation makes the Dyonisiac law inapplicable to the decree of Ctesiphon, and leaves that decree in direct violation of the law quoted by Æschines. But Demosthenes interprets the law thus : there shall be no proclamation of a crown in the theater, whether conferred by a tribe, a borough, or by *any one else*, that is, either by *foreign states*, or by *the people of Athens* or *the senate*, except the people vote it. This interpretation, and it is not a forced one, brings the decree of Ctesiphon within the scope of the law, and makes it legal. Which is the true interpretation we can not say, for neither orator has given the law in full. It will be observed that the law as quoted by Demosthenes has, "except the people and the senate shall *crown* any"—whereas in his comment it is—"except the people or the senate *shall decree*," that is, that it may be done. It is the same thing—the people and the senate may *decree* that those whom they *crown* shall have the proclamation made in the theater. It looks a little as if the former, *στέφανοι*, was Demosthenes' interpretation of the law, and the latter, *ψηφίσσεται* its actual words, especially as Æschines uses the same.

As a matter of rhetorical study, this part of the speech is worthy of much attention, as a good example of the mode of treating contemptuously that which the orator would have the audience believe to be contemptible. Æschines had laid out his greatest strength upon the legal points, devoting to them nearly one-third of his whole speech. But Demosthenes dismisses them, not merely with brevity but contempt. Still, he could not have ventured upon this, unless he had already secured the favor of the audience. He had shown that the crown was well conferred, and had so thoroughly aroused the spirit of his countrymen as to make them indifferent to the merely technical points. Hence, too, we see again the importance of that masterly movement of the orator, by which he was enabled to postpone these points to the present time. (See p. 114.) The postponement of topics, in order to treat them more successfully, may be fair, or it may be sophistical. In the present case, Æschines called it a mere trick of the court-house, and warned


the audience against it. (See pp. 100–101). Upon the sophistical use, see Whately, Part I. Ch. 3, § 7. Also, upon the mode of treating what the orator would have thought contemptible, Part I. Ch. 3, § 8.

§ 123–125. TRANSITION BETWEEN THE SECOND AND THIRD PARTS OF THE ORATION.

καίτοι καὶ τοῦτο. “Intelligendum ἐνθυμητόν vel simile verbum. Eodem modo pp. 43, 442, 568.” W. DINDORF. But in the utterance, the tone would express the verbal conception. ἐγὼ λοιδοροῦσαν—λέγειν. Compare Cicero: “Accusatio crimen desiderat, rem ut definiat, hominem ut notet, argumento probet, teste confirmet: maledictio autem nihil habet propositi præter contumeliam, quæ, si petulantius jactatur, convicium, si facetius, urbanitas nominatur.” Pro M. Cœlia. But contrast the condensed energy of Demosthenes with the more flowing but beautifully constructed sentence of Cicero. κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν; “prout cuique naturalis indoles obtigit, seu lenis, mitis, sedata, aut atrox, vehemens, cita, impetuousa, sæva, ita probra sunt, quæ adversario ingerit”—we here cut off the stream of Reiske’s eloquence. οὐχ ἵνα συλλέξαντες—ἀλλήλους, not, that assembling you in them we should upbraid one another—κακῶς λέγωμεν ἀλλήλους—with scandals drawn from private life. ταῦτα τοίνυν—ἐμοῦ, now § 124. then, knowing this not less than I. οὐ μὴν οὐδ’ ἐνταῦθα—ἀπελθεῖν, not truly, not even—οὐδ’ repeated for emphasis—in this, ought he to get off with less than he gave. ἔλαττον, “scilicet, τῶν λοιδοριῶν.” SCHAEFER. It is necessary in English to add—than he gave—which is obviously implied. ἐπὶ ταῦτα, “ad dedecora hominis domestica.” SCHAEFER. εἴτα οὐ μέν—ἀπὴν τηκας, why then where,—οὐ genitive of the relative used as an adverb and equivalent to “quibus in rebus,” with which Schaefer translates it—on the one hand, it was in your power to take punishment from me according to the laws, in behalf of these—ὑπὲρ τούτων, “pro his civibus Atheniensibus hoc iudicium circumstantibus,” REISKE—if I indeed had wronged them, did you neglect it, in the official Audits, in the Indictment for Illegal Propositions, in other kinds of prosecutions; but, where on the other—οὐδ’

corresponding to οὐ μέν—I—ἐγὼ μέν, having its correspondence in τῇ πόλει δ', but best expressed by the tone—*stand clear by every consideration, by the laws, by time, by prescription,—*τῷ χρόνῳ being generic, and τῇ προθεσμίᾳ specific, REISKE—*by my frequently having been tried before on all these charges, by my never having been convicted of crime against you, but where the STATE must of necessity share more or less in the glory at least of the public measures, there you have met me?* τοῦτων μὲν ἐχθρός. We expect πόλεως, but how much greater force is given to the remark by this unexpected appeal to the audience before him. ULPAN.—The argument is this: You neglected to attack me when you would have done it, had you been really my enemy; you attack me now, when you can not harm me but must harm the state; you must be aiming, therefore, a secret stab at the state.

This section may be regarded as the conclusion of the Defense. Demosthenes professes that he had made out a clear case, and need go no farther in that line of remark. As such a conclusion, it contains, it is worthy of notice, the same topic **Periodic Form of the Defense.** § 12–16, Demosthenes charged Æschines with dishonest motives as an accuser; we have here the same charge. In both cases, the charge is founded on the same fact, that Æschines had not prosecuted the crimes at the time they were alleged to have been committed, but so long after that they could not be properly punished, even if true; in both cases we have the same inference of dishonesty in motive; the only difference being that in the first instance, Æschines is accused of being influenced by hate towards a personal enemy, in the latter, by hate towards the state. Is this return to the original topic, an instance of regard for artistic unity so obvious in Greek writers, and preëminently so in Demosthenes, or, was it accidental? This section serves also as a Transition to the Third Part of the oration. It states the reason, or rather the pretext, under which Demosthenes changes his ground, and from acting on the defensive, becomes the assailant.



§ 126-252. THIRD PART OF THE ORATION.

ATTACK ON ÆSCHINES.

The division of the oration into three grand portions, together with the reasons for such division, has been mentioned in the Introduction, (pp. 97-99); and we need here do no more than allude to it. The First Part treats of irrelevant matter, the transactions of the fatal peace of 346, B. C., which the orator would throw out of the *case*, though he dare not leave it out of his *speech*; the Second Part treats of those public transactions in which, as chief statesman, he took the lead, ending with the triumph of Athens in the Byzantine war, and this constitutes his formal defense of the decree of Ctesiphon; the Third Part, under the disguise of recrimination, treats of the transactions of the last war, in which Athens was defeated and conquered;—thus leaving *out of* the Defense the fatal beginning and the still more fatal termination of the contest with Philip, and bringing *into* it, only that portion in which Athens was for a short time triumphant, while, however, it is to be remembered that Demosthenes could with safety have left neither out of his *speech*. This movement, by which Demosthenes represents himself as struggling to ward off a great evil brought upon the country by Æschines, is not less masterly than that by which he treats of the first peace as not pertaining to his case, or that by which he postpones the discussion of the strictly legal points.

This part of the oration, after an Introduction, § 126-128, takes up first the Private Life of Æschines, § 129-131, and then his Public Life. Under the latter head, the orator treats of several individual transactions, § 132-139, and then proceeds to the Amphissean war, which is the real subject of this part of the oration; we will give the analysis, when we reach the topic.

§ 126-128. INTRODUCTION.

ἡ μὲν εὐσεβὴς καὶ δίκαια ψῆφος, *the decision, which piety and justice requires*; εὐσεβής, with reference to the oath of the judges, upon which in the exordium, and elsewhere, Demosthenes has laid so much stress. διὰ τὰς —

εἰρημένους, "Ordo constructionis: διὰ τὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ-
του εἰρημένους βλασφημίας. Inversio hæc ordinis est
ex idiomatis Græcæ; ne de vocibus transponendis cogites."
SCHAEFER. See § 293, 314. ἀντὶ πολλῶν καὶ ψευδῶν,
instead of many and false things; such as Æschines had spo-
ken of him. Others, "as a set-off to his many and false char-
ges;" which, however, is implied in the preceding clause. αὐτὰ
τὰ νῆγκαιότατ', *barely the most necessary*. τίς ὢν καὶ
τίνων. See § 10 and note, p. 117. λόγους τίνας δια-
σύρει, *and what expressions he carps at*; connected with
δεῖξαι; "et quas orationes exagitet." VÆMEL. Seager proposed
τινάς, and translated, "et dictiones quasdam calumniatur,"
connecting διασύρει with ἄρχει. CLASS. JOUR. LIII, p. 52. Ap-
proved by SCHAEFER, and edited by DISSEN and WESTERMANN.
We subjoin an example of Æschines' criticism; οὐ μέμνησθε
αὐτοῦ τὰ μικρὰ καὶ ἀπίθανα ῥήματα, ἃ πῶς ποθ' ὑμεῖς, ὧ σιδήρεοι,
ἐκαυτερεῖτε ἀκροώμενοι; οἷ' ἔφη παρελθὼν "ἀμπελουροῦσι τινες
τὴν πόλιν, ἀνατετιμήκασι τινες τὰ κλήματα τοῦ δήμου, ὑποτέτμηται
τὰ νεῦρα τῶν πραγμάτων, φορμορροφούμεθα ἐπὶ τὰ στενὰ, τινὲς
πρῶτον ὥσπερ τὰς βελόνας διείρουσι." ταῦτα δὲ τί ἐστίν, ὧ κίνα-
δος; ῥήματα ἢ θαύματα. § 166. See, also, § 72. τίς τῶν
μετριῶν, *what ordinary man*. φθέγγασθαι, with this, the
sentence breaks off, without an apodosis. Αἰακός—Μίνως,
§ 127. a proverb, denoting an upright man. σπερμολόγος,
§ 127. "a word-monger." Lord BROUGHAM. The Athenian
philosophers applied the same epithet to Paul. τί ἂν θέλοι ὁ
σπερμολόγος οὗτος λέγειν; Acts 17:18. περίτριμμα ἄγο-
ρᾶς, *a hack of the forum*; compare, περίτριμμα δικῶν, Aris-
toph. Nub. 447. ὕλεθρος γραμματεὺς, *a pestilent*
scribe; ὕλεθρος taking the place of an adjective. ὧ γῆ καὶ
ἧ λῖε. The words of Æschines are; "Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν, ὧ γῆ καὶ
ἧ λῖε καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ σύνεσις καὶ παιδεία, ἣ διαγιγνώσκομεν τὰ καλὰ
καὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ, βεβोधήθηκα καὶ εἵρηκα." § 260. δὴ ποῦθεν—
I think, or, if I mistake not; with a sneer.—This section, we
easily observe, is in good keeping with the professed object of
recrimination. We may notice, however, that as Demosthenes
charged the blame of speaking his own *praises*, upon Æschi-
nes, who had made it necessary for him to do it, so, here, he
represents himself as driven to *invective*, by the necessity which
the previous invective of Æschines had forced upon him.

§ 129-131. PRIVATE LIFE OF ÆSCHINES.

οὐκ ἀπορῶν — μνησθῶ, at no loss what fittingly to say of you and yours, I am at a loss what to say first: I am at a loss for the first thing I may mention. ἐδοῦλυσεν παρ' Ἐλπίᾳ, served with Elpias; that is, was a slave of the schoolmaster Elpias. πρὸς τῷ Θησείῳ, near the Theseum; a temple of Theseus in the northwestern part of the city. διδάσκοντι γράμματα. "Est γράμματα διδάσκειν docere pueros legere et scribere." DISSSEN. χολνικας, "fetters." ξύλον, a wooden collar. τοῖς μεθήμερινοῖς γάμοις, prostitutions in the day time. "Sed quotidianus dicitur καθημερινός, diurnus μεθήμερινός. SCHÆFER. γάμοις. "Euphemismus, quo meretricum vita indicatur." BREMI. τῷ κλεισίῳ, the brothel. πρὸς τῷ καλαμίτῃ ἡρώϊ. The exact meaning is a matter of conjecture. Near the hero, Kalamites; that is, near his statue or monument. "Statuo demum fuisse herois cujusdam (Calamitem vocabant,) sive statuam sive sacellum sive monumentum, juxta vero porticum sive fornicem eoque pro lupanari usas fuisse, quæ Athenis prostabant." REISKE. But Schæfer makes ἡρώϊ the proper name, Heros, and καλαμίτῃ, an epithet. "Homo dictus fuit καλαμίτης, quod τοῖς καλάμοις perite uteretur aut in curandis ossium fracturis aut ad alios usus chirurgicos." He refers to p. 419, 22. πρὸς τῷ τοῦ Ἡρώ τοῦ λατροῦ. Heros, the surgeon. τριταγωνιστὴν ἄκρον, a third rate actor at the top of his profession,—ἄκρον—. KÜHNER, § 245, R. 5.—The terms selected in this account of Æschines' parentage are expressive of the utmost contempt. His father was not only a slave, but a base, fettered slave, and a slave to one who exercised the humblest calling; his mother, not only a prostitute, but a most shameless one, and the person who raised her from her honorable employment was the son of a slave, and a galley pipe-player; and Æschines himself—the beautiful puppet—not an actor, but an actor of third parts, though, to be sure, in these he shone.—ἀπ' αὐτῶν δὲ ὧν αὐτὸς βεβίωκεν = ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν αὐτῷ βεβιωμένων. Compare τὰ σοὶ κάμοι βεβιωμένα. § 125.

§ 130. The relative with the finite verb can sometimes be best translated by the participle, or the corresponding substantive.

Thus, οἷς γὰρ εὐτυχήμεσαν = εὐτυχήμασι. § 18. So, here; *I will begin with the acts of his life.* οὐδὲ γὰρ ὧν ἔτυχε νῆν, *for he was not one of the ordinary sort,*—ὧν ἔτυχε ν = τῶν τυχόντων, as above—but of those accursed by the people; that is, he was not a common, ordinary knave, but a great, public malefactor. The connection seems to be this; I will not dwell upon the private vices of his ancestors;—it would be unworthy of me—I will begin with Æschines himself, and his public crimes. The paragraph is, indeed, the transition to the account of the public life of Æschines. The sentence has received several interpretations. The above is substantially that of Reiske. “*Non enim est Æschines de genere hominum triviali, vulgari, sed unus illorum inventu rarorum hominum, quos populus per præconem publice devovet, h. e. parricida et proditor patriæ eoque dignus cujus in mores et cursum universæ vitæ inquiretur.*” DisSEN makes the orator speak of the acts of his life; “*neque enim vulgaris generis erant,*—ἀβεβλωκεν,—*sed qualia populus execratur.*” But this weakens the sense, and besides, it is Æschines himself who is the subject of discourse. “ὁ δὲ ἦμος καταρᾶται pertinent ad solemnem precationis formulam, quam præco populi nomine pronuntiabat initio comitiorum.” DisSEN. ὁ ψὲ γὰρ ποτε—*for late in life at length.* “ὁ ψὲ refertur ad Æschinis ætatem. Is dicitur grandis natu atque sero factus civis et orator, adeoque tam sero, ut res paucis diebus ante accidisse videatur.” SCHAEFER. ὁ ψὲ λέγω; *late, say I?* χθὲς μὲν οὖν καὶ πρόην, *yea, rather—μὲν οὖν, “immo.”* HER. ad VIG. p. 842—*yesterday or the day before; χθὲς καὶ πρόην, a proverbial expression; ἐποίησεν, he made his father instead of Troles, Atrometos. ἐποίησεν, “aliquanto gravius, opinor, quam ὠνόμασεν: quippe hoc verbo sarcasticæ quid acerbitalis indicari videtur. Quod quale sit, facile senties, si memineris ἀτρόμητος etiam ἐπιθετικῶς dici de intrepido.* Antipater in Antholog. Palat. t. 1, p. 270. Ζεὺς ἀτρόμητος εἶδεν.” SCHAEFER. σεμνῶς πάνν, compare μάλα σεμνῶς. § 35. Γλαυκοθέαν by adding two syllables to Γλαυκίς. Ἐμپουσαν. *Empusa; the name of a spectre, sent from Hecate, which transformed itself into different shapes.* See ARIST. Ranæ, 288. ἐκ τοῦ πάντα ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν, “*quod quævis turpia lucri causa faceret et pateretur, quasi quædam Empusa se in omnes formas transformans.*”

DISSEN. τῆς ἐπωνυμίας, *the nickname*. οὐχ ὅπως, § 131. is to be explained by an ellipsis. “Οὐχ ὅπως est οὐκ ἐρῶ ὅπως, *non dicam quomodo*.” HER. ad VIG. 788. Hence, it may mean either *not only*, or, *not only not*, as here, according to the following clause. τὶς ἀμφισβήτησιν. ἀμφισβητεῖν followed by ὥς or ὡς οὐ, is to argue that a thing is or is not. So, here; *as to things about which it may be argued that possibly he has spoken in behalf of his country, I pass them by.*

We may notice a certain completeness at which the orator aims. In the opening of the oration, he defended himself, first, against the attacks upon his private life, and then proceeded to measures of a public character. So, here, he begins with charges against the private life of Æschines. As he afterward takes up this topic, and pursues it at great length, it seems to be brought in, in the present connection, with reference, at least in part, to the unity of this portion of the oration.

PUBLIC LIFE OF ÆSCHINES.

§ 132–137. ISOLATED TRANSACTIONS.

§ 132–135. HIS CONDUCT IN THE CASE OF ANTIPHON.—ἀποψηφισθῆναι, properly, *ejected from the citizen-class*; perhaps, *outlawed*. “Vox ea generaliter et quasi proprie sumta *absolutionis* vim obtinet; verum in causa peregrinitatis, ubi quæritur, an civis sit, necne, *condemnandi* vel *ejiciendi*; ideo vero, quoniam, cum civium recensio fieret, quæ διαψήφισις, qui ex eo censu dejiceretur, ἀποψηφισθῆναι recte dici potuit. TAYLOR. The revisal of the citizens’ roll, at which Antiphon was ejected, was in 346, B. C. τὴν ὑμετέραν ἄγνοιαν — § 133. συμβεβηκυῖαν, “*your ill-timed error*,” KENNEDY; which well represents, though it hardly translates, the words. ἄγνοια refers to that state of mind, so often complained of by Demosthenes, and expressed by various words, such as ῥαθυμία, ἀμέλεια, through which the Athenians paid little earnest attention to public affairs, sacrificing from mere heedlessness and ignorance of the real state of things, their own best interests. But it is not easy in the present case to give a word-for-

word translation; by neglecting the participle, which would not have been used in English, and converting the abstract into the concrete, Kennedy has finely represented the thought. So, also, has Lord Brougham, though in a different way; "*seeing you thrown off your guard at a critical moment.*" ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀγνοίας, *from the same thoughtlessness.* προσελ- λεσθε. Wolf conjectured προσελεσθε, which is admitted into the text by Voemel. The people, it would seem, before voting for a syndic, had made the Areopagus the final arbiter of the election, and the Areopagus, in exercise of this authority, rejected Æschines and appointed Hyperides. Ὑπερείδης. Fragments of his speech, the λόγος Δηλιακός, remain. ἀπὸ τοῦ βωμοῦ, the most solemn form of voting.—With respect to this charge against Antipho, we know nothing more than what is here said by Demosthenes, though from the condemnation of him by the Areopagus, it was probably true. With respect to his examination by the Areopagus, at the instigation of Demosthenes, and his being tortured and slain by the people, it is mentioned by Deinarchus in his speech against Demosthenes, § 46, who says that Antipho was descended from Harmodius. The time of this transaction can not be certainly determined. Both the affair of Antipho, and the rejection of Æschines as syndic, which were closely connected, are referred to in the περί παραπροσβείας, p. 406, so that it could not have been *later* than 342–3, B. C. It was probably *after* the peace of 346, B. C. There had been for a long time a contest between the Athenians and the Delians, for the possession of the temple of Delos. The matter was finally brought before the Amphictyonic Council. It is this appeal to which reference is here made. But as the Athenians were in possession, the appeal was doubtless made by the Delians, and if so, probably after the admission of Philip into that council, since they might well hope his influence would be adverse to the Athenians in the matter. Hence, too, we may see the reason why the Areopagus rejected Æschines, and appointed Hyperides, who was strongly opposed to the Macedonian interest. See WESTERMANN. § 136–137. CONDUCT OF ÆSCHINES IN THE CASE OF THE ORATOR PYTHON, AND THE SPY ANAXINUS. ρεαυλον, refers not to age, but to character. πολλῶ ῥέοντι, *flowing deep.* "Qui magno flumine verborum invehetur in vos." DISSEN.

Compare *salso multoque fluenti*. Hor. Sat. 1, 7, 28. When it was that Demosthenes gained this victory over the celebrated Byzantine orator can not be certainly determined. Ἀναξίνοφ. Nothing further is known of Anaxinus than what is mentioned by Demosthenes.—With this the orator ends the list of individual acts, both because he has gone far enough to give color to his professed design of recrimination, and because the enumeration of particulars can never be successfully carried very far; while, at the same time, he hurries on to his real object, the Amphissean war.—§ 138–139. TRANSITION TO THE CONDUCT OF ÆSCHINES IN GETTING UP THE AMPHISSEAN WAR. πολλά—ἔτι τούτων. “ἔτι verte *præterea* et junge *πολλὰ τούτων*.” SCHAEFER. ὃν οὗτος—εὐρέθη. *Many of those things, with which—ὃν by attraction for α̃—this man was found, on the one hand, serving the enemy, and, on the other, abusing me.* ὑπηρετεῖν is *to serve*, that is, do acts of service, ἐπηρεάζειν, *to abuse*, to do abusive things, both containing the object within themselves, yet both may be construed with the pronoun in the accusative, expressive of that object. It is precisely so in English, with the exception that when the object is expressed, the relation is denoted by the preposition; as, to serve, to serve with, to abuse, to abuse with. οὐ τίθεται—ὀργήν. εἰς μνήμην θεῖναι τι, is *to lay up a thing in the memory*, as in English. But, εἰς ὀργήν θεῖναι τι, has no corresponding expression in English, and, hence, another verb must be introduced. *But these things are not laid up among you in careful memory nor resented with that anger which is appropriate.* διόπερ ὅτιον—πολιτεύεσθαι, *therefore is it easier and safer always for one to be a hireling, serving the enemy, than to be a statesman, maintaining the post of patriotism.* μισθαρεῖν, and πολιτεύεσθαι, like other verbs formed from substantives, can be best translated by the corresponding English substantives.—Several of the topics in this oration have been treated in other orations. Hence, we often meet in them with the same form of the sentence, and not unfrequently with the same words. But, on comparison we find the sentences in this oration more forcible; the expressions are more condensed, and the antitheses more pointed. Thus, we find the rudiments of the present sentence, in the Third Philippic: ἀλλὰ καὶ μετὰ πλείονος ἀσφαλείας πολιτεύεσθαι δεδῶκατε τούτοις ἢ τοῖς

§ 139. ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν λέγουσιν. § 55.—φανερώς—"jungendum esse verbo πολεμεῖν sequentia docent." SCHAEFER. τὰ πλοῖα ἐσεσύλητο. See § 77. Χερρόνησος ἐπορθεῖτο. See § 92. ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἐπορεύεθ' ἄνθρωπος. In attacking the Chersonese Demosthenes regarded Philip as attacking Attica. See § 101, Note, p. 174. "Volebat (Philippus) Ponti, Euxini, Hellesponti, maris Ægei imperio potiri, atque ita ipsi Atticæ imminere dici poterat." DISSEN. ἄνθρωπος, "cum contemptu." DISSEN. ὁ τι μὲν—δεῖξαι, *not one act is there which this Iambic mouther can show that he did for you.* λαμβεινοφάγος, "non de φιλολοιδόρῳ, sed de λυμαينوμένῳ τοὺς ἰάμβους, h. e. de disperdente bonos trimetros per vitiosam pronuntiationem, qua homo iambos tanquam absorbere videretur." SCHAEFER. See § 267. οὐδ' ἔστιν—Ἀισχίνῃ, *not a decree great or small, so far as Æschines is concerned.* ἐν τῷ ἑμῷ ὕδατι. The speakers were limited to a given amount of time, which was measured by the clepsydra. δυοῖν θάτερον, in apposition with the whole sentence. Reiske would supply ποιεῖν, but Schaefer says, "αὐτὸν ἀνάγκη syntactice continuatur sequentibus." See p. 113.—It will be observed that the orator follows a certain order. The conduct of Æschines against his country during the uncertain period of the peace, is referred to, but only to be forgiven. The period of his inaction during the war, that is, the Byzantine war, when Athens was victorious and nothing could be done for the enemy, is then mentioned. He then pauses, and asks—as he was inactive when his country was prosperous and he could not harm her, was he also inactive when the time came that he could harm her?—and this brings him to the Amphissean war.

THE AMPHISSEAN WAR.

The subject of the Amphissean war, though a vital portion of the oration, forms a distinct whole by itself. It opens with a formal and solemn introduction, and its topics are arranged with that consummate art which is apparent in the construction of the entire speech. It may be divided into four general divisions.

I. The Introduction, § 140–144.

II. The Part of Æschines in getting up the war, § 145–159.

III. The Part of Demosthenes in defending his country against it, by the Theban Alliance, § 160–247.

IV. The Judgment of the People after the war upon the conduct of Demosthenes, § 248–290.

§ 140–144. INTRODUCTION.

Ἄρ' οὐν οὐδ' — κακόν; *Did he then say nothing—as he then proposed nothing—when he could work you harm?* that is, as he proposed no decree, small or great *for* you, so, did he say nothing *against* you, when he had a chance to do you hurt? The contrast was brought out by the mode of utterance. “Ὅσπερ οὐδ' ἔγραψεν, ut inserta παρενθέτως, quod vocis inflexio, cum Demosthenes oraret, satis docuit, sola per se intelligenda, nec referenda sunt ad ea quæ continuo sequuntur. Ad ἔγραψεν subaudias τότῃς. SCHAEFER. οὐ μὲν οὐν, *nay, it was not possible for another to speak.* § 130, Note. ἐπέθηκε τέλος, *which gave the finishing stroke to all his former deeds.* τῶν Ἀμφισσεων, genitive of the object: *concerning the Amphisseans.* τό, referring to the preceding sentence; *the matter is not of such a nature; it can not be perverted.* ἐκνίψῃ, *wash out.*

“Will all great Neptune's ocean wash this blood
Clean from my hand?”

Lord Brougham unnecessarily changes the figure; “*never will you be able to expiate that passage of your life.*” οὐχ οὐτω πολλὰ ἐρεῖς, *not so many things will you speak;* that is, as to accomplish it: *not, however much you may* § 141. *say.* ἀνόνητον, *insensible to any good.* ὅτι καὶ γράμματ' ἔχων, *although both having;* the § 142. participle standing in an adversative relation to the finite verb. ἐν τῷ δημοσίῳ, *in the Record-office,* “*in Tabulario, non, in Ærario.*” SCHAEFER. ἐλάττων. We find a similar thought in the περὶ παραπροσβείας. “Let none of you, Judges, looking upon the magnitude of the transactions, suppose that the charges and the crimes are greater than his reputation”—μειζους τῆς τούτου δόξης—; that is, be-

yond his reputed power. § 32. τὸν γὰρ ἐν Ἀμφίσση πόλεμον, δι' ὃν εἰς Ἑλλάτιαν, is an hexameter, § 143. and was not unnoticed by the ancients. LONGINI Fragm. III, 4. CICERO'S Orator. Ch. 56. ὃς refers to πόλεμον. SCHAEFER. καὶ πάντων—κακῶν, and the one man guilty of all our calamities. § 73. ἐκ παρακλήσεως. παρακαλεῖσθαι is to summons one's friends and followers to give aid and countenance in a trial, or in the Assembly. Hence, *some sitting together on summons*, or from preconcert; that is, the Macedonian faction. δεινότης, "*calliditas*," SCHAEFER; "*craftiness*," KENNEDY.

The topic of Exaggeration—of setting forth an act or event as greatly above or below the ordinary standard of such acts and events—is a common topic in oratory. The present example is worthy of study. The object of the orator is, to show the enormity of the crime which Æschines had committed, and hence, incidentally to conciliate the favor of the audience to himself as a wise statesman and a true patriot. This is done by a series of topics judiciously selected and arranged. *The first* contrasts this act with other acts of Æschines. As to his other acts, the state was able, as it seems, to bear them,—they were not fatal—and he himself to escape detection as their author, but this act consummates all his former perfidies and reveals his treachery so manifestly that it can no longer be concealed. *Here*, the orator pauses, and, as if impelled by the magnitude of the charge, invokes the interposition of the gods. *Then follows* an explanation of the reason of this earnest prayer—that the crime was so enormous he feared lest Æschines might be thought too insignificant a person to have wrought it. And, *finally*, he paints the scene in the assembly, when he cries out—"You bring a war into Attica, Æschines, an Amphictyonic war"—and then by a most appropriate transition passes to the next subject. It may be remarked, also, that the orator with dramatic art keeps back the specific charge to the end, merely shadowing it forth at the outset, as something relating to the Amphisseans.

§145-159. CONDUCT OF ÆSCHINES IN GETTING UP THE
AMPHISSEAN WAR.

The topics, without any formal distinction, are as follows : Interest of Philip in an Amphictyonic war ; Employment of Æschines ; Proceedings of Æschines ; Proceedings of the Amphictyons, and the events of the war to the seizure of Elatea ; Documentary evidence ; Conclusion of the subject.

§145-147. INTEREST OF PHILIP IN AN AMPHICTYONIC WAR. For an account of the Amphissean war, see Hist. Sketch, § XVIII. For an account of the Amphictyonic League, § XIII, 46. τοῦ πρὸς ὑμᾶς πολέμου, the Byzantine war, of which the orator has already spoken, § 87-94. ἀπαλλαγῇ, *escape*; that is, from the war, not, "from the contracted theater of his country," as Champlin supposes. τῶν ληστῶν, neither "*pirates*," nor "*robbers*," but, *irregular troops*, who annoyed the enemy by sudden incursions here and there by the aid of the fleet, plundering and spoiling the country. Demosthenes in the First Philippic recommends the Athenians to carry on the war in this manner—ληστεύειν ἀνάγκη καὶ τοῦτω τῷ τρόπῳ τοῦ πολέμου χρῆσθαι. § 23. A fine illustration of ληστεύειν is found in a passage of Livy, quoted by Sauppe ; (Veientes) in fines Romanorum excucurrerunt, populandi magis quam justī more belli. Itaque non castris positīs, non expectato hostium exercitu, raptam ex agris prædam portantes Veios rediere. Lib. 1, 15. Here, too, Demosthenes distinguishes between the evils inflicted by this kind of warfare, and the war itself, that is, the war carried on in the usual way in the Chersonese and at Byzantium. They were the Guerilla troops of modern times. ἐκ τῆς χώρας, "cohæret syntactice cum γιγνομένων, logice cum ἐξήγετο. Plena enim locutio hæc est ; οὔτε γὰρ ἐξήγετο τῶν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ γιγνομένων ἐκ τῆς χώρας οὐδέν." SCHAEFER. αὐτῷ, "cohæret cum ἐξήγετο et εἰσήγετο." REISKE. μή τις Θετταλῶν — διελόντων, declares a fact, not makes a supposition ; *since neither the Thessalians followed him, nor the Thebans gave him a passage.*" BUTTMANN, Gr. § 148, 2, h. Note 1. αὐτῇ τῇ φύσει — ἐκατέροισι, *the nature of the country and of the forces belonging to each.* Notwithstanding the superiority of his army, Philip could not reach

Attica by land on account of the Thessalians and Thebans, nor by sea on account of the Athenian fleet, from which at the same time he suffered much harm and annoyance. *ἐὰν δὲ—λαβών*, but if taking advantage of the occasions [of war] common to them, he should be chosen leader, he hoped easily to cheat the one, and persuade the other [into it]; that is, if he could get up a war in which they should have a common interest, he thought he could bring them into it. *πρόφασις*, "modo, causa vera; modo, pretextus vanus; modo, occasio; sæpe tam dubie usurpatus, ut vim ejus definire difficile sit." REISKE. *τὰ μὲν παρακρούσεσθαι, τὰ δὲ πείσειν*, "hoc Thessalos spectat, illud Thebanos." DISSEN. *πόλεμον ποιῆσαι τοῖς Ἀμφικτύοις*, to make a war, not against, but, for the Amphictyons, that is, for them to carry on. "*Bellum excitare Amphictyonibus gerendum.*" DISSEN. *καὶ περὶ τὴν Πυλαίαν ταραχήν*, and a disturbance in the synod. *περὶ*=in. § 96, Note. *ἡ πυλαία* is the synod itself, as well as the place of holding it. *εἰς ταῦτ'*, for these, or with reference to these; that is, to settle the difficulty. § 148. EMPLOYMENT OF ÆSCHINES. *καὶ πάντας φυλάξεσθαι*, and all be on guard. *εὐπόρως λήσειν*, he thought easily to escape notice; or, that the scheme,—*τὸ πρᾶγμα*—would escape notice. § 149–150. PROCEEDINGS OF ÆSCHINES. *περιελθεῖν*, to survey the country; "*circuire ad fines determinandos.*" DISSEN. *σφῶν αὐτῶν οὖσαν*, as being their own. *τῶν Λοκρῶν ἐπαγόντων*. See Æschines, § 116. *ἐπάγειν δίκην*, to bring a suit. *οὐδ' ἂν*, "ex antecedentibus simpliciter ἐπαγόντων supple." DISSEN. *προσκαλέσασθαι*, to summon, which was to be done in the presence of witnesses (*κλητορες*), *ἐκλήτευσεν*, who served the summons? *κλητεύειν* is to perform the legal summons, that is, in the presence of *κλητορες*. *ἐπὶ ποίας ἀρχῆς*, "*quo archonte, hoc est, quo anno?*" REISKE. *κατεχρῶ*, simply, you make use of. § 151–153. PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMPHICTYONS, AND EVENTS OF THE WAR TO THE SEIZURE OF ELATEA. *κατὰ τὴν ὑφήγησιν*. *ὑφηγεῖσθαι*, to lead the way; hence, here, in accordance with the lead which this man gave, or, as we may say, under the lead. *προσπεσόντες—ἅπαντας*, the Locrians falling upon them slew almost the whole with their javelins—but took some of the Hieromnemones

prisoners. They routed the promiscuous crowd with great slaughter with their javelins at a distance, and took a few prisoners in the retreat. ἀπαξ = *at once*. ἐταράχθη, *was tumultuously excited*. "Bellum cum turba commotum est." BREMI. αὐτῶν τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων, *of Amphictyons only*. ἡγὰς, *became leader*; that is, commander-in-chief of the war. The army was not yet raised. οἱ μὲν οὐκ ἦλθον, that is, the Thebans and Athenians. εἰς τὴν ἐπιούσαν — πόλεσι, *the trained and veteran traitors among the Thessalians and in the other states, at the following congress transferred the business at once to Philip as leader*. ἦγον, "subaudias τὸ πρᾶγμα. Supra p. 125, 20, οἱ μὲν ἐφ' ὑμᾶς ἦγον τὰ πράγματα, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ Φιλίππον." SCHAEFER. ταῦτα, that is, contributing and supporting mercenaries. ἐρρωσθαί φράσας πολλά, *bidding a "long farewell."* νῦν δὲ — ἐκείνοι, *but as it was—νῦν δέ, corresponding to εἰ μὲν—they restrained him at least from the sudden onset—the one just supposed;—γὰρ limiting the assertion, because they were not able finally to restrain him.* εἴτα μέντοι — δι' ἐμέ, *then, however, and as far as was possible for one man—even by me.* ταραξάσα ἑδωκε, "*has stirred up with impunity.*" KENNEDY. § 154–157. DOCUMENTS. κοινά — προσεποιεῖτο, *but pretended to do what was of common interest, and had been decided by the Amphictyons.* § 158–159. CONCLUSION. ὅφ' ἐνόες — ἀνθρώπου, Philip. ὁ παρὰσχών, *not general, but personal*; Æschines. πολὺ τι σκότος, *in the language of Scripture, "a thick darkness."*

With regard to this section, we need make no remarks, except on the statement, § 143–148, in which the orator sets forth the motives Philip had in getting up an Amphictyonic war, and in employing an Athenian to do it. This is the second time the orator has made use of the διήγησις ἀποδεικτική, or Argumentative Narrative. The object of the first was to state the circumstances which led the Athenians to make the first Peace, of 346, B. C., § 18–20. The present is, also, a statement of facts and motives, but they are so connected together in the strictest logical sequence, without a superfluous sentence, and expressed with such precision and force, without a superfluous

word, that an analysis would be longer than the statement itself. It will be sufficient to recommend this as well as the former one, as oratorical studies.

§ 160–247. CONDUCT OF DEMOSTHENES IN DEFENDING HIS COUNTRY AGAINST THE AMPHISSEAN WAR, THROUGH THE THEBAN ALLIANCE.

As the Amphissean war was the great crime of Æschines against his country, so the Theban Alliance was the great achievement of Demosthenes for it. The topics in this portion of the oration have sole reference to it, and to the combined efforts of Athens and Thebes under it. They are as follows :

I. The Relation of Athens and Thebes to each other at the time of the Seizure of Elatea. § 160–167.

II. The Tumult at Athens on the seizure of Elatea. § 168–173.

III. Speech of Demosthenes on the occasion, and his Decree. § 174–187.

IV. Remarks preliminary to a consideration of the Results of the Measures proposed at that time by Demosthenes. § 189–210.

V. Narrative of Events, ending with the battle of Cheronea. § 211–247.

§ 160–167. THE RELATION OF ATHENS AND THEBES TO EACH OTHER AT THE TIME OF THE SEIZURE OF ELATEA.

§ 160. TRANSITION.—*συμβέβηκε*, as if in the natural course of things. *τὰ ἔργα τῶν ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν πόρων*, “the toil of exertions in your behalf.” KENNEDY. “Poterat brevius scribere τοὺς ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν πόρους : sed maluit illo modo ob solennem oppositionem τῶν ἔργων et τῶν λόγων.” SCHAEFER. *αὐτῶν*, genitive of the object, concerning them. See § 140, Note. § 161–167. STATEMENT.—*ὑπὸ τῶν τὰ Φιλίππου φρονούντων*, by those favoring the interests of Philip. *τά τινος φρονεῖν* is to think the thoughts of another, to be like-minded, of his party. See § 177. *παρ’ ἐκατέρους*, “apud utrosque seorsim, ut mox ἀμφοτέρους utrisque simul.” DISSSEN. *ταύτην τὴν φιλίαν*, between the Athenians and Thebans.

ἐαυτοῖς = ἀλλήλοις. SCHAEFER. οὗς, the pronouns are construed with the participles, not with the verbs, as bringing out the contrast better between ζῶντας μὲν κολακεύων and τεθνεώτων δὲ κατηγορῶν. αἰσθάνει, "recte ex codice S. pro αἰσχύνῃ restitutum. Non impudentiam notat Æschinis sed absurditatem, ut ex sequentibus verbis apparet." W. DINDORF. τὸν ἐν Ἀμφίσσῃ πόλεμον — ἔχθραν. The equipoise of the clauses of this sentence is perfect; τὸν ἐν Ἀμφίσσῃ πόλεμον being balanced by τὴν πρὸς Θηβαίους ἔχθραν, τοῦτου by τῶν ἄλλων, and ποιήσαντος by συμπεριλαμβανένων, while, at the same time they are arranged on the principle of the chiasmus, to do which μὲν is thrown out of its proper position after ποιήσαντος. § 97, Note. τὴν πρὸς Θηβαίους ἔχθραν, referring to the national hatred towards the Thebans. οὕτω μέγρι πόρρω. "οὕτω referendum ad πόρρω. Passim οὕτω a sua voce dirimitur, aliâ intersertâ. οὕτως ἐπεπεισμένην μέγαν. § 220." SCHAEFER. The separation is for emphasis, the unimportant word being interposed.

§ 168-173. THE TUMULT AT ATHENS ON THE SEIZURE OF ELATEA.

§ 168. INTRODUCTION.—διὰ τούτων, Æschines and his partisans. τὴν δύναμιν, that is, the force before mentioned as having been assembled. § 152. τὴν Ἑλλάτιαν κατέλαβεν. Demosthenes has already mentioned the seizure of Elatea, § 152, but leaving Philip, as it were, in possession, although with genuine art he anticipates, by way of relief, the results of the alliance he brought about between Athens and Thebes, by which the immediate danger was averted, he proceeded to speak of the relations existing between Thebes and Athens, and of the necessity of coöperating against Philip. He now returns to the seizure of that city, and first speaks of the consternation it produced in Athens. ὥς οὐδ' ἄν — τῶν Θηβαίων, as if, come what might, you and the Thebans could never agree; "could never again unite;" KENNEDY, but ἔτι points out the continuance of their estrangement: they would still continue in not uniting. μικρὰ = "pauca." SCHAEFER, § 34, Note. αὐτὰ τὰ νῦν καὶ ὁρᾶται. See § 126, Note. § 169-173. STATEMENT.—Ἐσπέρα μὲν γὰρ ἦν, ἥκε δ'.

There is a slight contrast. The time is not mentioned merely to denote that fact, but also to show the urgency of the case. Notwithstanding it was evening, a person came announcing. But the shade of the thought can not be well given in English, —we may adopt Lord Brougham's translation as the best. *It was evening.* ἀγγέλλων τις, *there came one announcing*; not a formal messenger. τοὺς τ' ἐκ — ἐξεῖργον. "Resolve: τοὺς τ' ἐν ταῖς σκηναῖς ταῖς κατὰ ἀγορὰν ἐξεῖργον ἐξ αὐτῶν." SCHAEFER. See § 145, Note. σκηνῶν, booths in the market, with wicker work coverings, (γέρεα.) ἐν περιμπρασσάν. "Suspensor incendium fuisse loco φρουκτωρίας, ut in tanto tumultu omnes e demis in urbem confluerent." SCHAEFER. τῇ ὕστεραίᾳ, supply, ἡμέρα. ἅμα τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, as soon as it was day; *at dawn.* ἄνω, in Pnyce. SCHAEFER. πάντες ἄν ὕμεῖς, all then present. οἱ τριακόσιοι, "trecenti ditissimi secundum symmorias Nausinici." DISSEN. See Böeckh Pub. Econ. of Athens, p. 527, 523. τοὺς ἀμφοτέρωτα ταῦτα, *those being both of these.* Compare Xenophon: τίς οὐκ ἂν ὁμολογήσειεν αὐτὸν βούλεσθαι μήτ' ἡλιθιον μήτ' ἀλαζόνα φαίνεσθαι τοῖς συνοῦσιν, ἐδόκει δ' ἂν ἀμφοτέρωτα ταῦτα εἶ—B. I. C. 1, § 5. See, also, ὥσπερ τᾶλλα πάντα. § 318. μετὰ ταῦτα. After the battle of Chæronea, according to Westermann, who refers to § 248, 312; but according to Schaefer, after the seizure of Elatea. πόρρωθεν, "*longo ex tempore.*" DISSEN. οὗτος, "scilicet quem ὁ καιρὸς ἐκάλει. SCHAEFER. ἐγώ, notice the position of this word: *there appeared now such a man on that day—I—.* πολλῶ πρὸς τὰ λοιπὰ—ἐμπειρότεροι, *you may become much better experienced for the future in every kind of policy.*

The description of the consternation at Athens, on the news of the seizure of Elatea, excels any thing of the kind to be found in oratory. It presents the scene to the eye like a painting, and calls forth all the feelings which must have been excited by the reality itself.

We may specify three excellencies. 1. The selection of individual circumstances. Few as these are, they are such as set forth the whole scene: the evening, the chance individual, not a formal messenger, who brought the news, the Prytanes starting up and leaving their meal half eaten. the early dawn of the

next day, and more than all, the significant fact, that the whole people were seated in the Pnyx, before the Senate had deliberated and resolved; then, finally, the formal entrance of the Senate, and the silence of the assembly, when the herald cries, "who will speak?"—till at length Demosthenes breaks that silence. Every thing in the description, it is noticeable, is individual, nothing general; and each individual circumstance, significant of consternation and dismay.

2. The Arrangement of the circumstances. Demosthenes had shown himself as the only statesman in Athens adequate to that emergency. To set forth, therefore, that individual act of statesmanship was most important to his case. What gave peculiarity to it was the greatness and immediateness of the danger, on the one hand, and, on the other, the fact, that he alone, in the despair and silence of all others, gave the counsel which caused the danger to pass away, as he says, like a cloud. Hence, first, the picture of tumultuous alarm; then, next, of silent despair. And as the first was drawn in detail, so, also, the latter. The fact, that all were present who might have been expected to speak; the fact that of those present, there was none but would have spoken, if they had known what counsel to give; the fact that the occasion demanded not the rich and the patriotic citizen, but the experienced and wise counsellor—these facts are dwelt upon in as many consecutive sentences and repeated with all the skill of consummate art till at length—such is the feeling of despair—we welcome the words, "Now then, there appeared such a man on that day—I—."

3. The negative merit, that the description no where passes beyond the bounds of oratory into the province of poetry. Although the whole is as beautiful as any poetry can be, still there is not a sentence, not a word, which appears to have been introduced merely for the sake of making a beautiful picture; nothing to divert the mind from the scene itself; thus, nothing to interfere with the feelings which would naturally arise on such an occasion. The words of the orator produce their effect without drawing any attention to themselves. And it is a sure test of the highest oratory that it is never consciously known to be such at the moment of its greatest triumphs.

This kind of description was treated of by the ancient Rhetoricians. Celsus calls it *ὑποτύπωσις*, i. e. *proposita quædam*

forma rerum ita expressa verbis, ut cerni potius videatur quam audiri. The Auctor ad Herenn. calls it *Demonstratio*, which is, "cum ita res verbis exprimitur ut geri negotium, et res ante oculos esse videatur. Lib. iv. Ch. 55. Cicero, in the De Oratore Lib. iii. 53, calls it *Sub oculos subjectio*. Cicero's orations abound in examples. But perhaps no better example can be alleged for comparison than Webster's description, in the trial of the Knapps, of the murder of their victim.

§ 174-187. SPEECH OF DEMOSTHENES, AND HIS DECREE.

ὑπαρχόντων Θηβαίων Φιλίππῳ. ὑπάρχειν τινι, is to be favorable to any one, PASSOW, a meaning not in Liddell and Scott. See p. 358. It is worthy of notice how in the gradual improvement of the text the process has been to throw out words, which, though proper enough, may still be omitted, and the thought left equally clear and more forcible:—a process which every one may apply to his own style. The text formerly contained φίλων after Φιλίππῳ. ἡ ὑπὲρ ἐπισ-
ταί, "sibi conciliavit." DISSEN. οὐδαμῶς πείσαι δύ-
ναται, he no longer hopes to persuade. ἐπᾶραι—ποιῆσαι—κα-
ταπλῆξαι, "pendent a remotiori βούλεται." SCHAEFER. αὐτῷ.
The Greek is not only sparing in the use of pronouns, but can accommodate the pronoun to either of two constructions. Thus, here, it was at the option of the orator to employ αὐτόν with προσδεξαμένων, as Reiske prefers, or αὐτῷ with ἀνθεστηκότων. See § 162, Note. Thus, we may translate; lest those yielding to him who had opposed, or, those yielding who had opposed him. πρὸς τῷ σκοπεῖν—γένησθε, be ready to consider, not to cavil at, what I say. "γίγνεσθαι πρὸς τινι est, mente versari in aliqua re." DISSEN. μεταθέσθαι—Θηβαίων, to turn about, and fear all for the Thebans. μεταθέσθαι, "dictum absolute." SCHAEFER. Ἐλευστῖν ἄδε. The route for an army was first on the sacred road to Eleusis, and thence north-west to Thebes. τοὺς ἐν ἡλικίᾳ, that is, of the military age, which was from the nineteenth to the sixtieth year. φρονοῦσι τὰ ὑμέτερα. See § 161, Note. καὶ τοῦ πότε—τῆς ἐξόδου, and give them authority, with the strategi, to determine both as to the time when the embassy should set out, and as to the march of the troops. REISKE and SCHAEFER.

τούτῳ—τόν νοῦν, *to this pay me strict attention.* Notice the diverse relations of the two datives. αἰσχροῦς γὰρ ὁ καιρός, *the opportunity is dishonorable*, that is, to avail ourselves of the opportunity. “*For at this time it would be shameful.*” Lord BROUGHAM. ἀβουλόμεθα—πράξωμεν, *we shall both accomplish what we wish*—we shall protect ourselves against Philip—and shall do it with an appearance worthy of the state; that is, while aiding the Thebans. κατατυχσῖν, *but should it not happen to us to be successful*; that is, if the Thebans should not receive our proposals and trust to us.—The student can not fail to notice that this reported speech is in a much lower tone than the other parts of this oration. It was natural it should be so. For, neither was the orator in the same state of feeling as when it was delivered, nor was the audience listening to it as a speech addressed to them, but as a mere matter of information. In accommodating himself to these circumstances, the orator evinces his usual and almost infallible judgment.—οὐκ εἶπον μὲν ταῦτα. The first rudiment of this sentence we may perhaps find in the third Philippic; καὶ οὐ γράφει μὲν ταῦτα, τοῖς δ’ ἔργοις οὐ ποιεῖ—§ 27. We quote from Lord Brougham: “The exquisite diction of this justly-celebrated passage is altogether inimitable in our language. The μέν and the δέ, the οὐκ and οὐδέ, are wholly Greek, and wholly untranslatable. We might come nearer the original indeed, than is done with ‘not only’ and ‘but,’ by using a double negative: thus, ‘I did not make a speech, and not make a motion; nor make a motion, and not go ambassador; nor go ambassador, and not persuade the Thebans;’ but the double negative is always more or less repugnant to our idiom. Possibly this turn may reconcile it:—‘I was not the man to make a speech, and not carry a decree; nor to carry a decree, and not go ambassador; nor to go ambassador, and not convince the Theban people.’ If the sense be rendered by ‘without,’ we are no nearer the original than by the course taken in the text;”—which is as follows: “All assenting, no one saying one word to the contrary, not only did I make this speech, but I propounded a decree; not only did I propound a decree, but I went ambassador; not only went I ambassador, but I persuaded the Thebans.” This is perhaps the best translation possible, and was not unlikely suggested by the imitation,

which Cicero attempted in his oration for Milo: "Neque vero se populo solum sed etiam senatui commisit; neque senatui modo, sed etiam publicis præsidiis et armis; neque iis tantum verum etiam ejus potestati cui senatus totam rempublicam, omnem Italiæ pacem, cuncta populi Romani arma commiserat." This sentence was the model for the climax with the ancient Rhetoricians. It will be sufficient to quote from Quintilian. "Gradatio quæ dicitur *κλιμαξ*, apertio rem habet artem et magis affectatam ideoque rarior esse debet.—Ejus exemplum ex Græco notissimum transferatur: 'non enim dixi quidem, sed non scripsi; nec scripsi quidem, sed non obii legationem; nec obii quidem, sed non persuasi Thebanis.' (ix. 3, 55.)—a very jejune translation, it must be admitted, not to be compared with Lord Brougham's.—While the clerk was preparing to read the decree, the orator as usual takes the opportunity to relieve the discussion, by sarcasm and retort on Æschines. *καί τοι—ἐπεὶ ἐτρεψας, although whom would you—βοῦλει—I should consider you, and whom myself on that day to have been?—εἶναι θῶ—would you—in speaking it is not necessary to repeat the εἶναι θῶ—MYSELF, as you sneeringly and opprobriously say, a Batalus, but YOURSELF no common hero, but one of those on the stage, a Cresphontes, or Creon, or him whom once in Colyttus,—Œnomaus—you murdered by your vile acting. κατ' ἐκείνον τὸν καιρὸν, "illa rerum conditione."* SCHAEFER.

§188–210. REMARKS PRELIMINARY TO A CONSIDERATION OF THE RESULTS OF THE MEASURES PROPOSED BY DEMOSTHENES.

The orator had already spoken of the political relations between Athens and Thebes, and of the efforts of the Macedonian faction to cherish their national animosities; of the consternation at Athens on the seizure of Elatea, and his counsel at the time to form an alliance with Thebes. The next step would have been to give an account of the negotiation. But, although the alliance was concluded, and the first efforts of the confederates were successful, the fatal battle of Cheronea disappointed all their hopes and destroyed the freedom of Greece. Before coming to speak of this, therefore, the orator wishes to secure the *feelings* of the audience on his side, so that they may contemplate the transactions in the lofty spirit of their forefathers. It

is the object of these preliminary remarks to arouse this spirit to its highest pitch. They proceed in the form of a climax, and may be thus arranged.

I. No other course of policy was possible.

(a) Because *even now* no one can point out any other course, with an appeal to Æschines to do it. § 188–191.

(b) But we must judge of the *aim* of measures, not of their *results*; hence, as no other course can be pointed out, his must be approved, though not successful. § 192–194.

(c) But, though unsuccessful, the results were better than if the measures had not been adopted. § 195.

II. A personal appeal to Æschines, by which he is placed in the dilemma, that either he knew these measures would fail, in which case he should have proposed others, or he did not know it, in which case he has the same responsibility for his ignorance as others. § 196–198.

III. But even if all had foreknown the future, if it had been known that we should be defeated, we ought to have acted just as we did. § 199–210.

§ 188–195. NO OTHER COURSE POSSIBLE.—κατάστασις, “*constitutio rerum antea turbatarum*,” DISSEN; *settlement*. ὁ φηγμένων, *misled*. “Inest notio doli mali.” BREML. ὁ πὸ τοῦτων; by Æschines and his party. ὁ σπερ νέφος. No two words, perhaps, in classic literature have been more celebrated. We may notice several things with respect to this figure. *First*, it was unexpected. Although the first part of the sentence prepares the way, so that it does not appear like an after-thought, but is felt to be a living member, yet the sentence might have ended with ἐποήσεν, without a feeling of disappointment on the part of the hearer. *Secondly*, though beautiful, it was strictly appropriate; presented naturally, not sought. Every hearer must have felt that it was used, not for its beauty though beautiful, but because it expressed the thought with more truthfulness than any literal language. If we call to mind the consternation at Athens which the orator had just described—how bereft of counsel the entire Assembly—we shall see that the choice of the figure was absolutely perfect. *Thirdly*, we may notice the simplicity of the words. Lord Brougham’s criticisms on the manner in which these words have been translated will best illustrate this point. “This passage, or rather

phrase, is celebrated, but not therefore the better rendered by translators. Dawson, 'scattered and driven away like a cloud before the wind.' Francis makes the phrase passive, passed 'away like a cloud, and was dissipated.' Leland adds figures as well as words, and makes it passive also—'the danger which hung lowering over our state was in an instant dissipated like a cloud.' Nothing can be worse. In rendering a passage, in composing which every syllable was weighed, the more literal we are, the better, surely." *Fourthly*, there is a peculiar rhythm, obvious to the ancient critic, and which, perhaps, may still be detected. To the ears of Longinus, the effect would have been much marred, as he informs us, by the substitution of either ὥς or ὥσπερ for ὡσπερ.—ἦν μὲν. μὲν is repeated below, ἦν μὲν οὖν, and has its correspondent particle in ἐγὼ δέ. τότε δεῖξαι. It should be remembered that none had ventured to give counsel in the time of peril but Demosthenes. ὁ γὰρ σύμβουλος καὶ ὁ συκοφάντης. We have before seen that definition is one of the common topics of oratory. It is obvious that Demosthenes does not define these two characters, for the sake of communicating knowledge, but to enliven and enforce the thoughts. See § 2, Note, and § 123, also, p. 600. οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν εἰοικότες, *alike in nothing else*. διδωσιν—τῷ βουλομένῳ, *makes himself responsible to those who trust him*—whether he gives good counsel—to fortune—whether he uses her rightly—to emergencies—whether he takes them in season—to any one—who might demand an account for anything whatever. From DISSEN. ὁ δὲ σιγήσας, not taken absolutely, which would require σιγῶν ἥτις δὲ λέγειν, but personally, with reference to Æschines. See § 159, and Note. ἦν μὲν οὖν. Demosthenes first states the duty of the patriotic citizen; next, illustrates this position by the distinction between the statesman and the demagogue, and here returns to his original statement. ὅπερ εἶπον, just above. ἐκείνος—λόγων, *that, then, as I said, was the time for the man having at least a regard for the state and for just counsels*. ἐγὼ δέ—ποιοῦμαι. *But I go so far*. ὅλως, *altogether*, in every case. ἐν ἧν, "subauditur προαιεῖσθαι, quod latet in sequente προειλόμην." SCHAEFER. ἀδικεῖν, *I confess myself guilty*. "ἀδικεῖν sæpe ponitur de rebus jam perfectis, ita tamen ut culpa etiam maneat." BREMI.

ἔωρακεν, *now knows of*. "In the perfect tense we often think less of the *past* action than of the state or condition which has resulted from that action." BUTTMANN. δεῖν ἐμὲ μὴ λαθεῖν, *ought not to have escaped me*. ἐπειδὴ δ' οὐ τότε, "subaudi ἔδειξας." REISKE. λόγος, *plan or counsel*; "ratio," "via," "modus agendi." REISKE. πραῖξις, "*practical measure*." Reviewer of Lord BROUGHAM.

§ 192–194. ἀλλὰ. The orator had been asking if a better course of policy could be pointed out *even now*; but here he pauses—such a request is to no purpose—and passes to another topic. ἀφ' ἑταυ, "*given up*." KENNEDY. παρῆν, "subaudi παρῆναι." SCHAEFER. ὁ δαίμων, "i. q. ὁ θεός." SCHAEFER. See below, ἐν τῷ θεῷ. ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις αὐτῆς, "*ipsa per se spectata*." DISSEN. κρατήσαι. "Vide ut nunc demum, postquam per totum antecedentem locum indirecte locutus est, triste verbum ipsum eloquatur, multis verbis ante præparatum, et nunc ipsum verissima γνώμη præmissa." DISSEN. κατ' ἀνθρώπινον λογισμόν, "*within*," to use Mr. Canning's words on a similar subject, the failure of the Walcheren expedition, "*within mortal foresight*." ὑπὲρ δύναμιν, *beyond my strength*. καὶ τότ' ἤδη κατηγόρευσέ μου, *then at length accuse me*; "et tum demum me accusa." REISKE. ὁ συμβὰς σκηπτός, *the hurricane which happened*; used with reference to τῆς ναυαγίας. The orator has before compared what happened to a torrent, χειμάρρους, § 153, as he does afterwards to a deluge, κατακλυσμός, § 214. τί χρὴ ποιεῖν; *what is it necessary to do?* that is, what view now to take of it? "Omissa autem est oratoris sibi ipsi responsio, quam facile suppleas fere hoc modo: σιγᾶν χρὴ καὶ μὴ καταγορεῖν. SCHAEFER. Perhaps, better in the form of a question;—is it to find fault? ὅσπερ ἂν εἴ τις—αἰτιῶτο, *as if a ship-owner, having done everything for safety, and provided the vessel with all those things by which he supposed it would be preserved, but having afterwards encountered a tempest, and his rigging laboring or being utterly destroyed,—some one should accuse of the shipwreck*. The ναύκληρος is the ship-owner who transports freight for pay; τις, the person who sends the freight, and who in case of loss or damage, might in some circumstances, have a legal claim upon the ship-owner. χρῆσάμενον, construed with ναύκληρον. "Non absimile est hinc significatui,

cum v. g. nauta dicitur *χρησθαι χειμῶνι*." Vig. p. 325, with a reference to the present passage. "Dein cum tempestate conflictatus." Lord Brougham and his Reviewer refer *χρησάμενον* to *πλοῖον*; Pabst to *ναύκληρον*, but αὐτῷ to *πλοῖον*; Kennedy, both to *ναύκληρον*, which is to be preferred. εἴτα. In English, we should perhaps use an adversative particle in addition to εἴτα, although there is no real opposition between being prepared for a tempest, and merely encountering it. οὐτὲς τῆς τούχης κύριος ἦν, connected with *ἐκυβέρων*, although Lord Brougham connects it with *ἐστρατήγουν*.

§ 195. *ἐκείνος*, Philip. DOBREE. *πάσας ἀφ᾽ ἧς φωνάς*, "*nihil sibi reliquit indictum*," REISKE; with reference to the efforts which, through his ambassadors and orators, Philip made at that time to unite the Thebans with himself. "*He used every effort of persuasion*." KENNEDY. *πόυ τῆς χώρας*, *somewhere in the country*; that is, of Attica. ἄρ' οἶσθ'—*κατηγορεῖς*, *Dost thou know as things now are*—*ῥῦν μὲν* having its opposite in *τότε δ'*, the contrast being between the course which was followed and that which might have been—*one and two and three days have given us the opportunity to stand up, to come together, to take breath—many things pertaining to the safety of the state*.—*πολλὰ* takes up and embraces the whole, shutting up the particulars with a general remark; and it would be best perhaps to repeat the verb with it, "have given,"—*but in the other case*—*τότε δ'*,—the result being suppressed, with an apology for its suppression—*but it is not proper to speak of those things which did not make themselves felt*—*πεῖραν ἔδωκε*, *gave a trial*, that is, of themselves—*through the favor of some one of the gods, and the protection of the city with this alliance you are attacking*. The respite of a few days after the battle of Cheroinea was of the utmost importance, and this could not have been secured without the Theban alliance, through which the battle was fought three days march from Attica.

§ 196–198. PERSONAL APPEAL.—*τὰ πολλὰ*, *many as they are*. "*Hæc tota, quamvis tam copiosa, oratio ad vos directa est*." REISKE. *περιεστηγότας*. Trials were often attended by large audiences. The *δικαστήριον* was surrounded by a bar or railing (*δουράκιω*) which was entered by a latticed gate (*κυκλίδι*.) *ταῦτα*, this ignorance of the future of which I just spoke. *τῇ πόλει*, "*pendet a δυσμενέστατος*." "*Libri non-*

nulli ποιήσεις τῇ πόλει. Optativus glossatori debetur apte explenti constructionem ellipticam." SCHAEFER. ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβα-
σιν, *on the occurrence of the events*. οἱ καθάπαξ ἐχθροί,
thorough-going enemies; that is, enemies in every thing. Com-
pare p. 377: οὕτω καθάπαξ πέπρακεν ἑαυτὸν, *he sold himself so
entirely*. καί τοι ὅτι — ἀπέχθειτο, *although to whomso-
ever the misfortunes of the Greeks are reserved to gain glory
from them*—ἐνευδοκίμησεν. "Subaudi αὐτοῖς, *ut famam ex
illis aucuparetur*." SCHAEFER. πράττεται. This is a form of
the sentence, technically called by the ancient critics, ἀντιστοι-
χῇ. For other examples in this oration, see § 117, 274. Dis-
sen quotes a fine example from Cicero: "Doletis tres exercitus
populi Romani interfectos, interfecit Antonius. Desideratis cla-
rissimos cives, eos quoque eripuit vobis Antonius. Auctoritas
hujus ordinis afflicta est, afflixit Antonius." Phil. II. τὰ ἑήγ-
ματα καὶ τὰ σπάσματα, "*fractures and sprains*." KEN-
NEDY. See Olyn. II, § 21, for another application of this com-
parison. τὸ σῶμα, the subject of λάβη; DISSEN, but Pabst
in his German translation makes τι κακόν the subject.

§ 199–210. THE POLICY NECESSARY.—νῦν μὲν γε—τῶν
πραγμάτων. *As things now are*—νῦν μὲν, having its cor-
respondence in τότε δ'—*the state appears to be merely*—γε—*unsuc-
cessful in its affairs*. τότε δ'—αἰτταν, *but in the other case,
being worthy to rule over the others, then renouncing this, it
would have had the blame of betraying all to Philip*. τίς οὐκ
κατέπτυσεν ἄν σοῦ. We naturally expect τῆς πόλεως,
which had been the subject of discourse, but the orator with great
skill substitutes Æschines, as if he alone were capable of such
meanness of conduct. μὴ γὰρ τῆς πόλεως γε μηδ' ἐμοῦ,
for not upon the state at least, nor upon me. The supposition
was not to be made of the state or of himself—and therefore
there was no danger of such a disgrace being cast upon them.
"Subaudiendum autem καταπτύσεις." SCHAEFER. εἰ τὰ μὲν
πράγματα—ἦσαν πεποιημένοι. This sentence is divi-
ded into two parts by τὰ μὲν and τὸν δέ, and then the first part
subdivided, according to Westermann, with a suppressed μὲν,
to which δέ after ἡγεμών corresponds, though the opposition is
very slight and would be expressed by the tone, it being merely
between the things and the person, as in § 25, πολλῶν μὲν χορη-
μάτων πολλῶν δέ στρατιωτῶν. But Schaefer rejects the δέ,

though without manuscript authority, and connects the clause to the preceding as a mere continuation of the thought. So, also, Disson, Kennedy, Brougham, and in general the translations. τοῦτ' ἂν ἀσμένως — προσσιάναι. Reiske finds much fault with this sentence, and says the hunting after participial constructions unconsciously involves the Greeks in ridiculous absurdities. But Schaefer thinks Demosthenes did not need to be taught by Reiske how to write Greek. He says the construction of the words does not differ from this: “τὸ κελεύμενον ποιούσῃ καὶ ἑώσῃ ἔτερον τῶν Ἑλλήνων προσσιάναι ὃ τι βούλεται λαβεῖν καὶ τὰ ἐαυτῆς ἔχειν. Hoc schema metathesis Technici appellant. SCHAEFER. κινδυνεύουσα, construed with διατετέλεκε. *It always continued encountering danger in contending.*—τὸν, supply θάνατον, *his destined lot.* Both expressions refer to the same thought, and are only an example of oratorical amplification; “*appointed or natural end,*” KENNEDY; “*awaits his destined end in the course of nature,*” Lord BROUGHAM.

§ 206–210. εἰ μὲν—νῦν δ'; ἐγὼ μὲν—οὔτις δέ. Observe the contrasts, between what he had not done, and what he did do, and then between what he did and what Æschines did. τῆς μέντοι διακονίας, *the administration*, which is contrasted with τὰς προαιρέσεις, and φρόνημα. The contrast is indicated by the μέντοι, and would be expressed by the tone, the corresponding μὲν being, according to Westermann, suppressed. See § 201, Note. τῶν ὅλων, *the whole*; both the policy and the administration. Demosthenes gives all the credit to the state. It was its spirit which led to the adoption of the measures against Philip; he claimed for himself merely a share in the execution of them. But Æschines, by attacking the whole, both the measures and the execution of them, in his eagerness to strip me of a *temporary* honor, is in reality taking away your praises for all coming time. The glory of Demosthenes as merely executing what they willed was temporary; theirs, eternal. Lord Brougham has overlooked this distinction, which is one of the finest strokes in this fine passage: “*But Æschines impeaching my whole conduct.*” He has made a still greater mistake in the opening sentence: “*there lives not a man who could justly blame me,*” the meaning being directly the opposite; *there is none who might not justly blame me.* τοῦδ', Ctesiphon. ἔπειτ' — ἔδει.

Æschines in several parts of his oration had brought forward the distinguished heroes of Greece, to disparage Demosthenes by the contrast. Thus, he asks, "which seems to you the better man, Themistocles, who commanded when you conquered the Persians at Salamis, or Demosthenes, who fled the ranks? Miltiades, who conquered the Barbarians at Marathon, or this man?" Demosthenes takes advantage of the impression just produced, to make a short and contemptuous reference to these contrasts. *And you then—ἐπεὶ—thou wretched scribbler, with a design to strip me of honor and favor with these, TALKED ABOUT trophies and battles and ancient deeds—of which what one does this present trial call for?—but me, thou third-rate actor—the counsellor to the state, concerning its highest honors,—we must not overlook the juxtaposition of τριταγωνιστά and τὸν σύμβουλον—inspired with the spirit of what one did it become me to ascend the Bema?* No translation has equalled, or can equal, the force of the original sentence. Both Brougham and Kennedy are tame in the comparison. But the sentence, even in a translation, must be *declaimed*, not read. The orator seems to have commenced it with a design to draw a direct contrast between Æschines and himself; σὸ μὲν—ἐγὼ δέ—"you talked about trophies and fights and ancient deeds, but I spoke from the Bema in the very spirit of those heroes who performed them;" but, to avoid the appearance of arrogance, he changes the structure, and asks with whose spirit, as counsellor of the state, he should have been animated? The contrasts are many and sharp. Æschines is a miserable scribbler, Demosthenes, a counsellor of state; Æschines mounted the Bema merely to injure a personal enemy, Demosthenes, to give counsel to his country; Æschines spoke about honorable deeds, Demosthenes did them. If we conceive of these points as *uttered* by the orator, we shall see that this sentence was not unworthy of the place which it occupies. ὅν τινος—οὐτοσσι, "*quibus rebus profecto opus non in hac causa, cum nihil actum sit quod indignum majoribus.*" DISSEN. ἐπεὶ, introduces the reason why he would have been justly slain, if he had not acted up to the spirit of their ancestors. τὰ—συμβόλαια, *the transactions of daily life.* ἐπὶ τῶν—σχοποῦντας, *examining according to particular laws and facts.* προαίρεσεις, *counsels.* "*Consilia, non, res gestas.*" DISSEN. The orator pur-

posely keeps up the distinction with which he started ; τὴν προ-
αἰρεσίν μου σκόπει τῆς πολιτείας, μὴ τὰ συμβάντα συκοφάνει.
§ 192. ἀξιόματα, "*præclara facta*." DISSEN. τῇ βακ-
τηρίᾳ καὶ τῷ συμβόλῳ. "To discharge the judicial
business of Athens, there were annually chosen by lot, in equal
portions out of the ten tribes, six thousand citizens. This num-
ber was divided into ten equal sections of five hundred each,
leaving one thousand to supply vacancies. Now, besides the
Helixæa, there were nine other courts in Athens. Over the
court rooms of the ten courts were the ten first letters of the
alphabet. (From the Reviewer of Lord Brougham. The remain-
der from Mitchell's note to the Wasps of Aristophanes, v. 918.)
Ten tablets bearing the same ten letters were thrown into a
vessel ; section A, or its representative, dipped into the vessel,
and drew up, it might be, the letter K. That letter determined
the court to which the judicial labors of section A, were for that
day to be directed. And so of the others. The courts having
been allotted, each member of a section received a staff, (ῥάβδος)
and a counter, (σύμβολον). The staff by the letter and color
impressed upon it directed him to the court, the exhibition of
the counter to the proper functionary, entitled him to his fee."

We have here a second example of an Appeal to the Feel-
ings, as preparatory to a statement of facts, and intended to
influence the judgment, as to those facts. The first instance
preceded the statement, which the orator gave of his successful
administration of public affairs in the war against Philip, § 61-
72 ; the present prepares the way for the account which he is
to render for his failure to protect his country from the war
which Æschines had brought into it. This repetition of the
modes of treating similar subjects is important to be noticed,
because it reveals not only the care with which the oration was
composed, but, also, the judgment of the orator, as to the value
of these modes.

In this Appeal, the orator would arouse the sentiments of
patriotism and glory, and carry them to the highest pitch of
enthusiasm. He would make his countrymen feel that it was
to their highest honor to fight for freedom, at whatever cost ;
that defeat was merely a misfortune, but submission, a dishonor ;
a dishonor to their own name, and to the fame of their ances-

tors. The whole Appeal converges to this one point, and terminates in the Oath. If he can lodge this sentiment in their breasts, he has won a favorable judgment upon the facts he has to state, even before mentioning them.

But before speaking of the Oath, we notice the Transition, by which the orator passes from his lofty eulogiums on the ancient heroes of Athens to the present case. Having set forth the noble principles, on which the state had always acted in the defense of Grecian freedom, he says—not, that *he himself*, in his Theban policy, had acted in this spirit—but the *state*; he had been only the agent who had executed her counsels. By this unexpected substitution of the state in place of himself, besides speaking with becoming modesty of his own services, Demosthenes is enabled to charge Æschines as attacking, not himself, but the state. It may be noticed, also, that the orator claims much less than he might have done. In other places, he has put himself forward. “*I proposed the embassies, I sent out the armaments,*” § 73; “*I then appeared such a man on that occasion,*” § 173. But, here, while speaking of the glory of the state and of her greatest men, with his usual judgment he keeps himself in the back-ground.

It is hardly necessary to say that this Oath was carefully analyzed by the ancient Rhetoricians. We give the substance of what Longinus says upon it as a mode of influencing the mind. “Demosthenes is arguing concerning his political measures. How would he naturally have done this, if he had not made use of the figure of the oath? ‘Ye did not err, Athenians, in contending for the freedom of Greece; on the contrary, ye have many examples of such struggles; for neither did your ancestors err at Marathon, nor at Salamis, nor at Platea.’ But when as if inspired by the Divinity, he swears by the Heroes of Greece—‘It is not possible ye erred; no, I swear by those at Marathon, who rushed to the front ranks of danger’—he appears, in the very oath itself, to deify their ancestors by whom he swore, and, at the same time, he both animates the judges with the very spirit of those who fought at Marathon, and so infuses a kind of healing balm into the minds of his hearers, that, cheered by these praises, they become not less proud of the battle against Philip, than of the victories at Marathon and Salamis.”

We may notice two things more. 1. The oath was an act of religious appeal, for which there was a sufficient ground in the belief and feelings of the audience. They believed in deified heroes by whom it was proper to swear; and the orator in the very act of swearing by them deified their own ancestors. With them, therefore, the oath had the reality and solemnity of a religious act, in which the speaker was in deep earnest. But now, this belief having vanished, the whole tribe of oaths, "by the blood of our ancestors," "by the spirit of our country," and the like, must be regarded as a rhetorical flourish—an idle mockery. Indeed, the figure of the oath has become one of those empty traditions which have lost their vitality; it can no longer influence the feelings, nor produce any other effect than that of admiration, it may be, at the skill of the orator.

Longinus has a remark to the same effect. In criticising the line of the poet Eupolis—"No, I swear by my *fight* at Marathon"—which was supposed to have suggested the oath to Demosthenes, he says: "The mere form of an oath is nothing; it is necessary to inquire where it was made, how, on what occasion, and for what end. And, moreover, the poet does not deify *the men* who fought, that he may inspire the hearers with thoughts worthy of their bravery, but passes from the heroes to the *inanimate thing*—the battle."

2. We must also notice, that in the appeal to the feelings, Demosthenes did not forget his argument; in the very height of his passion he remembered the distinction upon which he rested his defense of the Theban Alliance, that statesmen should be judged by their aims, and not by the result of their measures,—“all of whom alike, Æschines, the state buried, thinking them worthy of the same honor, not those alone of them who were successful, nor those only who conquered.”—Demosthenes did not utter this oath to strike the hearers with admiration of himself as a great orator; he did not look beyond the audience before him to future fame; he spoke for a present effect upon his cause, and expressed his argument in the impassioned language of an oath, because he could thereby give greater weight to that argument. False rhetoric,—speaking to please, not to convince, to gain admiration, not to win the cause,—which is the prominent fault of modern oratory, is no where to be found in Demosthenes.

This care of Demosthenes to subordinate every thing to the success of his cause, is noticed by Longinus. "He teaches us," says he, "that in the height of passion we should retain our judgment. He says, 'by those of your ancestors who *fought* at Marathon, by those who *engaged in the naval battle* at Salamis and Artemisium, by those who *stood side by side* at Platæa.' He no where says, 'by those who *conquered*,' but shuns the word which would indicate the issue of the battles, till at length he has prepared the way with the hearers, for the conclusion,—all of whom *alike* the state buried, and not those alone who were successful." He, indeed, specifies no instances of defeat, but merely implies them under the general expression—"many others."

The Oath is the climax of the oration. The orator does, indeed, continue from this point onwards in a very high strain of oratory, but no where attains to the sublimity of this passage. And in this, we notice a distinction between Grecian and modern oratory. The modern orator aims to end with a climax, reserving for the conclusion the most powerful of his arguments, or appeals; the Greek orator rises to the climax during the course of his speech, and then descends from it, ending with composure and decorum.

The orator follows the same principle, in the present instance. He passes, at once, without effort, from the impassioned and sublime utterance of the oath, to bitter vituperation, and thence to a calm statement of the principles upon which public and private measures should be examined and decided. With both of these topics, however, critics have found fault; with the former, as failing in decorum, and with the latter, as being too tame. But both topics are as they should be; they are naturally and effectively introduced.

In regard to the first, Æschines, in two very powerful passages of his oration, had brought Demosthenes into disparaging contrast with the ancient heroes of Greece. Now, Demosthenes had just uttered an oath by these same heroes, and carried his audience, we may suppose, to the highest pitch of excitement. What more natural, then, or effective, than to turn this current of patriotic feeling against his opponent as wanting in the spirit which animated their ancestors, while the orator takes the opportunity to intimate his own sympathy with them, under the

modest form of the question—"with whose spirit inspired should I have mounted the Bema?"

Demosthenes did not speak to please the fastidious critics of later ages, but to win his cause; and one way of doing this, he knew, was to depreciate his accuser in the minds of the judges, and modestly to commend himself to their favor. Here, while the minds of the judges were animated with the glow of patriotic feelings, was an opportunity to do it, and he accordingly made the attempt. This is another lesson upon the importance of an earnest and all-engrossing effort to produce a present effect upon the minds of those who are to make the decision upon the case before them.

Again, the second topic enforces upon the *judges* the duty of being governed by the same principle in *deciding*, which is assumed in the oath as obligatory upon *statesmen* in *acting*. Indeed, this duty follows with logical precision from the Oath. For, if statesmen should be guided by the spirit of their ancestors in their public measures, so should judges in their decision upon those measures. "If I had proposed counsels unworthy of your ancestors, I should have been justly condemned to death. For public trials should be decided with reference to their worthy deeds, and the judge should feel that along with the rod of office he takes the spirit of his country, when he enters upon public causes." Now, the orator did not pronounce the Oath merely to excite the patriotic feelings of the judges, but to produce in their minds such conviction and such feelings, as should lead to his acquittal. Hence, as is usual with him, he carefully points out the inference, and enforces it upon their attention.

§ 211-247. NARRATIVE.

Having prepared his hearers by these appeals, to judge favorably of the treaty with Thebes, and to overlook its fatal results, the orator proceeds to describe the events in the order of their occurrence. And here, he carries to an unusual degree his favorite mode of a brief statement of the fact, followed by various applications of the fact. As attention has already been repeatedly drawn to this method, it will not be necessary farther to point out the particular instances. The following are the topics in their order.

- I. Arrival of the ambassadors at Thebes. § 211–212.
- II. The Assembly in Thebes. § 213–214.
- III. March of the Troops; Reception in Thebes; the first two Skirmishes. § 215–216.
- IV. Rejoicings of the Athenians at their success; Fear of Philip; Honors to Demosthenes. § 217–226.
- V. The Advantages of the Theban Alliance, notwithstanding the defeat at Chæronea. § 227–233.
- VI. The Disadvantages of the Allies in the contest. § 234–243.
- VII. The Battle of Chæronea. § 244–247.

§ 211–212. THE ARRIVAL OF THE EMBASSADORS AT THEBES.

Under this head, we have the formal transition, the statement of the fact, and, while the clerk is preparing to read the letter of the ambassadors, the application.

τῶν ἄλλων συμμάχων, such as, the Ænians, the Ætolians, Dolopians, and Phthiotians. τοσαύτη γ', compare τὰ μέγιστά γε. § 110, and Note. τὸν καιρόν. See Æschines, § 137, § 141, § 239. ὥς ἐτέρως. See § 85, and Note. τῇν ἐμὴν τύχην. See Æschines, § 157. συνάλτιος, contrasted with μόνος αἷτιος.

§ 213–214. THE ASSEMBLY IN THEBES.

τὸ δ' οὖν κεφάλαιον, *but, for substance, then*; the sum of what they demanded; not, "*in a word*;" BROUGHAM, nor, "*in fine*," KENNEDY. οὖν implies that the detail is omitted, and resumes the discourse. So, also, οἱ τι δ' οὖν, below. τὸ κεφάλαιον, "*est absolute dictum nec syntactice cohæret cum sequentibus, in summa; ad summan; summatim*." SCHAEFER. But Matthiæ makes it in apposition with the whole clause. § 432, 5. διέντας, *letting them pass through*. See § 146. ἐκ τῆς Ἀττικῆς. ἐκ conforms to ἡξορία. See § 145. τὰ μὲν καθ' ἑκαστά, *each particular*; τὰ μὲν having its correspondence in οἱ τι δ', the contrast being between the details and the result. ἐγὼ μὲν, contrasted with ὑμᾶς δέ. ἀντιπαντὸς ἀντιμησαμένην τοῦ βίου, "*majoris faciam, quam vivere*;" or, "*vita ipsi æquiparem*." INDEX GRÆCITATIS, under βίος and τιμᾶν, "*the reply we made, I would give my life to reca-*

pitulate." KENNEDY. ὥσπερ ἄν εἰ,—ἡγοούμενοι, *thinking there had been as it were—ὥσπερ ἄν εἰ.* BUTT. § 149, m. § 151, 3, —*a deluge overwhelming the affairs.* μάταιον ὄχλον, *a useless vexation.*—The greater the obstacles, the greater the merit of overcoming them. Hence, the orator enlarges upon the obstacles, but contents himself with simply declaring the fact of his triumph. He declines to repeat the speech, partly, for the reason alleged, and partly, perhaps, because he had just repeated one, and it could serve here no good purpose. Plutarch says of this speech: "The advantage of the alliance did not escape the Thebans, but each one had before his eyes the horrors of the war, the Phocian wounds being still fresh; yet, says Theopompus, the power of the orator so set on fire their souls and so influenced their ambition, that it threw every thing else into the shade, and, inspired by the appeals to their honor, they forgot both fear and prudence and gratitude." Dem. 18.

§ 215–216. MARCH OF THE TROOPS; RECEPTION IN THEBES;
FIRST TWO SKIRMISHES.

τῶν ὀπλιτῶν καὶ τῶν ἱππέων, that is, of the Athenians. BÆCKH, *Pub. Econ. of Athens*, p. 284, and DISSEN. Reiske refers them to the Thebans. στρατιάν, *the body of citizen troops.* The heavy-armed troops and cavalry were mercenaries. BÆCKH, p. 271. τὰ τιμιώτατα. A general term, embracing the two preceding. "Additum abundantia oratoria; nam nihil quidquam differt ab antecedentibus, παιδας καὶ γυναικας." SCHAEFER. καίτοι, in its primitive sense; *and indeed.* See § 100. καθ' ὑμῶν. "κατὰ in bonam partem, *de vobis.*" See Phil. II. § 9, and SCHAEFER's note. καὶ παρὰ πᾶσι δ'. Dissen, though without manuscript authority, excludes δέ from the text, on the ground that there is nothing emphatic in this clause. But Reiske explains the emphasis, thus: "imo potius, ut rectius dicam, apud omnes;" *or, rather, among all.* τὰ ἐν πλείστη φυλακῇ. "Ad φυλακῇ subauditur ὄντα." REISKE. But compare τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς = *res vestrae civiles*; οἱ ἐν ταῖς αἰταις = *rei*; οἱ ἐν γένει = *cognati.* HERM. ad VIG. p. 856. Although the ellipsis of a participle may explain the *origin* of the use, it is an expression fixed in the language, not made on the occasion by the speaker, and needs nothing to be supplied. σωφρο-

σύνης, the genitive of the object; *confidence in your virtue*; a confidence in virtue, with respect to you. κατὰ γ' ὑμᾶς. γε has a peculiar emphasis. *So far as you at least are concerned*; with a remote allusion to the fatal issue of the alliance. Although the allied forces were defeated, it was fortune that did it, not any fault on the part of the Athenians. So far as the Athenians themselves were concerned, therefore, the Thebans did not misplace their confidence. There is a similar thought expressed in full in § 247. ἀήτιτος ἡ πόλις τὸ κατ' ἐμὲ. οὐτὲς — ἐν ἐκάλεσεν, *for never did any one bring any accusation—not even unjustly—against you*. δις τε συμπαρατάξαμενοι τὰς πρώτας μάχας, *and being drawn up together twice in the first skirmishes*; τὰς πρώτας μάχας, being an object of kindred meaning with the verb. BUTT. GR. § 131, 4. ἐπὶ τοῦ ποταμοῦ, probably, the Cephissus, which would have to be passed by Philip on his march from Elatea to Bœotia. DISSEN. τὴν χειμερινήν, according to some, *the winter-battle*; according to others, *the battle in the storm*. There can be no objection to the former explanation, which the obvious meaning of the word requires, if we follow Grote in prolonging the duration of the campaign. Nothing is known of these two battles, except what we learn from Demosthenes. τῷ ἄσμφ—τῇ προθυμίᾳ, “*admirable in discipline, in equipment, in courage*.” LORD BROUGHAM; the articles being happily disregarded.

§ 217–226. REJOICING OF THE ATHENIANS; FEARS OF PHILIP; HONORS TO DEMOSTHENES.

The specific facts to which Demosthenes refers, are the Decrees of Sacrifice, the Letters of Philip, and the Decrees bestowing crowns upon himself. These public documents are read, but are preceded and followed by remarks.

§ 217. THE DILEMMA IN WHICH ÆSCHINES IS PLACED, BY THE DECREES OF SACRIFICE.—αὐτὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἐποιήσατο μάρτυρας, since in sacrificing with his fellow-citizens he called on the gods as witnesses of their successes. οὐκ ἄριστα—τοὺς θεοὺς, *if he now demands of you to condemn these as not best*—which they would do, by condemning the decree of Ctesiphon which declared they were so—you, who

have sworn by the gods—said with reference to the judicial oath, ἀπολωλέναι πολλαίκις. Compare Shakespeare's "a thousand deaths would die." See, also, Philippic III, § 65, τεθνάναι δὲ μυριάκις.—"The beauty of this passage is very striking. Not merely the exquisite diction—the majesty of the rhythm—the skillful collocation—the picturesque description of Æschines' dismay, and skulking from the public rejoicings; but the argument is to be observed and admired. It is a dilemma, and one which would be quite sufficient for the momentary victory at which alone the orator often aims. It is not closely reasoned; it is not a complete dilemma; a retort is obvious, (to use the language of the logicians,) and this is always fatal, being the test before which no bad dilemma can stand. Æschines had only to embrace the second alternative—the second horn—and it never could have transfixed him. 'I did remain at home, not mourning over the success of your measures, but their wickedness; not grudging the people their short-lived joy, but grieved to see them deluded by your arts to their ruin.' This answer was complete. Nevertheless, there are but few complete dilemmas in the whole course of any argument upon any subject; and the one under consideration is quite good enough to pass with an audience in a speech. Many much less complete are every day used with us both in the senate, in popular assemblies, and even at the bar, and with sufficient success. This whole passage would be of certain success in our Parliament." Lord BROUGHAM.

§ 218. THE DECREES OF SACRIFICE FOLLOWED BY AN INFERENCE FROM THEM, AND A TRANSITION TO THE LETTERS OF PHILIP.—καὶ περιειστήκει—ἐμοί. Observe how finely this member repeats and enlarges the corresponding clauses of the first member. περιειστήκει, *had happened*, at the time of which the orator speaks. συνέχεια, *perseverance*. Compare τούτων γὰρ εἰχόμεν, § 79, *for these I clung to, followed up*. πλάνοι, *journeyings*, with reference to his many embassies and journeys to other states. ἄνυν οὗτος διέσσυρε. Dissen remarks that he knows of no passage in Æschines to which this may refer. Æschines, however, speaks of decrees "longer than the Iliad, but emptier than the words which he is accustomed to speak, and the life he leads, and full of hopes never to be realized, and armies never to be collected." § 100.

§ 219–221. REMARKS WITH REFERENCE TO HIMSELF.—These remarks are made while the clerk is preparing to read the Letters. ἀλλ' ὁμῶς—τῇ πόλει, *but yet no one of these ever in any transaction—οὐδεὶς εἰς οὐδέν—gave himself to the state throughout the whole of it—διὰ παντός*, “*sic ut totum negotium administraret.*” SCHAEFER. ἀναφοράν, *means of escape*; that is, of turning the blame from himself—a maneuver not yet obsolete in political life. οὐτως, “*referendum ad μέγαν.*” SCHAEFER. See § 163, and Note. ὧσ' οὐκ ἐδόκει—πράξειεν, *that it seemed to me to allow no opportunity or forethought for personal safety, but that one should be satisfied if neglecting nothing he should do his duty,—ἄδει—ἐδόκει*, that is, ὁ κινδυνός. WESTERMANN. τῆς ἀσφαλείας, grammatically belongs to πρόνοιαν, χάραν requiring the dative: *to give no place to, nor forethought of, personal safety.* WESTERMANN. τυχὸν μὲν ἀναίσθητῶν, *it may be, indeed, stupidly.* βέλτιον, “*pertinet etiam προᾶξαι.*” SCHAEFER.

§ 222. LETTERS OF PHILIP, WITH A TRANSITION TO THE DECREES TO CROWN DEMOSTHENES.—τὰ πρό τούτων. See § 188. πολλοὺς—λόγους, “*multa et audacia verba jactare solitus.*” DISSEN. τὸ μέρος. See § 103, and Note. τὰ τότε μὲν—γρᾶφέντα, *at that time successfully defended, but by this man—Æschines—not even indicted.*

§ 223–226. DECREES TO CROWN DEMOSTHENES, WITH AN APPLICATION TO THE PRESENT CASE.—ἐπερ ἀληθῆ—κατηγορεῖ. The argument is this: if the charges which he now brings against me as his ground for impeaching Ctesiphon, were true, he would more naturally have brought them forward at that time as grounds for impeaching Demomeles and Hyperides. σιχότως, *with greater propriety.* τὸν δ'. Ctesiphon. ὅτι τῷ μὲν—προλαβεῖν, *because now it is in his power—Ctesiphon's—to refer to them—Demomeles and Hyperides—and to the decisions of the courts,—that is, in the impeachments brought by Diondas—and to the fact that this very person—Æschines—did not prosecute them though proposing the same things which this person—Ctesiphon—has just done, and to the fact that the laws do not permit prosecutions concerning things thus settled,—οὕτω πράθεντων*, with reference to the adjudication in a trial of the παρανόμων γράφῃ, and to the proclamation of the crown by the people,—and to many other things; but in the

case supposed—τότε δ' corresponding to τῷ μὲν—the cause would have been decided by itself—that is, on its own merits; “tunc autem ipsa causa judicata esset sola per se,” SCHAEFER,—before it had taken to itself any of these things—that is, of the pleas just mentioned: or, the case on the part of his prosecutor would not have been cumbered with the objections, which can now be made. πρὶν τι τοῦτων προλαβεῖν. See p. 366. The law prohibiting a second prosecution for a matter once tried is to be found in Andocides against Alcibiades, p. 30, § 9, Bekk. and is quoted by Dissen, as follows: τῶν νόμων ἀπαγορευόντων δις περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν μὴ ἐξεῖναι διάξεσθαι. It is obvious, however, that the plea of *exceptio judicati*, strictly speaking, could not be made here, both because the parties were different, and because the subject-matter was not in all respects the same. Still the spirit of the law would apply, and the argument, as Westermann says, is rather moral than legal. For, it was the same person who was in reality attacked in both cases,—Demosthenes—and the crown was proposed by Ctesiphon about substantially the same transactions—the transactions in the last war. ἐπὶ τῇς ἀληθείας. See § 17. διόπερ—ἦκεν. See, for the same expression, § 15, and Notes.—The inference from the fact that Æschines did not prosecute these decrees, viewed in connection with the disadvantages under which he labored in the present trial is this—that he had no proper motive as a prosecutor, but got up the trial merely as a ῥητόρων ἀγῶνα. This is the third time Demosthenes has charged Æschines, founding the charge upon the fact that he did not prosecute him at the time the crimes were alleged to have taken place—with having other motives in the impeachment than such as belong to an honest prosecutor; first, with aiming, out of personal enmity, at himself, § 12–16; but, secondly, under the disguise of attacking himself, with aiming at the state, § 125; and, here, with an ambition of making an oratorical display. See § 12–16 and § 125, with Notes.

§ 227–231. THE ADVANTAGES OF THE THEBAN ALLIANCE,
NOTWITHSTANDING THE DEFEAT AT CHÆRONEA.

The orator having narrated the arrival of the embassy in Thebes, the proceedings of the assembly, the march of the troops, their reception and victories, together with the rejoicing

in Athens, the anxiety of Philip, and the honors to himself, would naturally proceed next in order to speak of the battle of Chæronea. But, before coming to this, he interposes two topics; the first, the benefits of the Alliance, notwithstanding the defeat, and the second, the disadvantages under which the allies labored, both as regards money and troops, compared with Philip. The topics were most happily brought in just at this time; the former shows that, though frustrated, his policy was a good one, while the latter accounts for its being frustrated; and both are well adapted to mitigate the pain of the defeat. We may also notice how skillfully they are introduced. Demosthenes had just charged Æschines with having got up this trial in order to have a contest in oratory. He here examines a specimen of his oratory.

Εἴτα σοφίζεται. εἴτα introduces the example with a sneer; *he plays the sophist, then.* καὶ φησι. See Æschines, § 59. *περιεῖναι χρήματα*, that money remains; that there is a balance in your favor. *τῷ λογίζησθαι*, you settle with some one,—*τῷ = τινι*. See § 5. *ἀν καθαγαὶ ὥσιν αἱ ψῆφοι*, should the accounts be square. The pebbles, *αἱ ψῆφοι*, are used for reckoning. The process seems to have been, first, to lay down the pebbles opposite each other,—*ψήφους τιθέναι*—; next, to take up those that were of the same value, from each side,—*ψήφους ἀνταναιεῖν*—; then, if all on each side were removed, the debtor and creditor side would be equal, or the accounts squared, when it was said, *καθαγαὶ εἰσιν αἱ ψήφοι*. From SCHAEFER and DISSEN. *ἐκ τοῦ λόγου*, from the discussion; the arguments of both parties. *σοφοῦ*, ironical; “*sapient*.” Lord BROUGHAM. *νῦν γ’ ἡμᾶς ὑπάρχειν ἐγνωσμένους*, that now at least we are understood. *καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε—ἀξιῶν*, and in truth, that at least he says what is unjust in demanding this opinion to be changed—*οὐ γὰρ ἐστίν—λογισμός*, for there is no such way of reckoning; or, actions are not to be reckoned in this way—*οὗτος*. *πρὸς ἐκείνον*. The selection of various readings, and the proposal of emendations, often involve the nicest questions of style. Thus, here, both Reiske and Taylor have proposed to add *ἐποίησε* after *ἐκείνον*, Reiske, however, remarking, “not as necessary, but for the sake of perspicuity.” But Schaefer replies with indignation; “*tam languet enim, tam inscite addi-*

tum est, ut qui additum malit parum intellexisse videatur, quid leges concinnitatis in struendis periodis poscant." ἄρα σοι—φαινεταί. The orator here turns upon Æschines, and asks him sneeringly how he likes this kind of reckoning. *Does, then, the reckoning of actions—not, this reckoning, but the kind of reckoning of which he had just given him an example—seem to you like the reckoning of accounts?* ἢ δεῖν—σκέψασθαι, *or does it seem necessary to expunge these, and not rather, to consider how they may be remembered through all time.* Demosthenes had stated the results of his Theban policy and what would have been the results, if the measures of Æschines had been followed—in the form of an account, the one being set against the other. Now, after asking Æschines how he likes this sort of reckoning, he inquires whether he thinks *both* of these results should be blotted out, as in an account which is balanced, or whether we should consider how *both* should be remembered for ever.—This is the view of Schaefer. "Quid est ταῦτα? Et ea, quæ Demosthenis administratio reipublicæ salutaria civitati gloriosaque effecit, et ea quæ Æschinis administratio damnosa turpiaque effectura erat, si cives ejus consilia probassent. Utraque in antegressis commemorantur. Quid est ἀνταρλεῖν? Utraque ad instar numerorum parium sed inter se oppositorum tollere, hoc est, oblivione perimere, ut numeri illi computatione perimuntur. Hoc vero Demosthenes vetat: nam jubet curari ut et sua preclara facinora et Æschinis foeda ausa sempiternæ memoriæ tradantur." καὶ οὐκέτι προστιθῆμι, *and I no farther add; that is, to the list of advantages gained and losses avoided, already made; or, I do not now add,—“non jam,”* SCHAEFER, but without implying any subsequent notice. ἢ νῦν οἷς—ἰδεῖν, *which it is common to see where—ἐν οἷς = “ubi,”* REISKE and DISSEN, but Schaefer, *quibus in rebus,*—Philip has become master of any. τὰ λοιπὰ—περιβαλλόμενος, *compassing his remaining purposes.* "Opponuntur inter se καθάπαξ κύριον καθιστασθαι et περιβάλλεσθαι. Illud vim armorum, hoc dolum consiliorum significat." SCHAEFER. ὁμεις καλῶς ποιοῦντες, *you happily received the fruits.* καλῶς ποιοῦντες is a peculiar phrase, and is exactly represented here by the word, *happily*, which means, not, *you being happy received*, or, *were happy in receiving*, but, *you received the fruits and I am happy you did.*

Thus, Hermann; "Verum indicatur his verbis facere aliquem id, quod aut sibi ipsi commodum est, aut, quod is, qui loquitur, fieri optat et gaudet." Ad VIg. 777. In the latter case, *καλῶς ποιῶν* refers *logically* to the person speaking, and expresses his feelings, though *grammatically* it is connected with the subject of the verb; as, here, *ποιούντες* with *ὑμεῖς*, though it expresses the feelings of Demosthenes.

In defending the Theban alliance, Demosthenes appeals chiefly to the sentiment of honor, subordinately, however, to the principle of utility. At the outset, § 195, he threw in a clause, setting forth the effect of the alliance in keeping the war from the territory of Attica and giving opportunity, after the disaster at Chæronea, for deliberation. He here takes up the topic formally and handles it with greater vigor. By comparing § 195, § 230, § 240–241, the student will see with what skill the orator has three several times repeated and enforced the same statement. We may, also, call to mind that the orator has heretofore, made the same appeal to the principle of utility, and in the same subordinate way. See § 65, § 89.

§ 232–243. COMPARISON OF THE RESOURCES OF THE CONTENDING PARTIES, WITH AN APPLICATION.

This topic, like the last one, is introduced by a criticism on Æschines as an orator, thus carrying still farther his allusion to the oratorical contest, which he had charged Æschines as aiming at. § 232–233. INTRODUCTION.—*κατηγόρει*, includes the notion of *saying*. Hence, *he would not say in accusing such things as you just now said*. *παράδειγματα*, "quale illud σοφὸν scilicet παράδειγμα τῶν ψήφων, quod orator modo exposuit." SCHAEFER. *ῥήματα*, *phrases*. See Æschines, § 72, § 166. *σχήματα*, *gestures*. See Æschines, § 209. *παρὰ τοῦτο γέγονε*, "*depended upon this*." TAYLOR. *ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων*, *on the ground of the facts themselves*. See § 117, and Note. *ἀφορμάς*, *resources*; it includes every thing pertaining to war; men, money, ships, and the like. *εἰς τὰ—εἰσῆειν*, *when I entered upon public affairs*. *καὶ τίνας—ἔγω*, *and what, when I was at the head of public affairs—ἐπιστάς*, see § 60, for the full expres-

sion, and the Note—*I afterwards added to it.* χρησόμεαι τῷ λόγῳ, = λέξω. See § 252. § 234–239. THE COMPARISON. Δύναμιν μὲν, the second accusative, completing the notion of the predicate; *as a force, the state had the islanders.* KÜHNER Gr. § 280, 4, § 240, 2. χρημάτων δέ, *but as to money.* σύνταξιν. At the formation of the new Confederation, (see Hist. Sketch, p. 18) the assessment paid by the confederate states was called σύνταξις, *a contribution*, not φόρος, *a tribute*. After the Social War, when most of the states became independent, it amounted, it seems, only to forty-five talents, though probably this was the lowest point, to which it sank. προεξέλεγε μὲν α, *collected in advance.* ὀπλίτην δ' ἢ ἱππέα πλὴν τῶν οἰκείων οὐδένα, troops of the allies, since Demosthenes is here speaking of the aid he obtained from the other Grecian states. ὀπλίτην δ' ἢ ἱππέα, are mercenaries, hired by the allies, as is obvious from the use of ξένοι, below, § 237; τῶν οἰκείων, the same as τῶν πολιτικῶν, below, § 237, are the citizen soldiery of the allies. See SCHAEFER. καὶ ἐπραττεν—κύριος πάντων. With this description, compare Canning's, of Bonaparte. "He asks no counsel, he renders no account, he wields at will the population and resources of a mighty empire, and its dependent states." The entire passage, however, both in point of condensation, and in the logical sequence of thought, is far inferior. (Speech on the Expedition to the Scheldt.) αὐτὸ γὰρ τὸ δημηγορεῖν πρῶτον, *for at the outset*,—to come to the main point at once—the *very speaking before the people*. This was the only thing in which it could be pretended he had supreme power. πρῶτον, not, *in the first place*, not, *to address the people first*, but, in a somewhat peculiar sense, difficult to express except by a circumlocution, *at once, at the first view*. See πρὸς Αἰπιδίην, § 54, § 106. "*For, first*," LORD BROUGHAM; but there is no second. "*For instance*," KENNEDY; but most translations omit it. καὶ ὅσα—βεβούλευμένοι, *and whatever measures they carried against me*,—and many were these, *from whatever cause each might happen—these you went away*—that is, "e concione," REISKE—*having adopted in favor of the enemy.* δι' ἣν ἕκαστον τύχοι πρόφασιν. τύχοι as denoting a chance result gives an indefiniteness to the proposition, *from one cause or another.* ἀλλ' ὁμῶς—συν-

ἡχθησαν. Bœckh thus states the account of the troops other than Athenians employed against Philip. "The greatest number of mercenaries which Athens collected at this time was fifteen thousand, together with two thousand cavalry, which were furnished by the Eubœans, &c., in addition to the other force composed of the citizens of these nations." Pub. Econ. B. II, Ch. xvi, p. 271. τὰ πρὸς Θηβαίους δίκαια, *our rights with respect to the Thebans*; not what they could claim of us, but we of them. περὶ τῶν ἴσων, *of equal apportionments*. "τὰ ἴσα h. l. sunt æquæ portiones sumtum in bellum faciendorum." SCHAEFER. See Æschines, §143 and §91. παρέσχετο, for another instance of the repetition of the same verb, see ἐξηπάτησθε, §42. εἴτα, corresponds to πρῶτον μὲν. The reply of Demosthenes is two-fold; that the treaties were in accordance with the generous spirit, with which Athens had always acted, and that it was useless to bring forward the accusation at this late hour;—topics which have already been urged more than once. παρῶν, "præsens in concionibus, ubi de illis rebus agebatur." SCHAEFER. This is clear from its connection with ἔγραφε. εἴπερ—καιρούς, *if indeed these were practicable by reason of these times*; "παρὰ=διά." SCHAEFER. §240–243. CONCLUSION.—'Αλλ' εἰ νῦν. Having just charged Æschines with being a malicious accuser,—συκοφαντῶν—he very naturally introduces the present topic;—if he had done as they now propose, they would have accused him still the more, their object being nothing but to accuse. This is a common topic in constant use. Εὐβόλας καὶ Θηβῶν καὶ Βυζαντίου, but below in the reverse order, by the chiasmus. τῆς σιτοπομπίας. See §87. ληστιῶν. See §145. πονηρὸν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πονηρὸν ὁ συκοφάντης. Compare a similar form of expression in Æschines; καλὸν, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καλὸν ἢ τῶν δημοσίων γραμμάτων φυλακή. §75. τοῦτο δὲ—ἐστίν, *but this little creature is by nature a fox*. αὐτοτραγικὸς πῖθηκος, *a genuine tragic ape*. ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ—λέγεις, *as if a physician going to the sick while they were in a feeble state*—ἀσθενοῦσι μὲν the predicate of τοῦς κάμνουσιν and having its correspondence in ἐπειδὴ δέ—*should neither mention nor point out by what means they could escape the disease, but when one of them has died and the funeral rites are performing, fol-*

lowing to the tomb, should explain, if this man had done so and so, he would not have died. Fool! is it now you speak?

The present section and the last one taken together form a certain whole, though following the general course of remarks. The unity will be obvious from recalling the course of thought. Æschines had brought the impeachment in order to institute a trial of oratory. Demosthenes then sneeringly alludes to a specimen of his oratory, or rather of his sophistry, and turns it against him with great force. He next speaks, in contrast with the course of Æschines, of what the true orator would do in examining the conduct of the statesman, and gives an example of such an examination, in speaking of the disadvantages under which the Athenians labored. He concludes with setting forth the character of the party orator, and of the malicious accuser. Thus, the single idea with which he started gives tone to the whole.

The last three sentences are a fitting conclusion of this topic. The first attacks Æschines and his party as determined to find fault with whatever course might be taken; the second generalizes, as if from these instances, the character of the whole class of demagogues and sycophants; while the third turns upon Æschines individually, and ends with one of these pointed remarks, with which, at intervals, the orator is fond of winding up any important topic.

§ 244-247. BATTLE OF CHÆRONEA.

The orator having thus carefully prepared the way, proceeds to speak of the fatal battle, though without formality, and without any display of effort which might show that he was conscious of having a difficult point to meet. οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ τῇν ἡτταν, *not then, not even the defeat.* ἐν οὐδενί τῳ παρ' ἐμοί, "*nulla in re quæ in potestate mea sita fuit.*" W. DINDORF. ἐν οἷς — κατεστρέφετο, *but in what places his ambassadors were overcome by arguments, these he attacked by arms and brought under himself;* "But where his ambassadors were vanquished in argument, he came with arms and carried the day." KENNEDY. εἰς τε μαλακίαν σκώπτων, with reference to the frequent charge of cowardice

brought against him by Æschines. § 148, 152, 155, 175. *ἐνα ὅντα*, not, *that I*, but, *that he*—the same man—*being one*; for though it refers to himself, he forbears, as long as he can, to mention himself directly. *πασαν ἐξέτασιν*, *any scrutiny*, however severe. See § 5. *ιδεῖν*, *to see*, simply. *προαίσθεσθαι*, *to see and feel the importance of what is seen*. *πολιτικά = οἰκεία*, *home-bred*; *natural*. See § 234, 237. *τίσι—διφκήσατο*, *by what means Philip managed the greater part of those things which he achieved*. *τῷ δίδόναι καὶ διαφθελεῖν*, *by promises and bribes to those in power*. *τῷ διαφθαρεῖναι—Φιλίππου*, *in the matter of being bribed by money or not, I have conquered Philip*. *ὧσπερ γὰρ—τὸν ὠνούμενον*. This is not an example drawn from the buyer and seller of merchandize, but the terms so used are applied to bribery and corruption. *For as he who offers to buy—ὁ ὠνούμενος*, “*emens, hic i. q. largitionibus corrumpens*,” SCHAEFER—*has conquered him who listens to the offer*,—*τὸν λαβόντα*, corresponding to *ὁ ὠνούμενος*, the one to whom the offer is made and who entertains it—in case he buys him,—*πρὶνταί*, “*si perpulit ut acciperet*,” SCHAEFER,—*so he who neither listens nor is bought has conquered him who makes the offer*.

In explaining the arrangement of the topics, we have been compelled to refer frequently to the battle of Chæronea, and to the present passage. The orator himself, however, it hardly need be said, makes no such explanation, nor gives to it any such prominence. He has done no more than mention once or twice the fact of the battle; and the present passage formally relating to it is introduced without parade, in its natural, chronological order, and is in no respect preëminent over the adjoining passages.

The duty of the Athenian statesman in *the choice* of his measures is what the orator had hitherto dwelt upon, and in respect to which he had shown that he acted in the spirit of his country. The present topic relates to *the execution* of these measures, and here, too, he shows that he had failed in no duty which could be exacted of the statesman. This completes his defense; both in *the choice* of measures, and in *the execution* of measures, he stands acquitted of all blame.

§ 248-290. APPROVAL OF THE MEASURES OF DEMOSTHENES
BY THE PEOPLE, AFTER THE BATTLE OF CHÆRONEA.

In treating of the Amphissean war, the orator spoke first of the treachery of Æschines, by which that war was brought into Attica. With the battle of Chæronea terminates the course of measures by which Demosthenes strove in vain to deliver his country from that great calamity. One topic remains; the approval of these measures, notwithstanding the fatal issue of them, by the people of Athens. Under this head, there are three important facts which the orator brings forward; his election to several important posts connected with the defense of the city, and his acquittal in various impeachments brought against him, immediately after the battle; his appointment to pronounce the funeral oration over the slain; and the inscription placed upon their monument. These facts, however, take up but a small portion of this part of the oration; between the first and the last two, the orator interposes two other topics of a different kind; a comparison of the *Fortune* of himself and Æschines, and a reply to the charge of deceiving and misleading, by the power of eloquence. We have, then, the following topics:

I. Proceedings at Athens immediately after the battle. § 248-251.

II. Reply to the charge that he was an ill-fated man, and a comparison of his fortune with that of Æschines. § 252-275.

III. Reply to the charge of deceiving and misleading, by the power of eloquence. § 276-284.

IV. Appointment to pronounce the funeral oration over the slain. § 285-288.

V. The Inscription on the Monument erected over the slain. § 289-290.

§ 248-251. PROCEEDINGS AT ATHENS IMMEDIATELY AFTER
THE BATTLE.

εἰς τὸ δίκαιως τοιαῦτα γράφειν τούτοις. Demosthenes seems to have forgotten, or, more probably, supposes his audience to have forgotten, that he professed, at the outset of this part of his speech, to have finished his defense, and de-

clared the aim of his subsequent remarks to be, to retaliate on Æschines, not to justify Ctesiphon. See § 126, and Note. εἰδὼς καὶ ἐορακώς, "*probe sciens.*" DISSEN. ἐμβεβηκώς, "*versans in ipsis terroribus.*" SCHAEFER. Not connected with the preceding participles, because standing in a different relation to the finite verb. *Although living in the very midst of the horrors and dangers.* ἦν ἢ κ'—πρὸς ἐμὲ, *when it would not have been strange*—ἄν is omitted with ἦν, as is usual in such phrases as, αἰσχρὸν ἦν, εἰκὸς ἦν, and the like, SCHAEFER,—*if the people had been somewhat disaffected*—ἀγνομονῆσαι τι—*towards me.* σιτώνην, *a commissary for procuring grain*; an office of the greatest trust and importance. See § 87, § 241. γραφάς, εὐθύνας, εἰσαγγελίας, for the distinctions, see Introduction, p. 88, 89, 90, and § 13. κατὰ τὴν ἡμέραν ἐκαστην, *day after day.* See § 68. τοῦτο γάρ—δικαστῶν, *for this is both according to truth*—ἀληθεύς, *what facts, the reality—require—and is useful to, or, (as we should rather say), worthy of judges, who are under oath and who decide according to their oaths.* ὑπὲρ τῶν δικαστῶν, "*utile iudicibus, qui, si aliter iudicaret, sibi ipsi nocerent, quippe peierantes.*" SCHAEFER. See § 1, § 234. Here, as elsewhere, Demosthenes regards the decision of the judges as a matter of religious duty. See the Exordium, and § 126. τι, construed with ὄνομα. τὸν δῆμον, τοὺς δικαστάς, τὴν ἀλήθειαν, correspond to the different kinds of trial, since the εἰσαγγελία was tried before the people, the παρανόμων γραφή before the judges, and the εὐθύνη, before the logistæ, where the question was a matter of fact; hence, ἡ ἀλήθεια must mean, not truth in the abstract, but the reality, or as we should say, *facts.* *Was it not that which he saw the people giving—not that, the Judges on oath—not that, Facts confirming before all.* We naturally expect the sentence to end with ἀλήθειαν, τιθεμένην being supplied, instead of which we have the fuller ending, παρὰ πᾶσι βεβαιούσαν. Ναί, φησὶν—καλόν, *true, § 250. he says, but the lot of Cephalus was honorable,*—καλὸν being the predicate of τὸ τοῦ Κεφάλου; "*quod Cephalo contigit pulchrum est.*" SCHAEFER. See Æschines, § 194. καὶ ἢ Δι' εὐδαιμόν γε, *and, by Jupiter, a happy one, at least, if no more;*—καὶ expresses the rapidity of the retort, while γε, as if an afterthought, limits the assertion to the single

thing, that it was a *happy* lot. τὸ τοῦ Κεφαλῶλου καλόν, *the honorable lot of Cephalus*,—καλόν being the predicate attribute of τὸ τοῦ Κεφαλῶλου, as it was the adjective predicate before. ἐγράψατο, ἐδίωξε, refer, according to Reiske, the former to bringing, the latter to trying, the suit. But Schaefer makes no distinction, considering them as only another instance of the orator's love of pleonasm. μηδέν, "Significantissimum h. l. μηδέν: ne putes valere idem quod οὐδέν. Hoc vult orator: etiamsi forte sim deterior Cephalo civis, tamen tu quidem tali usus argumento confiteris me nihilo deteriore illo civem esse. Tot verbis opus est ad explicandum quod Græcorum mirabile idioma solo negatarum discrimine significat." SCHAEFER.

The present passage is a fine example of a Condensed Statement of Facts. It differs from the Argumentative Narrative, in which the conviction produced depends upon combination, whereas, in the present case, it depends upon accumulation. In the former, the individual facts may be unimportant, but yet contribute to an important result; in the latter, the individual facts are all weighty, but by being closely compacted acquire a greater momentum.

§ 252-275. A COMPARISON OF THE FORTUNES OF HIMSELF AND ÆSCHINES.

Æschines had represented Demosthenes as the Evil Genius of Greece—"τὸν τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀλιτρίον"—involving every body in destruction with whom he had any connection;—one of those ill-fated men, according to the notion of the Greeks—destined of the gods to destroy themselves, and involve others in the same destruction. The connection of this topic with what immediately precedes is obvious. Having shown that the defeat did not happen from any thing within his sphere of action, the orator proceeds to show farther that it was not brought about by his evil Fate.

ὁλως μέν has its opposite in ἐπειδὴ δ', the contrast being between Demosthenes and Æschines. προφέρει, "i. q. ὀνειδίζει." SCHAEFER. χρηταί τῷ λόγῳ. See § 233. ἡ νῦν ἐπέχει, *which now prevails*; with reference to the victories of Alexander. τὸ μὲν τοίνυν—πράττειν. Observe

§ 254. how the orator condenses in this sentence the great principles of his defense; the choice of what is honorable, resulting, however, in what is useful. ἀξιῶ, "arbitror." SCHAEFER. ὑμῖν, that is, δοκεῖν. κυριωτέρων, *has gotten the mastery over*, πάντως, *at any rate*, § 256, like πᾶσαν in § 246. ψυχρότητα, "*folly*," Lord BROUGHAM; but "*bad taste*;" KENNEDY. πενίαν προπηλακίζει, *sneers at poverty*. ἐκ τῶν ἐνόντων, *under the circumstances*.

§ 257. ἐμοὶ μὲν, repeated below, ἐγὼ μὲν, and having its correspondence in ἐξελοῦντι δέ, and ἐπειδὴ δέ. εἰσφέρειν, "*notum est dici, de tributo extraordinario ad belli necessitates*." DISSEN. καλὰ γ', *honorable at least*, however disastrous the result. Demosthenes never forgets his leading distinctions. οἰκέτου τάξιν—ἔχων, *holding the post of a servant, not of a gentleman's son*. τῇ μητρὶ—συνεσσεωροῦ, *you recited to your mother while she was performing the rites of initiation*—τελούσῃ—the formularies—τοὺς βίβλους, "*carmina initiationum*," SCHAEFER,—and got ready the other impostures,—συνεσκευοῦ, "*ceteras imposturas*." DISSEN. Compare περὶ παραπ. § 221, § 279. νεβρίζων, *putting on the fawn skins*; that is, on the initiated, the reason for which Reiske thus explains; "*nam deponendæ ipsis erant suæ vestes, quo nudi baptizarentur*." κρατερίζων, "*bibendum dabat iis vinum e cratere sacro*." DISSEN. καθάλαργων, a general term, including the several rites of the lustration, some of which the orator specifies; *purifying*. ἀπομάττων—πιτύροις, *rubbing them down with clay and bran*. One part of the lustration was to besmear the body with clay,—περιμάττειν—and then to wipe it clean with bran—ἀπομάττειν. Reiske thus explains: "*Loti fricabantur creta, ochra, argilla, et furfuribus, quæ sunt res abstergendis sordibus oleosis, sudori, squalori, seu squamis cutis perquam accommodatæ. Saponem illi veteres ignorabant aut rarius eo utebantur*." ἀνιστάς, *causing them to rise*. "*Sedebant humi, qui se expiandos præbebant sicut poenitentes et lugentes. Nunc finita tota re surgere jubentur*." DISSEN. ἔφύγον κακόν, εὔγον ἄμεινον, a form of words expressive of gratitude, pronounced by the initiated, after their leader. φθέγγεσθα οὕτω μέγα. Demosthenes frequently refers to the loud voice

of Æschines, as something on which he prided himself. Thus, in the *περὶ παραπρεσβείας*, he asks, "who of all in the city can speak the loudest and utter what he likes in the clearest tone? Æschines." § 228. See, also, below, § 285, § 313. *θιάσους*. See *περὶ παραπ.* § 322. *τοὺς παρείας*, a noun in the accusative plural from *παρείας*, used as an adjective; *copper-colored snakes*; "est genus serpentinum ingentibus maxillis." DISSEN. *ὁ ἦς ἄττης*. Dissen supposes these words to be the refrain or chorus of a mystic hymn, and to be put for the whole hymn. "Hoc carmen saltabat Æschines, motu et gestibus liberioribus, orgiasticis imitans verba et sententias dum canerentur," DISSEN, *dancing Hyes Attes, Attes Hyes*. *ἑξαρχος*, *leader of the singers*, the Coryphaeus. *πρωηγέμων*, *leader of the dancers*; "utpote qui thiasos ducerent." DISSEN. *κιστοφόρος*, *the chest-bearer*; "qui cistam sacram portaret qua reconditæ res mysticæ." DISSEN. *λικνοφόρος*, "*fan-bearer*." KENNEDY. *λκνον*, "a fan-shaped basket, carried on the head at the feast of Bacchus, containing the sacrificial utensils and the first fruits; Virgil's "*Mystica vannus Iacchi*," LIDDELL and SCOTT. *ὥς ἀληθῶς*. See § 85 and Note. *γραμματεῦειν*, *to be an Assembly-clerk*; an office held in contempt. See *περὶ παραπ.* § 222, where the word is *ὑπογραμματεύοντα*, with the same meaning. *τοῖς ἀρχιδλοῖς*, "*petty magistrates*," KENNEDY; a meaning not in Passow, or Liddell and Scott. *βαρυστόνοις*, *deep-groaning*; "sic dicti, opinor, quod in partibus suis agendis inepte et contra naturam *ὑπερπαθόντες* spectatoribus risum moverunt." SCHAEFER. *ὁπωρὼν ης*. Dissen and Schaefer subjoin *ἐκείνος*, making the reference to a particular individual, but, besides the want of sufficient manuscript authority, such a reference itself would hardly be expected from our orator. *λαμβάνων*, in most editions is followed by *τραύματα*, which is rejected by Dindorf on the authority of Codex S. The present text has been translated thus: "*plus inde lucri faciens quam ex certaminibus, seu potius pro vita veris pugnis*." DOBREE. That is, the players made more out of the figs and grapes and olives with which they were pelted than from their playing, in which they carried on a constant contest with the audience. *ἦν γὰρ—πὸ λεμὸς*. This fine and forcible sentence,—nothing more forcible could be said of the most important war—adds much to the picture, making it almost

humorous:—*a war without a truce, and which admitted of no herald.* δειλούς, with reference to the charge of cowardice so frequently brought against him by Æschines. Æschines, § 148, 152, 155, 175. τοῦ τρόπου, the objective genitive. ἐπῆλθέ σοι, *it came into your head.* εὐχερῶς, *recklessly.*

§ 265. Ἐξέτασον. We recall the course of thought. Demosthenes first spoke of himself, though briefly, passing from boyhood to manhood, and then of Æschines, but at length, tracing the successive steps of his life till he became a public man. In both cases, he excuses himself from saying more—of himself, lest he might offend by seeming to boast, but of Æschines, because there were things which it would be disgraceful for him even to mention. He now sums up the whole topic in a parallel between Æschines and himself, in which the contrast is brought down to the present trial. The parallel, therefore, must be interpreted with this in view. βεβιωμένα. See § 130. γράμματα, the A, B, C's, § 129. ἐφοίτων, that is, to respectable schools, § 257. ἐτέλεις, that is, into the mysteries just described, § 259. ἐτελούμεν, that is, into the Eleusinian mysteries. ἐχόρευες, with reference to ἐπορχούμενος ὅς τις ἄντης, above. ἐχορήγουν, *I furnished a chorus*; an honorable one. See § 257. But, notwithstanding the peculiarly emphatic contrast in the above words, it seems better to render them without the circumlocution which would be necessary to express it. *You taught letters, but I went to school; you initiated, but I was initiated; you danced in a chorus, but I furnished a chorus; you was a clerk in the Assembly, but I, a speaker; you acted third parts, but I was a spectator; you was hissed off, but I hissed; you managed every thing for the enemy, but I, for the country.* ἐξέπιπτες. This is more fully expressed in the περὶ παραπρεσβείας. *You drove him off and hissed him from the stage, and only did not stone him to death, so that at last he gave up acting third parts.* § 389.—Milton has professedly imitated this parallel. In reply to the charge of frequenting play-houses, founded on certain play-house expressions in his writings, he says: "But since there is such necessity to the hearing of a tire, a periwig, or a vizard, that plays must have been seen, what difficulty was there in that? when, in the colleges, so many of the young divines, and those in next aptitude to divinity, have

been so often upon the stage, writhing and unbonying their clergy limbs to all the antic and dishonest gestures of trinculoes, buffoons and bawds, prostituting the shame of that ministry which either they had or were nigh having to the eyes of courtiers, and court-ladies with their grooms and mademoiselles. There while they acted and overacted, among other young scholars I was a spectator; they thought themselves gallant men, and I thought them fools; they made sport, and I laughed; they mispronounced, and I misliked; and to make up the atticism, they were out, and I hissed." Apology for Smectymnus. ἀλλὰ νυνὶ—τῷ ν ψήφω ν, *but now to-day I—ἐγὼ μὲν* contrasted with σοὶ δέ—*am on trial as to whether I deserve to be crowned, and am admitted to have done no wrong whatever, while you of necessity on the one hand—συννοφάντη μὲν* having its correspondence in *κινδυνεύεις δέ—must be regarded as a malicious accuser, and on the other, run the risk, whether it must needs be that you should still carry on this business, or be now stopped by not getting the fifth part of the votes.* With respect to this contrast of their respective situations on the trial, the point is this: Demosthenes is acknowledged to have done no wrong, the only question being whether what he has done deserves a crown; Æschines is known as a malicious accuser, the only question, or rather the risk which he runs—being whether he shall continue in that business, or be stopped in it.

§ 267. ἀναγνῶ, *let me read*, the first person being used to correspond to καὶ σὺ, although the orator reads it only as causing it to be read, as is manifest from λέγε below. ἐλευμαίνου, *which you murdered.* ἦ καὶ—πύλας. *I came, "the mansions of the dead, and the gates of darkness," leaving—λίπών,* from a verse not quoted. Eurip. Hecuba. 1. κακαγγελεῖν—με, "*hic quoque Euripidis Sophoclisve ex tragedia perdita versus est.*" W. DINDORF. κοινοῦς, *kind.* οὐδέ ν, "*scilicet, εἴποιμι.*" REISKE. προαχθήσομαι, "*scilicet, ποιῆν.*" DISSSEN.

Demosthenes having spoken of the fortune of Æschines and of himself, both as private and as public men, proceeds to speak of the prevalent fortune of all men and nations, in order to show, on the one hand, the true cause of the common calamities, and, on the other, the unfairness of Æschines in charging him with being the cause.

§ 270. ἀπαλλαγείς, *having escaped*; as if from something unpleasant. Compare ἀπαλλαγῇ, § 145. ὑπὸ τοῦτον τὸν ἥλιον, *under this sun*, the world of the Greeks; like the English, "*under the sun*." φορὰν τινα πραγμάτων, "*a certain force of circumstances*." Lord BROUGHAM. τὸν παρὰ τοῦτοις πεπολιτευμένον, *charge me with being the cause, who conducted public affairs among these*; that is, *only* among these, whereas the suffering had been extended to persons, who had never seen or heard him. καὶ ταῦτ' εἰδώς. The orator introduces here another topic, that in making such a charge, Æschines really brought an accusation against all the Athenians, and not least against himself. Demosthenes returns now to a favorite topic, already several times used, that Æschines should have given better counsels, if he had any, at the time measures were to be decided upon, not now find fault. §§ 188, 189, 196. οὐ γὰρ—τιμῶν, *for not out of good-will at least did you relinquish to me hopes, glory and honors*. ἐλπίδων, "*spes laudis et præmiorum*." DISSEN. παρὰ μὲν τοίνυν τοῖς ἄλλοις. The comparison is between all other men and Æschines—*Αἰσχίνης τοίνυν*—though not formally carried out; hence, the corresponding particle δέ is not used. ἀδικεῖ τις ἐκόν. See, for this form of the sentence, § 117, 198. ἐν τοῖς νομίμοις, "*in scriptis legibus*." DISSEN. τοῖς ἀγράφοις. Lord Brougham refers to Cicero's well-known—"non enim scripta sed nata lex;" ὥστε—κατηγορεῖ, *so that even what he enumerates as MISFORTUNES, even these he imputes to me AS CRIMES—"as crimes,"* implied in κατηγορεῖ, and necessary, to make out the antithesis. Lord BROUGHAM.

Lord Brougham remarks that "the whole passage upon Fortune seems inferior to the general style of Demosthenes." But, certainly in respect to style, no part of the oration is more carefully elaborated; few passages, indeed, are equal to the description of the rites of initiation, or to the parallel between the lives of the two orators. With respect to the topic itself, doubtless it would never be formally introduced into a modern speech, yet Demosthenes had sufficient reasons for entering upon it. The sentiments were in accordance with the popular opinions of the age, and it is not unlikely that it was necessary to remove

the effect of the charge of being an ill-fated man. Besides there were several incidental advantages in the topic.

1. It enabled the orator to set forth the common fortunes of all men in that age as hard and severe, and thus to fortify his position, that the battle had been lost by the decree of Fortune.

2. In drawing the comparison between himself and Æschines, he was enabled to repeat several of the more important points of his defense, without the appearance of repetition; such as, that, "his enemies even could not say that the policy which he had adopted was not at least *honorable*;"—or, that "Æschines grew bold and cheerful, just in proportion as the country suffered adversity."

3. It also enabled him, without offense, to conciliate the good-will of the audience, and at the same time to depreciate his opponent.

§ 276–284. REPLY TO THE CHARGE OF DECEIVING BY THE POWER OF ELOQUENCE.

Demosthenes has shown that the ill-success of his Theban policy was not attributable to any thing within his sphere of action, nor to his evil fate; *to all appearance* has shown it. But yet, the judges, if they trust to Æschines, may think it an appearance only, produced by the magic of oratory. That impression, the orator would remove; hence, the present topic, which, like the preceding, is opened abruptly, without a transition sentence. $\delta\epsilon\iota\upsilon\acute{o}\nu$, an adjective, used as a substantive, to which the abstract $\delta\epsilon\iota\nu\acute{o}\tau\eta\tau\alpha$ below corresponds; *calling me an artful speaker, and juggler, and sophist, and the like.* Æschines, § 16, 207. $\acute{\omega}\varsigma\ \epsilon\acute{\alpha}\nu$ — $\epsilon\chi\omicron\nu\tau\alpha$, as though, if one should be the first to say of another what belongs to himself, that even now,—or, at once—becomes so;— $\kappa\alpha\iota\ \delta\eta$, "*protinus.*" SCHAEFER. "Nam $\kappa\alpha\iota\ \delta\eta$ apud Atticos prope idem est, quod $\eta\delta\eta$." HERM. ad VIG. p. 827. For the construction of $\acute{\omega}\varsigma$ with the participle, see KÜHNER Gr. § 312, 6, d. Also, § 122. $\kappa\alpha\iota\tau\omicron\iota\epsilon\gamma\omega\gamma'$ — $\phi\theta\omicron\nu\sigma\iota\nu$, although I perceive that those who hear are for the most part masters of the power of those who speak;—the audience controls the speaker, not the speaker, the audience—for according as you receive and favor each speaker, is he thought to be skillful. In the $\pi\epsilon\pi\lambda\eta\gamma\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\varsigma$ the orator

states the same truth negatively: *other powers are tolerably independent, but that of speaking is reduced to nothing when you who hear are unfavorable.* § 393.—According to modern notions, it is paradoxical to say that the audience is master of the power, natural or acquired, of the speaker; but with the Greek, power in oratory is only power so far as it is successful, and success depends mainly upon the character which the orator bears among those whom he addresses. Aristotle, in his Rhetoric, dwells upon the reputation of the speaker for good sense, good will, and integrity, as affecting his power over his hearers. So, also, Whately. But this short parenthesis gives the substance of all that has been since said by Rhetorical writers: *παρ' ἐμοί.* See § 110, 233. *ἐξετάζου ἐν ἡν. ἐξετάζεσθαι, to be tested; hence, as a result of such trial, to be shown to be so and so; and, hence, to appear to be, or simply, to be, so and so. Manifested.* *εἴ τις ἐλύπησέ τι.* See below, § 307. *εἰ δ' ἄρ'—ἔχειν, but if perchance there is a necessity, to have them mildly and moderately disposed.* *ἐν οἷς—τῷ δὲ ἡμῶ, in those things in which some all-important matter of the commonwealth is at stake, and in which the people are contending against their enemies.* *πρὸς τοὺς ἐναντίους ἐστὶ τῷ δὲ ἡμῶ.* Some manuscripts and editions have *ἐστὶ τι*, but *τι* is also omitted by Dissen, and Voemel; “*et ubi adversus adversarios res est populo.*” DISSEN. But Kennedy, “*and he, (the orator) is opposed to the adversaries of the people.*” *ταῦτα γὰρ—πολίτου, for these things call for the noble and good citizen; it is theirs to direct them.* Compare § 190. *μηδενὸς δὲ ἀδικήματος—ἔχει κακίαν.* This section contains the same topics as are dwelt upon, more at length in § 12–16. See especially § 15, 16. *πᾶσαν κακίαν, all possible wickedness.* Compare *πᾶσαν ἐξέτασιν*, § 246. *καὶ μοι δοκεῖς—τιμωρίαν.* For same topic, see § 226. *λόγων; φωνασκίας.* These are distinct things; *eloquence and elocution.* “*Duas res Æschines dicitur ostentare voluisse, orandi facultatem et vocis sonorem. Docent quæ sequuntur.*” SCHAEFER. *ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς, “scilicet ἀγκύρας.”* DISSEN. A proverbial expression, sometimes found without the ellipsis. Herod. 7, 188. “*Does not anchor in the same roadstead:—*” LORD BROUGHAM; “*rides not on the same anchorage.*” KENNEDY. These translations give the thought, but with a slight change of the figure;

he is not held—moored—by the same anchor. ἐγώ, “scilicet, eadem nitor anchora.” REISKE. ἑξ αἰρεσιον οὐδ’ ἰδιον, *nothing separate—from the public,—nor personal.* “*I have no interests separate and distinct.*” KENNEDY.

The triumph of oratorical art would be for the orator, at the time of speaking, to be himself unconscious of being an orator, and to be unthought of as such by his audience. Whatever is attributed to art is so much detracted from the impression which should be made, not only as putting the hearer in a critical state of mind, so that he listens as a judge of what the orator is, not of what he says, but, also, as leading him to fear being misled by false reasoning and artful appeal. Hence, the frequent charge, on the one hand, and disclaimer, on the other, of being an orator. Never was there a more felicitous reply to such a charge; never a more dextrous use of the opportunity afforded by such a charge. The parallel between himself and *Æschines* as to the ends for which they had respectively employed their power, besides being most admirable in itself, enables him in an easy and natural way, to repeat his leading topics. Upon the frequent repetition of topics in this part of his speech, Lord Brougham remarks: “Here is the same leading topic once more introduced; but introduced after new topics and fresh illustrations. The repetitions, the enforcement again and again of the same points, are a distinguishing feature of *Demosthenes*, and formed also one of the characteristics of Mr. Fox’s great eloquence. The ancient, however, was incomparably more felicitous in this than the modern; for in the latter it often arose from carelessness, from ill-arranged discourse, from want of giving due attention, and from having once or twice attempted the topic and forgotten it, or perhaps from having failed to produce the desired effect. Now in *Demosthenes* this is never the case: The early allusions to the subject of the repetition are always perfect in themselves, and would sufficiently have enforced the topic, had they stood alone. But new matter afterwards handled gave the topic new force and fresh illustration, by presenting the point in a new light.”

§ 285–288. APPOINTMENT OF DEMOSTHENES TO PRONOUNCE
THE FUNERAL ORATION OVER THE SLAIN.

ἔτ' ἄμεινον, *still the more*. ἐν οἷς, *when*. ἄδεια, *security in speaking what they thought*. “Vacuitas metus ab iis quæ cogitat, etiamsi libere eloquatur.” SCHAEFER. ὑπολαμβάνοντες—with this text, the sentence is unfinished. Dissen has the finite verb ὑπελάμβανον. παρ' ἐμοί. See above, § 277. ἐπὶ τὰς ταφάς = ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν τάφων παρασκευήν: WESTERMANN; *over the burial*. ὥς, “referendum ad superlativum.” SCHAEFER. ἕκαστος ἐκάστω, *each survivor to each of the dead*.

The present topic furnished the orator with an opportunity to draw another parallel between himself and Æschines, but on another point;—having reference to the feelings with which each regarded his country and its citizens; Demosthenes, rejoicing in her prosperity and sympathizing with the people in their adversity,—Æschines, sad in her prosperity and exulting in her adversity. This point, the orator enforces again and again henceforth to the end.

§ 289–290. THE INSCRIPTION.

δημοσίου, *at the public expense*. ἐπιγράψαι. “Inscribebantur talia στήλῃ in sepulchro positæ.” DISSEN. The ashes of those who fell in battle were burned in the Ceramicus, and Pausanias mentions having seen in the suburbs of the city the monument which was placed over those who fell at Chæro-neæ. 1, 19, 11. By whom the inscription was written is not known. λήματος. The reading of the manuscripts, δειματος, *fear*, is corrupt, for which the conjecture of Valckenær, adopted in the text, seems to be the best substitute. λήματος as well as ἀρετῆς is construed with βραβῆ. *And fighting they spared not life, but made death the common rewarder of bravery and valor*—common, says Dissen, because all were worthy of rewards—for the sake of the Greeks. ἡδε κρείσσις, which follows. ἐν βιοτῇ—ἐπορεν, *but in life*—that is, of men, in contrast with θεῶν, or expressing the abstract in the concrete form, *among men—to flee from fate the Deity permits not*—οὐ τι ἐπορεν, that is, ὁ θεός. ἀνέθηκε, that is, τὸ ἐπιγράμμα.

§ 291-324. CONCLUSION.

The honors paid to the slain fitly conclude the fatal drama of the last sacred war. The orator has gone through it with all the skill of consummate art, and has made out for himself a perfect defense. With this terminates, also, the course of his entire defense; and from this point he begins to draw towards the end of his speech. What remains is, for the most part, a repetition, under the form of refutation, of the principal topics of his defense. There is a definite course of thought, the topics of which may be arranged as follows:

I. The feelings exhibited by Æschines at the calamities of his country. § 291-293.

II. The betrayal of the freedom of Greece. § 294-296.

III. The course of Demosthenes against the traitors. § 297-305.

IV. Coöperation of Æschines with them. § 306-313.

V. A comparison of himself and Æschines, with reference to the great men of former times. § 314-320.

VI. The feelings exhibited by Æschines and Demosthenes towards their country. § 321-323.

VII. Peroration.

§ 291-293. THE FEELINGS EXHIBITED BY ÆSCHINES AT THE CALAMITIES OF HIS COUNTRY.—*πολιτης*, “subaudi *ἔχοι*.” SCHAEFER. *ἔσχε τὴν γνώμην*, he expressed no sentiments. *ἐπάρσας τὴν φωνήν*. How subtle the discrimination, which detects the false patriot in the tones of his voice, and how fine the turn which is thus given to the charges which Æschines had brought against him. *τοῖς γεγενημένοις — τοῖς ἄλλοις*. For a similar topic, see § 217. *τὸν τῶν νόμων — φροντίζειν*. Æschines, from the conservative point of view which he assumed, had dwelt much upon the ancient laws and constitution of the government. *ταῦτά λυπεῖσθαι — τοῖς πολλοῖς*. For a similar topic, see § 280. *τῶν κοινῶν*, public measures. *πράγματα*, difficulties, Demosthenes using the milder word, but Æschines the stronger *ἀτυχήματα*. See Æschines, § 57. *πραττομένην*. For this position of the participle, see § 98, 126, 314. *δι’ ἐμὲ — δεδόκατε*. Compare § 206. *ἐνεκα τῆς πρὸς ἐμὲ ἔχθρας*. See § 279, and compare § 125.

§ 294–296. THE TRAITORS WHO BETRAYED GREECE.—The orator passes from Æschines to the whole body of traitors who coöperated in betraying Greece. This topic is introduced under the guise of a reply to the charge of philippizing which Æschines had brought against him.

φιλιππισμόν. In speaking of the First peace, Æschines charges Demosthenes with being a flatterer of Philip, § 61. ὡς ἀληθῶς, *really*. See § 85. τοὺς ὑπάρχοντας, “*cives sue factionis, scilicet, clientelæ*,” SCHAEFER, *each their own partizans*. For this meaning of—*belonging to or being friendly to*—in ὑπάρχοντας, see § 174. ἡ κρωτηρίασμένοι, “*mutilating*.” LORD BROUGHAM. προπεπωκότες, “*toasting away*.” LORD BROUGHAM. We have had several descriptions of the traitors before—see especially § 46–49—but this is the finest of all. Nothing can be added, nothing taken away; the whole intense indignation of his soul is poured out in these few terrible epithets.

§ 291–306. CONDUCT OF DEMOSTHENES AGAINST THESE TRAITORS.—ἀναίτιος, *guiltless*; “*carens culpa*.” SCHAEFER. εἰτά μ’ ἐρωτᾷς. See Æschines, § 236. ἐγὼ δὲ. δὲ expresses the assurance with which the orator speaks; *to be sure I say to thee*; I do not hesitate to say. ὅσα—συμβεβούλησιν, *nor in whatever counsel I at any time gave to these, did I give the counsel like you, as if in a scale, inclining to the side of interest*. ῥέπων ἐπὶ τὸ λῆμμα, “*inclinans ad lucrum*.” DISSEN. For the same figure, see περὶ εἰρήνης, § 60. διέσσυρες. See Æschines, § 236. οὐ λίθοις. See Æschines, § 84. οὐδ’ ἐπὶ τούτοις—φρονῶ, *nor, of my measures—τῶν ἐμαιοῦ—am I the most proud—μέγιστον φρονῶ—of these*. BUTTMANN Gr. § 147, p. 417. τῶν ἐμαιοῦ construed with μέγιστον. τοὺς ἀμυνομένους, “*nempe præsens participii cum articulo est pro substantivo*,” DISSEN; *and many troops for the defense of these—the Athenians*.

§ 301–305. The orator having spoken of the general aim of his measures, now proceeds to particulars. We find a similar topic in § 240–241, and § 230–231. τοὺς ὁμόρους ταύτη. “*Putæ Megarenses, Corinthios, Achæos*.” DISSEN. φιλίαν, supply χώραν, *along a friendly region to the Piræus*. τὰ δ’ ὅπως—περᾶξαι, *to manage the others, that they may become friendly and allied*. παραθεύτα, “*per negligentiam*.” SCHAEFER. προσθέντα, “*per proditorem*.” SCHAEFER. στρατηγῶν,

without the article, and hence spoken of only a portion of the commanders. ἡ πάντα—ἀνέτριψαν, *or all these weakened the chief interests of the republic*—τὰ δὲλα = *summa reipublicæ*, SCHAEFER—*till they worked destruction*.

§ 306–313. COÖPERATION OF ÆSCHINES WITH THE TRAITORS. —ὁ πῆρξεν. ἄν omitted, as also with προσῆν. See § 248, Note. ὥς ἐτέρως. See § 85. μένειν depends upon ὑποσ-
τάντα. ἡ συχία. See Æschines, § 216. τὰν θρόπιναν, includes, besides the idea of belonging to man, the idea of frailty; and *many are human casualties*. σαρῶς καὶ ἀπ-
νευστι, *in a clear tone, and without pauses*: a picturesque description of one who speaks without feeling, as if from mem-
ory, something in which he has no earnest interest. ἐν τοῖς
ἄνω χρόνοις, in the earlier period of the republic, con-
trasted with ὁ παρελθὼν χρόνος, the times just preceding. ἐξέ-
τασις, *a trial*: these things were the tests of public men.
ἀποδείξεις, *opportunities*; that is, of showing what he was.
ἐν οἷς, “scilicet, ἀνδράσι καλοῖς καὶ κακοῖς, id quod e proximo
ἀνδρὶ καλῷ τε καὶ κατῷ tacite excipiendum.” REISKE. οὐκ οὖν
—ἡ ὑξάνετω, *not, at least in any of those things by which
the country was benefitted*. “Inest his verbis sarcasmus satis
amarus. Hoc enim orator vult: certe virtus tua civica nihil quid-
quam contulit ad eas res, quibus civitas augetur.” SCHAEFER.
τίς γὰρ συμμαχία. For a similar sentence, see the περὶ
παραπ. § 323. τίς—χρημάτων, *what pecuniary aid of a
political and public character from you to the rich or the poor?*—
such as was furnished by Demosthenes’ Trierarchy law. “πολι-
τικὴ καὶ κοινὴ junguntur ut affinis voces sensus; nam quæ κοινὰ
sunt, sunt eadem πολιτικά.” SCHAEFER. ἐπεδίδοσαν, after
the battle of Chæronea. εἰς τὴν ἐπιτιμίαν, *for his civil
rights*; that is, for their recovery. παρῆλθε. “Magna vis
est in verbo παρῆλθε. Æschines ὁ πρότερον πολλάκις φθέγγασ-
θαι.” SCHAEFER. ὅς γε—πεντεταλάντων, *who at least
inherited from the estate of your kinsman Philo more than five
talents*. SCHAEFER. ἔρانون. “The support which private
individuals procured by means of a particular agreement which
they made by entering into a society (ἔρανος) differed from pub-
lic maintenance. The society itself and the money subscribed

was called *ἐρανος*, the members *ἐραμισται*, their whole number, the community of *ἐραμισται*, (*τὸ κοινὸν τῶν ἐραμιστῶν*), and their president, *ἐρανόρχης*. Their objects were of the most various description; if some friends wanted to provide a dinner, or a corporation to celebrate a solemnity, to give a banquet, or to forward any particular purpose by bribery, the expense was defrayed by an *ἐρανος*." Böeckh, *Pub. Econ. of Athens*, Bk. II, Ch. xvii, p. 245. *ἐρανον δωρεάν*, a club-gift. *ἐλυμήνω*. It would seem from this that Æschines was bribed to procure the abrogation of Demosthenes' law of the Trierarchy. *ἵνα μή* — *ἐκ κροῦσω*, that speaking word after word—passing from topic to topic—I may not carry myself away from the present topic. *νεανίας*, an adjective; active.

§ 314–320. A COMPARISON OF HIMSELF AND ÆSCHINES WITH REFERENCE TO THE GREAT MEN OF FORMER TIMES.

The most powerful passages in the speech of Æschines were those in which he brought forward the ancient heroes of Greece, Solon, Aristides, Themistocles, Miltiades, and placed them in contrast with Demosthenes. Demosthenes, however, turns this very topic greatly to his own advantage. Under cover of it he refers to these heroes, and thus is enabled to say, without offense, that at least in spirit and purpose, he had aimed at the same things with them. It was in appealing to these ancient heroes on this point, that he reached the climax of his speech, in the Oath; but it was too important a topic not to be introduced into his concluding address; and here it comes in very appropriately. The orator had stated his own policy with regard to the conspiracy against the freedom of Greece, and contrasted it with the policy of Æschines. He now refers naturally to the great men of ancient times, and shows that his policy aimed at the same things with theirs, while that of Æschines accorded with the policy of those who opposed those ancient heroes.

προλαβόντα, taking advantage of; or, turning to his own account. *κρίνωμαι καὶ θεωρῶμαι*; am I to be judged and scrutinized? *ἐπὶ τὸν παρόντα βίον*, "in *præsentem ætatem*." DISSEN. *κατ' ἐκείνους*, in those times. *διέσυσπον μὲν, τοὺς δέ*. "Adverte sedem harum

particularum. Hæ enim particulæ duo periodi membra haud raro ita jungunt, ut qui notionum ordo in priori membro fuit in posteriori convertatur. Sic ordine notionum converso hic ad se referuntur διέσυγον et ἐπῆρουν, τοὺς ὄντας τότε et τοὺς πρότερον γεγενημένους." SCHAEFER. See, also, § 163. μηδὲν ἄλλ', *nothing else*, that is, than ὃ χρησιτέ. τοὺς καθ' αὐτόν, *those of the same age*; the orator and his contemporaries. ὅσπερ τὰ ἅλλα πάντα, "Scilicet ἐξετάζειν σε δεῖ." SCHAEFER. See § 171, Note, for the neuter. οὐδὲν αἰξίσταμαι, *I shrink from none*; "comparationem cum nemine defugio," SCHAEFER. ὅν — ἐφαινόμην, *of whom, when it was in the power of the state to choose the best course, love of country being proposed to all in common as the object of rivalry, I appeared proposing that which prevailed.* κράτιστα, "scilicet, quæ præferebantur cæteris et victoriam reportabant, aliorum sentiis et rogationibus postpositis." DISSEN. ἐξέτασις, see § 310. ἐν τάξει — ἱπποτρόφος, *in a position of distinction — τάξις, a position*, but here used emphatically of a distinguished position: "*eine ansehnliche Stelle*," PABST.—and a great and splendid keeper of race-horses. ἱπποτρόφος. Men of ambition and high rank were accustomed to train horses for the games and races, and among the young men there arose an excessive passion for horses, which is spoken of by many ancient writers. Bœckh. Pub. Econ. of Athens, Bk. I. Ch. xiv, p. 74. "*Became flourishing, and wealthy, and attended with equipages.*" Lord BROUGHAM.

§ 321–323. THE FEELINGS MANIFESTED BY ÆSCHINES AND DEMOSTHENES TOWARD THEIR COUNTRY.

Having thus completed the general subject of the conspiracy against the Freedom of Greece, together with his own opposition, and Æschines' support of it, and having compared their conduct respectively with that of the great men of former times, he returns to the topic with which in § 291–293, he commenced this part of the oration;—the feelings exhibited by himself and Æschines towards their country.

δύο δ' — ἐβνοίαν, *these two things, Athenians, it becomes the citizen of naturally ordinary worth, to have—for to speak thus—οὕτω*, "quod dico me πολίτην φύσει μέτριον," SCHAEFER—

will be the least invidious for me in referring to myself,—see § 10,—on the one hand, in emergencies,—“Sunt ἐξουσίαι opportuna momenta, ubi liceat τὰ πρωτεῖα persecui, quemadmodum supra dicit οἷς μὲν τῇ πόλει τὰ βέλτιστα ἐλέσθαι παρῆν,” DISSEN, —to maintain the CHOICE of that which gives honor and the first rank to the state, but on every occasion and in every action, goodwill; for of this latter—maintaining goodwill—nature is mistress, but of power and superiority, other things; that is, fortune, or faults of generals, or corruption of traitors, as Demosthenes enumerates in § 303. Lord Brougham remarks that “it does not very distinctly appear that Demosthenes enumerates two qualities.” The first quality is that hereditary spirit of independence, that regard for “glory, ancestry, and posterity,” which, as the orator had before said, § 199, would lead to the choice of what is honorable, even in the certainty of defeat. The second is, that natural kindness, which manifests itself in love to the citizens as individuals. The orator contrasts emergencies—ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις—with the routine of ordinary life—ἐν παντί δὲ καιρῷ,—and lays down the principle of duty in each, with the reason of it. In all cases, the citizen should maintain goodwill, for nature is mistress of this; in emergencies, the choice of what is honorable—the choice, for of the successful results of his choice, other things are arbiters. The clause τοῦ δύνασθαι—ἐτεροα gives the reason for the use of the expression, τὴν προαιρεσιν διαφυλάττειν instead of δύνασθαι καὶ ἰσχύειν. ταύτην, that is, εὐνοίαν. ἐξαίτου μένος, “ab Alexandro post eversas Thebas.” DISSEN. ἐπαγόντων, spoken of Æschines and his party. ἐτέρων, the Macedonians. ἐκεῖσε, Macedonia. φασὶ δεῖν τηρεῖν. See § 89.

§ 324. PERORATION.

The orator ends as he began, with a prayer. ἐξώλεις καὶ προώλεις, “est solennis formula imprecantium diras, v. p. 395.” SCHAEFER; utterly destroyed,



TOPICS FOR EXAMINATION SELECTED FROM 'THE ANNOTATIONS.

1. Give the structure of the sentence, § 1-2 ; also of its clauses.

2. Repeat the remarks made upon the *matter* of the sentence apart from its form.

✓ 3. Character of the exordium.

✓ 4. Give the contents of the First Part of the oration, and point out the skill of the orator in making this division.

5. In ἀναγκαῖον—δίκαιον in § 9, point out the emphatic position of the words.

6. In the defense of his private Life, § 10-11, mention the characteristic of the orator which is pointed out.

7. What is said of the Depreciation of an Opponent, in remarks to § 12-16.

8. Into what three divisions does the orator divide the topic of the Peace ?

9. In § 18-20, point out the structure of the sentences analyzed in the notes ; also, what is said of that kind of narrative.

10. Why does the orator speak of the Agents of the peace, after the causes of the peace, § 21.

11. Give the remarks on Refutation, founded on § 22-24.

12. Mention the practice of the orator in the statement of facts, as founded on § 25-30.

13. Mention what is said on the section, treating of the remote consequences of the Peace, § 42-49.

14. Demosthenes coming to speak of the Indictment itself, has to answer the claim of Æschines, that he should follow the same order with himself ;—how does he answer it ? how does this answer differ from that at the opening of the speech ? Why are these answers kept distinct ? What is said of the skillfulness of this movement ? pp. 148-150.

✓ 15. Mention, in their order, the principal topics of the Defense. pp. 145-146.

16. What are the principal topics in the account of his Foreign Administration? p. 150.

✓ 17. What new topic is suggested by *διεκωλύθη* in § 60? and what is said of the consistency of the several parts of the oration? p. 151.

✓ 18. Into what two parts is the statement preliminary to the account of his Foreign Administration divided? What is said of the topic in the first part? p. 153.

19. Analyze the structure of the compound sentence *κλεονέκτημα*—*γίγνεσθαί*, in § 61, pp. 152-153.

✓ 20. In the second part, Demosthenes contends that there was no other honorable course left than to interpose for the defense of Greece;—Under what *three* aspects does he present the proposition?

21. In § 73-78, Demosthenes proves that Philip, not Athens, broke the peace; that other statesmen, not himself, proposed war;—why was he anxious to show this?

✓ 22. What is said of Demosthenes' mode of treating facts,—as appears from the account of his Foreign Administration? pp. 165, 168.

23. Give the remarks upon the examples alleged by Demosthenes in justification of his measures. pp. 172-174.

24. Give the structure of the sentence, *ὁμῆς τοίνυν*—*παράθεστων*. Also, show how the sentence, *καίτοι τότε*—*ἑώραν*, repeats and condenses the former.

25. Give the account of the Trierarchy prefixed to the annotations upon Demosthenes' account of his Trierarchy law. pp. 175-178.

26. What is said of that account? p. 181.

27. What is said of Demosthenes' treatment of the merely Legal Points of the case? p. 188.

28. What is said, in the passage of transition from the Second to the Third part of the speech, § 123-125, upon the topic with which it ends? and what as to the periodic form of the Defense? On what pretense does he take a new position in the Third Part of the speech?

29. Give the summary of the three parts of the speech, in p. 191.

30. Mention the general topics of this part of the speech.

31. What is said of the portion of the speech relating to the Amphiscean war? and what are the principal topics?

32. What is said on the topic of *exaggeration*, in Remarks to § 140-144? p. 200.

33. What, of the διήγησις ἀποδεικτική, in § 143-148? p. 203.

34. Give the topics in the account of Demosthenes' course in the Amphiscean war. p. 204.

35. Give the remarks on the description of the consternation at Athens, on the news of the seizure of Elatea. pp. 206-208.

36. Why is the reported speech of Demosthenes in a lower style of oratory? p. 209.

37. What is said on the Remarks preliminary to a consideration of the results of the proposed measures? pp. 210, 218.—Give the order of the remarks. p. 211. What is said upon the ὅσπερ νῦν φασ? p. 211. What on the Oath? pp. 219-221. What upon the topics which immediately follow? p. 221.


38. What is said upon the orator's treatment of facts, in the Narrative? p. 222.


39. Upon what facts does the orator depend to show that the people approved his measures, after the defeat at Chæroneia?


40. What reason is given for the introduction of the topic of Fortune where it is? and what is said of the topic itself? pp. 243-244.

41. What, for the introduction of the reply to the charge of misleading by his oratory, where it is? and what is said of the topic itself? What, of the frequent repetition of topics? p. 246.

42. What is the course of thought in the concluding portion of the speech and the order of the topics?—What is the character of the topics?







THIS BOOK IS DUE ON THE LAST DATE
STAMPED BELOW

AN INITIAL FINE OF 25 CENTS
WILL BE ASSESSED FOR FAILURE TO RETURN
THIS BOOK ON THE DATE DUE. THE PENALTY
WILL INCREASE TO 50 CENTS ON THE FOURTH
DAY AND TO \$1.00 ON THE SEVENTH DAY
OVERDUE.

MAY 12 1938

50ct '53SS

SEP 25 1953 LU

19Oct 53BA

OCT 10 1953 LU

U. C. BERKELEY LIBRARIES



C046206396

YB 00199

Demosthenes
10590

